The discussion concerning Poland's accession to the Eurozone is dominated by economists, which is understandable as this issue falls into the scope of economics and public finances. The legal aspect of this issue is said to be considerably narrower than its economic aspect. However, its role is significant as the very constitutional settlements determine starting the process of legal convergence, the realisation of which constitutes a necessary premise of the introduction of the euro in our country.
Public finance is the subject of constitutional regulation. Chapter 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland[1] is dedicated to public finance. The scope and intensity of this regulation covering the status of the National Bank of Poland and the status of the Monetary Policy Council gives rise to the question of the necessity of potential changes within the Constitution of the Republic of Poland resulting from the intention of our country to join the Eurozone. It is worth noticing that we are already in the Eurozone in a way as it is the euro that monetary figures used in the normative acts of the EU law are given in. It is the euro that the long-term financial frameworks as well as the EU budget and funds are drawn up and received. Also, it is the euro that the EU statistics are given in[2]. All this concerns us. However, our participation in the zone must be qualified as incomplete as long as the zloty currency is not replaced by the euro[3].
It is important to realise that we are already on the way to the introduction of the euro. The sequence of considerations on the introduction of the euro is as follows. Firstly, a political decision concerning the introduction of the common currency is made, considering importantly the professional economic reasoning[4], next followed by constitutional and legal decisions which will enable the process of the introduction of the euro to flow as smoothly as possible.
The political decision has already been taken. It was made on 1 May 2004, that is on Poland's accession to the EU. On this day, however, we embarked on a legal path leading to the introduction of the single currency in Poland. The moment of Poland's accession to the EU marked the beginning of Poland's participation in the economic and currency union in the successive stage of its creation, as a member state subject to temporary derogation from the single currency according to Article 122 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 5 of the Act of Accession. A member state with a derogation is exempted from applying certain provisions of the Treaty concerning the currency union. However, we are obliged by the Treaty to do our best to fulfill the required criteria[5] and next introduce the euro[6].
It should be stressed, however, that Article 4 of the Accession Treaty does not determine the date of the introduction of the euro in Poland. Thus, the decision on starting by our government further actions towards the introduction of the euro, the decision on intensifying or slowing down such actions as well as the decision stating the date of the introduction of the euro in Poland, are political decisions considerably dependant - but not entirely though - on the Polish side.
Summing up, according to the Treaty it rests on us to introduce the euro. The only question is not whether but when to adopt the single currency[7]. However, when it should be introduced in Poland is subject to many factors, both external and internal. So for the time being, it is impossible to specify clearly the date of the introduction of the euro in Poland. What is certain, however, is the fact that without the will and determination on the part of Poland, the introduction of the euro in our country will not be possible.
Recently the will of our administration has been revealed to intensify actions towards the introduction of the euro. Another step leading to the fuller participation of the Republic of Poland in the currency union would be adapting Polish legislation, including constitutional legislation in accordance with the incurred obligations, stemming from the Treaty and our will to intensify the participation in the process of European integration. It primarily gives rise to a question of necessity and scope of modifications of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
The necessity of changes in domestic law in connection with the intention to introduce the euro is
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determined by the scale of contradiction between European regulations, such as the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks[8] on the one hand, and Polish constitutional and statutory regulations on the other hand. Thus, it is necessary to achieve the state of legal convergence[9] as stipulated by Article 109 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. Appropriate constitutional and statutory changes should be introduced prior to the decision of the Council of EU on abrogation of the derogation towards Poland, that is on the introduction of the euro in our country.
Poland is clearly delayed in the scope of legislative preparations to the introduction of the euro against a background of other countries still with a derogation, such as Hungary, Estonia or Lithuania or even Sweden being "resistant" to the introduction of the euro. Hence, it should be considered urgent to start work on appropriate modifications in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and modifications in legislation.
The leading modification in the Constitution connected with the intention to receive the euro will concern Article 227, namely it will be necessary to change the constitutional status of the National Bank of Poland as well as the Monetary Policy Council. NB, the National Bank of Poland is one of few central banks in Europe that enjoys constitutional grounds for its activity and relatively big independence.
The National Bank of Poland is a national central bank[10], which is entitled to issue money and pursue monetary policy on the exclusive basis. The NBP is also responsible for the value of our currency (Article 227 section 1). However, in the Eurozone the central bank is the European Central Bank (ECB), which is also a bank of issue in reference to the euro currency. On joining the Eurozone Poland will be included in the uniform monetary policy formulated by the ECB[11]. In the Eurozone the organ which is authorised on the exclusive basis to develop the monetary policy is the Governing Council[12]. This juxtaposition of the constitutional duties of the NBP with the duties of the ECB under the Treaty clearly shows that maintaining Article 227 section 1 in the existing shape seems impossible[13]. In the case of joining the Eurozone, the National Bank of Poland will lose its competence to issue money and will be deprived of the responsibility for the value of the zloty as it will be non-existent.
Also the competences of the Monetary Policy Council will be thoroughly changed (Art. 227 section 2 and 6). The competences of the Monetary Policy Council concerning conducting the monetary policy will be passed to the Governing Council. That can but does not have to mean the liquidation of the Monetary Policy Council. The Governing Council functions within the ESCB as an organ responsible for the development of monetary policy of the states belonging to the Eurozone. It should be determined which specific competences of the Monetary Policy Council will be passed to the Governing Council and which will stay. This settlement will be decisive either for maintaining its constitutional status or for its deconstitutionalisation. One can also consider entrusting the Monetary Policy Council with the role of an advisory organ to the President of the National Bank of Poland. Its potentially advisory status would imply its missing the status of a constitutional organ as well as changing the manner of selecting its members.
The constitutional position of the President of the National Bank of Poland will also be changed[14]. On Poland's accession to the Eurozone he will become ex officio a member of the Governing Council in which he will jointly decide on the development of the monetary policy of the states belonging to the Eurozone. Thus, he will be the only NBP organ with an influence on this policy[15]. In the case of maintaining the Monetary Policy Council as an advisory and consultative body, it would be advisable to quit the solution according to which the President of the National Bank of Poland presides over the Monetary Policy Council (Article 227 section 5). Presiding over the Council enjoying such a status by a managing organ such as the President of the National Bank of Poland in his new role might restrict the Council's objectivism and impartiality.
The constitutional position of the President of the National Bank of Poland comprises among others the principles of his accountability. On the grounds of the Constitution in force he is included in the subjective scope of the Tribunal of State (TS) (Article 198 section 1). It means that the President of the National Bank of Poland holds constitutional accountability, that is the accountability for violating the Constitution or a statute committed within its office[16]. A little differently and in very general terms the premises of his dismissal are determined in the statute of the European System of Central Banks. It provides for the President's recalling only when he does not fulfill the requirements necessary to perform his duties or in the event of his having committed a serious offence. This is giving rise to a question of what relations there are between the constitutional and statutory premises of the accountability of the President of the National Bank of Poland.
Seemingly, a violation of the Constitution or a statute committed within the office may qualify as "a serious offence" according to the statute of the
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ESCB. Hence, it can be discussed whether excluding the President of the National Bank of Poland from the subjective jurisdiction of the Tribunal of State would be necessary. On the other hand, according to the Statute of the ESCB, a decision to dismiss the President of the National Bank of Poland from his office may be appealed against by himself or by the Governing Council to the European Tribunal of Justice. However, Polish regulations do not provide for any possibility of appealing against the final decision of the European Tribunal of Justice[17]. This is undoubtedly a certain technical inconsistency, obviously supporting the exclusion of the President of the National Bank of Poland from the subjective jurisdiction of the Tribunal of State, especially considering that the previous practice of the Tribunal makes one look at it as an organ of an only superficial character.
The remaining, except for the above questioned sections of Article 227, that is sections 3, 4 and 7 might - which does not mean they would have to - be upheld.
It should also be stressed that the activity of the National Bank of Poland is subject to the audit of the Supreme Chamber of Control using the broadest four factor auditing criteria (Article 203 section 1 Constitution of the Republic of Poland). Thus, the activity of the National Bank of Poland is audited by the Supreme Chamber of Control regarding the legality, economic prudence, efficacy and diligence[18]. In the case of joining the Eurozone all the areas of the activity of the National Bank of Poland that will be connected with the functioning of the NBP within the European System of Central Banks should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Chamber of Control. It is the ESCB that will take over, partly at least, the audit competences regarding the NBP, from the Supreme Chamber of Control.
Passing the above mentioned proposed amendments in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland would constitute an important signal of achieving a broad parliamentary and political agreement regarding the intensification of work on the realisation of this treaty obligation. The most important recipients of this signal would be the Polish lawmaker and the ESCB, including the European Central Bank.
The outlined propositions of modifications of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland connected with the adoption of the euro are of adaptive character and thus also reductive. Another matter is the question of what is going to be in force instead of the abrogated provisions. Will we find sufficient the treaty regulation that will have been extended to include us on the introduction of the euro or will we decide to take one step forward and introduce to our Constitution the European Central Bank and the euro currency. The constitutionalisation of such institutions would certainly reinforce them and might give rise to serious consequences.
As regards the European Rate Mechanism (Exchange Rate Mechanism II, ERM2)[19] - this currency corridor limiting the rate fluctuations of the zloty against the euro (plus minus 15%), in the light of the above considerations, entering it does not require any modifications of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. I believe the sufficient modification would be on the legislative level. In connection with the accession to the ERM2 Article 24 (currency policy) Act on the National Bank of Poland[20] should be amended, especially section 2. It provides that the rules of the zloty rate against other foreign currencies are set out by the Council of Ministers in agreement with the Monetary Policy Council. Thus, it also regulates the rules of establishing the rate of the zloty against the euro. However, within the framework of the ERM2 fluctuations of the rate would have to be limited to some extent.
As regards the scope and manner of conducting statutory changes connected with the introduction of the euro, we should review the legislation in terms of its conformity with appropriate EU regulations. For instance, among the statutory changes as required by the intention to introduce the euro, apart from the mentioned proposition of amending the Act on the National Bank of Poland, one can signal the necessity of amending the Act of the Bank Guarantee Fund[21]. Of the main concern here are the provisions which collide the EU ban of financing from central bank resources as well as refer to the privileged access to such resources[22]. Moreover, one can expect modifications within the act on the Supreme Chamber of Control[23], being an implication of amending Article 203 section 1 Constitution of the Republic of Poland concerning the Supreme Chamber of Control. Also, certain changes had to be made in the Act on currency law[24].
As far as the legislative part of the "embedding" of the Euro regulation in Polish legal system is concerned, we can use one of the two models. The idea of the first of them, tested in Germany, is to adopt a set of acts specifically regulating the effects of the introduction of the euro in various branches of law. The other model, far more frequently used, consists
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in the adoption of a comprehensive umbrella act, also called a horizontal act. Horizontal provisions are to guarantee continuity of all legal relations, maintain the principle of protection of acquired rights and principle of freedom of agreement. They also serve the purpose of reducing the risk of terminating contracts for the reason of changing the currency and introducing the duty of quoting double prices in both the previous and the new currency[25].
The scope of horizontal acts tends to be very wide, interdisciplinary and covers three directions of amendment of domestic legislation: 1. Issues strictly connected with the introduction of the euro itself, 2. Amendment of provisions concerning the national central bank, 3. Amendment of other specific acts[26]. The use of the concept of horizontal act would make the technical aspect of the introduction of the euro in Poland clearer. Besides, it would be a single act, passed within one, yet complex legislative procedure. Such an operation would reduce the threat of more serious scale of errors and contradictions that might ensue, should the task of introducing the euro be "allocated" into several or dozens of usually parallel legislative procedures. I believe such an act should be passed preferably just before the planned date of abrogation of the derogation by the Council of EU. As regards the manner of its coming into effect I think it would be safest to enact that the horizontal act is to come into effect upon the abrogation of the derogation by the Council, namely on the day of Poland's accession to the Eurozone.
What specific wording the constitutional and statutory changes resulting from the intention to receive the euro will be given depends on the Sejm and the Senate. What is essential, however, is that the introduced amendments should meet the requirement of their non-contradiction with EU regulations (TEU, sESCB). To the end of ensuring the non-contradiction with the legal system, the statutory changes connected with the reception of the euro should be enacted only after making appropriate amendments within the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
In the light of the above considerations, accessing the Eurozone without any previous appropriate amendments in the Constitution seems to be impossible. However, a different opinion is known, according to which accession to the Eurozone is possible without such changes[27]. Its idea is to apply appropriate interpretative operations and especially relatively discretionally applied purposive interpretation meant to be leading to the argument of supremacy of TEC and the Accession Treaty over the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
This is impossible as no interpretation can be conducted contra legem. In other words, the result of the interpretation cannot violate the literal wording of the provisions. If this was the case, the interpreter would become an unlimited lawmaker. However, article 8 section 1 (the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution), article 87 section 1 (the principle of hierarchicality of the system of the sources of law) and article 188 item 1 of the Constitution, guarantee the supremacy of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland over all international agreements, including the agreements already ratified under prior consent as expressed in the statute. Since one of the competences of the Constitutional Tribunal is deciding on the conformity of international agreements with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and not the other way round. Thus, I believe the argument of the supremacy of the Treaty over the Constitution is unprovable.
On the other hand, one should understand the true intentions of the advocates of the accession to the Eurozone without amending the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. What they aim at is the growth of security of Polish public finances and the finances of Polish citizens. Typically, as a result of the introduction of the euro would be savings from the lack of rate differences and facilities in cash payments[28]. The euro would protect Poland both against too strong currency and the currency which is too weak. The point was to achieve the goals without the necessity of striving for the support for amending the Constitution of the Republic of Poland on the part of the eurosceptical members of the parliamentary opposition, especially of the Sejm. The motives that drove the authors of the idea of introducing the euro without the necessity to amend the Constitution deserve appreciation. That doesn't change the fact that this operation would be a mere substitute of the proper action, that is the action pursuant to the requirements of legislation as we cannot accept the principle saying that the end justifies the means.
In connection with the intensification of the actions towards the introduction of the euro in the Republic of Poland, there appears a question of using the referendum institution in this process.
A nationwide referendum may be conducted in matters of particular importance to the state (Article
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125 of the Constitution). The introduction of the euro is such a matter but only from the purely formal or even lexical point of view. However, what speaks against using it are legal arguments which are of the substantial and rational nature. Their analysis requires maintaining a far reaching sceptical approach to the idea of using the institution of referendum in the process of introducing the euro in Poland. First of all it is not known what is supposed to be the subject matter of such a referendum.
Firstly, the decision of introducing the euro was taken along with the accession to the European Union. Ne bis in idem. Hence, the referendum in this matter would be pointless.
Secondly, the date of the repetition of the euro by Poland cannot be determined at the moment. This date depends on Poland's prior meeting the criteria of economic and legal convergence. At the moment we are unable to determine when this will happen. The result of the potential referendum voting in this case would have no causal power. Formally the competence of determining the date of abrogation of Poland's derogation pursuant to Article 122 TEC, or the decision of the introduction of the euro in Poland - as it is the case in every other EU member state - is in the hands of the Council of the European Union.
Thirdly, the very matter of public finances including the problem of introducing the euro, is so complex and complicated that it should rather be left for specialists. Such was the case in other countries which acceded to the Eurozone. No referendum on the euro was conducted in neither of the states except Sweden[29]. In all the Eurozone countries, the process of its implementation was piloted by the professional factor, not by the popular factor. The society is not obliged to study the public finances thoroughly. However, it does have the right to thorough information on the euro. The duty of conducting an in-depth campaign on the euro rests on the government as it is the government that bears the responsibility for fulfilling the treaty obligations.
Fourthly, out of the question is using a referendum as part of the procedure of amending the Constitution. Article 235 section 4 Constitution of the Republic of Poland states that amendment of the Constitution is to be passed by the Sejm by a majority of at least two thirds of votes in the presence of at least half the statutory number of deputies and the Senate by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half the statutory number of senators. As a matter of fact, the constitutional referendum is optionally admissible, but only where the planned changes concern the provisions of chapters I, II or XII (Article 235 section 6 Constitution of the Republic of Poland). However, the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland to be amended in connection with the introduction of the euro, do not fall in neither of the above mentioned chapters.
To sum up, from the rational point of view, using the referendum institution in connection with the intention to introduce the euro is not justified and pointless. It may only lead to useless complication and blurring the picture of the situation. Facing the lack of possibility to determine the subject matter of the referendum concerning the euro, there appears a danger of using the referendum institution as a tool of limiting parliamentary representation[30]. Persistently insisting on the referendum institution concerning the euro may be justified either by the lack of competence (lack of knowledge) or ill will, that is wanting to use (abuse) the nationwide referendum institution as a pretext of deferring an actual decision in this matter.
It must be noted that a certain indicator of the scale of support for the reception of the euro in Poland will be the results of the nearest elections to the European Parliament scheduled on 7 June 2009. The problem of the euro has divided Polish political scene.
Considering the constitutional aspects of the introduction of the euro, we undoubtedly operate in the scope of what is termed as the economic constitution of the state. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland uses the term "state security" (Article 146 section 1 item 6 and 7 [competences of the Council of Ministers], Article 126 section 2 [duties of the President of the Republic of Poland]), or its corresponding notion of security of citizens (Article 5). Contemporarily we tend to divert from the understanding of this "security of the state and citizens" in the traditional, limited way, that is as the only military security. The idea is much bigger than this. In the contemporary constitutionalism this term is extended to include other "kinds of security" like health security, energy security or the very financial security of the state. Thus, the euro is seen as a stabilizer of the public funds. Accession to the Eurozone is the accession to the zone of stable currency - and in this context more secure or more secure than the zloty. This area is also the area of economic stability.
Moreover, delaying the date of the actual accession to the Eurozone may be a factor which favours the realisation of the concept of two-speed Europe. Such a perspective appears to be particularly disadvantageous and reducing the security of the countries
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of our region, namely the mid-European countries. It poses a risk of our national currency remaining outside the interests of the Union, that is outside the mainstream of its activities. Our national currency becoming increasingly exotic and the discretion of the approach and the reluctance of foreign investors to it constitute a significant threat to the stability of the zloty. In this context accession to the Eurozone would be a step towards building the longterm security of the finances of our country and the finances of citizens. I believe we should care for the deepening of the process of European integration, also within the framework of the financial sector.
It is worth quoting here a certain argument of less legal than political nature. Thus, will the eurosceptical opponents of the accession to the Eurozone guarantee us that as a consequence of not taking steps towards the euro, we will not face entering the ruble zone in 15-20 years' time? The opponents of the introduction of the euro in Poland insist on quoting the example of the UK and Sweden as the states which resist introducing the currency. However, they keep forgetting that the geopolitical situation of these states is definitely different from the geopolitical situation of the countries of our region, including Poland and Slovakia, which has already received the euro. The developing public debate on the euro is increasingly showing that the debate over Poland's accession to the Eurozone is part of a wider conflict between the supporters of the separating Poland, who think in terms of particular interests and the supporters of Poland and society open to the European integration, who think in broader terms.
A certain argument of constitutional nature is raised against the introduction of the euro. According to this argument the introduction of the euro was to result in limiting our sovereignty. The idea of defending our sovereignty is often raised by some circles which are reluctant to Poland's integration with the EU, which I believe, is justified to a lesser extent less by thorough judgement of actual threats than by comfort and emotional response of that sort of argumentation[31]. Talking about sovereignty, part of which was to be manifested by the sovereignty of Polish zloty is a sign of archaic thought not considering contemporary European reality and challenges.
Taking each step leading to the deepening of European integration, we do take it on the same basis as other member states of the EU which take part in this process. If we voluntarily transfer - pursuant to Article 90 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland -the competences of public authorities to international organs or organisations, we do transfer them in the same scope as other EU member states do.
The transfer of definite competences to EU organs is not transferring them to the account of a superior authority, on the contrary, it is an order to execute it by purposefully appointed EU organs. The transfer of competences to EU organs is the limitation of executing sovereignty, but it does not constitute any limitation of the sovereignty itself. Organs of the Communities (EU) may pursue such competences just because the states have authorised them to do so, and, what should be stressed, they have authorised them voluntarily. Thus EU organs do not pursue their competences of their own accord, as they are not subject to the sovereignty attribute[32]. On the contrary, they pursue them under the sovereignty of each member state and their mandate. For this reason the euro should not be classified as a tool of reduction of our sovereignty.
Summing up, the supporters of the introduction of the euro should pursue to win wider support for the realisation of this idea. The scale of the parliamentary support is sufficient to carry out legislative changes sufficient to enter the ERM2. An important test of the social preferences on the Euro will be the results of the nearing elections to the European Parliament. Members of Parliament should aim at achieving parliamentary consesus on the amendments within the Constitution which enable the introduction of the euro. This issue should be given the status of a suprapartite matter, objectively lying in the interest of Poland as a member state of the EU. One should also stress that the priority of the strategic goal, which is the introduction of the euro fully justifies the mobilisation of the public opinion and decisionmaking centres for the intensification of efforts for the prompt creation of the conditions for the realisation of this goal[33].
It is worth remembering that the only amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland conducted so far was carried out in connection with the necessity of adapting the domestic regulations to European regulations, specifically to the institutions of the European Arrest Warrant. This particular amendment concerned Article 55 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland[34], and its idea was to resign from the absolute prohibition of the extradition of a Polish citizen. This proves that in the matter as sensitive from the point of view of the principle of
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the sovereignty of the Nation as the euro case, we have managed to gather a parliamentary majority (especially of the Sejm) necessary to amend the Constitution.
And also the euro problem being conditional to our participation in the next stage of the EU integration should become the object of prompt suprapartite and parliamentary consent. However, in this matter the eurosceptical part of the parliamentary opposition should not confine itself to expressing particular interests. On the contrary, its position regarding the euro should evolve towards the introduction of the single currency, in the name of responsibility for the common good of all the citizens, which is the Republic of Poland (Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland). Political consent on respecting the standards that will let us in the Eurozone would be a confirmation to the world that we will not take irresponsible actions[35]. ■
NOTES
[1] Official Journal of 1997 No. 78, item 483; Correction of The Official Journal of 2001 No. 28, item 319; Official Journal of 2006 No. 200, item 1471.
[2] C. Kosikowski: Prawne aspekty wejscia Polski do strefy Euro, Panstwo i Prawo No. 12/2008, p. 19.
[3] I use the equivalent phrases: "accession to the Eurozone", "introduction of the euro" and "reception of the euro".
[4] According to the dominating economic opinions, Poland's strategic goal, alike other new EU member states', which is joining the single currency area, appears in the light of both experiences as well as theoretical analyses to be economically right. Thus aiming for the Eurozone membership should be the signpost and the axis organizing the overall shape of Polish economic policy. K.Lutkowski: Siedem lat euro - próba bilansu i wnioski dla Polski, Wspólnoty Europejskie No. 8(176/177)/2006, p.3.
[5] The catalogue of economic criteria to be fulfilled includes: 1. Criterion of stability of prices, 2. Criterion of interest rate, 3. Criterion of rate stability, 4. Criterion of the public finance sector deficiency and 5. Criterion of public debt. See further on this in: G.Wójtowicz: Wejscie do strefy euro - konsekwencje dla banków, Prawo Bankowe No. 10(98)/2005, pp. 101-103.
[6] M.Siemaszko, M.Zogala: Proceduralne i prawne aspekty wprowadzenia euro w Polsce, Prawo Bankowe No. 9(97)/2005, p. 72.
[7] P.Zientara: "Za" i "przeciw" wczesnemu wejsciu Polski do strefy euro, Wspólnoty Europejskie No. 11(180)/2006, [p.] [3.]
[8] European System of Central Banks is a multinational system including national central banks of the member states of the currency union and the European Central Bank. Z.Knakiewicz: Teoretyczne podloze kreacji i regulacji euro, Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny No. 4/2004, p. 141. Thus the ESCB consists of two components: national and community. The community component in the form of the ECB plays an important role in the currency union and holds a dominant position in the ESCB. S.Pawlowski: Europejski Bank Centralny - wybrane zagadnienia, Gdanskie Studia Prawnicze, Vol. XVI edited by A.Drwillo, Gdansk 2007, p.696.
[9] K.Szelag: Perspecktywy przystapienia Polski do strefy euro (part I), Prawo bankowe No. 11(99)/2005, p. 88.
[10] The central bank runs the banking service of the state budget, which includes the accounts of the government, state central institutions, state target funds and budget units and processes their orders. Executing the function of a state central bank consists in: 1. The participation in the development of the state economic policy as well as drafting forecasts, analyses and evaluations of its implementation together with the signaling of possible dangers in this scope, 2. The development of the monetary and credit policy, 3. The participation in the development and conducting the currency policy, joint creation of the balance of payments and the development of the exchange rate policy and its current implementation, organizing and conducting interbank settlements by accounting chambers as well as in the cash settlement service of central bank units, representing the interests of Poland in the International Bank for Economic Cooperation, the International Investment Bank, the World Bank and other international institutions. See: C.Kosikowski, A.Borodo, E.Ruskowski: Finanse publiczne i prawo finansowe, Wolters Kluwer Polska 2008, p. 211.
[11] K.Szelag: op.cit., p. 94.
[12] The Governing Council of the ECB is the most important decision-making organ of the ECB. It is composed of members of the Board of the ECB in number of six and Presidents of National Central Banks of the Eurozone. As the Governing Council mainly makes decisions on matters concerning the monetary policy, Presidents of National Central Banks of non-member states of the Eurozone are excluded, including the President of the NBP. However, all the Presidents of the NCB belonging to the ESCB, including the President of the NBP compose the General Council of the ECB performing the advisory, supporting and administrative functions. A.Górska, M.Zogala: Dostosowanie NBP do czlonkostwa w Europejskim Systemie banków Centralnych i Eurosystemie (part 1), Prawo Bankowe No.10(98)/2005, p. 91.
[13] A.Bisztyga: Przyjecie euro wymusi zmiane konstytucji, Gazeta Prawna No. 212, 29 October 2008, p. 3.
[14] Even now the President of the NBP participates in the proceedings of the General Council of the European Central Bank and representatives of the NBP participate in the meetings of the ESCB committees. Ideally this participation is to serve the purpose of proper organisation of actions towards the introduction of the euro in Poland and the preparation of the central bank to this new situation. G.Wójtowicz: op. cit., p.103.
[15] A.Górska, M.Zogala: op. cit., p. 71
[16] As a result of the deep politization of the proceedings leading to a decision on constitutional accountability, practically it is an illusory accountability and the institution of the Tribunal of State itself verges on constitutional fiction.
[17] C.Kosikowski: op.cit., p. 27.
[18] This control is wide and comprehensive as all the criteria are applied at the same time. Moreover, only the legality criterion is defined in a strict manner. However, the economic prudence, efficacy and diligence criteria are not determined by law but it is only determined in the practice of the Superior Chamber of Control, in the study of law and in caselaw. This results in the serious importance of the control executed by the Chamber, during which it is automatically determined what is lacking economic prudence, efficacy and diligence. J.Boc (ed.): Konstytucje Rzeczypospolitej oraz komentarz do Konstytucji RP z 1997 roku, Wroclaw 1998, p.308-309.
[19] ERM2 is a system of exchange rates linking the euro to the currencies of EU member states outside the Eurozone. The system has been in operation since the beginning of the third stage of the economic and currency union that is since 1 January 1999. Its main aim is to enable the efficient functioning of the Internal Market, which would not be possible without appropriate stability of the currency rates. M.Siemaszko, M.Zogala: op.cit., p.75. One of the economic criteria conditioning the accession to the Eurozone, namely the criterion of
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the stability of currency rate, include: 1. Accession to ERM2,
2. Determination of the central rate of the zloty to the euro,
3. Selection of the range of permissible fluctuations of the market rate around the central rate, with the standard range of +- 15%, 4. Maintaining the rate within the range of permissible fluctuations for at least two years with no seroius tensions and finally 5. Intervening on the currency market in the case of major deviations of the market rate from the central rate. See: G.Wójtowicz: op. cit., pp. 101-102.
[20] Official Journal of 2004, no. 1, item 2 as amended.
[21] Official Journal of 2000, no. 9, item 131 as amended.
[22] C.Kosikowski: op. cit., p. 29.
[23] Official Journal of 2001. No. 85, item 932 as amended.
[24] Official Journal of 2002. No.141, item 1178 as amended.
[25] Opinion of Mr M. Olszak, PhD of the Legal Department of the National Bank of Poland, www.forsal.pl.
[26] Ibidem, p. 30.
[27] M.Jungnikiel: Euro po polsku - bez zmiany Konstytucji, www.alfaomega.webnode.com.
[28] P.Lysakowski: SEPA - jednolity obszar platnosci euro, (w): Integracja rynków finansowych w Unii Europejskiej od A do Z , Bank i Kredyt No. 11-12, pp. 3-4; T.Nieborak: Aspekty prawne funkcjonowania rynku finansowego Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2008, pp. 218-219.
[29] It doesn't change the fact that Sweden carried out in its Act on Form of Government, necessary amendments to enable the introduction of the euro.
[30] Cf. A.Bisztyga: O referendum jako elemencie procesu tworzenia prawa, (w): R.M.Malajny (ed.): Konstytucjonalizm a doktryny polityczno - prawne. Najnowsze kierunki badan, Uniwersytet Slaski, Katowice 2008, p. 245. See also interesting considerations by R.Piotrowski on the stream of representative lawmaking, R.Piotrowski: Spór o medel tworzenia prawa, Warszawa 1988, p. 43 and subsequent.
[31] P.Zientara: op. cit., p.3.
[32] J.Kranz: Panstwo i jego suwerennosc, Panstwo i Prawo No. 7/1996, p. 9.
[33] K.Lutkowski: op.cit., p. 3.
[34] Article 55 Constitution RP was amended by Art. 1 Act of 8 Sept 2006. (Official Journal No. 200, item 1471).
[35] M.Grelowski, BCC: Potrzebna nam zgoda w sprawie euro, Dziennik of 10 March 2009, p. 8.
Lábjegyzetek:
[1] The Author is from a Department of Constitutional Law Faculty of Law and Administration University of Silesia
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