The institution of local land committees was introduced into the Hungarian legal system by the provisions of Section 68 of Act CXXII of 2013 on Transaction in Agricultural and Forestry Land (hereinafter referred to as Land Transaction Act). The body set up to protect agricultural land is not a new thing, because the general meeting of land owners (közbirtokossági közgyűlés in Hungarian) was a known concept in the 19[th] century. This general meeting of land owners set out the rules for pasture use, the variations for grazing, animal husbandry and the keeping of breeding males. The general meeting of land owners had the right to authorize its own officers to perform tasks, to adopt rules to this end and to elect separate councils and an executive body[2]. According to Paragraph (1) of Section 68 of the Land Transaction Act, farmers, agricultural production organizations, other natural persons and legal entities using the land within the administrative area of a township's local government form the community of local farmers in that township. According to Paragraph (2) of Section 68, the local land committee elected by the member of the community is the representative body of this local farmer community. According to Paragraph (3) of Section 68 of the Land Transaction Act, it is the responsibility of the local land committee to influence the transactions aimed at the transfer of ownership of land within the administrative area of the relevant township and falling within the scope of the Act in order to prevent speculative acquisition of agricultural land with a view to the transparency of ownership, create and maintain such a structure of land that ensure single, competitive estates, enforce the interests of the local farming community, in consistence with the goals of land policy and by exercising its responsibilities in Sections 24 and 25.
According to the reasoning of the competent minister to Section 68 of the Land Transaction Act, the local land committee is a new element in Hungarian law, but local communities have been involved in the land acquisition procedures in many European countries for a long time. The introduction of this new institution allows for the appearance of criteria related to local interests and relationships (these were previously unknown to the authorities), and this provides a more complete picture for the determining authority during its consideration. The land committee is not an authority, its procedure is not a full-fledged administrative or a special authority procedure; thus, there are no grounds for addressing, complaint or any other legal remedy against its statements.
"Similar elements are seen in the regulation of France and Austria, where local producers are involved in procedures (opinionating), and in France, Italy, Germany, where contracts must be made available to the public"[3].
The Land Transaction Act gives role to the local land committee and the Chamber acting in its powers in the procedure to approve sale and purchase agreements aimed at the acquisition of ownership over agricultural land. The purchase offer for the sale of agricultural land must be included in a sale and purchase agreement, the owner must disclose the purchase offer to the holder(s) of pre-emption right(s) based on the Land Transaction Act,
- 258/259 -
any other act of Parliament and the agreement itself; in the event of a pre-emption right based on the Land Transaction Act, the purchase offer must be disclosed to the owner through the municipal notary of the local government of the township within the area of which the land is, in case of other pre-emption right, it must be disclosed directly to the right holder(s). The holder of the pre-emption right has a 60 days term of preclusion from the disclosure of the offer to make a statement either accepting the sale and purchase agreement or waiving his/her/its pre-emption right. The municipal notary shall prepare a list of documents of the declarations with legal effect received within 8 days after the lapse of the deadline for making statements, and he/she shall send it together with the original of the sale and purchase agreement and the declarations with legal effect to the agricultural administration body for approval. The agricultural administration body shall - pursuant to Section 23 - perform the "validity screening" of the sale and purchase agreements and acceptance statements received by it; it shall check compliance with the validity and applicability requirements based on their content and formal components. Within 15 days from the receipt of the documents, the agricultural administration body shall decide whether it refuses to approve the sale and purchase agreement, if the agreement or the acceptance statement does not comply with the requirements specified in Paragraph (1) of Section 23 of the Land Transaction Act. If the agricultural administration body does not refuse to approve the sale and purchase agreement, then it shall immediately contact the local land committee to obtain its position. According to Paragraph (1) of Section 24 of the Land Transaction Act, the local land committee shall issue its position necessary for either the refusal to approve of the sale and purchase agreement or the granting of such approval within 15 days. The local land committee shall assess the sale and purchase agreement based on facts known to the public and according to the best of its knowledge, especially according to the criteria set out in Paragraph (2) of Section 24 of the Land Transaction Act, and it issues its position accordingly. The seller, the buyer and the holder of the pre-emption right (if it has made a statement of consent within the respective deadline) may submit an objection against the position of the local land committee to the local council of the local government. The local council shall alter the position if it was issued with the infringement of Sections 23-25 of the Land Transaction Act, otherwise it shall reject the objection. The option of judicial review against the decision of the local council is provided by Section 103/D. of Act CCXII Of 2013 laying down certain provisions and transition rules in connection with Act No CXXII of 2013 concerning agricultural and forestry land trade (hereinafter referred to as the Interpreting Act to the Land Transaction Act). The latter legislative provision was enacted because Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.) of the Constitutional Court defined the constitutional requirement that the fundamental right to legal remedy ensured in Paragraph (7) of Article XXVIII of the Fundamental Law is only ensured if judicial review is available against the decision of the local council of the local government, as interim, meaningful decision, assessing the objection submitted against the position of the land committee. The Constitutional Court also required that the land committees provide a detailed reasoning to their positions[4]. Opinion No. 2/2016. (III. 21.) KMK of the Kúria[5] (its College of Public Administration and Labour Affairs) also confirmed that the decision of the local council may be revised in a separate administrative lawsuit. A meaningful revision is subject to the fact that the decisions of both the land committee and the local council have a reasoning for their decision.
The Constitutional Court dealt with the meaning, role of the local land committee in the approval procedure of the sale and purchase of agricultural land in many of its decisions.
- 259/260 -
In Margin Number 51 of its already mentioned Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.) AB, the Constitutional Court determines that the land committee is not a public corporation, "though, as a statutory representative body of the farming community of a township, it resembles the voluntary public corporation of business life that appeared in the beginning of the 20[th] century in Hungary[6]". The Constitutional Court also referred to the community of pasture owners (közbirtokosság in Hungarian), as a predecessor in legal history, considered in terms of the establishment of local land committees. From the rules pertaining to the legal status of the local land committee, the Decision of the Constitutional Court drew the conclusion that the legislator "did not authorise the land committee to exercise public powers, did not empower it as an authority[7]". The Constitutional Court is on the opinion that the Land Transaction Act provided such a special private law entitlement to the local land committee that "it exercises in representation of those who are interested in the sale and purchase of agricultural land but do not have the subjective right in terms of the individual sale and purchase agreements (they are not the contracting parties and are not entitled to pre-emption)[8]". The land committee has therefore a private law and indirect interest (because a member of the land committee may not participate in a procedure that is related to his/her case or the case of his/her relative). The local land committee is therefore to be considered as being indirectly interested in terms of private law, despite fact that the Land Transaction Act and the Interpreting Act to the Land Transaction Act. The public law consequences of the position of the local land committee are applied by the agricultural administration body.
Based on Margin Number 74 of the Decision of the Constitutional Court, the assessment-based position of the local land committee - as an indirect private law right holder - is to be considered equal to the statement of the client in the procedure of the agricultural administration body.
Ágnes Czine, judge of the Constitutional Court, explains in her dissenting opinion regarding the Decision of the Constitutional Court that the local land committee may not be regarded as an interested party falling within the scope of private law, because it acts in order to enforce local interests. If it would still be considered as a person with private law interest, then it would not have the veto right in the application process of the sale and purchase agreement of persons who have the same private law status as the local land committee[9].
In his dissenting opinion, László Kiss, judge of the Constitutional Court, scrutinises the legal status of local land committees further and he concluded that these bodies do not have private law entitlement but exercise public authority. In his opinion the right to agree of the land committee implies that it has the right to "co-decision" with the agricultural administration body; thus it participates directly in the making of the final decision, as a public law body.
The Constitutional Court annulled the wording "a helyi földbizottsággal, a kifogást tevővel és a mezőgazdasági igazgatási szervvel" (in English: with the local land committee, the objecting party and the agricultural administration body) in the last sentence of Paragraph (2) of Section 103/A of the Interpreting Act to the Land Transaction Act with its Decision No. 18/2016. (X. 20.). According to the Constitutional Court "Exercising the right to turn to court requires that the parties concerned are notified of the decision that affects their right or legitimate interest and that they can familiarize themselves with its content. It is also essential for the exercising of the right to legal remedy that the parties concerned are notified of the decision that concerns their rights or legitimate interests and that they can familiarize themselves with its content. The studying of the manner each element of the legal remedy is regulated must consider whether it is guaranteed that the parties concerned become aware of the decision that can be contested with legal remedy. In the opinion of the Constitutional Court,
- 260/261 -
obtainment of information is guaranteed if it applies that the option to obtain information applied without any doubt[10]. The Constitutional Court concluded that the decision of the local council should be communicated not only to those in Paragraph (2) of Section 103/A of the Interpreting Act to the Land Transaction Act, but to everybody who are considered as clients in the procedure.
Before 1 July 2016, Paragraph (2) of Section 27 of the Interpreting Act to the Land Transaction Act provided an exhaustive list (and this list is still in force) which persons and organizations may be considered as clients in the official approval procedure of agreements requiring the approval of the agricultural administration body and aimed at the acquisition of the ownership of agricultural land or its acquisition in a way not constituting the transfer of ownership, not including the acquisition of the ownership of agricultural land in an auction conduced according to Section 35 of the Land Transaction Act. According to the list, in the procedure, a client shall be the natural person, economic entity party to the legal transaction; the organisation exercising the ownership rights of the state in legal transactions aiming at the changing of the right of ownership of the state, or the asset manager, if asset management rights apply; the person having pre-emption rights for the piece of land subject to the legal transaction; any other right holder in the real estate register, whose right to the piece of land is affected by the procedure, including the right holder and obligor who have not been registered in the real estate register but are subjects of the application for the registration of an index attached to the title deed; close relative(s) defined by the Interpreting Act of the Land Transaction Act, whose status was considered when the legal transaction was made the validity of which is subject to the existence of a close relative relationship. any other right holder whose right to the piece of land in question is affected by the legal transaction. The last element of Paragraph (2) of Section 27 has a broader scope of persons; however, the local land committee (and the chamber acting in its powers) does not fit into this scope, because it does not (and may not) have any entitlement regarding the piece of land subject to the legal transaction. We do not even have to come to the studying of the concept of client provided by the Administrative Procedures Act, because the Interpreting Act to the Land Transaction Act provides an exhaustive list of the persons and organizations that are considered clients in the authority approval procedure. According to Section 107 of the Interpreting Act to the Land Transaction Act, it Section 27 is not a cardinal provision.
Before 1 July 2016, it occurred in the practice of administrative and labour courts that the chamber body acting in the powers of the local land committee applied for a lawsuit against the decision of the local council. Most of the administrative and labour courts dismissed such complaints without hearing based on Point (g) of Paragraph (1) of Section 130 of the Civil Procedure Act. In my opinion, the decision of such administrative and labour courts was sound, because of the following. Currently, it is the Paragraph (1) of Section 327 of the Civil Procedure Act that defines the scope of those who might launch an administrative lawsuit. According to this provision, an administrative lawsuit may be launched by the client and any other participant of the procedure, regarding a provision that pertains especially to such participant. Previously (this also means the period of Decision No. 2/2004. for the uniform application of administrative law on the right of local governments to file for lawsuits), the Civil Procedure Act regulated the scope of those who were entitled to file for an administrative lawsuit differently. Accordingly, that person is entitled to file for an administrative lawsuit whose right or legitimate interest is affected by the case underlying the procedure. The Civil Procedure Act
- 261/262 -
did previously not specify the scope of persons entitled to file for lawsuits and Point (g) of Paragraph (1) of Section 130 of the Civil Procedure Act was applicable if the piece of legislation expressly defined the person entitled to file for lawsuit and the complaint was not submitted by that person. Contrary to the previous unclear legislative provision that caused legal uncertainty, the actual Paragraph (1) of Section 327 of the Civil Procedure Act specifies the scope of persons entitled to file for lawsuits: the client taking part in the administrative proceedings and any other participant of the procedure, for the provision specifically pertaining to such participant. Regarding the approval procedure of the authority, Paragraph (1) of Section 27 of the Interpreting Act to the Land Transaction Act requires the application of the Administrative Procedures Act only if the acts on land transaction do not provide for otherwise. Paragraph (2) of Section 27 of the Interpreting Act to the Land Transaction lists the persons, organizations qualifying as clients; in my opinion, therefore, the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act are not applicable. Other participants of the procedure are listed by Point e) of Section 172 of the Administrative Procedures Act: the witness, the official witness, the expert, the interpreter, the holder of the inspected object, the representative of the client and the mediator of the authority. Pursuant to the above legislative provisions, the chamber body acting within the powers of the local land committee may, therefore, not be regarded as either client or any other participant of the procedure. The Constitutional Court also regarded the local land committee as an interested party with indirect private law entitlement. Since the body acting within the powers of the local land committee is not considered as either a client or any other participant of the procedure, it may not file for an administrative lawsuit, thus the complaint submitted by this body should be dismissed without hearing according to Point (g) of Paragraph (1) of Section 130 of the Civil Procedure Act.
The Veszprém Regional Court also applied the above solution, amongst others, when -upholding the order of the court of first instance - it decided to dismiss the complaint without hearing. The Regional Court referred to Paragraphs (1)(2) of Section 27 of the Interpreting Act to the Land Transaction Act and to the fact that the listing in Paragraph (2) of Section 27 is exhaustive, thus it excludes the application of Paragraph (1) of Section 15 of the Administrative Procedures Act for the determination of the client status. Regarding Paragraph (4) of Section 15 of the Administrative Procedures Act, the Regional Court determined that "the client status based on the fact whether a person is affected by the responsibilities is created by the fact that the responsibilities of administrative bodies do not match the powers provided by the legal authorisation, but the decision to be adopted in the case might affect the public interest the operation of which should be ensured by the body concerned (land committee)[11]". The procedure of the local council may investigate if the statements of the person having submitted the objection substantiate the legality and substantiation of the position. If the local council alters the position of the local land committee, then it does not establish any additional rights or obligations, it does not take away the existing rights of the land committee, it only expresses its alternative assessment of legality regarding Section 23-25 of the Land Transaction Act. Consequently, the local land committee will not have a narrower or broader or other scope of responsibilities under the relevant legislation, because it has already fulfilled its responsibility by issuing its position. The local land committee "uses the position issued to express that it assessed the sale and purchase agreement according to the legal criteria, in representation of the local farmer community[12]".
The Kúria did however not share the position of the administrative and labour courts and regional courts following the above procedure. The supreme judicial court stated in several cases that "the case must consider the doctrinal meaning of administrative decision
- 262/263 -
No. 2/2004. for the unified interpretation of the law must be considered. Though this decision for the unified interpretation of the law pertains to the right of local governments to file for lawsuits; Point 2 of its operative part may however governing in this case as well. Accordingly, determination if the entitlement to enforce claims (legal standing, right of action) applies is an issue for the substantive part of the legal dispute; the lawsuit may be dismissed with a ruling in the absence of a legal standing. The Kúria drew attention to Doctrinal Judicial Decision No. EBRD2016. K.21., which states that legal standing is basically a matter of substantive law and pertains to the material law interests of the parties in the dispute; therefore, it can be judged within the scope of the substance of the legal dispute, its absence might result in the dismissal of the lawsuit with a ruling"[13]. The Kúria is on the opinion that "the court may dismiss a complaint under Point (g) of Paragraph (1) of Section 130 of the Civil Procedure Act, if the absence of legitimacy in the lawsuit can be established without any substantive examination, i.e. from the complaint, without investigating the right or legitimate interest. If the existence of legal standing is disputed, as it is in the case at hand, then the court must include its decision into a ruling after performing the substantive judgment of the lawsuit"[14]. Doctrinal Court Decision No. EBRD2016. K.21. the Kúria referred to is Ruling No. 12.K.27.292/2015. adopted by Szolnok Administrative and Labour Court, which Ruling referred to the fact that the right to file for a lawsuit and the legal standing are not always the same in an administrative lawsuit. The court of first instance has concluded that "the plaintiff did not verify its legal standing in the lawsuit, it failed to specify a direct legal interest that would support that it might enforce its claim against the defendant. It did not present a specific injury that it would suffer from the fact that it approved the sale and purchase agreement between the defendant interveners and the sellers[15]". In relation to legal standing, the Szolnok Ruling (which also referred to Administrative Decision No. 2/2004. for the uniform application of the law) points out that "in an administrative lawsuit, the entitlement to file for a lawsuit is subject to the legal capacity of the party and the fact that the case underlying the procedure affects the right or legitimate interest of that party. The involvement of the party manifests in the legal standing (legitimation in the lawsuit). Legal standing implies direct involvement, a specific relationship of interest. Legal standing is basically an issue of substantive law, it pertains to the interest of the party in terms of substantive law; therefore, it might be judged as a substantive legal dispute, its absence results in the dismissal of the lawsuit with a ruling[16]".
The uncertainty of the client status of the body acting within the powers of local land committee and thus its entitlement to file for a lawsuit was further intensified by the meeting of heads of regional colleges of administrative and labour courts on 26 February 2016, as this meeting stated that, in the administrative proceeding of the local council assessing the objection against its position, the local land committee was neither client nor another participant of the procedure. The local council did not conduct the procedure against the local land committee, it did not proceed at the request of the local land committee. Though Paragraph (4) of Section 15 of the Administrative Procedures Act grants client rights to the body the responsibilities are concerned by the case if such a body is not involved as a special authority in the judgment of the case, judicial practice made it clear that the administrative body of first instance may not submit a petition for revision against the decision of the administrative body of second instance in the administrative proceedings of first instance. According to the heads of regional colleges, the local land committee is to be regarded as a body acting as a quasi body of first instance in the judicial review of the decision of the local council having judged the objection. It does not have a client status in the proceedings before the local council, its other involvement is indirect, therefore the complaint may be dismissed without hearing under Point (g) of
- 263/264 -
Paragraph (1) of Section 130 of the Civil Procedure Act.
In my opinion, Doctrinal Decision No. EBRD2016.K.21. raised serious concerns in the official approval procedures conducted before the entry into force of Government Decree No. 175/2016. (VII. 1.), because that Decision is based on such an administrative decision for the uniform application of the law, which was made in connection with the interpretation of a different legislative provision. Guidance of the supreme judicial body was indeed necessary regarding the separation of the right to bring an action and legal standing in terms of the previous Paragraph (1) of Section 327 of the Civil Procedure Act, because the legislative provision did not provide a clear definition of the scope of persons entitled to the filing for an administrative lawsuit. Such an aid in the application of the law is, however, not necessary for the right to bring an action and legal standing.
In summary, dismissal without hearing of complaints submitted by a body acting within the powers of the local land committee was as sound practice before 1 July 2016, given the fact that Paragraph (1) of Section 327 of the Civil Procedure Act explicitly specified the scope of persons who were in the position of plaintiff of administrative lawsuits (client, other participant of the procedure), and the body acting within the powers of the local land committee was not within this scope; therefore, it could not have bring about an administrative lawsuit. The above position is supported by Order No. Kfv.III.37.323/2013/5. of the Kúria, reading that "in the absence of the right to bring an action, the question of examining the existence or absence of legal standing does not even arise. Only the client entitled to bring about actions may have legal standing; the plaintiff was not a client, subject of the legal relationship of the administrative proceeding in the case in question. The court of first instance should have, therefore, dismissed the complaint without hearing"[17].
Government Decree No. 175/2016. (VII. 1.) on the client rights of local land committees has two sections only. According to Section 1, the local land committee or the Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture, Food Industry and Rural Development (hereinafter referred to as the Chamber) fulfilling its responsibilities based on Act CCXII Of 2013 laying down certain provisions and transition rules in connection with Act No CXXII of 2013 concerning agricultural and forestry land trade (hereinafter referred to as the Interpreting Act to the Land Transaction Act) shall exercise the rights of client in administrative proceedings concerning this scope of responsibility. Section 2 requires that the provisions of the Government Decree must be applied in procedures either in process at the time of its entry into force or repeated after that.
The above Government Decree clearly declared the body acting within the powers of the local land committee client; therefore, courts could not apply Point (g) of Paragraph (1) of Section 130 of the Civil Procedure Act and dismiss complaints without hearing any more. After the entry into force of that piece of legislation, the courts examined the legal standing of the body acting within the powers of the local land committee, and the courts of first instance made rulings that rejected the petitions due to the absence of legal standing.
In the revision of district court orders rejecting complaints without hearing, the Kúria adopted a position regarding legal standing as well. The Kúria stated in many of its decisions that "legal standing, the right to enforce claims may be given rise by the direct interest of the party. General arguments, protection of public interests and other similar argumentation shall not provide a ground for the right to enforce claims"[18]. In the case before the Kúria, "in its complaint, the plaintiff could not justify the fact that it would have undoubted, direct and obvious interest in the refusal of the approval of sale and purchase agreements, issue a negative position, because it is not even ex-
- 264/265 -
ercising authority powers"[19]. Referring to the specific status of private law interested party described in Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.) of the Constitutional Court, the Kúria made it clear "that this qualification of the Constitutional Court may not be considered so that the Chamber (land committee) has legal standing in this case of public administration. The land committee is considered as a particular private law interested party. Pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Section 327 of the Civil Procedure Act, the plaintiff does not have the right to bring about an action regarding and due to its own position, the decision of the defendant does not affect its right or obligation"[20].
The Zalaegerszeg Administrative and Labour Court followed the above interpretation of the law of the Kúria when it rejected the claim of the body acting within the powers of the local land committee due to the lack of legal standing. To supports its legal standing, the plaintiff referred to Paragraphs (3), (4), (5) and (5a) of Section 15 of the Administrative Procedures Act, claiming that the plaintiff serves the interest of the public by playing the role of the local. According to the plaintiff, "if it did not have the option to protect its position in the lawsuit, then it would render the responsibilities conferred upon it by the law meaningless, because the local governments would alter the position of the Chamber without any control"[21]. The Plaintiff also referred to "the commentary to Paragraph (1) of Section 327 of the Civil Procedure Act, according to which the absence of the legal interest of the plaintiff may be established only in the substantive examination of the claim and if it does not have the right to bring an action according to Paragraphs (1)-(6) of Section 15 of the Administrative Procedures Act and Points (a)-(c) of Paragraph (1) of Section 327 of the Civil Procedure Act"[22]. The court of first instance did not agree with the argumentation of the plaintiff, and since the plaintiff did not prove its specific, direct interest regarding the sale and purchase agreement being the subject-matter of the lawsuit despite having been called upon by the court to do so, it dismissed the claim due to the absence of legal standing.
Another ruling of the Zalaegerszeg court of first instance referred to Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.) of the Constitutional Court which came to the conclusion that the Land Transaction Act provides bodies acting within the powers of the local land committee with such a specific private law entitlement which it exercises in representation of the parties concerned interested in land transactions but not having own subjective rights in terms of the individual sales and purchase agreements; hence, such an interest is of private law nature and indirect, i.e. the land committee should be regarded as a party concerned of indirect private law. The ruling of first instance also referred to the decision of the Kúria (Kfv.IV.37.508/2016/4., EBRD2016.K.21.). The client status provided in the meantime by the Government Decree does not provide the body acting within the powers of the local land committee with legal standing. According to the ruling, "legal standing is not a lawsuit position that can be determined by a legislative provision, but a specific relationship of interest, which is to be assessed based on the relationship with a specific case of public administration. On the other hand, the fact that the client status of the plaintiff in the administrative proceeding is recognised does not affect the above explanation pertaining to the missing of its substantive interest. The reasons provided by the plaintiff in the lawsuit were general and related to the protection of public interest only and the plaintiff is not specifically interested, involved, even despite the fact that such a position is given in a specific case, in the protection of the above interests"[23]. A reference to Paragraph (4) or Paragraphs (5)-(5a) of Section 15 of the Administrative Procedures Act does not provide grounds for such direct involvement. The reference to the doctrinal administrative decision No. EBH2016.K.8. does not stand because legal standing in that case was based on a Community requirement as well and the plaintiff in that lawsuit based its legal standing on the fact that it was a competitor, because the contested decision did directly affect its interests.
- 265/266 -
Regarding the legal standing of the body acting within the powers of the local land committee, another ruling of first instance determined that "in case of the plaintiff, the direct link between direct interest, the subjective right claimed to be infringed and the administrative decision wished to be revised is missing, though this link would support the direct interest of the plaintiff regarding the land specified in the individual case, the approval or rejection of the sale and purchase agreement made between the seller and the buyer - despite the client status of the plain-tiff"[24]. Regarding Paragraphs (5) and (5a) of Section 15 of the Administrative Procedures Act, the court explained that the body acting within the powers of the local land committee issues its positions for individual cases, and the important thing in such individual cases is not the manifestation of public interest but the judgment of the specific case. The local land committee may not act in representation of the community of local farmers only in order to enforce their interest; hence, Administrative Doctrinal Decision No. EBH2016.K.8. does not prove the legal standing of the plaintiff, based on the enforcement of public interest. In case of civil organizations that promote the operation of public interest, the direct involvement, individual injury must also be examined for the legal standing, in relation to the specific infringement of the law. The court came to the conclusion that "the substantive legal claim of an organisation generally responsible for the development of land transactions regarding the approval or rejection of an individual sales and purchase contract of the parties is conceptually excluded"[25].
The Győr court of first instance came to a similar conclusion regarding legal standing, when it determined in its ruling of first instance that "the plaintiff did not prove its legal standing in its claim, it did not indicate any direct legal involvement that would support the enforcement of its claim against the defendant. It did not present a specific injury that it would suffer from the fact that the defendant approved of the sale and purchase agreements (...) against the contractual buyer. In its claim, it did not provide a support of the fact that it is undoubtedly, directly and obviously interested in the non-approval of sale and purchase agreements"[26]. The court of first instance referred to Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 15.) of the Constitutional Court and the relevant decisions of the Kúria (Kfv.IV.37.442/2016/4, Kfv.IV.37.443/2016/6, Kfv.IV.37.713/2016/5, Kfv.IV.37.717/2016/4.)
The Veszprém Administrative and Labour Court also examined the client concept of the Administrative Procedures Act regarding the legal standing of the body acting within the powers of the local land committee. Regarding the plaintiff's reference to Paragraph (3) of Section 15 of the Administrative Procedures Act, it concluded that "the special client concept applied by the Administrative Procedures Act only means that it is considered client without the examination of the conditions defined for the general client-concept. Certain conceptual elements of the general client-concept of the Administrative Procedures Act are still applicable to the definition of the scope of ex lege clients, and the interpretation framework developed by the practice. Judicial practice has, however, developed the concept that client status is subject to the general requirement that direct and obvious interest exists in decisions of doctrinal importance. The fact that the plaintiff is a client implies that it could have start the lawsuit; however, this does not entail the fact that it had the right to enforce the infringement of the law claimed by it in the lawsuit. Its direct involvement in terms of substantive law, as it would be necessary for that, did not prove true to the court"[27]. The Veszprém court of first instance also referred to Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.) of the Constitutional Court, then it determined that "in a case of land transaction, only the persons who are parties to the relevant agreement and the persons exercising the pre-emption right have the direct interest in terms of substantive law that could constitute legal standing. All the local farmers who did not enter into the agreement regarding the agricultural land in question or did not make a statement of consent may also
- 266/267 -
be involved; their involvement is, however, indirect only. This level of involvement does not constitute legal standing, because these persons are not financially involved in the dispute, they are only in an indirect connection with the subject matter of the lawsuit. Consequently, since the Chamber of Agriculture exercises its rights in representation of the interests of local farmers, and not in its own name, the involvement of the Chamber of Agriculture may not be more direct than that of those in representation of whom it acts"[28].
The ruling of second instance of the Zalaegerszeg Regional Court hit the courts of first instance as lightning from clear blue sky, because it found the legal standing of the body acting within the powers of the local land committee determinable, contrary to the argumentation of the court of first instance. Since the order of second instance determined that the chamber body acting in the powers of the local land committee is not a nongovernmental organisation, it reference to Paragraphs (5)-(5a) of Section 15 of the Administrative Procedures Act is ungrounded, and the court explained that the status of indirect private law involvement described in Decree No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.) of the Constitutional Court and the fact that it is not subject to any rights or obligations arising from the sale and purchase agreement concerned by the position do not exclude legal standing based on indirect involvement. Direct involvement related to the subject-matter of the case should be judged based on the legal status, responsibility of the local land committee. The court determined that "in the legal transaction, the plaintiff acts in the name of the community of land owners not having its own subjective right according to the criteria in Paragraph (2) of Section 24 of the Land Transaction Act in order to protect the interest of the public; this legal status was created by a piece of legislation; accordingly, only another piece of legislation may confer client rights upon it. If it submits a claim to enforce interests falling within the scope of this legal status, responsibility, then - in the view of the court of second instance - its legal standing may not be disputed if it acts in the same role. Its indirect involvement in the revision of the local council decision changing its own decision adopted during the enforcement of interests falling within the scope of its responsibilities is obvious"[29].
In its order of second instance, the Győr Regional Court provided a different reasoning for the existence of the legal standing of the body acting within the powers of the local land committee. The court of second instance started from Paragraph (3) of Section 15 of the Administrative Procedures Act and determined that this Paragraph "defines the special client concept which covers such persons and organizations that are considered clients without the examination of the requirements defined for the general client concept (Paragraph (1) of Section 15 of the Administrative Procedures Act) such as the persons and organizations defined in a separate act of parliament or government decree and clients who are determined as such according to the rules of procedures with many clients"[30]. Then the court determined that, according to the Government Decree, the client status of the plaintiff should have been examined based on Paragraph (3) and not Paragraph (1) of Section 15 of the Administrative Procedures Act (meaning that the examination of the involvement of rights and legitimate interests in the case is not necessary); thus the legitimation of the plaintiff in the lawsuit is not disputable, "Section 1 of the Government Decree itself provides a basis for the legal standing of the plaintiff"[31]. According to the judgment of the court of second instance, "if, in the administrative proceeding, the administrative body recognised the client-status of a party concerned, then its (the plaintiff's, where applicable) legal standing in the lawsuit may not be examined any more. The court shall examine a right or a legitimate interest if the plaintiff having lodged for the administrative lawsuit does not participate in the administrative proceeding"[32].
- 267/268 -
Act XLI of 2017 on the amendment of Act CXXVI of 2012 on the Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture enacted the following Paragraphs (1)-(2) of Section 13/A in Act CXXVI of 2012 on the Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture (hereinafter referred to as the NCA Act) with effective date of 18 May 2017: The Chamber of Agriculture shall have a client status in the administrative cases and the related procedures of legal remedy in which it fulfils responsibilities specified by the law in a non-authoritative capacity. According to Section 103 of Act CCXII Of 2013 laying down certain provisions and transition rules in connection with Act No CXXII of 2013 concerning agricultural and forestry land trade, the Chamber of Agriculture fulfilling the responsibilities of the local land committee is entitled the status of client in the procedure aiming at the judgment of the objection submitted against the position of the local land committee, including the appeal proceedings as well, and the right to bring an action for the judicial review of the decision on the judgment of the objection. According to the ministerial reasoning of the above amendment, the body acting within the powers of the local land committee has dealt with more than one hundred thousand cases so far, the rate of refusals is about 2 percent of the cases. The reasoning of the minister referred to the practice of the Kúria regarding the legal standing (right to bring an action) of the local land committee, then it came to the conclusion that "the procedure of the land committee is an important element of the regulation of land transactions, it is to ensure that the priorities of land policy defined in general by the law are effective in individual cases as well; together with the option of legal remedy. Since the judicial practice has separated the client-status and the legal standing (right to bring an action) of the Chamber, one of the most important provisions of the act is, with a view to clearly enforce the original intention of the legislator, the settlement of the client status and the legal standing (right to bring an action) of the chamber on the level of an act of Parliament"[33].
Courts of both first and second instance have already reacted to the above amendment of the NCA Act. According to the ruling of the Veszprém court of second instance of 29 June 2017, the "right to bring an action in Paragraph (2) of Section 13/A of the NCA Act and legal standing are not equivalent, and the court may not come to the conclusion based on the text of the act that the legislator applied the wrong concept and it actually wanted to provide the Chamber with legal standing"[34].
The ruling of the Veszprém court of first instance, already referred to, also dealt with Section 13/A of the NCA Act and the relevant reasoning of the competent minster, and it referred to the fact that "the reasoning of the competent minister to this amendment act uses the terms 'right to bring an action' and 'legal standing' as synonyms, which is wrong. The 'right to bring an action' is not identical to legal 'standing'. The 'right to bring an action' means the option to file a lawsuit as a defendant in a case with a specific subject matter. Legal standing is a narrower concept, it means the direct involvement in terms of substantive law that provides the legal entity with the enforcement of the right in the lawsuit at hand against the counterparty"[35].
The already-mentioned ruling of second instance has already referred to the fact that, according to Section 13/A of the NCA Act, the legal standing of the plaintiff is not disputable, otherwise the legislative provision would become meaningless. According to the ruling, "the purpose the legislator had with the amendment of the specific legislation was that the court can allow the plaintiff as client to file for a lawsuit without the examination of the legal standing"[36].
- 268/269 -
The issue of legal standing was first investigated Ruling No. Pf.I.20.431/1990. of the Supreme Court (BH1991. 107.). Accordingly, "legal capacity in the lawsuit is not identical to the right to bring an action (active legitimation in the lawsuit). Legal ability in the lawsuit (perbeli jogképesség in Hungarian) and capacity in the lawsuit (perbeli cselekvőképesség in Hungarian) regulated in Section 49 of the Civil Procedure Act, which the court of first instance referred to regarding the entitlement to launch the lawsuit, must be examined in the preparatory phase of the hearing. The absence of legal ability in the lawsuit entails the dismissal of the complaint without hearing (Point (e) of Paragraph (1) of Section 130 of the Civil Procedure Act); legal consequences of the absence of capacity in the lawsuit are defined in Paragraph (2) of Section 49 of the Civil Procedure Act. By contrast, the absence of legal standing results in the meaningful rejection of the action"[37]. In the lawsuit above, the plaintiff based its action on the fact that the invalidity of an agreement which is null and void may be referred to by anybody, but the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that "the option to file a lawsuit against agreements that are null and void is provided by legal involvement (legal relationship) or the statutory authorisation ensuring the entitlement to file a lawsuit. By contrast, the plaintiff did not refer directly to any involvement, and it did not indicate any piece of legislation that would have entitled it to file a lawsuit; in the absence thereof, it does not have legal standing; thus, it may not effectively request the establishment of the nullity of the declaration with legal effect indicated in its complaint"[38].
According to case-by-case decision No. BDT2000. 346., legal standing must be distinguished from legitimacy in the lawsuit, because they have a different content. The lack of legitimacy in the lawsuit is an obstacle to the lawsuit, it omits the substantive examination of the case, determines who is entitled to launch the lawsuit with the submission of the complaint, and against whom the lawsuit can be launched on the legal basis indicated in the complaint. Legal standing is an entitlement to enforce claims, it determines if the specific plaintiff is entitled to subjective right in the lawsuit against the specific defendant based on the facts of the case at hand. According to the Decision, legitimacy in the lawsuit and legal standing are terms with different contents, "both concepts mean the right to bring an action based on substantive provisions, sometimes partly defined in the special procedures of the Civil Procedure Act - in case of legitimation in the lawsuit -, partly regulated in substantive provisions, and their difference lies in the consequences of procedural law[39]". Active and passive legitimation in the lawsuit is the legislative (formal) definition of the person who is entitled to launch the lawsuit by submitting the complaint, and against whom the lawsuit may be launched based on the legal grounds indicated in the complaint. If the complaint is submitted by a different person, or the defendant is a different person, then the complaint must be dismissed without hearing, and if the effects of launching the lawsuit already apply, then the procedure must be terminated. According to the Decision, legal standing "is understood as the entitlement to enforce claims, namely the question whether the specific plaintiff is entitled to the subjective right in the lawsuit against the specific defendant based on the facts of the case at hand[40]". In essence, Case-by-case decision No. BDT2003. 758. repeats the legal position explained above.
According to the case-by-case Decision No. BDT2005. 1145., legal standing must be distinguished from the right to bring an action. The latter one is only subject to legal ability in the lawsuit, while legal standing (legitimation in the lawsuit, entitlement to enforce claims) is, by contrast, pertains to the relationship of substantive law between the party and the subject-matter of the lawsuit, it means that the
- 269/270 -
defendant is entitled to the right enforced through the lawsuit against the defendant. In the event where there is no legitimation in the lawsuit - apart from exceptions defined by the law - the lawsuit must be dismissed with a ruling.
Legitimacy in the lawsuit in terms of substantive law (legal standing) does therefore pertain to the relationship of substantive law between the party and the subject-matter of the lawsuit, it determines if the plaintiff is entitled to the right enforced with the lawsuit against the defendant. The absence of legal standing leads to the dismissal of the lawsuit with a ruling.
In the examination of the right to bring an action of local governments, the Supreme Court pointed out in its Decision No. 2/2004. for the uniform application of administrative law that "in administrative lawsuits, the right to bring an action is subject to the legal ability of the party and the fact that the case underlying the procedure concerns the right or legitimate interest of the party. The involvement of the party manifests in the legal standing (legitimation in the lawsuit, legitimatio ad causam). Legal standing implies direct involvement, a specific relationship of interest[41]". Since legal standing is a matter of substantive law, its absence leads to the dismissal of the lawsuit with a ruling.
According to Decision No. 4/2010. (X. 20.) for the uniform application of administrative law (title: Legal status of non-governmental organizations in official cases dealing with environmental administration and their right to bring an action and legal standing in administrative lawsuits), "Non-governmental organizations are entitled to bring an action pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Section 327 of the Civil Procedure Act. In administrative lawsuits, legal standing of non-governmental organizations is determined by the administrative procedure in environmental protection or the limits of the participation of the special authority. This means that the nongovernmental organisation bringing the administrative lawsuit may dispute environmental issues in the specific, primarily nonenvironmental administrative lawsuit, its legal standing does not cover issues that are not directly related to the environment in the administrative proceeding"[42].
The Kúria examined legal standing and its scope in cases of the construction authority. According to the conclusion of the supreme judicial body, "being the neighbour entitled to initiate the administrative lawsuit, legal standing of the plaintiff aligns to the direct and obvious legitimate interest"[43]. Legal standing of the neighbour may not cover the disputation of the lawfulness of the entire construction permission procedure, having regard to the fact that it is not in every respect associated with the protection of its legitimate interests"[44].
In its Ruling No. Kfv.I.39.283/2010/9., the Kúria reviewed the judicial practice developed in terms of legal standing, and it deducted the concept of legal standing through Paragraph (1) of Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Act. When they examine the legal standing, the courts must take Paragraph (1) of Section 327 and Paragraph (1) of Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Act, by virtue of the Decision of the Kúria. Referring to Ruling No. Pfv.III.21.685/2009/5., the Kúria explained that the right to bring an action is such a subjective right that gives priority to those who have legal ability in the lawsuit, so that they can submit a complaint to the court and act in the case until the adoption of the ruling, having regard to Paragraph (1) of Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Act, under which a legal dispute arisen within the scope of civil law cases may be submitted by a party involved in such a case, unless otherwise provided for by the law. By contrast, legal standing pertains to the substantive law relationship between the subject-matter of the lawsuit and the party, namely to the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to the right enforced with the action against the defendant; in this case, the content of the litigation is the examination of the substantive law relationship between the parties and the subject-matter of the lawsuit, and the result of such examination will appear in the ruling either upholding or dismissing the law-
- 270/271 -
suit"[45]. Based on Paragraph (1) of Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Act, "that person shall have legal standing (legitimacy in the lawsuit) who is entitled to the right enforced with the lawsuit against the defendant, i.e. the person who is the recipient of the substantive right enforced. Substantive rights are provided by an agreement/contract or a statutory provision"[46].
In terms of legal standing, legal literature also relies on judicial practice. Legitimacy in the lawsuit "pertains to the substantive law relationship between the party and the subject-matter of the lawsuit, i.e. it means whether the plaintiff is entitled to the right enforced with the lawsuit against the defendant. Legitimacy in the lawsuit is a matter of substantive law, its absence leads to the meaningful dismissal of the lawsuit"[47]. According to legal literature, however, "legitimacy in the lawsuit may also be a matter of procedural law, especially if the lawsuit may be initiated by a person who is so authorized by the law or if the lawsuit may be lodged against the person(s) determined by the relevant piece of legislation"[48]. With reference to Paragraph (1) of Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Act, Professor Kengyel makes the remark that "the right to initiate a lawsuit pertains primarily to the party involved in the dispute, but the position of the plaintiff may not always be regarded as voluntary, because the Civil Procedure Act and other pieces of legislation authorize other organizations (such as the prosecutor, municipal notary, Guardianship Authority) to file for a lawsuit. In such cases, the right to file for a lawsuit does not match the substantive right"[49].
According to another position formulated on Paragraph (1) of Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Act, "involvement in the dispute expresses the relationship of the claiming party towards the right subject to the lawsuit, and it always pertains to a specific case (specific lawsuit, which pertains to a specific right = specific cause of action). The specific cause of action expresses the relationship between the claiming party and the right to be enforced, which is identical with the legal standing/right to bring an action. The expression "legal standing" implies the entitlement to enforce claims in the lawsuit"[50].
Following the review above and considering the changes in legislation and the judicial practice pertaining to the body acting within the powers of the local land committee, and the concept of legal standing elaborated by the Kúria and the legal literature, the following answer can be given for the question in the title.
The body acting within the powers of the local land committee qualified as client in the administrative proceedings concerning its responsibilities after the entry into force of the Government Decree. Therefore, it is, according to Paragraph (1) of Section 327 of the Civil Procedure Act, entitled to file for lawsuits against local council decisions altering its position. This circumstance, namely the fact that the body acting within the powers of the local land committee became client, did however not mean that the body acting within the powers of the local land committee would have legal standing in an administrative lawsuit. Legal standing is, however, not created by the client status itself. What I refer to here is the practice of the Kúria, elaborated in the cases pertaining to the building authority, which implies that direct and obvious legitimate interests must be examined based on the complaints of neighbours qualifying as clients. Moreover, in certain cases, persons, organizations not qualifying as clients may also submit complaints, for which the court must examine - regardless of the existence or absence of the client status - the existence of legal standing and the substantive-law relationship between the plaintiff and the subject-matter of the lawsuit. Therefore, based on the foregoing, the position elaborated in Order No. 2.Kf.20.607/2017/2. of the Győr Regional Court (stating that the client status provided by the Government Decree does on its own create legal standing) is not correct. The foregoing render the argumentation - stating that
- 271/272 -
if the client status of the plaintiff is recognised in the administrative proceeding, then the legal standing of the plaintiff may not be examined in the administrative lawsuit - also wrong. The above approach would mean that all complaints of all neighbours would have to be substantially examined in cases related to building authorizations, even those where the direct and obvious legitimate interest of the neighbour may not be established.
According to the claim of the body acting within the powers of the local land committee, the legal standing of the plaintiff had to be examined before the amendment of the NCA Act. In agreement with the position of the Zalaegerszeg Regional Court, the fact that Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.). AB of the Constitutional Court qualified the local land committee an indirect interested party in terms of private law does not mean that the legal standing should not be substantially examined in a specific administrative lawsuit. Through creating the specific status of interested party in terms of private law, the Constitutional Court wanted to settle the issue that the local land committee could not be regarded either as an authority or as an interested party to a sale and purchase agreement. Legal standing is however not constituted only by the statutory responsibility of the body acting within the powers of the local land committee - contrary to the order of the Zalaegerszeg court of second instance. In my opinion, the issue to be clarified - even if the plaintiff needs to be called upon - is that what specific interest, regarding a specific sale and purchase agreement, the plaintiff has in terms of the community of land owners it represents to act in the lawsuit. This means that, in its complaint (or if the court calls upon it), the plaintiff must indicate, for the specific sale and purchase agreement or statement of consent, the precise reason(s) - with a view to the transparency of estates, prevention of the speculative acquisition of land, creation and maintenance of land estates forming a viable and competitive, uniform structure of cultivated estates, enforcement of the interests of the community of local farmers - for its action in the lawsuit. If it manages to justify its action within the lawsuit in accordance with the foregoing, then the court must decide on the claim in substance.
Paragraph (2) of Section 13/A of the NCA Act did, however, change the situation described above again, because - within the meaning of the legislative provision referred to - the organisation acting within the powers of the local land committee has right to bring an action regarding the judicial review of the local council decree assessing the objection submitted against its position. The question arises whether the statutory right to bring an action provides, on its own, the right to bring an action to the body acting within the powers of the local land committee - as the reasoning of the competent minister refers to the legal standing (as a synonym of the right to bring an action). In my opinion, the starting point for answering the question is Paragraph (1) of Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Act, meaning that, unless provided otherwise by the law, an application for the judgment of a civil law dispute may be submitted by one of the parties interested in the dispute. The stipulation "unless provided otherwise by the law" means that, in exceptional cases, even a party not interested in the dispute may also initiate the civil law dispute. According to judicial practice, that person shall have legal standing (legitimacy in the lawsuit) who is entitled to the right enforced with the lawsuit against the defendant, i.e. the person who is the recipient of the substantive right enforced. Substantive rights are provided by an agreement/contract or a statutory provision. According to Professor Kengyel the right to initiate a lawsuit pertains primarily to the party involved in the dispute, but the position of the plaintiff may not always be regarded as voluntary, because the Civil Procedure Act and other pieces of legislation authorize other organizations (such as the prosecutor, municipal notary, Guardianship Authority) to file for a lawsuit. In such cases, the right to file for a lawsuit does not match the substantive right.
There are countless examples where a piece of legislation confers the right of action upon
- 272/273 -
certain persons, organizations, including those whose substantive entitlement regarding the subject-matter of the lawsuit may not be established. Such are the right of action in the interest of the public, defined in Section 39 of Act CLV of 1997 on Consumer Protection[51], the right of action to establish fatherhood in Paragraph (1) of Section 4:104 of the Civil Code of Hungary[52], the list of persons entitled to contest the presumption of fatherhood according to Paragraph (1) of Section 4:109 of the Civil Code of Hungary[53], Paragraphs (2)-(3) of Section 4:115 of the Civil Code of Hungary and the list of persons entitled to file for a lawsuit of motherhood in Section 4:116 of the Civil Code of Hungary[54], etc. In the cases above, the court does not conduct the substantive investigation of legal standing, as the person, organisation indicated in the relevant piece of legislation is entitled to it by operation of law. This idea is in consonance with the text of the minister's reasoning to Section 13/A of the Act on Chambers, as it regards the right of filing for a lawsuit and legal standing as synonymous concepts. In this case - in my opinion - the right of filing for a lawsuit and legal standing, guaranteed by the law, are indeed synonymous concepts.
On the whole, the process of legislation has come to the point - mostly driven by judicial practice - to enact the right to bring an action of the body acting within the powers of the local land committee; so that the legal standing of the plaintiff is to be examined by the court only in terms of the question whether the body acting within the powers of the local land committee really challenges the local council decision in order to "protect" its own position, in connection with the fulfilment of its assessment responsibilities stipulated in the Land Transaction Act. The courts are therefore not required to examine direct substantive law involvement, because the legislator has provided the body acting within the powers of the local land committee with the right to bring an action with a view to the effectiveness of its statutory responsibilities.
Concurrently with the issue of existence of the legal standing of the local land committee and the body acting within its powers, courts examined the case where the body acting within the powers of the local land committee entered lawsuits as an intervener, and the issue of court notification of the intervention.
The circumstance that the body acting within the powers of the local land committee gained client status with the entry into force of the Government Decree raised the question in the jurisprudence of courts of first instance whether it has to be notified of the option to intervene, pursuant to Paragraph (5) of Section 332 of the Civil Procedure Act, as a client with opposite interest in the administrative proceeding.
Based on margin number 61 of Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.) AB of the Constitutional Court, the procedure of the local council in which it judges the objection submitted against the position of the body acting within the powers of the local land committee is an administrative procedure, and in this procedure, the body acting within the powers of the local land committee is a client (pursuant to the Government Decree); therefore, the notification on the option to intervene must be examined substantially, and the courts of first instance must decide the issue of mandatory notification in the light of the ascertainment of the adverse interest of the local land committee against plaintiff having launched the lawsuit. If, for instance, the plaintiff files for an administrative lawsuit against such a local council decision that dismissed the objection challenging the position submitted by it and issued by the body acting within the powers of the local land committee, then the adverse interest of the body acting within the powers of the local land committee is ascertainable; thus, it must be notified of the option of intervention.
The above judicial practice was confirmed by Opinion No. 2/2017. (X. 2.). KMK of the Kúria, stating that "the local land committee
- 273/274 -
or the Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture, Food Industry and Rural Development fulfilling its responsibilities based on Section 103 of Act CCXII Of 2013 laying down certain provisions and transition rules in connection with Act No CXXII of 2013 concerning agricultural and forestry land trade may intervene into lawsuits launched for the revision of administrative decisions adopted in land transaction cases or enter such lawsuits as an interested party. The court must notify the local land committee or the Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture fulfilling its responsibilities of the potion to intervene or to enter the lawsuit as an interested party"[55]. ■
NOTES
[1] This paper has been made within the framework of the programmes initiated by the Hungarian Ministry of Justice to raise the standard of legal education.
[2] András Mikó: A Nemzeti Agrárgazdasági Kamara szerepe a termőföld jóváhagyási eljárásban [The role of the National Chamber of Agriculture in the land approval procedure] In: Gazdaság és Jog [Economy and Law] 2017/3., Page 17
[3] István Olajos - Tamás Andréka: A földforgalmi jogalkotás és jogalkalmazás végrehajtása kapcsán felmerült jogi problémák elemzése [Analysis of legal problems detected in land transaction legislation and the implementation of related laws] In.: Magyar Jog [Hungarian Law] 2017/7-8., Page 415
[4] Ascertained as a constitutional requirement by the Constitutional Court in Subpoint (a) of Point 2 of its Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.), 2. Regarding the procedure(s) of land committees, the Constitutional Court defines the constitutional requirement that the fundamental right to legal remedy, ensured in Paragraph (7) of Article XXVIII of the Fundamental Law, shall be operative only if the position of land committees contains the assessment required by the law in such a detailed fashion so that its rationality can be meaningfully assessed in the administrative procedure; the factual substantiation and lawfulness of the decision of the authority can be overruled during the judicial review, both formally and substantially.
[5] The Curia of Hungary, i.e. the Hungarian supreme court
[6] Margin Number 51 of Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.) AB of the Constitutional Court
[7] Margin Number 56 of Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.) AB of the Constitutional Court
[8] Margin Number 56 of Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.) AB of the Constitutional Court
[9] The Dissenting Opinion to Decision No. 17/2015. (VI. 5.) AB of the Constitutional Court (Margin Number 158)
[10] Margin Number 17 of Decision No. 18/2016. (X. 20.) of the Constitutional Court
[11] Order No. 3.Kpkf.20.215/2016/3. of the Veszprém Regional Court
[12] Order No. 3.Kpkf.20.215/2016/3. of the Veszprém Regional Court
[13] Order No. Kfv.IV.37.805/2016/4. of the Kúria
[14] Order No. Kfv.IV.37.805/2016/4. of the Kúria
[15] Point 22 of Doctrinal Decision No. EBRD2016.K.21.
[16] Point 27 of Doctrinal Decision No. EBRD2016.K.21.
[17] Order No. Kfv.III.37.323/2013/5. of the Kúria
[18] Ruling No. Kfv.III.37.698/2016/5. of the Kúria
[19] Ruling No. Kfv.III.37.698/2016/5. of the Kúria
[20] Ruling No. Kfv.III.37.698/2016/5. of the Kúria
[21] Ruling No. 1.K.27.332/2016/11. of Zalaegerszeg Administrative and Labour Court
[22] Ruling No. 1.K.27.332/2016/11. of Zalaegerszeg Administrative and Labour Court
[23] Ruling No. 3.K.27.005/2017/8. of the Zalaegerszeg Administrative and Labour Court
[24] Ruling No. 5.K.27.008/2017/9. of the Zalaegerszeg Administrative and Labor Court
[25] Ruling No. 5.K.27.008/2017/9. of the Zalaegerszeg Administrative and Labor Court
[26] Ruling No. K.27.030/2017/14. of the Győr Administrative and Labour Court
[27] Ruling No. 3.K.27.072/2017/14. of the Veszprém Administrative and Labour Court
[28] Ruling No. 3.K.27.072/2017/14. of the Veszprém Administrative and Labour Court
[29] Order No. 1.Kf.20.274/2017/3. of the Zalaegerszeg Regional Court
[30] Order No. 2.Kf.20.607/2017/2. of the Győr Regional Court
[31] Order No. 2.Kf.20.607/2017/2. of the Győr Regional Court
[32] Order No. 2.Kf.20.607/2017/2. of the Győr Regional Court
[33] The Reasoning of the competent minster to Section 9 of Act XLI of 2017
[34] Ruling No. 3.Kf.20.570/2017/6. of the Veszprém Regional Court
[35] Ruling No. 3.K.27.072/2017/14. of the Veszprém Administrative and Labour Court
[36] Order No. 2.Kf.20.607/2017/2. of the Győr Regional Court
[37] Case-by-case Decision No. BH1991. 107.
[38] Case-by-case Decision No. BH1991. 107.
[39] Case-by-case Decision No. BDT2000. 346.
[40] Case-by-case Decision No. BDT2000. 346.
[41] Part IV of the Reasoning of Decision No. 2/2004. for the uniform application of administrative law
[42] Part III of Decision No. 4/2010. (X. 20.) for the uniform application of administrative law (title: Legal status of nongovernmental organisations in official cases dealing with environmental administration and their right to bring an action and legal standing in administrative lawsuits)
[43] Ruling No. Kfv.II.37.458/2011/9. of the Kúria
[44] Ruling No. Kfv.II.37.458/2011/9. of the Kúria
[45] Ruling No. Kfv.I.39.283/2010/9. of the Kúria
[46] Ruling No. Kfv.I.39.283/2010/9. of the Kúria
[47] Miklós Kengyel: Magyar polgári eljárásjog. [The law of civil procedures in Hungary] Osiris Kiadó, Budapest 2013. Point 195.
[48] Kengyel: cited work, Point 195.
[49] Kengyel: cited work, Point 191.
[50] József Lugosi: Keresetjog és kereseti jog [Law of lawsuits and legal standing] Jog, Állam, Politika [Law, state, politics] Year 8, Vol. 4 (2016). Page 176
[51] Paragraph (1) of Section 39: If the illegal activity of the business operator affects a large number of consumers (not known in person but determinable by the circumstances of the tort) or causes material injury to them, and the procedure falls within the competence of courts, then the prosecutor or consumer-protection associations shall have the right to bring an action.
[52] Paragraph (1) of Section 4:104: An action for establishing paternity by way of judicial process may be brought by the
- 274/275 -
mother, the child - or by the child's descendant after his/her death -, or by the father.
[53] Paragraph (1) of Section 4:109: The presumption of paternity may be challenged by the presumed father, the mother, the child, or by the child's descendant after his/her death..
[54] Paragraph (2) of Section 4:115: If the mother's person cannot be established, the child may bring action requesting the court to award mother's status to the person he/she designates. In the event of the child's death, this right shall accrue upon his/her descendants. Paragraph (3) of Section 4:115: An action for establishing maternity by way of judicial process may also be brought by a person who claims to be the mother of the child. Section 4:116: The child, or his/her descendant after the child's death, or the natural mother may bring action requesting the court to establish that the person shown in the registry of births as the mother is not the woman who gave birth to the child, provided that the wrong entry of maternity cannot be remedied by way of an administrative procedure.
[55] Opinion No. 2/2017. (X. 2.). KMK of the Kúria
Lábjegyzetek:
[1] The Author is judge, Administrative and Labour Court of Szombathely, doctoral student, Doctoral School of the Faculty of Law at the University of Pécs.
Visszaugrás
