The principle of judicial independence is a fundamental requirement of the rule of law and has been a core issue before the European Courts. The set of requirements related to the constitutional principle of judicial independence is evolving dynamically. While originally the focus was mostly directed to the functioning of national courts, later on increasing attention has been paid to the independence of international courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). A comparative law approach may prove to be a suitable and useful method in the discourse on the independence of international judicial bodies. This article is aimed to serve as a thought provoking writing, which introduces the focal points of the Mádl Ferenc Institute's research group established to examine and analyse the functioning of the European Courts. The research group pays particular attention to the analysis of the rules governing the nomination and election of judges of the CJEU, which - except for the advisory panel established under Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - primarily takes place at Member State level, as confirmed by the CJEU in its recent Valančius judgment. Regarding the allocation of cases and the designation of the judge-rapporteur, particular attention was paid to the lack of random case allocation and the discretionary power of the president at the higher level of the CJEU that is the Court of Justice. The research group examines the role of the Advocate General and the référendaires, the lack of parallel reasoning and dissenting opinions, and the link between these issues and the eligibility of judges for reappointment. Last but not least, the research group identifies and analyses the areas in which the CJEU has contributed actively to the development of Community law over the last decade.
A bírói függetlenség elve a jogállamiság alapvető követelménye, amely évek óta az európai bíróságok gyakorlatának fókuszában áll. A bírói függetlenség alkotmányos elvével összefüggő követelményrendszer dinamikusan fejlődik. Ez a gyakorlat nagyrészt a nemzeti bíróságokra fókuszál, azonban az elmúlt években egyre nagyobb figyelem fordult a nemzetközi bíróságok és az Európai Unió Bíróságának (EUB) függetlenségének kérdésére is. A nemzetközi bírói szervek függetlenségének kérdéseire irányuló diskurzusban az összehasonlító-jogi megközelítés alkalmas és hasznosnak módszer lehet. Jelen cikk megírásának célja az volt, hogy gondolatébresztő írásként szolgáljon, amely bemutatja a Mádl Ferenc Intézet Európai bíróságok működését elemző kutatócsoportjának főbb kutatási irányait. A kutatócsoport különös figyelmet fordít az EUB bíráinak jelölésére és kinevezésére vonatkozó szabályok elemzésére, amely - az Európai Unió Működéséről Szóló Szerződés 255. alapján felállított bizottság kivételével - elsősorban tagállami hatáskör, amint azt az EUB a Valančius-ítéletében is megerősítette. Az ügyek kiosztása és az előadó bíró kijelölése tekintetében a kutatócsoport különös figyelmet fordít az ügyek véletlenszerű kiosztásának hiányára és az elnök diszkrecionális jogkörére az EUB felsőbb szintjén, a Bíróságon. A kutatócsoport vizsgálja továbbá az előadó bírónak az ügy kimenetelére gyakorolt hatását, a főtanácsnokok szerepét és annak összefüggését a kollegiális döntéshozatallal, valamint a bírák újra választhatóságával. Végül, de nem utolsó sorban a kutatócsoport azonosítja és elemzi azon területeket, ahol az EUB az utóbbi évtizedben kifejezetten aktív módon járult hozzá a közösségi jog fejlesztéséhez.
The procedure for nominating and electing judges to both levels of the CJEU, namely the Court of Justice (hereafter: CJ) and the General Court (hereafter: GC)[1], is thoroughly examined in the literature. As Angela Huyue Zhang points out, given that, on the one hand - unlike the Council of Europe, which regulates to some extent the rules for the election of ECtHR judges-, EU law does not provide for uniform rules for the nomination of judges to the CJEU, and on the other hand, since Member States do not veto each other's nominees, the nomination remains in the hands of the Member States.[2] Although the experiences gained from the functioning of the seven-member advisory panel established under Article 255 TFEU[3] (hereinafter:'255 Committee') show a more nuanced picture, the fact remains that the nomination of judges at the domestic level falls within the competence of the government as confirmed by the CJEU in the Valančius-case.[4] While at the time of signing the Treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community (hereafter: ECSC) this set-up fitted well the majority perception among the governments of the founding Member States, that is to create a supervisor for the technocratic High Authority and a counter-balance for supranationalism,[5] over the time the CJEU turned into an advocate of supranationalisation.
The fundamental problem with the current nomination and appointment system is that in many Member States the rules of the nomination procedure, including the system of criteria for candidates, are interpreted rather broadly, and the way decisions are taken has a 'black box' nature. The biggest dilemma raised by the literature is how to strike the best balance between democratic legitimacy and a technocratic, profession-
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ally driven system. While the former necessarily results in political games and the positioning of political candidates - with the consequent loss of professionalism -, the latter facilitates professionalism to the fullest possible extent at the expense of democratic legitimacy.[6] As Daniel Kelemen concludes: 'A bit of politics in selecting judges might not be entirely bad.'[7]
In their comparative analysis, Tomáš Dumbrovský and his fellow co-authors present, among other things, two groups of nomination practices in the EU Member States, namely the government-dominated and the mixed systems. In the case of the latter, the government, before taking its decision, must consult the parliament or its competent committee.[8] They elaborate on the nomination rules and practices of selected countries and evaluate their advantages or shortcomings. They also introduce cases in which the nomination of a person has triggered a social/political controversy or the decision in a given procedure has been subject to a judicial review. The main question of the research is whether the selection procedure for CJEU judges meets the requirements set by the CJEU in its rule of law case-law that is whether the nomination and appointment process raises doubts about the independence and impartiality of the judges concerned.[9]
The purpose of setting up the 255 Committee was to overcome the problems of the diversity and the lack of clarity of national rules mentioned in the previous point.[10] As Dumbrovský and his fellow co-authors point out, the broad provisions of Article 255 TFEU, and the resulting freedom of interpretation, mean that neither the rules for the election of the committee - the seven-member committee is appointed by the Council, one of whom is proposed by the EP[11] - nor its functioning comply with the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Zhang also expressed criticism saying that despite the freedom of interpretation, the 255 Committee has not developed a clear set of criteria for certain concepts. The secrecy of the Committee's functioning is also subject to criticism. While it is argued that the 255 Committee does not publish its reports to protect the rights of the candidates, it also makes it hard to examine whether the Committee's reports influence national governments in their appointments. As Alberto Alemanno[12] points out, it is intended to protect the interests of the 255 Committee rather than those of the candidates: the former is exempted from democratic control, while the latter may be adversely affected in their subsequent career, since the possible future employer may not be aware that the candidate was refused by the 255 Committee for the total lack of competence for the post, or because insufficient work experience due to the candidate's younger age.[13] Despite these shortcomings, the impact of the 255 Committee is seen positively by Dumbrovský and his fellow co-authors since several Member States have reviewed their previous nomination practices in the light of its opinions. However, there is a lot ahead, as a current member of the 255 Committee, Julie Laffranque points out. She proposes that instead of a single candidate, Member States should put forward several candidates for their CJEU seat, so the 255 Committee would have a genuine choice instead of a 'take or leave it' decision. As for the mandate of judges, she proposes a longer, but non-renewable term as a more effective way to guarantee the independence of the members of the CJEU. Should this proposal lack the support of Member States, increasing the 255 Committee's control over re-election - instead of its current 'rubber stamp' role - could be another possible way of improving the independence of judges.[14]
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