https://doi.org/10.14232/forvmaip.2025.2.159-179
"The biggest part of our digital transformation is changing the way we think."
(Simeon Preston)
The rapid and explosive digitalisation of the last decade and especially of the last few years has created new challenges and opportunities in free societies, transforming nearly all aspects of their members' everyday lives. These changes - to a certain extent - have necessarily also appeared in the penal system of developed countries,[1] including Hungary, within the framework of legal regulations and restrictions. Digitalisation greatly affects every stage of the broadly interpreted criminal procedure, including the order and quality of penal institutions,[2] concerning, inter alia, the rights and also fundamental rights of prisoners and detainees of other dues.[3]
This research aims to explore the areas of the Hungarian penal system that are sensitive in terms of fundamental rights, regulated by legislation, while being considerably influenced by digitalisation and its degree of implementation. In other words, the goal of this research is to examine the digital possibilities of Act CCXL of 2013 on the Execution of Punishments, Measures, Certain Coercive Measures and Detention for Misdemeanours (hereinafter: Act on the Execution of Punishments or Prison Code) and further related pieces of legislation - a question that has never been explored before. The primary scope of the examination expands to the parts of the Act on
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the Execution of Punishments concerning imprisonment that are already infused with certain types of digital technology. Secondarily, further parts of the penal regulation relating to incarceration also fall under examination, unravelling critical areas where digital technology could be put to use in order to help either the convicts or the prison staff.
The topic in question has significance beyond the narrowly interpreted prison system: technological possibilities and their limitations, assessed from the perspective of prisoners' fundamental rights, ultimately contribute to the effectiveness of the resocialisation of convicts too. To put it another way, digitalisation also sets new challenges to the prison system regarding resocialisation and its connection to the free society, as now it also has to prepare its inmates for the new way of life outside its walls.[4] Consequently, the adequate usage of technological inventions might be the newest form of manifestation of the principle of normalisation.[5] Penal enforcement has to approximate the digital reality of prisons to those beyond the bars and put technology to use, keeping in mind that its "main goal and result is expanding and improving human capabilities, and increasing the efficiency of activities."[6] Without proper preparations, prisoners will most likely not be able to adjust to the digital dynamics of free societies, undermining the reintegration goals of criminal punishment and penal enforcement.[7] This circumstance in itself would mean the emergence of a new facet to the sanctioning side of imprisonment, leading to further alienation and distancing between the incarcerated and members of free society.[8] Therefore, the attitude with which the legislator handles the prisoners' access to digital technology has its effects outside the bars too.
The vast majority of the Act on the Execution of Punishments, promulgated on 23 December 2013, came into effect on 1 January 2015 [Penal Code § 435 Subsection (1)], with a limited number of paragraphs entering into force on 1 January 2016 [Penal Code § 435 Subsection (1)]. From the aspect of digitalisation, this timeframe was crucial. The Internet was well-established countrywide and well-embedded in the everyday lives of
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free Hungarians via smartphones in nearly every pocket, while online administration as a form of e-government was taking off on its way now known not to end.[9] On the other hand, during this period - for most people - artificial intelligence was considered a fantasy coming towards us in baby-steps. These were the technological and sociological circumstances within which the legislator decided to introduce a new regulation of the penal execution system, substituting - after thirty-four years and countless modifications - the Law-Decree 11 of 1979 on the execution of punishments and measures.
Even though the preamble of the Penal Code does not write anything about digitalisation or any type of technological inventions, it expressly refers to the importance of fundamental rights when it comes to penal execution.[10] On the other hand, right at the very beginning of the reasons for enacting the new legislation, the legislator mentions the social changes of recent years.[11] In this regard, it also fails to speak of digital challenges, but given the timeframe discussed above, it is only clear that technological development and spreading is encompassed in this expression.
Article 28 of the Fundamental Law[12] elevates constitutional and teleological interpretation to primacy, the latter of which can be ascertained from the preamble and the justification of the law. From the juxtaposition of the two propositions set above, it can be seen that one idea behind the Act on the Execution of Punishments was to accommodate the requirements created by the social shifts dictated, amongst others, by digital technologies, while paying attention to the fundamental rights of prisoners stemming from their dignity. This whole attitude shows how important it is to examine this topic, because it filters through other provisions of the Penal Code via interpretation as well.
Within its text, the Act on the Execution of Punishments mentions and regulates digital access and technologies in multiple different areas of the penal system. Right at the very beginning, amongst the interpretative provisions, it defines the expressions of electronic monitoring device[13] and remote electronic monitoring device,[14] preparing the
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law enforcer for the digital terminology. It also regulates the usage of qualified electronic signature [Penal Code § 4 Subsection (4)], electronic contact details, electronic mail address, voice mail address or other electronic contact details [amongst others: Penal Code § 8 Subsection (3); Penal Code § 17/A Subsection (3a)], internal electronic case management interface [Penal Code § 17/A Subsection (1a); Penal Code § 26 Subsection (3)], and electronic communications [Penal Code § 26/A]. As a form of criminal measure, the Penal Code also regulates the executive rules of disabling access to electronic data permanently [Penal Code § 69/A; Penal Code § 324], and since 1 March 2025 the execution of the termination of hosting services as well [Penal Code § 342]. Technological inventions also get a role when it comes to the verification of the convicted offender's identity [Penal Code § 89 Subsections (3) and (5)], and the participation in the procedure by the convict [Penal Code § 50 Subsection (1) Paragraph e) Subparagraphs ea)-ec)] and the aggrieved party [Penal Code § 75/A Subsection (5); Penal Code § 188/A Subsection (4)].
Amongst the rights of the convicted offender that are suspended due to penal execution, the Act on the Execution of Punishments mentions the right to use electronic administration services [Penal Code § 121 Subsection (1) Paragraph g)], whereas regarding their rights arising from the correctional institution relationship, convicts are entitled to use means of an electronic communications network to give statements as a form of self-expression [Penal Code § 124 Subsection (1)]. Furthermore, "[t]he convicted offender shall have the right to access the case file or a copy of the case file transmitted by the court, the public prosecutor's office or the investigating authority on an electronic medium in the course of the criminal proceedings against him or her, or a copy of the case file of the criminal proceedings against him or her on an electronic medium, by using the computer equipment provided by the department of corrections." [Penal Code § 127 Subsection (1)] Concerning the convicts' obligations, the Act on the Execution of Punishments also stipulates the wear of "an electronic wristband equipped with a transmitter to monitor his or her location and physical condition, and to receive instructions and notifications directly." [Penal Code § 133 Subsection (1) Paragraph k)]
Amidst the rules of maintaining communication, the Penal Code regulates a multitude of technological inventions, for example electronic correspondence [Penal Code § 174 Subsection (6)], telephone calls [Penal Code §§ 175-175/A], contact by means of telecommunication [Penal Code § 175/B], and reintegration leave [Penal Code § 180/B]. Remote electronic monitoring devices play a crucial role in the enforcement of reintegration custody and home care custody [Penal Code §§ 187/A-187/I]. Such devices may also contribute to the supervision or control over employment [Penal Code § 219 Subsection (8)], while electronic means of communication may be applied in probation with supervision between the probationer and the probation officer [Penal Code § 313 Subsection (4a)]. There is a brief mention of technological inventions regarding the enforcement of involuntary treatment in a mental institution "for the purpose of monitoring a patient who has previously attempted suicide or committed an offence against his or her own or others' physical integrity, with the minimum of disturbance to the persons not directly affected by the order of monitoring." [Penal Code § 328 Subsection (8)] The Act on the Execution of Punishments also regulates such innovations concerning juvenile offenders [Penal Code § 353 Paragraph e); Penal Code § 355
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Subsection (5); Penal Code § 369 Subsection (1) Paragraph a)] and pre-trial detention as well [Penal Code § 401 Subsection (1); Penal Code § 406 Subsection (1)].
It shines from the comprehensive overview of the Penal Code above how imbued it is with technological inventions.[15] They cover a multitude of areas of the penal system from the convicts' rights and obligations, via several different methods of maintaining communication, regulations on the enforcement of digitally inclined criminal sanctions and special means of preliminary leave from penal institutions, to more administrative tasks concerning different parties of the correctional institution relationship. It shows how - to a certain extent - the legislator was open to the idea of incorporating digitalisation into a traditionally offline part of the legal system, in accordance with its starting points enshrined in the preamble and justification of the Act on the Execution of Punishments. Moreover, it also suggests a legislatorial attitude towards the inmates, constituting a pivotal aspect of their concept of figure, partly defining them as beings with the capability of taking responsibility for their own lives while understanding and manoeuvring digital technology.[16]
On the other hand, evidently not all digital engagements of the Penal Code can or do have relevance from the aspect of prisoners' fundamental rights. Interpretative provisions, administrative tasks, such as the regulation on qualified electronic signature, and the sole means of identification have hardly, if, any relevance in terms of fundamental rights. Other regulations, such as those concerning the execution of disabling access to electronic data permanently or of the termination of hosting services, have strong exposure to fundamental rights, but have no direct attachment to imprisonment, therefore fall outside the scope of this study. Consequently, the main topics analysed later on are i) the different means of maintaining communication, ii) remote tools for the supervision of preliminary leave, iii) electronic access to documentation, and iv) the digital participation in proceedings.
The Act on the Execution of Punishments regulates a wide variety of forms of communication,[17] with which the incarcerated can keep in touch with the members of free
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society. Amongst these a multitude of forms are - more and more - affected by some sort of digital technology,[18] the application of which is positively encouraged by modern standards.[19] It is no accident, as enabling prisoners to keep in touch with their loved ones, may they be family or friends, and no matter how damaged these relations might be, is of utmost importance. Losing such contact can raise the possibility of recidivism after or even self-harming behaviour while in prison.[20]
Regarding correspondence, the legislator amended the rules on 1 August 2024. Since then, the inmate may, in accordance with the house rules, also correspond via an e-mail address including attachments as well, which address is set up by the penal institution itself. This creates easier managing of letters and also prevents banned items or substances from getting inside prison walls hidden in envelopes.[21] It is noteworthy however that this type of correspondence is only possible if the technical conditions are available. This entails that the creation of such environment is not an obligation for the state, but in case it exists suitably, providing the opportunity for it to be put to use for the prisoners' correspondence is. The provision also creates the possibility for this type of communication to be checked using an IT application [Penal Code § 174 Subsection (6)].
Communication via telephone in itself, inherently requires the usage of a technological device. The convicts have the right to initiate telephone calls, using the device designated by the penal institution,[22] in accordance with the rules applicable to their category,[23] based on which both the frequency and the duration of calls might differ [Penal Code § 175 Subsections (1)-(2)]. As a general rule, this type of communication can also be monitored or even interrupted, in accordance with the law and accompanied by proper information of the convict, "in the interests of the order of the penal institution and the safety of detention." [Penal Code § 175 Subsection (3)]
Contact by means of telecommunication is the most technically inclined means of communication in the framework of the Penal Code. Its frequency and duration, just like in the case of telephone calls, is dependent on the prisoner's category, and it can also be both monitored and, in justified cases, interrupted for the same purposes as those mentioned above [Penal Code § 175/B Subsections (1)-(2)]. The establishment and
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continuous ensuring of the technical conditions for video calls, as well as for monitoring the performance of tasks related to ensuring these conditions is the responsibility of the head of the correctional facility [BVOP instruction 29/2021 (V. 19.) on the rules of procedure for electronic communication via telecommunication devices Paragraph 6.]. This kind of contact provides the most personal experience of keeping in touch with the outside world without actually leaving the penal institution. It also overcomes physical distance, age- and health-related causes and many times, when real personal connection would cost a severe amount of resources due to transportation and accommodation, financial obstacles of classical ways of meeting.[24]
Reintegration leave is a special means of maintaining communication, implemented on 1 January 2023, that may only be applied with the authorisation of the commander of the penal institution [Penal Code § 180/B Subsection (4)], after an initial period [Penal Code § 180/B Subsection (2)] "if the conditions for reintegration custody are met and the convicted offender's behaviour and willingness to cooperate in the penal institution are consistent with the achievement of reintegration goals." [Penal Code § 180/B Subsection (1)] The Act on the Execution of Punishments clearly states that the use of a remote electronic monitoring device is mandatory in case of reintegration leave [Penal Code § 180/B Subsection (2)].
From all the above it shows that electric, digital or telecommunication devices are put to multiple different use when it comes to means of communication, which follows the ever-broadening spectrum of means of communication[25] and also the introduction of new methods of effectively keeping order and security.[26] In the case of correspondence, telephone calls and contact by means of telecommunication, the technology itself serves as a channel for communication, a direct tool for it. Regarding the monitoring of electronic correspondence and reintegration leave, on the other hand, technological inventions are the means of supervision, not the channels themselves. From the aspect of fundamental rights, this is a distinction of paramount importance: the former ones create the possibility to exercise such rights, while the latter ones constitute a limitation for them. Because of this difference in characteristics, reintegration leave is to be examined in the following chapter.
In relation to the means of communication, the most relevant fundamental right is the right to respect for private sphere. It is worth pointing out that amongst human rights, digitalisation affects the right to privacy to one of the most extensive level.[27] This fundamental right is enshrined in Article 8 § 1[28] of the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR) and Article VI Subsection (1)[29] of the Fundamental Law of Hungary. In their texts, both documents expressly mention the protection of private life and of either correspondence or communications, as part of private sphere, bringing the
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provisions of the Act on the Execution of Punishments in question within their own circles of influence. The reason behind this is that "[i]t is an essential part of a prisoner's right to respect for family life that the authorities enable him or, if need be, assist him in maintaining contact with his close family."[30] Given that these regulations of the protection of private sphere are relatively short of words, both in case of the ECHR and the Fundamental Law, the merit of their real content is created case-by-case by the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) and the Constitutional Court of Hungary (hereinafter: CCH) respectively. Therefore, the most prominent statements of their relevant case-law, if existing, need to be examined.
The ECtHR has a wide case-law regarding the correspondence of prisoners protected within the framework of Article 8 of the ECHR, especially on the monitoring of such communications. The requirements of legality for interferences are explicitly set in Article 8 § 2[31] of the ECHR. The ECtHR also expressed in a multitude of its cases that "interference will contravene Article 8 § 1 unless it is 'in accordance with the law pursues one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 and, furthermore, is 'necessary in a democratic society' in order to achieve them."[32] The ECtHR has determined that such monitoring has to be regulated on its duration and on the reasons for justification, and has to " indicate with sufficient clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the discretion conferred on the authorities in the relevant sphere."[33] In order to avoid even the appearance or possibility of arbitrariness or unreasonableness, the ECtHR also requires that reasons are to be given to the interference, enabling the inmate or their representatives to verify whether or not it was well-founded.[34] The ECtHR not only prohibits - as a general rule - the unjustified opening of letters,[35] but on the other hand also constitutes an obligation for the penal institution to contribute to the delivery of them.[36] These judicial statements obviously concern all kinds of correspondence and their monitoring, regardless of the material of the channel, may it be paper of electronic data. The ECtHR has case-law on digital aspects of correspondence as well, determining that the mere scanning and registration of such communications, regardless of subsequent usage,[37] in a judicial electronic information system for a considerable amount of time constitutes an interference with the convicts' said right.[38]
Regarding telephone calls, even though the ECHR does not explicitly mention such a tool of communication, the ECtHR declared decades ago that in case said facility is made
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available, the usage of it falls under the scope of Article 8 of the ECHR,[39] the restriction of which must be compatible with Article 8 § 2.[40] In this regard, restricting the language of telephone calls,[41] insufficient access to the rules of application,[42] complete ban without adequate substitutions[43] are in breach of the right enshrined in Article 8 § 1. On the other hand, the cost of making phone calls being higher[44] or the reasonable restriction on the duration of such calls[45] might be compatible with the spirit of the ECHR.
Likewise, the application of other digital devices for communication is not directly protected by Article 8 of the ECHR, as it "cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing prisoners the right to communicate with the outside world by way of online devices, particularly where facilities for contact via alternative ways are available and adequate."[46]
Unlike the ECtHR, the CCH has quite a narrow basis for case-law relevant from the aspect of means of communication in prison. Concerning correspondence, the CCH examined the legislative exclusion of books, catalogues, magazines, and newspapers from the circle of correspondence and classified them under packages, which resulted in a more severe and restrictive regulation on said objects.[47] The scope of examination in the case was not the right to private sphere, but the freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, right to education, right to a fair administrative procedure and the right to effective defence, due to the arguments of the complainant. In its decision, the CCH expressed its view that the modified contested provisions "does indeed restrict the possible forms of correspondence that can be sent, and removes optional possibilities from prisoners that they were previously able to exercise more freely." The CCH took into account the justification of the modification, according to which the reason behind the introduction of new regulation was the fight against the growing abuse of psychoactive substances in prisons, supported by their delivery via correspondence. Based on this, and given that prisoners have numerous other opportunities to exercise the fundamental rights they claim to be violated, the CCH found the contested provisions to be conform with the Fundamental Law. Therefore, it dismissed the constitutional complaint.
Regarding telephone calls, the procedure of the CCH was initiated on whether or not the higher tariffs compared to those in free society, that might constitute an obstacle in the effective communication of prisoners, are in breach of human dignity, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment, and the right to private sphere.[48] In its decision the CCH claimed that the complainant "did not assert any unconstitutionality that would materially influence the court's decision, nor did it raise any issues of fundamental constitutional significance", at least one of which is a condition for acceptance. Consequently, the CCH rejected the complaint without expressing any view on its merits.
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It can be seen from the case-laws above that the Act on the Execution of Punishments goes further than it would be otherwise required by judicial bodies destined to protect fundamental rights, as it guarantees a wider set of tools for prisoners' communication. Regardless of the vast difference between the depths of the case-law of the ECtHR and the CCH, the Penal Code seems to be compatible with both of them, especially by incorporating digital means for the sake of facilitating such communications.
The Act on the Execution of Punishments regulates a wide variety of cases when the prisoner may legally leave the prison preliminarily to their final release, but might be required to wear some sort of electronic device to track their location and movement in real-time.[49] These remote electronic monitoring devices play a significant role in reintegration leave (the rules of which are described in the former chapter), reintegration custody[50] and the relatively newly introduced home care custody.
According to the rules of the Penal Code, "[t]he convicted offender may be placed in reintegration custody before the date on which his or her release on parole is due or, if this is excluded or not possible, before the expected date of release, if the purpose of the penalty can also be achieved in this way, and the convicted offender undertakes to do so and has been sentenced to imprisonment for a criminal offense by way of negligence or, if sentenced to imprisonment" [Penal Code § 187/A Subsection (1)] for certain types of intentional criminal offenses. The essence of this legal option is that the convict may only leave their judicially designated area for primarily specified purposes [Penal Code § 187/A Subsection (4)]. Otherwise it "eliminates the complete deprivation of liberty of the convicted offender, but restricts his or her freedom of movement and the right to choose his or her place of residence." [Penal Code § 187/A Subsection (3)] In case of reintegration custody, the usage of remote electronic monitoring device is mandatory [Penal Code § 187/A Subsection (5)], hence if, for some reason, the designated residence is not suited for the installation of such tool, the convict cannot be placed in reintegration custody [Penal Code § 187/C Subsection (1) Paragraph e)]. Violating the rules on the use of the device, damaging it or rendering it unusable entails the initiation of the termination of reintegration custody [Penal Code § 187/E Subsection (1) Paragraph b)].
The Act on the Execution of Punishments has regulated since 19 August 2025, that "[i]f a convicted offender suffers from a serious, presumably long term chronic disease, and is unable to meet his or her basic needs independently and requires continuous assistance and care in his or her everyday life, he or she may be placed in home care custody if there is a person who undertakes to provide care for him or her in writing." [Penal Code § 187/H Subsection (1)] To put it another way, home care custody is a means
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of preliminary leave for those diseased whose healthcare and assistance is better provided outside penal institutions. The initialisation procedure requires the correctional system physician's assessment on the health status of the convict [Penal Code § 187/H Subsection (2)], in which specialist recommendation they shall cover, inter alia, "whether the use of remote electronic monitoring device appears feasible based on the health condition of the convicted offender" and "whether the convicted offender requires regular healthcare where the remote electronic monitoring device has to be removed." [Penal Code § 187/H Subsection (7) Paragraph a)-b)] The temporal or terminal inability to wear such device does not exclude the ordering of home care custody [Penal Code § 187/I Paragraph d)], but the convict "shall notify the probation officer in due time if he or she is going to undergo an examination, medical treatment or surgery that may require the removal of the remote electronic monitoring device." [Penal Code § 187/I Paragraph f)].
It shines from the above that the application of these remote supervision tools restricts one's freedom of movement or of choosing their place of residence.[51] More precisely, the freedom of movement is indeed restricted, but the freedom of choosing the place of residence is revoked.[52] These rights are protected by Article 2 § 1 of Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR,[53] and Article XXVII Subsection (1) of the Fundamental Law.[54]
Within its case-law, the ECtHR established that the requirement not to leave a designated area might constitute an interference, may it be in relation to certain measures in the context of criminal proceedings.[55] Such restrictions must be in accordance with the law,[56] pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society.[57] First of all, being in accordance with the law requires some basis in domestic law, and also, as a question of quality, demands accessibility and foreseeability.[58] Secondly, legitimate aims are listed in Article 2 § 1 of Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR, such as national security, public safety, the maintenance of public order, the prevention of crime, the protection of health or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Last but not least, necessity in a democratic society involves the pursuit of a legitimate aim and proportionality between restrictive measures and their protective function.[59] When it
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comes to proportionality, the ECtHR takes into account, amongst others, the conduct of the offender[60] and the gravity of the crime.[61]
Furthermore, the European Committee on Crime Problems (hereinafter: CDPC) and the Council for Penological Cooperation (hereinafter: PC-CP) published, on 4 December 2013, a draft commentary to recommendations on electric monitoring (hereinafter: Draft Commentary). According to this soft law instrument, electronic monitoring "may be used to prepare prisoners for release while they are still in prison, for example in case they are on a prison leave or are working outside the prison perimeter or are requested to attend meetings with their social worker, future employer or probation officer outside prison."[62] In other words, the CDPC and the PC-CP accepts the application of such devices in case of a preliminary or temporarily release from prison. The Draft Commentary also suggests certain limitations to the usage of such inventions: a definite purpose and restrictions tailored to that [Draft Commentary Rule 5], while emphasizing that the application shall not be mandatory for all prisoners on preliminary leave, based on special circumstances [Draft Commentary Rule 24]. With similar content, the Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on electronic monitoring (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 February 2014, at the 1192nd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies; hereinafter: Recommendation)[63] also mentions electronic monitoring in relation to conditional or pre-release from prison, acknowledging its possible impact on human rights. The Recommendation highlights, inter alia, the conditions of regulation by law [Recommendation Basic principles 1.], judicial review [Recommendation Basic principles 2.], proportionality [Recommendation Basic principles 4.], taking into account the interests of third parties [Recommendation Basic principles 6.], and being non-discriminatory [Recommendation Basic principles 7.]. It also regulates ethical issues and the rules of data protection.
The CCH has become close to examine cases in which someone under a criminal procedure was banned from leaving a designated area,[64] or was made to wear a tracking device,[65] but in these cases the CCH did not really make memorable statements regarding the constitutional problem in question. In general and under the effect of the old constitution [Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary], it stated that the freedom of movement, encompassing the right to change one's residence,[66] and the right to personal freedom are intersected.[67] Should one's freedom of movement be restricted, sufficient reasoning and adequate procedures would be required for it. Regarding the proportionality of such restriction, its length, reasons, the circumstances of the person concerned and the possible remedies are all to be taken into account.[68]
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The case-laws above show that the judicial bodies have dealt with the topic in a more general sense, in which the focus was not really on the remote electronic monitoring device. It is only understandable, as the conventional or constitutional question is on the limitation itself, not on its supervision. However, the Draft Commentary and the Recommendation expressly expand the frameworks to said electronic tools, directly pulling them under the influence of the statements above. The application of these devices therefore has to conform with the fundamental rights-related interpretations of the ECtHR and the CCH, otherwise a breach of the freedom of movement could be assessed.
The Act on the Execution of Punishments regulates two types of electronic access to different kinds of criminal documentation for inmates. The first one is governed by the right of access to documents generated during the enforcement procedure. According to this, if such document, to which the convict shall have access [Penal Code § 26 Subsection (1)], "is available as an electronic document, as an electronic copy of a hard copy or in electronic form, the person authorized to have access to it can request that the copy be issued by electronic means or on an electronic medium." [Penal Code § 26 Subsection (3)] As stated by the second type of access, "[t]he convicted offender shall have the right to access the case file or a copy of the case file transmitted by the court, the public prosecutor's office or the investigating authority on an electronic medium in the course of the criminal proceedings against him or her, or a copy of the case file of the criminal proceedings against him or her on an electronic medium, by using the computer equipment provided by the department of corrections." [Penal Code § 127 Subsection (1)] That is to say that the Penal Code provides electronic access, by indirectly prescribing the obligation for equipping a computer in penal institutions, to criminal documentation regardless of the stage of the proceeding, may it be an on-going procedure in a narrow sense or the penal enforcement itself. These provisions have utmost importance on an inmate's procedural possibilities,[69] as it creates the opportunity for them to study their own case and prepare for further steps of the proceeding using modern technology.
The ECHR generally protects the right to a fair trial in Article 6 § 1,[70] which text covers a great extent of said procedural right, expressively mentioning certain cornerstones, such as the requirement of public hearing, reasonable time or independence and impartiality of the judge. From the text of Article 6 § 1, the ECtHR has identified further
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conditions, like - in case of criminal and related procedures - being adversarial, or the principle of the equality of arms between the defence and the prosecution. In accordance with the case-law of the ECtHR, in criminal cases, an adversarial trial entails that the defence and the prosecution shall be enabled to have knowledge of the evidence and the observations filed in the case, and to comment on those as well. Consequently, the access to evidence, which is not an absolute right, as it might be restricted by justified contesting interests,[71] is in general part of such requirements.[72] The right to a fair trial is also enshrined in Article XXVIII Subsection (1) of the Fundamental Law,[73] with quite similar content to the ECHR. It needs to be highlighted that the right to a fair trial is not only one of the fundamental rights - which would be of high legal prestige already. It is "part of the rule of law and an essential pillar of democratic society."[74] Therefore, its prevail and the extent to which its safeguards are incorporated in legal regulation is paramount.
The ECtHR has already expressed its view that the access to documentation is part of the arsenal of facilities relating to the rights of the defence, enshrined in Article 6 § 3 b) of the ECHR,[75] which are specific aspects of the right to a fair trial.[76] Adequate facilities of substantive defence activities may encompass everything "necessary" to the preparation for the main trial,[77] including the opportunity for the accused to acquaint themselves with the results of investigations in the case, for the purposes of preparing their defence.[78] Yet only formal access does not in itself mean that the criteria set in the ECHR are met, as the access has to be substantive. It means that the conditions have to reach a certain level of quality, for example the circumstances have to "permit the person to read and write with a reasonable degree of concentration."[79] It must be emphasized that the degree of access might differ based on whether the detainee participates in the procedure with or without a legal representative, who has to be able to follow the proceedings, answer questions and present their arguments without excessive tediousness too.[80] Such statement is paramount, because in case the detainee has a legal representative, the lawyer is in the position and has the obligation to help them in the exercise of their rights and the constructing of effective defence. Therefore, the access to documents might be restricted on the side of the detainee, provided that the representative was enabled to gain knowledge and inform the detainee on such documents.[81] Notwithstanding, such restrictions cannot result in the accused being excluded from obtaining the evidence before the trial, commenting
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on it in oral submissions at the latest, [82] or using notes taken during the proceeding.[83] On the other hand, when the detainee does not act with legal representative, it follows from the ECHR that they shall be given access to the case file and to obtain a copy of the documents.[84]
The CCH has also expressed that the right to access documents, in certain cases even in electronic form, is a requirement of fair trial. It also emphasized that there is a difference between the fact and the method of the access. Even though the general rule is that access should be granted, actually both fact and method can be restricted by justified reasons, but the interference with the latter cannot result in rendering the possession of copies impossible.[85] According to the CCH, the access is to be assessed under the principle of equality of arms, which is a partial requirement of fair trial, more precisely of the rights of defence. With regard to its enforcement, the CCH has stated that it is essential that the prosecution, the defence, and the defendant have access to the same completeness and depth of information relevant to the case.[86] According to the case-law of the CCH, the infringement of the access of documents, in itself, negatively affects the fairness of the trial,[87] and might result in the annulment of the judicial decisions on the ground of unconstitutionality. With its decisions, the CCH highlighted how great of a significance it attaches to the access of documents, for which electric means are a lawful method.
The case-laws above mirror how critical the importance of access to documents is in relation to the fairness of the trial,[88] both according to the ECtHR and the CCH. Even though some limitations might be justified, as a general rule such access is a key point,[89] without which the principle of equality of arms cannot prevail, undermining the entirety of the rights of defence. With all this in mind, the Act on the Execution of Punishments represent a quite progressive attitude with the implementation of electronic means into the regulation on access. This method, while it requires a computer, can save a fair amount of resources, should it replace making copies of thousands of pages in some cases, and it can also facilitate the overview or research of the files.
Pursuant to the Penal Code, the hearings and the trials before the sentencing judge shall be held on the premises of the court, or in case of those in custody, detainees held on other
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grounds and those placed in a reformatory institution, shall be held in the penal or reformatory institution. Should the hearing or the trial be held on the premises of the court, the presence of the inmate, the offender with habitual residence abroad, or the one who requests it, is to be ensured by means of telecommunication equipment. [Penal Code § 50 Subsection (1) Paragraph e) Subparagraphs ea)-ec)] Therefore, in this case it is the telecommunication equipment itself that breaks the general rule of holding hearings and trials in penal institutions for those incarcerated, because it enables the authorities to secure the inmate's presence in other ways.
This question inevitably leads to the right to presence at trial, which is safeguarded by Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR, more precisely by its "public hearing " expression,[90] and also by Article XXVIII Subsections (1) and (3)[91] of the Fundamental Law.
According to the ECtHR, the orality and publicity of hearings are fundamental principles of fairness, especially concerning criminal procedures, in which the first instance tribunal has to meet all requirements of a fair trial. This includes, inter alia, the entitlement to have one's case heard, the opportunity to give and hear evidence, and examine witnesses.[92] In order to exercise these entitlements, one's presence at the hearing is paramount, as it "ranks as one of the essential requirements of Article 6."[93] However, it is important to note that in itself the offender's absence does not make the proceeding incompatible with the ECHR, should there be adequate subsequent procedural guarantees of fairness.[94] Furthermore, the presence is also not an absolute requirement in a sense that if there are no issues of credibility or there are no contested facts, the courts may decide on written materials without an oral hearing.[95] Even in criminal cases, where mostly criminal responsibility and punitive sanctions are at stake, the gravity of the requirements still depend on the degree of stigma attached to the issue to be dealt with, as these differ in narrowly interpreted criminal cases, administrative penalties and disciplinary proceedings.[96]
According to the case-law of the CCH, "[t]he principle of equality of arms, which derives from the right to a fair trial, and the rights of defence, which are part of the right to a fair trial and are specifically mentioned in the Fundamental Law, have a common set of elements, which also includes the rights of the defendant and the defence to familiarize themselves with the case, to make statements and to present their positions."[97] In this cross-section, amongst the right to familiarize oneself with the case, lies the right to be present.[98] In order for the equality of arms to prevail, the presence of the opposing parties is indispensable.[99] "The right to defence can naturally be exercised most effectively
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by responding directly to the arguments and motions of the opposing party and by participating in the proceedings in person, which ensures persuasive power."[100] Subsequently, in accordance with the established case-law of the CCH, the presence at one's trial in a fundamental part of the right to a fair trial. On the other hand, the CCH also takes into consideration the characteristics and the stage of the procedure too, which has a severe influence on the extent of guarantees of fairness in the exact case.[101]
In this sense, procedures relating to penal execution might also have completely different characters, ranging from the release on parole to disciplinary proceedings. Regardless of that, the digital participation in hearings and trials offer a safe and cost-effective way to have the inmate heard in their case, for which the continuous image and sound connection creates the necessary directness.[102] This way, the inmates can express themselves and offer evidence or relevant information on their conduct, attitudes, desires and opinions, while the judge and other participants of the proceeding are able to ask questions and examine the presentation of the prisoner. On the other hand, this regulation also puts stress on the justice and penal systems, because it requires a dual-sided investment in technological tools.[103] In case there is inadequate equipment, while the number of cases for which it is needed are on the rise, this can cause serious problems, even result in the breach of reasonable time of procedures [Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR]. Therefore, even though it is a great and modern way of simplifying procedures, to avoid the further burden of the otherwise also strained prison staff and the unnecessary and uncomfortable transport of prisoners, investments for it must be sufficient. If not, with unchanged legal regulation, the justice system will not be able to serve its function properly.
As it has been set at the beginning, digitalisation affects other areas outside of its technological boundaries: it has a decisive influence on the quality of resocialisation, due to the vast changes of the outside world in terms of technological inventions.[104] In other words, any major flaw in the implementation of digital technologies in penal execution can risk a higher rate of recidivism,[105] as "digital exclusion [...] perpetuates and exacerbates [...] social exclusion."[106] Therefore, adequate education and training concerning the application of digital means is of utmost importance. As a matter of
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principle, this leads back to normalisation, as education in prison itself has to model that of the outside world, with provided learning opportunities as wide as possible.[107] The key definition of this kind of education is digital literacy, which "is the awareness, attitude and ability of individuals to appropriately use digital tools and facilities to identify, access, manage, integrate, evaluate, analyse and synthesize digital resources, construct new knowledge, create media expressions, and communicate with others, in the context of specific life situations, in order to enable constructive social action; and to reflect upon this process."[108] This type of skill enables its practitioners to successfully manage actions in different life situations, may it be work, learning or leisure activities.[109] Consequently, in order to navigate and manoeuvre in free society, effective education aiming digital literacy is inevitable.
Unfortunately, the Act on the Execution of Punishments does not mention digital education at all in its respective provisions [Penal Code §§ 181-182]. In itself it may be considered an omission, as it would be fitting for such a significant area of reintegration to be granted a place in regulation on the level of Acts. It only aggravates the problem that the executive order for the Penal Code [IM decree 16/2014 (XII. 19.) on the detailed rules for the enforcement of imprisonment, custodial arrest, pre-trial detention and detention replacing administrative fines; hereinafter: Executive Order] does not mention digital aspects amongst its rules on education, training, and leisure activities for prisoners either [Executive Order §§ 116-117/A]. However, it expresses that the primary tools for reaching reintegration goals are education, vocational training and training, which are provided by the penal institution [Executive Order § 116 Subsection (1)]. Pursuant to § 116 Subsection (2) of the Executive Order "[i]n order to make reintegration more effective, the correctional institution shall provide cultural, leisure, and sports activities, as well as individualized personality development, healing and rehabilitation programmes, and programmes aimed at recognizing the consequences of crimes, taking responsibility for it, and making amends for the harm caused." It shines from the regulation that there would have been plenty of room for mentioning the digital aspects of resocialisation, yet the Executive Order still fails to do so. There is no regulation on it amongst the numerous BVOP instructions either. In other words, no matter how important the question of digital education is, it is completely left out from the entirety of the regulations on penal enforcement, regardless of its level. Consequently, the texts themselves do not mirror the legislative attitudes enshrined in the preamble and justification of the Act on the Execution of Punishments towards the alignment to social changes wired by wireless technology.
As a de lege ferenda suggestion, respecting the existing legislative structure of the question, I would amend § 116 Subsection (2) of the Executive Order with a Paragraph c) as follows:
116. § (2) In order to make reintegration more effective, the correctional institution shall provide
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a) cultural, leisure, and sports activities, as well as individualized personality development, healing and rehabilitation programmes,
b) programmes aimed at recognizing the consequences of crimes, taking responsibility for it, and making amends for the harm caused, and
c) digital education, including the responsible, critical and effective application of modern technological tools, especially those helpful in the field of work and social connections.
As far as I am concerned, such regulation, taking its importance into consideration, should be given place in the Act on the Execution of Punishments. Yet, acknowledging the previous legislative decision to regulate the means of making reintegration more effective in the Executive Order, a provision on digital education can be granted place there without problem. It fits perfectly with the other means of increasing the effectiveness of reintegration, but it also emphasizes the significance of digital education, otherwise not really included in programmes and activities in neither Paragraph a) nor b). By this amendment, the legislator would comply - at least in the Executive Order - with its goals set to the Penal Code, as it would explicitly accentuate the adjustment to modern needs. It would also successfully reach conformity with international standards set in various recommendations mentioned above on education and normalisation alike.
Furthermore, sufficient education on the usage of digital technologies and means could not only affect the life of the prisoners once they return to society - whether it is by preliminary parole or final release. Proper training would be necessary to avert any negative effects on prisoners while incarcerated, such as being isolated when using said devices, the dwindling personal interaction (and therefore loss of control) between prisoners and members of staff, and addiction.[110] On the other hand, the study on such downsides found that the main cause of these is not technology itself, but how it is being used.[111] Consequently, the education on the responsible application of digital devices play a crucial role in the prisoners' possibilities in free societies, but also in their everyday experience in penal institutions. In accordance with the principle of normalisation, digital penetration to prisons is inevitable - it has started already, and it will not stop now. Therefore, the aim is to teach prisoners to use them correctly, rather than to keep them from usage altogether.
All in all, no matter how many barriers there might be, the legislator has to adhere to keep up with the new waves of innovation. Ineffective use of multimedia learning materials of respectable quality, restricted access to technology, unawareness or even fear of innovation, inter alia, have been identified problems regarding education in prisons for years.[112] Finally overcoming these and "[p]roviding education and rehabilitation to prisoners should be regarded as a major public priority."[113] Education on the responsible
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and effective application of digital technology calls for the modernisation of technological means in penal institutions, while its inclusion in legislative regulation mirrors how paramount digital literacy is for social inclusion.[114]
Digital technologies weave through the provisions of the Act on the Execution of Punishments, regulating a wide variety of areas concerning penal enforcement, may it be administrative tasks, rights and obligations of prisoners, the execution of specific sanctions, or procedural requirements. With such provisions, the legislator could -partially - meet its goals set out in the preamble and justification of the Penal Code, and could adopt a relatively modern perspective to the application of technology in order to adjust the penal enforcement to the needs and possibilities of the XXI[st] century.
A number of these technologically inclined regulations fall outside the scope of fundamental rights, while many have close ties to different kinds of them, including the right to private sphere, freedom of movement, and certain aspects of the right to a fair trial. It is safe to say that the regulations of the Act on the Execution of Punishments concerning digital technology comply with the case-law of the ECtHR and the CCH, which respectively interprets and develops the texts of the ECHR and the Fundamental Law. In certain cases, it is the technology itself that enables the regulation to be in conformity with the jurisdiction of said judicial bodies.
On the other hand, the Penal Code and related pieces of legislation, including its Executive Order and the BVOP instructions, suffer greatly from the lack of digital aspects in one of the most crucial areas for reintegration: digital education. The legislator failed to recognize or name how important digital education is when it comes to preparing inmates for returning to society. Without proper skill at their hands, including those enabling them to use and take advantage of the tools of the digital era, the convicts leaving prisons will find themselves in a world primarily unknown to them. Such circumstances are the breeding grounds for recidivism, the avoidance of which would be one of the main targets of penal enforcement. So even though technology is already in penal institutions, forming the everyday lives of those concerned by it, we should further change our way of thinking and open the bars to new waves of digital aspects as well.
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The article analyses how digitalisation permeates the Hungarian prison system in accordance with the regulation of the Act on the Execution of Punishments, assessing the areas with the focus on incarceration, which can impact the prisoners' fundamental rights. Once these dimensions are identified, the article examines the conformity of the regulation with the national and international fundamental right provisions and respective case-law. The article also aims to reveal major digital insufficiencies in the regulation, and to give legislative suggestion on them.
Keywords: digitalisation, technological tools, penal enforcement, prisoners' rights, fundamental rights ■
NOTES
* The research was supported by the Cluster of Humanities and Social Sciences of the Digital Society Competence Center at the Centre of Excellence for Interdisciplinary Research, Development and Innovation (IKIKK) at the University of Szeged. The author is a member of the "Artificial Intelligence and the Legal Order" research group.
[1] Juhász Zsuzsanna: Digitális technológiák a büntetés-végrehajtásban. Börtönügyi Szemle 2016/2. p. 97.
[2] Wexler, Rebecca: Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System. Stanford Law Review Vol. 70 May 2018. p. 1347.
[3] Karsai Krisztina: Algorithmic decisions within the criminal justice pipeline and human rights-an introduction. In: Adem Sözüer (editor): 9th International Crime and Punishment Film Festival "Justice in the World" Academic Papers. Onikilevha; On Iki Levha Yayincilik. Istanbul, 2022. p.127.
[5] Robberechts, Jana - Beyens, Kristel: PrisonCloud: The Beating Heart of the Digital Prison Cell. In: Turner, Jennifer - Knight, Victoria (editors): The Prison Cell Embodied and Everyday Spaces of Incarceration. Palgrave Studies in Prisons and Penology. 2020. p. 283.
[6] Karsai Krisztina: Algoritmusok és büntető igazságszolgáltatás. In: Török Bernát - Ződi Zsolt (editors): A mesterséges intelligencia szabályozási kihívásai. Tanulmányok a mesterséges intelligencia és a jog határterületeiről. Ludovika Egyetemi Kiadó. Budapest, 2021. p. 359.
[7] Juhász 2016, p. 88.
[8] Jewkes, Yvonne - Johnston, Helen: Cavemen in an Era of Speed-of-ligh Technology: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Communication within Prisons. Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 2009/2. p. 135.
[9] See similarly from an international point of view: Scharff Smith, Peter: Imprisonment and Internet-Access: Human Rights, the Principle of Normalization and the Question of Prisoners' Access to Digital Communications Technology. Nordic Journal of Human Rights 2012/4. p. 454., p. 467.
[10] " For the purpose of defending the inviolable and inalienable fundamental human rights, in particular to respect the human dignity of convicted offenders and detainees held on other grounds, to enforce the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and to ensure equal treatment, [...] Parliament has adopted the following Act."
[11] "1. Social changes, the criminal policy response to them, the adoption of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code (hereinafter: new Criminal Code) and the experiences of the past years in the enforcement of punishments make it necessary to replace Law-Decree 11 of 1979 on the enforcement of penalties and measures [...] with a new penal code that is modern in terms of its content, regulatory principles, and directions."
[12] "In the course of the application of law, courts shall interpret the text of laws primarily in accordance with their purpose and with the Fundamental Law. In the course of ascertaining the purpose of a law, consideration shall be given primarily to the preamble of that law and the justification of the proposal for, or for amending, the law. When interpreting the Fundamental Law or laws, it shall be presumed that they serve moral and economic purposes which are in accordance with common sense and the public good."
[13] Penal Code § 3 Paragraph 5. "'electronic monitoring device' shall mean a closed-circuit security equipment capable of image, sound, or audio-visual recording and transmission in electronic format."
[14] Penal Code § 3 Paragraph 6. "'remote electronic monitoring device' shall mean a technical equipment capable of monitoring the movement of convicted offenders and detainees held on other grounds." Together with the electronic monitoring device, they are tools of safety measures that may be applied in order to preserve the rules of enforcement and maintain the safety of detention, pursuant to Penal Code § 145 Subsection (1) Paragraphs d)-e).
[15] This is in line with the trend of slow destruction of the conservative approach towards technology in relation to penal execution - Juhász Zsuzsanna: V-learning és a virtuális valóság egyéb felhasználási lehetőségei börtönkörnyezetben. Miskolci Jogi Szemle 2024/3. pp. 23-24.
[16] See similarly from an international point of view: Knight, Victoria - Van De Steen, Stefen: Digital transformation for prisons: Developing a needs-based strategy. Probation Journal, 2017/3. p. 258.
[17] Penal Code § 173 Subsection (1) "Forms of communication for the convicted offender are as follows:
a) correspondence;
b) telephone calls using the telephone and telecommunication equipment provided by the penal institution;
c) sending and receiving packages;
d) receiving visitors;
e) receiving a visitor outside the penal institution;
f) furlough;
g) leave;
h) reintegration leave."
[18] Juhász 2016, 89. p.
[19] Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules, Rule 24 (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 January 2006 at the 952[nd] meeting of the Ministers' Deputies). Accessed via: https://rm.coe.int/european-prison-rules-978-92-871-5982-3/16806ab9ae. (date of downloading: 29 March 2026).
[20] Jewkes - Johnston 2009, p. 135.
[21] Juhász 2016, p. 89.
[22] This device can only be kept by the convict if they agree to the blocking of the bail in their deposit account at the same time as the phone is issued, in accordance with the rules of civil law, pursuant to Penal Code § 175/A Subsection (1).
[23] Pursuant to Penal Code § 82 Paragraph 6., in effect since 1 March 2024, a category is "an execution environment based on the principle of individualization, reflecting the risks of recidivism and incarceration of convicted offenders, their conduct and willingness to cooperate, and that serves to achieve the individual objectives of crime prevention by way of offering reintegration programs intended to accommodate the needs of convicted offenders." Categories range from I to V and affect the extent of prisoners' several rights and obligations.
[24] Juhász 2016, p. 91.
[25] Scharff Smith 2012, p. 482.
[26] Juhász 2024, p. 113.
[27] Karsai 2022, p. 132.
[28] "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence."
[29] "Everyone shall have the right to have his or her private and family life, home, communications and good reputation respected. Exercising the right to freedom of expression and assembly shall not impair the private and family life and home of others."
[30] Khoroshenko v. Russia [GC], (app. no. 41418/04), § 106
[31] "There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
[32] Amongst many other authorities: Calogero Diana v. Italy (app. no. 15211/89), § 28; Domenichini v. Italy (app. no. 15943/90), § 28; Labita v. Italy [GC] (app. no. 26772/95), § 121.
[33] Enea v. Italy [GC] (app. no. 74912/01), § 143.
[34] Onoufriou v. Cyprus (app. no. 24407/04), § 113.
[35] Narinen v. Finland (app. no. 45027/98), § 32.
[36] Uygun v. Türkiye (app. no. 9389/19), §§ 65-70.
[37] S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC] (app. nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04), § 67.
[38] Nuh Uzun and Others v. Turkey (app. no. 49341/18), § 82.
[39] A.B. v. the Netherlands (app. no. 37328/97), §§ 92-93.
[40] Lebois v. Bulgaria (app. no. 67482/14), § 62.
[41] Nusret Kaya and Others v. Turkey (app. nos. 43750/06, 43752/06, 32054/08, 37753/08 and 60915/08).
[42] Lebois v. Bulgaria (app. no. 67482/14).
[43] Danilevich v. Russia (app. no. 31469/08).
[44] Davidson v. the United Kingdom (app. no. 52990/08).
[45] Bădulescu v. Portugal (app. no. 33729/18).
[46] Ciupercescu v. Romania (no. 3) (app. nos. 41995/14 and 50276/15), § 105.
[47] AB Decision 3322/2022. (VII. 21.).
[48] AB Ruling 3284/2019. (XI. 5.).
[49] See similarly from an international point of view: Nellis, Mike: Standards and Ethics in Electronic Monitoring: Handbook for professionals responsible for the establishment and the use of Electronic Monitoring. Council of Europe. 2015. 10. p. Accessed via: https://rm.coe.int/hand-book-standards-ethics-in-electronic-monitoring-eng/16806ab9b0 (date of downloading: 31 March 2026).
[51] Raimondo v. Italy (app. no. 12954/87), § 39.
[52] Judicial Practice Analysis Group of the Criminal Division at the Curia: A büntetés-végrehajtási bírói gyakorlat, különös tekintettel a reintegrációs őrizetre. Összefoglaló vélemény. 2018. Accessed via: https://kuria-birosag.hu/sites/default/files/joggyak/osszefoglalo_velemeny_8.pdf (date of downloading: 31 March 2026). From an academic perspective: Hussein 2020, p. 32.
[53] "Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence."
[54] "Everyone residing lawfully in the territory of Hungary shall have the right to move freely and to choose his or her place of residence freely. The exercise of the right to freely choose one's place of residence must not infringe upon the fundamental right of local communities in Hungary to self-identity."
[55] Ivanov v. Ukraine (app. no. 15007/02), § 85.
[56] Khlyustov v. Russia (app. no. 28975/05), § 64.
[57] Article 2 §§ 3-4 of Protocol No. 4 of the ECHR.
[58] Rotaru v. Romania [GC] (app. no. 28341/95), § 52.
[59] Bartik v. Russia (app. no. 55565/00), § 46.
[60] Folnegović v. Croatia (app. no. 13946/15), § 49.
[61] Villa v. Italy (app. no. 19675/06), § 46.
[62] https://rm.coe.int/16806f97b1?utm (date of downloading: 31 December 2025).
[63] https://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/41781569/42171329/CMRec+%282014%29+4+on+electronic+monitoring.pdf/c9756d5b-be0e-4c72-b085-745c9199bef4 (date of downloading: 12 January 2026).
[64] AB Ruling 3066/2024. (II. 23.), AB Decision 3258/2015. (XII. 22.).
[65] AB Ruling 3258/2017. (X. 10.).
[66] AB Decision 60/1993. (XI. 29.), ABH 1993, 507, 509-510.; AB Decision 3/1998. (II. 11.), ABH 1998, 61, 65-66.
[67] AB Decision 46/1994. (X. 21.), ABH 1994, 260, 268.
[68] AB Decision 65/2003. (XII. 18.), ABH 2003, 707, 716.
[69] Akhpanov, Arstan et al.: Digitalization and artificial intelligence in criminal proceedings: Issues of legal regulation. International Journal of Innovative Researchand Scientific Studies 2025/4. p. 1864.
[70] "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice."
[71] Natunen v. Finland (app. no. 21022/04), §§ 40-41.
[72] Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom [GC] (app. nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98), § 46.
[73] "Everyone shall have the right to have any indictment brought against him or her, or his or her rights and obligations in any court action, adjudicated within a reasonable time in a fair and public trial by an independent and impartial court established by an Act."
[74] Karsai 2022, p. 135.
[75] "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence."
[76] Dowsett v. the United Kingdom (app. no. 39482/98), § 40.
[77] Huseyn and Others v. Azerbaijan (app. nos. 35485/05, 45553/05, 35680/05 and 36085/05), § 175.
[78] C.G.P. v. the Netherlands (app. no. 29835/96), §§ 31-38.
[79] Mayzit v. Russia (app. no. 63378/00), § 81.
[80] Makhfi v. France (app. no. 59335/00), § 40.
[81] Kremzow v. Austria (app. no. 12350/86), § 52.
[82] Öcalan v. Turkey [GC] (app. no. 46221/99), § 140.
[83] Rasmussen v. Poland (app. no. 38886/05), § 48.
[84] Foucher v. France (app. no. 22209/93), § 36.
[85] AB Decision 3360/2023. (VI. 19.), Reasoning [22].
[86] AB Decision 6/1998. (III. 11.), ABH 1998, 91, 95-96; AB Decision 209/B/2003., ABH 2008, 1926, 1938; AB Decision 3357/2017. (XII. 22.), Reasoning [61].
[87] AB Decision 3360/2023. (VII. 19.), Reasoning [31].
[88] Bérces Viktor: Emberkép a büntetőeljárásban. A terhelt jogállása jogalkotói és jogalkalmazói szempontból: Hazai megoldások és nemzetközi elvárások. In: Erdődy János - Komáromi László (editors): "Ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram" Emberkép a jogban. Pázmány Press. Budapest, 2024. 428. p.
[89] Even so that electronic access is considered a primary measure in ensuring the right to a fair trial in times of pandemic and martial periods - Andrusyshyn, Bohdan et al. : Right to a Fair Trial in Extraordinary Conditions. The Age of Human Rights Journal 2023/2. p. 4.
[90] Although the presence itself is not part of the text of Article 6 § 1, it can be derived from its object and purpose as a whole. See: Hermi v. Italy [GC] (app. no. 18114/02), § 58.
[91] "Persons subject to criminal proceedings shall have the right to defence at all stages of the procedure. Defence counsels shall not be held liable for their opinion expressed while providing legal defence."
[92] Jussila v. Finland [GC] (app. no. 73053/01), § 40.
[93] Stoichkov v. Bulgaria (app. no. 9808/02), § 56.
[94] Sejdovic v. Italy [GC] (app. no. 56581/00), § 82.
[95] Döry v. Sweden (app. no. 28394/95), § 37.
[96] Jussila v. Finland [GC] (app. no. 73053/01), § 43.
[97] AB Decision 3188/2021. (V. 19.), Reasoning [23]; AB Decision 3410/2023. (X. 11.), Reasoning [29].
[98] AB Decision 15/2016. (IX. 21.), Reasoning [38].
[99] AB Decision 3245/2018. (VII. 11.), Reasoning [21].
[100] AB Decision 3294/2021. (VII. 22.), Reasoning [33].
[101] AB Decision 3303/2020. (VII. 24.), Reasoning [53].
[102] Flower, Lisa: The Digital Courtroom: Participation, Attendance, Engagement and Consumption. Routledge. Abingdon, 2025. p. 26.
[103] Juhász 2016, p. 88.
[104] Juhász 2024, p. 103.
[105] Branstetter, Ben: The Case for Internet Access in Prisons. The Washington Post, 9 February 2015. Accessed via: https://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=32&docid=12355 (date of downloading: 30 March 2026).
[106] Warren, Martyn: The digital vicious cycle: Links between social disadvantage and digital exclusion in rural areas. Telecommunications Policy 6-7/2007. p. 379.
[107] Recommendation No. R(89)12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Education in Prison, Rule 2 (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13 October 1989 at the 429[th] meeting of the Ministers' Deputies). Accessed via: https://rm.coe.int/09000016804c858f (date of downloading: 30 March 2026).
[108] Martin, Allan: A European framework for digital literacy. Nordic Journal of Digital Literacy 2/2006. p. 155.
[109] Martin 2006, p. 154.
[110] Juhász 2024, pp. 104-105.
[111] Robberechts - Kristel 2020, p. 300.
[112] Lockitt, William George: Technology in Prisons. 11 March 2019. Accessed via: https://williamlockitt.co.uk/download/technology-in-prisons/ (date of downloading: 30 March 2026).
[113] https://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/CSJJ8671-Digital-In-Prisons-INTS-210114-WEB.pdf (date of downloading: 30 March 2026).
[114] Monteero, Angélica- Barros, Rita - Leite, Carlinda: Lifelong learning through e-learning in European prisons: Rethinking digital and social inclusion. Proceedings of INTED2015 Conference 2[nd]-4[th] March 2015, Madrid, Spain. 1044. p. Accessed via: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281441754_Lifelong_learning_through_e-learning_in_european_prisons_Rethinking_digital_and_social_inclusion (date of dowloading: 30 March 2026).
Lábjegyzetek:
[1] The author is doctoral student, University of Szeged Faculty of Law and Political Sciences Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Science; https://orcid.org/0009-0000-7653-7929.
Visszaugrás
