The establishment of constituencies is rarely mentioned among the basic requirements of a democratic election. The modification of the compensatory electoral system established during the political changes of 1989-90 increased the importance of the regulation of the number of voters in a constituency, the number of constituencies and their territorial borders-both in terms of parliamentary and local council elections. According to Section 3 of Act CCIII of 2011 on the Elections of Members of Parliament (hereinafter referred to as MP Elections Act), the 199 parliament seats can be divided into 106 seats for MPs elected in single-member constituencies and 93 seats for MPs from national lists. In the new system of compensation, the adding of votes casted for the winning mandate to the compensation list is a clear proof of the decisive gravity of the parliamentary single-member constituencies.[1]
The mixed electoral system of local councils is in a similar situation because the number of mandates on the compensation list has significantly decreased in comparison to the number of councillors elected in single-member constituencies. For instance, the provisions of Chapter II of Act L of 2010 on the Election of Municipal Representatives and Mayors (hereinafter referred to as the Municipal Elections Act) set out that a local council consisting of 16 councillors shall have 12 councillors elected in individual constituencies and 5 councillors from the compensation list.
According to the first sentence of Section 47(2) of Act CLXXXIX of 2011 on Hungary's Local Governments (hereinafter referred to as Hungary's Local Governments Act), adoption of any proposal requiring simple majority requires the "yea" votes of the councillors present, those requiring super-majority require the "yea" vote of more than half of all the councillors. Due to the changing proportion of individual and compensation mandates, the meaningful participation of councillors of the compensation list in individual decisions has become a mere formality only.
Due to the development and decisive role of the information society, the role of owners of information channels and interest groups influencing it has become more significant, making the legal and institutional safeguard for the elements of the electoral system become the cornerstone for the functioning of a democratic state. In this case, substantive and not formal issues decide whether a state is a democratic one. In my opinion, there are not any levels of democracy between the two, there is no such thing as less democratic or limited democracy.
Such expressions are rather denials of democracy. The individual's need for freedom may differ from this, somebody may feel free even in a non-democratic state as well.
The borders of parliamentary single-member constituencies were specified in the Schedule to Council of Ministers Decree 2/1990 (I. 11.) MT on the Establishment of Single-Member and Regional Parliamentary Constituencies (hereinafter referred to as Council of Ministers Decree). This legal source level regulated the border of constituencies on the basis of a statutory authorisation, as an implementing regulation based on Section 50(2) of Act XXXIV of 1989 on the Election of Members of Parliament (hereinafter referred to as Former MP Elections Act), until it was annulled by Decision No. 193/2010. (XII.8.) AB of the Constitutional Court on 31 December 2011,
The importance of creating the regulation is shown by the fact that the Constitutional Court dealt with this issue beforehand as well[2], when, acting on its own initiative, it found that the Parliament, by failing to perform its duties of legislation, created an unconstitutional situation by failing to fully create the legal prerequisites ensuring the functioning of the requirements resulting from the basic principle of equal voting right in Section 71(1) of Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (hereinafter referred to as Constitution) and called upon the Parliament to
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perform its duties of legislation after the election of the Members of Parliament under Section 20(1) of the Constitution by 30 June 2007. The Constitutional Court rejected, in consideration of the decisions in the foregoing, the motion to establish the unconstitutionality of Schedule No. 2 of Act XXXIV of 1989 on the Election of Members of Parliament and annul them.
The first election based on parliamentary single-member constituencies[3] enshrined in a statutory rule[4] took place at the general election of members of Parliament in 2014. In addition to the level regulating the specification of constituencies not complying with the, nearly a quarter a century old, requirements of constitutionality, the electoral system has also undergone a significant transformation.
The six general elections of members of Parliament between 1990 and 2010 were about the election of 176 members of Parliament from single-member constituencies and 152 members of Parliament from county and capital-city constituencies.[5] Another 58 compensatory mandates were won from the national list of the parties based on the national-level summation of the votes that had not yielded a mandate in the individual or territorial constituencies. In the new electoral system, 106 members of Parliament are elected from single-member constituencies, 93 members of Parliament are elected from national lists.[6]
The dominance of individual constituencies is further strengthened by the fundamental changes of the rules of compensation, which qualify votes given for a candidate not winning a mandate in the individual constituency and the number of votes calculated by substracting the number of votes plus one from the number of votes won by the candidate having won the second most votes after the candidate having won the mandate as fragmentary votes.[7]
If two or more candidates receive the majority of votes with an identical number of votes in any single-member constituency, the votes for every candidate in the particular single-member constituency shall qualify as surplus votes.[8]
In addition to the rearrangement of constituencies, modification of compensation rules resulted in the winner-takes-it-all system, which shows that compensation has lost its gravity and has become a merely symbolic thing. This fact must be emphasised because the requirement of proportionality does not only apply to the specification of the number and borders of constituencies but also the development of the system of compensation. The Constitutional Court rejected[9] the constitutional appeal against the order of the Curia[10] adopted in this subject[11], but made the remark in its decision that the new electoral system which functioned for the first time in practical terms is by nature capable of being modified or its details can be changed. Issues raised by the movers in this regard do however fall within the scope of competence of the Parliament and not the Constitutional Court.
With safeguards regulated in legislative regulations requiring supermajority, the decision of the Constitutional Court laying down the requirement of legal regulation of constituencies[12] decided that a legal regulation adopted with simple majority is sufficient for specifying the borders of specific single-member constituency. This ensures the equality of voting right and the flexibility of the regulation.[13] This decision of the Constitutional Court was adopted upon merging two motions for subsequent constitutional review and a constitutional appeal[14]. The Constitutional Court terminated the procedure in the subject of a constitutional appeal aiming at the exclusion of the application of Section 152 of Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedure (hereinafter referred to as Electoral Procedure Act) and Council of Ministers Decree No. 2/1990. MT on the Establishment of Single-Member and Regional Parliamentary Constituencies in specific cases. The Constitutional Court has found that the legislative provisions contested in the constitutional appeal were applied in a non-appealable court decision[15] which reviewed the decision of election bodies regarding the establishment of wards and the closing of the election registry in connection with interim parliamentary elections during the parliamentary cycle of 2006-2010[16].
Against this background, prohibition of application would have obviously not affected the nonappealably closed specific case, because exclusion of the application of the unconstitutional legal regulation could not have been expected to modify the establishment of wards for an interim parliamentary election held in a previous parliamentary cycle and to so remedy the alleged injury of the mover. It is clear that insufficiency of regulation induced disputes at an interim election held during the non-performance of the Parliament.
The legislator applies a different logic for establishing the single-member constituencies of local councils, Section 66 of Act XXXVI of 2013 on Elec-
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toral Procedure (hereinafter referred to as Electoral Procedure Act) leaves the establishment of constituency borders, under specific statutory requirements with a so-called external player, the municipal clerk acting as the head of the local election office.[17] Single-member constituencies must be so determined that they form a coherent area and the number of voters must be approximately the same.[18] The various social and economic impacts have resulted in moves in a specific direction within the settlement in the recent years, a part of the larger population of microdistricts moved to cheaper weekend houses, and this process was further intensified by the forced moves due to the disproportionate increase of payment burdens due to foreign currency denominated crediting. The large garden plots were parts of previously existing, amoeba-shape single-member constituencies.
The traditional settlement structure consisted of neighbourhoods with their own name and the single-member constituencies of councillors were adjusted to that. Due to the reduced number of single-member constituencies and moves within the settlement, the borders of single-member constituencies had to be rearranged to ensure an approximately same number of voters.[19]
Opinion No. 190/2002. of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (hereinafter referred to as Venice Commission)[20], functioning as an advisory body of the Council of Europe, summarises the requirement of even distribution of mandates among constituencies as follows:
- the seats representing the people are distributed equally among the constituencies, in accordance with a specific apportionment criterion, e.g. the number of residents in the constituency, the number of resident nationals (including minors), the number of registered electors, or possibly the number of people actually voting;
- constituency boundaries may also be determined on the basis of geographical criteria and the administrative or indeed historic boundary lines, which often depend on geography;
- the maximum admissible departure from the distribution criterion adopted depends on the individual situation, although it should seldom exceed 10% and never 15%, except in really exceptional circumstances (a demographically weak administrative unit of the same importance as others with at least one lower-chamber representative, or concentration of a specific national minority);
- in order to avoid passive electoral geometry, seats should be redistributed at least every ten years, preferably outside election periods;
- if constituency borders are redrawn, the following criteria must apply: impartiality, exclusion of any disadvantages to national minorities, hearing the opinion of a commission comprising a majority of independent members.
It must be mentioned that, for the determination of constituency borders, the Venice Commission assumes that the best solution would be to submit the problem in the first instance to a commission comprising, preferably, a geographer, a sociologist, a balanced representation of the parties and, where appropriate, representatives of national minorities.
In the Hungarian regulations, the above principles function as follows: the maximum permissible deviation from the arithmetical mean of voters in a single-member constituency - taking the specificities of settlement structure, geography and other features also into account - is fifteen percent.[21] Within these limits, it is the municipal clerk, as the head of the election office, who makes the decision.
We must mention the action of the head of the National Election Office[22] regarding the determination of single-member constituencies, which served as guidance to the decisions of the heads of local election offices, summarising the requirement of constituency revision.
Regarding the making of this decision, not only the person making the decision and the legal safeguards for professional independence necessary for the decision must be investigated, but also the forum adopting decisions in the review proceeding. Until 21 April 2013, Section 102(2) of the Electoral Procedure Act provided as follows: the number, serial number and area of single-member constituencies shall be established by the head of the local election office on the basis of the population applicable on 1 January in the year of the general election of local council councillors and mayors and he/she shall disclose such decision in a locally customary manner until 28 February. Based on Paragraph (3) of this Section, decision of the head of the local election office made under Paragraph (1) and (2) may be objected within 2 days after the promulgation thereof at the head of the territorial election office. Objection against the decision of the head of the local election office adopted under
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Paragraph (2) hereof may be submitted under reference to the infringement of Section 9(1).
The head of the territorial election office shall decide on the objection within 2 days. The head of the territorial election office shall either uphold or modify the contested decision. No further legal remedy may be sought.[23]
This regulation was modified by Section 30 of Act LXXXIX of 2013 on the Amendment of Act XXXVI of 2013 on the Electoral Procedure, changing the forum of legal remedy, therefore, the request for judicial review against the decision of the head of the local election office on the creation and revision of single-member constituencies may be submitted during the period of disclosure. The request shall be assessed by the regional court."[24]
The municipal clerk, who - under the law - acts as the head of the local election office, may not be instructed by the local council or the mayor, only by the superior election bodies and the election commission for his/her jurisdiction, but only regarding its duties as commission secretary.[25] Technical activities of election offices are overseen by the president of the National Election Office.
The special nature of the election procedure is demonstrated by the fact that the president of the National Election Office may give direct instructions to the head of the election office in questions related to the tasks specified by the election procedure act.[26] After the councillors say their vows, they shall attend the mandatory training organised by the government office within three months and the mayors are invited to such trainings as well.[27] These trainings shall lay special emphasis on the independence of the head of the election office during the election procedure, because it is not known to elected persons and is a source of many conflicts. Respecting professional and organisational independence during the election is rather a matter of human factors, attitude as some kind of self-control. The conflict is intensified by the fact that the result of the election is often a personal matter, and existential issue, which is valuated by one's neighbourhood, friends and family.
From the point of view of safeguards, it is important that the rules for appointing municipal clerks have changed on 28 December 2012. Section 6 of Act CCIX of 2012 on the modification of certain Acts in connection with the Parliament and local governments modified Section 82(1) of Hungary's Local Governments Act, which provision qualifies as cardinal under Article 31(3) of the Fundamental Law, therefore its adoption and modification requires the two thirds of the votes of the members of parliament present.[28] The municipal clerk is still appointed through a call for applications, but not by the local council, but the mayor him- or herself.
This means an even more stronger dependence from the mayor than before. Previously, the mayor could exercise other employer's rights over the municipal clerk, after the amendment however, the mayor may exercise the full scope of employer's rights, including the dismissal as well. The dependence is further nuanced by the adoption of the act on the legal status of public officers in the same year.
Sections 63(2) and 66(1) of Act CXCIX of 2011 on Public Service Officials (hereinafter referred to as Public Service Officials Act) introduced unworthiness and loss of trust as reasons for dismissal, these are however difficult to define, and difficult to subject to substantive assessment in the court practice as a result of labour disputes.
Independence of the head of the National Election Office, which is on the top of election bodies, is guaranteed by a strict legal provision.[29] This is in sharp contract with the legal safeguards provided to heads of election offices on the lowers levels of the system of election organisation. The revision of regulation under uniform principles would be appropriate, strengthening the technical independence of the heads of election offices.
Raising regulations from the level of decrees to the level of acts of Parliament - which does not only mean the a change of legal source level, but broader publicity, a chance for debate, which is a basic prerequisite to the adoption of a better bill and decision requiring broader consensus - is an exception on account of the amendment of the regulations meeting the decision[30] of the Constitutional Court before the amendments of legal regulations applied to the 2014 parliamentary elections. The decision of the Constitutional Court requiring statutory regularisation of constituencies[31] regards acts of Parliament adopted with simple majority as sufficient in the course of determining parliamentary single-member constituencies, providing that the principles for determining the constituencies are adopted with supermajority. Act CCIII of 2011 on the Elections of Members of Parliament (herein-
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after referred to as MP Elections Act), however -especially its Section 24 - qualifies the entire act, including its Schedules, as cardinal[32]. The Constitutional Court found the act adopted with simple majority fit for determining constituency borders due to the functioning of equal voting rights and the flexibility of the regulation. The legislation still requires supermajority for the act having entered into force on 1 January 2012. This means broader consensus, which is positive, but makes it more difficult to perform the requirement in Section 4(6) of the MP Elections Act, which provides that Parliament shall modify Schedule No. 2 to the MP Elections Act if the difference between the number of voters of the single-member constituency and the national mean of the number of voters of single-member constituencies is more than twenty percent. Irrespective of the functioning of this rule, the constituency limits referred to in the act requiring supermajority also question the functioning of the revision at specified intervals.
The new electoral system means that compensation goes into the opposite direction, it overcompensates the winner and does not limit the exercise of power but strengthens it. If we applied the rules pertaining to the 2010 election of MPs, the quantified results of the 2014 elections of MPs would not have resulted in a supermajority in the Parliament.[33]
The determination of parliamentary singlemember constituencies with supermajority[34] decision, in consideration of the aspects of safeguards[35] and the evolution of forces in the Parliament means some kind of cementation, because nearly one year after the 2014 general election of MPs, due to the resignation of a government MP appointed as a commissioner of the European Commission, on 22 February 2015, the government majority lost its supermajority at an interim election of MP.
The question arises: if we leave the determination and modification of single-member constituencies of local councils to a person outside the elected body concerned, then is there such a person for determining and modifying parliamentary single-member constituencies? The president of the National Election Office, as the head of an autonomous public administration body, appointed for nine years by the President of the Republic, upon the proposal of the prime minister, might be fit for the making of such decision, with appropriate legal remedy. One can lodge an appeal against a decision of the National Election Office with the Curia, therefore, in this case, it would be practical to designate the Curia as the forum of legal remedy. Another safeguard would be the election of the president of the National Election Office by the Parliament, among the personnel decisions requiring supermajority. All I want to indicate is the direction to strengthen safeguards, in my search for answers for the modification of the rules pertaining to safeguards requiring comprehensive changes of legal regulations. By defining the legal source level[36], the Constitutional Court sets the determination of parliamentary constituencies to the level of Acts of Parliament, in the case of local governments however - in the absence of the relevant motion -, it did not deal with the issues of safeguards concerning the one-man decisions of the municipal clerk, the head of the local election office.
The establishment and modification of the single-member constituencies of local councils requires, under unchanged regulation, that the independence of the head of the election office is real and not only declarative. This is not the simple restoration of the previous regularisation, because dependence on local councils is not an appropriate safeguard. Especially the transformation of the electoral system[37] reduced the number of councillors holding a compensation mandate in settlements with more than 10,000 inhabitants and districts of Budapest, which results in a disproportionate minority in comparison with the number of councillors holding a mandate of their single-member constituency, while the order of decision-making has not changed.[38] Compensation, as a designation has become void.
As a result of the size of the settlement, the mixed electoral system provides a greater role to the nominating organisations[39], which usually means the majority of councillors from single-member constituencies, nominated by the organisation giving the mayor as well, in the local council.
There are different results as well, which, if everything goes well, get resolved either through an agreement or with an interim election, their number is however low, and this is typical of smaller settlements only, not the local councils elected in the mixed election system.
The past quarter century spent with the restoration of self-governance saw several occasions where the idea of strengthening the position of the
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municipal clerk was raised, embracing solutions from the state-approved appointment to state-appointment. The municipal clerks themselves are divided in this issue, irrespective of their personal situation. There have been municipal clerks who held their office for multiple cycles, his/her personal authority was strong enough to keep his/her position even despite the members of the local council changed. In such cases, the position got stable, and the mayor was not changed and could establish a good cooperation with the municipal clerk. This is however not the general case, but an exception. Their professional recognition made them significant influences in the regulatory process and they rejected the intervention of the state into the appointment of the municipal clerk. The other side, being sensitive to the local council and the mayor, wanted some state control, protection so that they can do their job without any influencing. The dispute was not closed, the current rules provide that the mayor appoints the municipal clerk.
The restructuring of public administration, the restoration of district offices from 1 January 2013, Section 20/A of Act CCX of 2012 on the Amendment of Regulations Relating to Budapest and County Government Agencies, and on the Amendment of Act CXL of 2004 on the General Rules of Administrative Proceedings and Services and Certain Related Acts (hereinafter referred to as Amendment Act concerning Government Agencies) strengthens the role of the state.
Public administration tasks are gradually taken over from local government offices. After the district offices were set up, the offices of government issued documents - today: government windows -were taken over, which previously used to provide IT support in election matters.
As a result of the various IT developments, the electoral procedure runs from the establishment of constituencies to the nomination of candidates to the establishment of results on the portal operated by the National Election Office. Every election event must be recorded here. The organisational changes in the year preceding the 2014 MP, MEP and local council elections put the heads of local election offices into a situation they had to respond to with an appropriate organisational answer.
There were physical limits as well: wherever there was an office of government issued documents, it was not always located in the building of the city hall. Working through the district office is non-feasible in organisational terms, the head of the election office does not have any employer's rights over the people who work there. The election procedure is characterised by short procedural deadlines and working hours outside the scope of statutory working hours.
The different settlements have found mixed solutions from verbal agreements to the provisional or final relocation of the officer familiar with the use of the election IT system. The people who worked in the office of government issued documents knew how to use the software of the election procedure. Technically it were the so-called ASZA[40] computers used for civil registration purposes that enabled access in larger numbers, ensuring connection to the electronic system used during the elections.
The majority followed this organisational model, based on opinions created in various forums, unions of municipal clerks, they had registrars and supporting members of the election office do the IT tasks of elections during the 2014 MP, MEP and local council elections.
Proposals of the State Reform Commission[41] included the reorganisation of registrars into the district offices - as they performed public administration duties - but this would have required the complete reorganisation of the activities of election offices. Registration related administrative management is still dealt with the mayors' offices of local councils, no legal regulation has come out that would have ordered any reorganisation into district offices. The direction of organisational changes does not point outside the government offices, many state administration tasks on county level go to district level. This can conserve the electoral organisational system set up in 2014, which -in addition to its constraint-made character - was set up within the legal and technical framework by those who work during elections with a view to efficiency. This fact is on its own a criticism of legislation in this field.
Transferring the tasks of election offices to district offices did not even arise in the proposals, irrespective of the fact that the district officers have the ideal technical and personnel background. According to the conditions for employment[42], the appointment of the head of the district office is a political appointment and not a technical one, because it recognises MP experience, experience gained as the chairperson of the county council or as a mayor as public administration experience.
Against the background outlined above, strengthening the stability and technical independence of the position of municipal clerk, occasional reinforcement of the IT system used for civil
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registration purposes or the creation of register offices and ordering them under an autonomous state administration body may ensure an appropriate institutional safeguard protected from influence in the field of organisational and legal safeguards. In both cases, the registrars are the ones who are the most accessible to the voters because they are present in every local government office, while from smaller settlements, one has to travel to government offices, which, besides local government elections, means a greater cost and time allocation in case of parliamentary elections. Reduction of the number of parliamentary individual constituencies and their growing area at the same time does consider the proportionate number of voters in the first place, and not the travel options.
In summary, transformation of the electoral system before the 2014 elections requires the modification of institutional and legal safeguards, which can be done with the strengthening of legal safeguards in the existing institutional framework. The question arises: what is the earliest time when this legislative amendment can be submitted, considering the election year?
In my opinion - since the strengthening of safeguards does not affect the result of elections, as it is the case with the number of eats and the transformation of the compensation system -, the amendment can be implemented at any time before the calling of the election: in case of any major organisational change (establishment of a new organisation, selection, appointment of its head), the amendment should precede the calling of the election with at least one year. So was the National Election Office established in 2013.[43]
The comparison of the rules for establishing and modifying parliamentary and local council single-member constituencies sheds light to the fact that it would be appropriate to elaborate rules resting on the same principles while strengthening the appropriate legal and institutional frameworks as well. Different regulations in any similar or identical scope of regulations, as in the right to vote, cause disturbances and uncertainty. Any distinction that is difficult to explain does deteriorate the public trust. A good example for this is the decision of the Curia, which it adopted after assessing one of the latest requests for review,[44] which makes distinctions in procedural matters of national and local referenda after an act amendment adopted in 2016.
Act XLVIII of 2016 (hereinafter referred to Modifying Act) on the modification of Act CCXXXVIII of 2013 on Initiating Referendums, the European Citizens' Initiative and Referendum Procedure (hereinafter referred to as Referendum Act) modified the moratorium rule for submitting referendum requests in case of calling national referenda only, and it left the provisions concerning local referenda unchanged. In order to avoid coherence disturbances, an amendment of legislation may not be the response of the legislator to an unprecedented and scandalous event, but the procedure must be reviewed for the entire institutional framework.
The scandal that happened in the building of the National Election Office on 23 February 2016 and became known as the attack of the bald in the public discourse caused such a grave crisis in public trust that the Government submitted a bill[45] on 1 April 2016. The reasoning argued that the bill aimed at a significant easing of the so-called submission moratorium.
For national referenda, the rule applicable for the so-called parallel submission moratory[46] provided that, after submitting the question for the referendum, no question may be submitted in the same subject until the decision refusing to validate the question becomes final and non-appealable. This means that, in the same subject, if the National Election Offices refuses to validate the question, newer questions can be submitted after the refusing decision becomes final and non-appealable.
Upon the scandalous submission of the referendum initiative regarding the so-called Sunday closure of shops, the dispute around the interpretation of the law became intense again, namely: when is the time of becoming non-appealable and when can new requests for referendum be submitted.
In order to clearly settle the issue above and to prevent any newer events that could threat public trust, the Parliament adopted the Modifying Act. As a result of the modification, it is not the nonappealability of decision refusing the validation of a question that governs national referenda. Based on the new statutory rule[47] no question with similar subject may be submitted after a non-appealable decision of the National Election Commission under Section 22(3) of the Referendum Act finds that the number of valid signatures is at least two hundred thousand. Accordingly, multiple questions with the same subject can be submitted for national referendum and that one will have the priority which first submits the two hundred thousand signatures necessary for the ordering of the mandatory referendum.
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The Modifying Act did not consider the parallel submission moratorium[48] in case of local referenda. Based on the unchanged regulations[49], after submitting the question, no question with similar subject can be submitted until the decision refusing the validation of the already submitted question becomes non-appealable. This means that, in case of local referenda, a new question with the same subject can be submitted, if the decision of the election commission on the refusal of the validation of the first question has become non-appealable.
The reasoning of the above-cited decision of the Curia clearly shows that unjustified distinctions in the regulations, either at the adoption or modification of a legal regulation, causes disturbances in the application of the law and deteriorates the public trust.
In conclusion, I think it is important to draw attention to the fact that public trust, acceptance of decisions adopted by election bodies and the forums participating in legal remedies are cornerstones of the entire election procedure. No matter how much they meet legislation in force, decisions adopted in procedures regulated by non-uniform principles can shake the public trust laid in the entire institutional system. These referendum questions are the tests of direct exercise of power, and in case of elections, that of the legitimation of elected bodies.
The determination of parliamentary and local council single-member constituencies requires such a decision-making process and the relevant rules of procedure, under uniform principles -considering the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the opinion of the Venice Commission[50] - that functions as a mutually accepted set of rules for each party to the election procedure. This allows for real legitimation where nobody can question the winner. ■
NOTES
* This paper has been made within the framework of the programmes initiated by the Hungarian Ministry of Justice to raise the standard of legal education.
[1] Section 15(1)(b) of the MP Elections Act
[2] Decision No. 22/2005. (VI. 17.) AB of the Constitutional Court
[3] Schedule No. 1 to the MP Elections Act
[4] Decision No. 64/1991. (XII.17.) AB of the Constitutional Court
[5] Section 4(2) of the former MP Elections Act
[6] Section 3(2) of the MP Elections Act
[7] Section 15(1) of the MP Elections Act
[8] Section 15(2) of the MP Elections Act
[9] Decision No. 3141/2014. (V.9) AB of the Constitutional Court
[10] The agreement between the Curia and the Doctoral Schools contributed to the success of the research project
[11] Order No. Kvk.III.37.512/2014/3.
[12] Decision No. 193/2010. (XII. 8.) AB of the Constitutional Court
[13] Eszter Bodnár: Alkotmányjogi dilemmák az új országgyűlési választási törvénnyel kapcsolatban [Constitutional Law Dilemmas concerning the new MP Elections Act] Közjogi Szemle [Public Law Review], 2012. vol. 5. no. 1, 40-48 p
[14] Section 28(1) of Decision No. 2/2009. (I. 12.) Tü. on the Provisional rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court and its Disclosure (in. Official Journal of the Constitutional Court, issued on 3 January 2009, hereinafter referred to as Rules of Procedure)
[15] Order No. 23.Kpk.45.060/2009/2 of Budapest-Capital Court
[16] Decision No. 12/2009. (I. 14.) FVB of Budapest-Capital Election Commission, Decision No. 36/2009. (I. 11.) 12.sz. OEVB of the Election Commission of Parliamentary Single-Member Constituency No. 12. in Budapest
[17] Imre Mózes: Egyéni választókerületek arányosságaaránytalansága [Proportionality and Disproportionality of Single-Member Constituencies], Jegyző és Közigazgatás [Municipal Clerk and Public Administration], 2010/5 40-48 p
[18] Section 306/A(2) of the Electoral Procedure Act
[19] Eszter Bodnár: Alkotmányjogi dilemmák az új országgyűlési választási törvénnyel kapcsolatban [Constitutional Law Dilemmas concerning the new MP Elections Act] Közjogi Szemle [Public Law Review], 2012. vol. 5. no. 1, 40-48 p
[20] European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission): Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (Opinion no. 190/2002), Strasbourg, 23 May 2003[2.2.]6-7.
[21] Section 306/A(3) of the Electoral Procedure Act.
[22] Action No. 18/2010. (VI.25.) OVI
[23] Ákos Cserny: A választójogi szabályozás néhány aktuális kérdése a 2010. évi választások tükrében [Some actual questions of regulation of the right to vote, in light of the elections of 2010] Új Magyar Közigazgatás [New Hungarian Public Administration], 2010. vol. 3. no. 12, 15-23 p
[24] Section 307/Q of the Electoral Procedure Act
[25] Section 71 of the Electoral Procedure Act
[26] Section 71(2) of the Electoral Procedure Act
[27] Section 32(2)(j) of Hungary's Local Governments Acts
[28] Article T(4) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary
[29] Section 60 of the Electoral Procedure Act, which qualifies as cardinal under the regulation in Section 354(1) of the same act.
[30] Decision No. 193/2010. (XII. 8.) AB of the Constitutional Court
[31] Decision No. 193/2010. (XII. 8.) AB of the Constitutional Court
[32] Article XXIII(4) and Article 2(1) and (2) of the Fundamental Law
[33] János Mécs: On the constitutionality of winner-compensation, judgment of positive fragmentary votes in light of equal voting rights, 2014 Elections in Hungary, Actual issues of public law and politics ELTE Bibó István Szakkolégium
[34] Decision No. 4/1993. (II. 12.) of the Constitutional Court
[35] Zoltán Pozsár-Szentmiklósy: Decision of the Constitutional Court on the regulation of the areas of parliamentary single-meber constituencies. A választójog érvényesítéséhez szükséges részletszabályok rendeleti szintű szabályozásának alkotmányellenességéről [About the unconstitutionality of regulating detailed rules necessary for the functioning of voting rights] Jogesetek Magyarázata [Explanation of Legal Cases], 2011. vol. 2. no. 3, 18-21 p
[36] Decision No. 193/2010. (XII. 8.) AB of the Constitutional Court
[37] Section 5 of the Municipal Elections Act.
[38] Section 47(2) of Hungary's Local Governments Acts
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[39] Section 3(3) of the Electoral Procedure Act
[40] Electronic Civil Registration System
[41] Pursuant to Section 30(1) of Act XLIII of 2010 on Central Administrative Bodies and on the Legal Status of Ministers and State Secretaries, the Government set up a consultative body with Government Decree No. 1602/2014. (XI. 4.) Korm. on the setting up of the State Reform Commission.
[42] Section 20/D(2) of the Amendment Act concerning Government Agencies
[43] Section 347 of the Electoral Procedure Act 3 May 2013 Appointment of the President as from 24 May 2013, Decision No. 247/2013. (V. 27.) KE.
[45] Bill No. T/9894.
[46] Section 8(1)(b) of the Referendum Act
[47] Section 8(a) of the Referendum Act
[48] Section 38 of the Referendum Act
[49] Section 38(1)(b) of the Referendum Act
[50] European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission): Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters (Opinion no.190/2002), Strasbourg, 23 May 2003[2.2.]6-7.
Lábjegyzetek:
[1] The author is PhD student, Doctoral School of the Faculty of Law at the University of Pécs.
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