https://doi.org/10.56749/annales.elteajk.2024.lxiii.11.203
This is a summary of my habilitation lecture given on 29 November 2023. The research on which the lecture is based was conducted within the framework of the MTA Bolyai Scholarship, and during the same period I also conducted postdoctoral research within the framework of the National Research, Development and Innovation Office Postdoctoral Excellence Program, entitled The State of Emergency in the Era of Global Ecological and Pandemic Crisis.[1]
We have entered an era of overlapping crises (polycrisis). The authoritarian populist right-wing has rapidly reemerged in the field of authoritarian state and emergency governance. Moreover, the COVID-19 crisis has given new impetus to this phenomenon. The failures of liberal democracy, which can be called "neo-Weimarisation", have opened the way to authoritarian right-wing populism. The rise of authoritarian populism and extraordinary measures of governance have fundamentally changed the relationship between law and politics. I will examine the impact of extraordinary governance measures (EGM) on democracy and the structure of law. Overlapping states of exception lead to several dilemmas, as governing by extraordinary measures is not inherently undemocratic. However, if the executive power primarily performs its tasks in an extraordinary manner, this has very serious social and political consequences, and it also leaves its mark on democracy. At the same time, governments have shifted strongly towards a kind of crisis management direction, which provides incredible opportunities to govern by EGMs, but also takes us incredibly far away from any kind of political or social normality. In examining the practice of exceptional governance in autocracies, one of the most important issues is the impact of political governance on constitutionalism,
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the legal system, and the law itself. Under a state of exception, the law becomes an instrument of political voluntarism and loses its autonomy.
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that the separation of war from politics was a fundamental goal of modern political thought and practice among both liberal and non-liberal political theorists.[3] This consensus has collapsed, and authoritarian populist regimes are introducing the kinds of permanent states of exception elaborated by Giorgio Agamben.[4] As Michael Head states: "The early years of the twenty-first century have seen increasing resort to emergency-type powers or claims of supra-legal executive authority, including by the Western countries regarded as the world's leading democracies."[5] Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and global social crises, the rise of emergency powers defines our time more than ever. The solid contours of war have disappeared. Moreover, war and peace are mixed up, and the emerging states of exception indicate these tendencies remarkably well. Authoritarian populist regimes sense these trends and prefer to use emergency measures of government. These systems are using the power of the police/penal state to create political enemies and annihilate them as modern forms of homo sacer.[6] The state of exception and modern forms of deprived social groups, understood as contemporary homo sacer, have become the main accompanying components of the authoritarian populist regimes of our time.
Authoritarian populism is about the use of exceptional measures to maintain political power, and the COVID-19 crisis has given new impetus to this phenomenon. According to Agamben,[7] there has been a seminal transformation in conjunction with the idea of government, "which overturns the traditional hierarchical relation between causes and effects. Since governing the causes is difficult and expensive, it is
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safer and more useful to try to govern the effects".[8] Authoritarian populist regimes have started to manage the effects of the crisis they have created, and this is a considerable change. Agamben described this situation in the following way: "The ancient regime aimed to rule the causes; modernity pretends to control the effects. And this axiom applies to every domain, from the economy to ecology, from foreign and military politics to the internal measures of police. We must realize that European governments today have given up any attempt to rule the causes, they only want to govern the effects."[9] Exceptional or putative exceptional situations offer authoritarian populist regimes a convenient opportunity to criminalise political groups and claim that these groups are enemies and that the regime is protecting people from these enemies they have created. This is a situation where the normal processes of governing are replaced by police forces, and the normal situation becomes exceptional, during which anything is conceivable.[10]
The major challenge of exceptional measures is thus how to preserve the status quo (i.e. the existing 'normality', the democracy to be defended), which is to be protected by exceptional means, while at the same time granting the executive extraordinary powers.[11] This is further complicated by the fact that there may be exceptional situations (e.g., natural or industrial disasters, war, or epidemics) that require rapid and effective mechanisms to address and when there simply is not enough time to operate the normal democratic process of constitutional decision-making. It is to resolve this dilemma that the rules of liberal constitutionalism have been developed - to ensure the rule of law and the system of checks and balances that also apply even in times of emergency, the basic idea being that the executive, when brought into a situation, cannot make any definitive constitutional changes during the emergency, the main aim being to manage the dangerous situation and "rescue" normality.[12]
The constitutional system of the exercise of exceptional power has been significantly influenced by the Roman legal tradition through republican political thought, as the elaborate Roman legal system incorporated a number of fundamental limits and checks and balances on the executive. On the one hand, this ensured the rights to which Roman citizens were accustomed, but on the other hand, it resulted in a rather cumbersome system of responding to various crises, whereby in the event of an emergency the Roman Senate could order the consuls to appoint a dictator for a period
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of six months.[13] The Roman legal system was rather conservative, since a dictator was entitled to suspend rights and various legal procedures, and to deploy military and other forces to avert threats to the republic, but when he had finished this work he had to resign, and his decrees and their legal effects were terminated, i.e. the original 'normal' state had to be restored. Exceptional legal measures in modern constitutional democracies follow a similar conservative approach: that is, emergency powers are intended to deal with temporary situations and to create a situation in which a normal constitutional system of rights and procedures can be restored.[14] As Ferejohn and Pasquino have argued, Niccolo Machiavelli, James Harrington and Jean-Jacques Rousseau constitute the theoretical mediators through which the institution of the Roman dictator has grounded debates in modern constitutional and political history about the exceptional exercise of power.[15] Carl Schmitt plays a key role in this debate, which has resurfaced in the context of the crises of our time, following the period between the two world wars. The German constitutional lawyer examined the question of exceptional governance within the framework of sovereignty[16] and linked it to the unlimited power of the executive.[17] For this reason, it is crucial to outline the historical circumstances in which the contingency models introduced in the context of COVID-19 are to be assessed: in the second section of this paper, it is argued that both in the inter-war period and during contemporary governance regimes, the practice of governing by extraordinary measures (with its many dangers) has come to the fore, thus, while the onset of the pandemic posed an unexpected challenge to nation-state governments, the extraordinary practices that have been adopted in many places are far from without historical antecedent.
V-Dem research (from before the COVID-19 pandemic) showed that there is a positive correlation between an undemocratic (authoritarian) turn and governance by extraordinary measures: countries affected by emergency measures are 59% more likely
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to experience a downturn than those without.[19] The authors therefore proposed viewing the state of emergency "as a potential symptom and accelerator of autocratization processes. Like a fever, they are a strong warning sign that something maybe wrong with the state of democracy and that autocratization might be under the way."[20] In other words, exceptional governance measures and special legal orders can be both a cause and a consequence of democratic decline.[21] This makes it important to examine the intentions of the leader of the executive when judging the use of exceptional measures of governance and for the public to monitor them continuously, so that the former does not exceed their mandate in terms of either substance or timing, and uses exceptional means genuinely to defend the democratic order (to restore it) and not to authoritatively reinforce their own position.
One of the most comprehensive such studies was conducted by Ginsburg and Versteeg, who compiled a substantial database and collected information on the pandemic response in some 106 countries until mid-July 2020.[22] The authors examined the emergency governance in the context of the pandemic, basically in line with the framework of the emergency models presented above, with one of the main aspects being the state of legislatures and courts during the pandemic. The authors found that the most common response to a pandemic was to resort to an element of the legislative model, with 52% of the countries they studied relying on legislation in their response. The latter include, among others, large democracies such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, the United States, Australia, Belgium, Taiwan, South Korea, South Africa and Japan.[23] The vast majority of countries surveyed by Ginsburg and Versteeg, 89%, have detailed constitutional emergency legislation, while only 43% have declared such a constitutionally based emergency (compared to 40% of the total sample), including Spain, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Armenia, Sierra Leone and Senegal.[24] Ginsburg and Versteeg's data collection also highlights another interesting aspect: the activation of emergency provisions in constitutions is not primarily dependent on whether the regime is authoritarian, as 42% of democratic regimes and 33% of authoritarian regimes have made use of this option.[25] However, there have also been cases (China, Cuba, Cameroon, Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Cambodia, Rwanda, Laos and Tanzania) when emergency
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governance was based solely on executive measures and the legal basis for the measures taken was not clarified.[26]
The investigation also provided an opportunity to assess the checks and balances on the executive during the emergency period, namely the legislatures, the courts and sub-national (e.g. local officials, municipalities, member states of federal states) checks and balances. In 64% of the countries studied by Ginsburg and Versteeg, the legislature was directly involved in the management of the pandemic (a state of emergency was declared or extended, or new legislation was adopted). In 75% of the countries responding under the constitutional model, the legislature had to declare or extend a state of emergency, while in 45% of the countries responding under the legislative model, the legislature passed new laws to deal with the pandemic, but in 72% of these countries the laws were temporary and only applied to the COVID-19 pandemic.[27] The strength of democratic controls and institutional resilience is demonstrated by the fact that in 52% of the countries studied, legislatures were continuously involved in the fight against the pandemic (68% in democratic countries, but even 30% in authoritarian regimes) and thus in counteracting the executive.[28] In 41% of the countries studied by Ginsburg and Versteeg, the judiciary was directly involved in the response to the pandemic. The courts were involved in 55% of democracies and 27% of authoritarian regimes:[29] such control included ensuring compliance with procedural requirements; in the case of disproportionate and unnecessary violations of fundamental rights, the courts could take the initiative to prevent or lift a blockade; further, the courts could call for concrete action by the executive to fulfil its constitutional obligation.[30] In 34% of the countries surveyed, countervailing forces against extraordinary measures emerged at the sub-national level, and in 82% of the countries, one or more of these countervailing factors were present at all three levels (legislative, judicial, and sub-national).[31]
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With the crisis of liberal democracy and the legal and political reactions to exceptional circumstances, the constitutional and political reinterpretation of constitutional democracies by authoritarian regimes has begun. The essence of this is to redefine the political sovereignty inherent in the executive and elevate it to a hegemonic position. This requires ignoring the basic assumptions of the previous constitutionalism that prevented the concentration of power and subordinating law as an instrument to politics. As the Weimarisation tendencies of the inter-war period showed, the excessive and persistent hegemony of politics can very easily turn into the totalisation of politics, since a politics freed from its legal and (related and consequent) moral constraints can essentially keep the political community in a state of permanent exception. In other words, even in a changed environment, in an era of objective crises and suspended normality - an inescapable reality in the wake of the global ecological and climate crisis - it will be necessary to maintain the fundamental moral constraints of constitutionalism. The permanent state of exception applied by governments essentially damages the democratic immune system of society and individuals and nips in the bud any mechanisms of social self-defence, and governments exploit this to the full: as we have seen in the analyses of the COVID-19 pandemic, the promise of security has become a political watchword under which mechanisms intended to restrict freedom can be introduced, not for the security of society, but for the political security of government. In the context of 20th-century and contemporary parallels, I have indicated that in many ways there is much to learn from where and how totalitarian politics emerged in the 20th century, but there is also much to learn from the responses.
It is therefore worth recalling here the consequences of the constitutional and legal abuses of National Socialism, as described earlier, which followed the Second World War. I refer to Gustav Radbruch's formula, which he formulated in his work from 1946, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law.[32] According to Radbruch, unjust law must be regarded as "flawed law" when the conflict between law and justice becomes intolerable.[33] Radbruch starts from a critique of German legal positivism: "Positivism, with its principle that 'a law is a law', has in fact rendered the German legal
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profession defenceless against statutes that are arbitrary and criminal".[34] Radbruch takes the conflict between justice and legal certainty as his starting point, and nor does he formulate his famous formula to resolve it: "The conflict between justice and legal certainty may well be resolved in this way: The positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence even when its content is unjust and fails to benefit the people, unless the conflict between statute and justice reaches such an intolerable degree that the statute, as 'flawed law', must yield to justice."[35]
Radbruch also refers to a qualified case in his formulation, for in his view, when there is not even an attempt to enforce the truth in the creation of a particular law (that is, when, in his view, equality is deliberately betrayed by the enactment of the act), it is not only flawed, but lacks legal quality.[36] Radbruch puts it this way: "It is impossible to draw a sharper line between cases of statutory lawlessness and statutes that are valid despite their flaws. One line of distinction, however, can be drawn with utmost clarity: Where there is not even an attempt at justice, where equality, the core of justice, is deliberately betrayed in the issuance of positive law, then the statute is not merely 'flawed law', it lacks completely the very nature of law. For law, including positive law, cannot be otherwise defined than as a system and an institution whose very meaning is to serve justice."[37]
In my view, in the case of law constituted in a state of exception and constituted by the executive as a tool aimed at the concentration of power, we see a shift from "defective law" in the Radbruchian sense to law that is increasingly morally and professionally questionable. I believe that in the 21st century, what we consider to be law needs to be thoroughly revised, since politics is increasingly producing (exceptional) situations in which political norms are given legal normativity uncritically, without controversy, and without social and professional debate. This seriously damages the quality of legislation and, according to the Radbruch formula, its very existence. However, this is not only dangerous for the law, but also for politics, since a policy imposed by legal means loses its deliberative, negotiated character: in other words, its political quality. For all these reasons, Radbruch shows that the apparent national socialist legal order that emerged as a result of the dual state was far from being a national socialist legal order: "Measured by this yardstick, the coherent parts of national socialist law never acquired the dignity of valid law."[38]
Exceptional legal orders and extraordinary measures of governance, rather than defending the normality of the legal and political system (for which they were historically established), have very often become a means of dismantling normality,
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and the use of law as a "weapon" is a key trend in this. In this context, it is worth quoting Kennedy, whose term "lawfare" refers to "law as a weapon, law as a tactical ally, law as a strategic asset, an instrument of war. They observe that law can often accomplish what might once have been done with bombs and missiles: seize and secure territory, send messages about resolve and political seriousness, even break the will of a political opponent."[39] Such a fusion of warfare and law has a very dramatic effect. Moreover, normality and exceptionalism, war and peace, have now become mixed. Kennedy also refers to the observation made in relation to the US military that law can very often be a more effective instrument of war than actual combat (I will give a number of examples in this research, from economic exceptionalism to Guantanamo, of the intertwining of the legal structure of government by extraordinary means in the history of American ideas and politics). Kennedy says: "When the military buys up commercial satellite capacity to deny it to an adversary - contract is their weapon. They could presumably have denied their adversary access to those pictures in many ways. When the United States uses the Security Council to certify lists of terrorists and force seizure of their assets abroad, they have weaponized the law. Those assets might also have been immobilized in other ways. It is not only the use of force that can do these things. Threats can sometimes work. And law often marks the line between what counts as the routine exercise of one's prerogative and a threat to cross that line and exact a penalty."[40]
All this shows that the weaponisation of law is very much connected with the disappearance of the moral content of law (as criticised by Radbruch), and the practically institutionalised form of this is the dual state or autocratic legalism. In other words, the political management of a state of exception, of a state of emergency (historical and modern examples of which we have seen in this volume) that is constantly maintained, necessarily damages law, because as a political instrument it upends the moral and normative content of law, and as we have seen, law without normative embeddedness can only be considered law in a formal sense, not in a substantive sense.
The research aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the impacts and challenges facing the system of law and democracy in the first decades of the 21st century. Three clusters of challenges to liberal democracy and the legal system can be identified: (1) on the one hand, the acute crises of liberal democracy that have been dragging on for decades, in particular the rise of authoritarian populism; (2) on the other hand, with the era of crises comes the era of governance by extraordinary means; here, the emphasis
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is on authoritarian tendencies of extraordinary governance; and, (3) finally, due to the authoritarian tendencies, the nature of legal normativity itself has begun to change. All these phenomena point to the disintegration of the normativity that we have hitherto associated with law and democracy in the historical-geographical system of liberal democracies. The problem for research is therefore whether there may be a return to normality, or more precisely, whether law can henceforth be a guarantee of normality, or whether, in an era of polycrisis, we must accept the primacy of politics and the fact that it (re)constructs normality itself on a daily basis.
The question of normality and the role of law in it is increasingly at the centre of social science research. A very interesting aspect of the dilemma noted here is highlighted by Mark Neocleous, who argues that normality and emergency are not really separable, as if they were two sides of the same coin.[41] He argues that "In separating 'normal' from 'emergency', with the latter deemed 'exceptional', this approach parrots the conventional wisdom that posits normalcy and emergency as two discrete and separable phenomena. This essentially liberal paradigm assumes that there is such a thing as 'normal' order governed by rules, and that the emergency constitutes an 'exception' to this normality. 'Normal' here equates with the separation of powers, entrenched civil liberties, an ongoing debate about public policy and law, and the rule of law, while 'emergencies' are thought to require strong executive rule, little time for discussion, and are premised on the supposedly necessary suspension of the law and thus the discretion to suspend key liberties and rights. But this rests on two deeply ideological assumptions: first, the assumption that emergency rule is aberrational; and, second, an equation of the emergency/nonemergency dichotomy with a distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional action. Thus liberalism seeks to separate emergency rule from the normal constitutional order, thereby preserving the Constitution in its pristine form while providing the executive with the power to act in an emergency."[42]
Petr Agha examines the question of the state of norms in the context of the EU's economic policy and legal paradigms in the context of the integration of Central and Eastern European states.[43] He argues in terms of the rule of law (RoL) that "One primary manifestation of the pursuit of normalcy is the emphasis on the RoL as a foundational EU principle. The discourse on the RoL often revolves around 'good governance' and 'democratic values,' essential components of normalcy. This pursuit aims to restore stability in the face of disruptions, shifting towards legal constitutionalism post-1989. This transition led to counter-majoritarian institutions, juridification across
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policymaking, and the rise of 'legal constitutionalization'. Legal constitutionalism post-1989 recalibrated political dynamics, establishing a network of legal institutions known as the 'juristocracy'. This system emphasizes normalization through harmonized laws across member states for consistency. The link between post-1989 politics and normalization is intricately woven into 'legal constitutionalization', altering governance dynamics and elevating the role of legal norms in shaping the political landscape."[44] All of this, Agha argues, leads to an overlooking of the structural factors that sustain social inequalities, to technocracy, and to an overemphasis on institutional aspects in crises, as well as an underemphasis on social factors.[45] Agha also notes in relation to exceptional situations that "[t]he normalization narrative frames emergencies as abnormalities, reinforcing established institutions' authority and perpetuating the sense of inevitability surrounding existing power dynamics".[46]
Whichever approach one adopts, there is no doubt that the three sets of nodal challenges to liberal democracy and the legal system examined in this volume have made it doubtful that legal normativity can continue to be a guarantee of normality under the system provided by liberal democracy. One can reflect on how liberal democracy (even at the EU level) can be radically transformed; one can argue for the integration of exceptionalism into normality and for treating the two as a unity. However, one thing we cannot do, in my view, is give up the fundamental guarantee of legal normativity, because however we conceive of the relationship between exceptionalism and normality, a legal system that is autonomous and thus constrains politics must have a corollary role in both. ■
NOTES
* This paper was written within the framework of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences' call for proposals for the support of researchers raising children and is an expanded and revised version of the author's earlier Hungarian-language paper.
[1] The research website can be found here: https://www.stateofemergency.hu/ (last accessed: 31.12.2024.).
[2] This section is based on a paper I am currently publishing, in which I explain the points made here in more detail: A. Antal, The Impact of the Exceptional Governance Measures on Democracy and Legal Systems, ELTE Law Journal (forthcoming).
[3] M. Hardt and A. Negri, Multitude. War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (Penguin Publishing Group, New York, 2004) 6.
[4] G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Transl.: D. Heller-Roazen (Stanford University Press, California, 1998); G. Agamben, State of Exception (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005) DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1134d6w.16
[5] M. Head, Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice. The Long Shadow of Carl Schmitt (Routledge, Surrey, 2016) 1. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315563282
[6] Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.
[7] G. Agamben, From the State of Control to a Praxis of Destituent Power, (2014) ROAR Magazine, https://roarmag.org/essays/agamben-destituent-power-democracy/ (last accessed: 31.12.2024.).
[8] See also: Agamben, From the State of Control to a Praxis of Destituent Power.
[9] See also: Agamben, From the State of Control to a Praxis of Destituent Power.
[10] A. Antal, The Rise of Hungarian Populism. State Autocracy and the Orbán Regime (Emerald Publishing, Bingley, 2019) 29-30. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/9781838677510
[11] J. Ferejohn and P. Pasquino, The law of the exception: A typology of emergency powers, (2004) 2 (2) International Journal of Constitutional Law, (210-239) 210. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/2.2.210
[12] See also: Ferejohn and Pasquino, The law of the exception... 211.
[13] See also: Ferejohn and Pasquino, The law of the exception... 211-212.
[14] See also: Ferejohn and Pasquino, The law of the exception... 212.
[15] See also: Ferejohn and Pasquino, The law of the exception... 212.
[16] C. Schmitt, Dictatorship. From the origin of the modern concept of sovereignty to proletarian class struggle (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2014).
[17] T. Ginsburg and M. Versteeg, The Bound Executive: Emergency Powers During the Pandemic, (2020) (52) Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper, 1503. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3608974
[18] This section is based on my forthcoming paper: Antal, The Impact of the Exceptional Governance Measures on Democracy and Legal Systems.
[19] A. Lührmann and B. Rooney, When Democracy Has a Fever: States of Emergency as a Symptom and Accelerator of Autocratization, (2019) (85) V-DEM Working Paper Series, 16. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3345155
[20] See also: Lührmann and B. Rooney, When Democracy Has a Fever... 18.
[21] See also: Lührmann and B. Rooney, When Democracy Has a Fever... 19.
[22] See also: Ginsburg and Versteeg, The Bound Executive... 1513.
[23] See also: Ginsburg and Versteeg, The Bound Executive... 1516.
[24] See also: Ginsburg and Versteeg, The Bound Executive... 1516.
[25] See also: Ginsburg and Versteeg, The Bound Executive... 1516.
[26] See also: Ginsburg and Versteeg, The Bound Executive... 1516.
[27] See also: Ginsburg and Versteeg, The Bound Executive... 1516.
[28] See also: Ginsburg and Versteeg, The Bound Executive... 1517.
[29] See also: Ginsburg and Versteeg, The Bound Executive... 1517.
[30] See also: Ginsburg and Versteeg, The Bound Executive... 1518-1526.
[31] See also: Ginsburg and Versteeg, The Bound Executive... 1517.
[32] G. Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory, (2006) 26 (1) Law Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1-11. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqi041
[33] B. Bix, Radbruch's Formula and Conceptual Analysis, (2011) 56 (1) American Journal of Jurisprudence, 45-57. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ajj/56.1.45
[34] Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory, 6.
[35] See also: Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory, 7.
[36] See also: Bix, Radbruch's Formula and Conceptual Analysis, 46.
[37] See also: Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory, 7.
[38] See also: Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory, 7.
[39] D. Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 2016) 258. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1wf4cz3
[40] See also: Kennedy, A World of Struggle... 258.
[41] M. Neocleous, The Problem with Normality: Taking Exception to "Permanent Emergency", (2006) 31 (2) Alternatives, 191-213. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540603100204
[42] Neocleous, The Problem with Normality... 207.
[43] P. Agha, Reinforcing Institutional Power: The Discourse of Normalcy in European Union Governance, (2024) 16 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00232-5
[44] See also: Agha, Reinforcing Institutional Power...
[45] See also: Agha, Reinforcing Institutional Power...
[46] See also: Agha, Reinforcing Institutional Power...
Lábjegyzetek:
[1] The Author is Dr. habil., Associate Professor, Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Law Institute of Political Science, antal.attila@ajk.elte.hu.
Visszaugrás
