The new Hungarian Constitution (Magyarország Alaptörvénye) reported a series of problems on the agenda of political and constitutional debate which remained unresolved from the phase of the transition scheme, including the role of the demos in the constitutional process and in the legal process of political decision. Indeed, the approval of the text on 18 April 2011 occurred entirely in the parliament - as required by former Constitution - with a favorable vote of 262 deputies from Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség), the center-right ruling party, against 44 representatives of the extreme right party, Jobbik, and one abstention. The remaining 79 members, all representatives of the opposition parties, did not take part in the voting. Therefore, the first critical element of the process concerns counting the numbers, which leads us to way, unequivocally, that the new Charter is a "Constitution by Fidesz". This approach has broken with the long tradition of consensus and compromise between the political, institutional, and social forces that had characterized Hungarian constitutional history and was clearly expressed after the adoption of the Acts of March 1848 by the National Assembly.[1]
It should be recalled that in 1995, because of strong internal dissent on the part of the Socialist Party, an earlier draft Constitution was not adopted by the Government. During the second post-transitional legislature, 1994 to 1998, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP) not only won a majority to govern, but had captured two-thirds of the parliamentary seats; constitutional reform was included in the government program, but nevertheless, the Party was looking for compromise with the opposition.[2]
The second element of criticism during the approval of the text regarded the absence of demos, a subject legitimizing the exercise of power in a democratic and constitutional State. In addition, on the same day that Parliament approved the constitutional text, the National Electoral Committee (Nemzeti Választási Bizottság) rejected a referendum on the new Constitution, arguing that in conformity with the constitutional system in force, namely that constitutional matters could not be the subject of consultations with the people, for this was within exclusive competence of Parliament.[3]
Whereas on one hand the formal decision to adopt a new constitution appeared to be consistent with the needs of a modern democracy, marked by a solemn moment and a symbolic act of breaking with the socialist past, on the other hand, in many areas the new text codified and streamlined existing provisions without excessive distortions. This decision attests to the durability of the Hungarian traditional setting, which had maintained a formal continuity at different State systems, according to the vision of a "historical Constitution" characterized by reformist gradualism[4] or, rather, had become a paradigmatic case of permanent "constitutional maintenance".[5]
Hungarian constitutional continuity was based on a set of customary norms that endured for a millennium and found their institutional unity in the "Holy Crown of Hungary". The first Hungarian Constitution in written form was the socialist Charter of 1949, substantially revised in 1989 and 1990.[6] It is understandable that Hungary, the last former socialist country to have maintained, albeit substantially modified, a Constitution approved during the socialist era, would adopt an entirely new text.
Here we shall examine the new text from the standpoint of the role assigned to institutions which constitute the direct manifestation of the people's will, leaving aside the general issues relating to the State system and the form of government.[7] In order to understand the scope of the new constitutional provisions, some brief details are provided on the theoretical framework of the direct democracy institutions in general, and their constitutional treatment in the recent past of Hungarian constitutionalism.
A brief overview on the principal types and institutions of direct democracy is no easy task, for it can all too easily become merely a list of national legal systems and their specific historico-cultural traditions. When discussing direct and participa-
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tory democratic institutions, if the most important institution is the referendum, this also refers to the people's legislative (agenda) initiative, the people's initiative, and the right of petition. Participatory democracy, just as such other forms as deliberative democracy, proposes to offer the "openness of decision-making to all who have an interest through the usage of the deliberative method".[8] In addition, entirely acceptable are the theoretical approaches that define the referendum as a constitutive element of mature democracy,[9] in the context of secularization suffered by the direct democracy that is presented to twenty-first century constitutionalism as "one of the most appropriate solutions to make the decision in the form and manner described in the Constitution."[10] If the debate is still open, the problem of referendum and, more generally, the adjustment of direct democracy, resides in the quantum.
Given the many manifestations of positive law, it is now impossible to find a uniform notion of referendum that transcends the etymology of the word.[11] However, within the definition of referendum, a number of types can be identified that are classified, at a minimum, on the basis of five criteria: the object of the vote; automatic (or not) recourse thereto; the subject of initiative; the procedural stage in which it is operational; the effectiveness of voting or purpose of consultation. Based on these criteria, it is customary to distinguish, for example, between a constitutional and legislative referendum, people's or presidential initiative referendum, mandatory or optional referendum, previous or subsequent referendum, decisional/deliberative and advisory or consultative referendum.[12] More generally, the function assigned to referendum and the reference object contribute to confer on this institution a special meaning. It would be, therefore, the referendum on constitutional law that takes the form of a founding and unifying act of the nation; whereas the referendum on legislative matters is a form of integration, control, or manifestation of approval in the elected assemblies.[13]
Totally original, is the "arbitration referendum", including the recall referendum of the Head of State, who is directly involved in the definition of the system of government, which is susceptible to individual and collegial recall institutions.[14] Although the "transition" referendum does not have autonomous features from a strictly legal and technical point of view, it is rather the specific implementations of the referendum that directly affected the State and government system.
Ultimately, the role of the Constitutional Courts to "tame" direct democracy institutions is especially relevant in order to include their exercise of power in the perimeter of the forms and limits of Constitution.[15]
The discussion of direct democracy institutions must start from the principle of people's sovereignty. In Hungarian constitutional history that principle has been linked to two political and constitutional traditions. The first was based on the idea of the centrality of the National Assembly, a key element in defining the balance between the powers and the definition of the parliamentary system of government, which attributed to direct democracy institutions an integrative role with respect to the main circuit of political representation.
This approach came from the long-lived Hungarian parliamentary tradition where the middle class intellectual who led the 1848-1849 revolution supported the establishment of a pure representative system devoid of any tool of direct democracy found in the French or Swiss model.[16] The parliamentary regime established in the nineteenth century was not based on theoretical assumptions of people's sovereignty and democratic principles, but rather reflected the representation of classes. The first Hungarian Parliament set up in 1867 was the venue for seeking political compromise, and the parliamentary government formed between 1867 and 1944 was similar to the British system. The only element of direct democracy that immediately attracted the attention of the Hungarian reformist bourgeoisie, even if not translated into constitutional texts, was the institution of the recall of public representatives. This institution was assimilated to the practice of medieval assemblies to elect representatives to the Hungarian Diet, give them instructions, ask for accounts of their activity, and recall the representatives without giving reasons.[17] With the beginning of the transitional regime, in the early 1990s, the appeal to the principle of democracy led to a revival of the parliamentary tradition, with liberalism rather than the democratic radicalism of Rousseau prevailing.[18]
A second local constitutional tradition is intimately linked to the French Jacobin movement by Ignác Martinovics.[19] In Hungary at the end of the eighteenth century pamphlets and ideas of the democratic radicalism related to the Jacobin movement were circulated. Martinovics promoted the drafting of a Hungarian Constitution inspired by
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the Jacobin Montagnard Constitution and containing the mandatory constitutional referendum and the people's veto over Parliamentary Acts which, however, never entered into force.[20]
The request for direct democracy institutions, which had become a minority interest in the second half of the nineteenth century, came into vogue after the Second World War when the project was discussed of setting up a "Switzerland of the East" in order to respond to problems of administrative and territorial organization of a multinational State and to self-government of national minorities. Therefore, there was the possibility of resolving territorial issues through the usage of direct democracy institutions and the organization of the referendum of December 1921 for the permanence of the Sopron territory in western Hungary: this was the first referendum in Hungarian constitutional history and held at an important time for the construction of the Hungarian multinational State from below.[21]
The institute of the referendum was introduced for the first time in Article 20(1) of the 1949 Socialist Constitution, formulated as follows: "The Presidential Council [Presidium]: [...] d) may call a referendum on matters of national importance», although it restricted people's participation at the stage of deliberations, completely excluding a people's initiative referendum.[22]
A second important institution was the recall of an elected person according to the 1936 USSR Constitution model: voters could recall a public representative if he could not fulfill the mandate or if he became unfit to hold office. Article 30(3), 1949 Constitution, stated that: "Voters may recall the parliamentary representatives elected", but, according to the implementation Act, the institution responsible for submitting the proposals for withdrawing was the People's Patriotic Front, an organization wholly owned by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP).[23]
However, it must be recalled that in the 1949 Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic the provisions on public participation were not much like those found in constitutions of the other European socialist countries. Most were programmatic, as in Article 2(5), which involved the cooperation of citizens in public management; or the fundamental right of the citizen to "participate in the management of public affairs" (Article 68); and even the recognition of the role of social organizations in the management of public affairs (Article 4); or the collaboration of the same in State aministration (Article 36). The cultural and political background of typical Hungarian constitutionalism from 1949 to 1989 informed the tenure of the socialist regime.
However, the 1949 Hungarian Constitution, as amended in 1989 - as well as that of 2011 - did not contain provisions which allowed the electorate to intervene in defining the balance between the powers and affect being in charge of agencies. With the constitutional reforms of 1989-1990, most importantly, the principle of free parliamentary mandate was introduced in Article 20(2), according to which: "Members of Parliament shall carry out their duties in the public interest", and in Article 20/A, which listed exhaustively the causes of corruption in office without mentioning a recall election. In addition, the Hungarian Constitutional Court (Magyarország Legfelsőbb Bírósága, also known by its historical name Kúria) in Judgment n. 2 (1993) sealed the definition of the parliamentary system, anchoring it to the exercise of free mandate and in the rejection of the imperative mandate principle of public representatives established by the 1949 Constitution.[24]
Hungary was among the first Central or Eastern European countries to introduce, by way of a primary source, the institution of referendum with the approval by a single-party Parliament of Act n. I of 10 January 1989 on the constitutional referendum and the Act n. XVII of May 1989 on the referendum and the people's initiative.[25] This last Act, in force from 1989 to 1997, was the tangible symbol of a political contradiction in the regime transition that made all the direct democracy rules incomplete and contradictory. The most criticized aspect was concerned with the imbalance between the threshold of signatures needed to promote a referendum, relatively low, and the quorum for its validity, much higher. Missing, furthermore, were the provisions on procedural and materials elements such as the duration of the referendum campaign, the collection of signatures, and the prior review on the admissibility of the question.[26]
As for the evolution of the principle of people's sovereignty, the 1949 Hungarian Constitution, amended with the return to a multi-party system, just as other constitutions of the Central and Eastern Europe countries, reiterated the affirmation of the principle of the derivation of power from the people.[27] Article 2(2) stated: "In the Republic of Hungary supreme power is vested in the people, who shall exercise their sovereign rights directly and through elected representatives". Apparently, then, the two democratic circuits seemed to be on
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the same plane in referring to the two described constitutional traditions.
The National Assembly of Hungary (Országgyűlés) changed the rules on direct democracy institutions with the constitutional reform of 1997,[28] that distinguished between the referendum by people's initiative, the deliberative referendum, the consultative referendum, and the people's (agenda) initiative. Furthermore, it is important to note that the previous requirement of turnout to be over 50% (participation quorum) was removed; instead the requirement became that over 25% of registered voters had to support a referendum (approval or non-rejection quorum): according to many observers in order to ensure the success of the NATO, the accession referendum was launched in the same year.
To be noted immediately is the absence of the constitutional referendum, nor is there any type of mandatory referendum, except the ad hoc consultation introduced in 2002 for Hungary joining the European Union and subsequently repealed. The normative materials concerning the regulation of a referendum in force since 1998 thus include two texts besides the constitutional source: the Act on electoral procedure, which also concerns the deliberative vote (Act n. C of 1997) and the Act on the national referendum and the people's initiative of 1998 which gave effect to the constitutional reform and repealed entirely the previous norms of 1989 (Act n. III of 1998). Finally, those rules were repealed in 2013, respectively, with the Act on electoral procedure[29] and the Act on Initiating a referendum, the European citizens' initiative, and the referendum procedure.[30]
Article 28/C, Const. 1949 provided a constitutional basis for the definition of referendum by making provision for two types, one a deliberative and one merely advisory, depending on the effectiveness of people's consultation. Moreover, it added a further classification between the mandatory or optional referendum, in addition to the legislation on the people's initiative referendum.[31]
The first unambiguous type (para. 2), therefore, is the deliberative referendum by mandatory calling and people's initiative; namely, a referendum on the approval of an Act, promoted by a fraction of the electorate composed of at least two hundred thousand voters, and with binding force for the National Assembly, characterized almost as unique under the constitutional law of European Union member States.[32]
The second type (para. 4) gives the referendum initiative to four subjects, namely a fraction of a hundred thousand members of the electorate, the President of Republic, the Government, and one-third of the members of Parliament. However, the National Assembly is given a wide margin of discretion for calling and organizing the referendum and the question of definition, setting up an optional referendum, in the sense that the legislative body has veto power over the possibility to submit a question to a referendum and control over the procedure for calling the referendum.
A referendum by presidential initiative can also be viewed in the context of the government system and the powers of the Head of State. It should be noted that the Hungarian President has many unusual tools of veto power to block or postpone a bill, both in the case of mere political disagreement, with a suspending veto that can be overcome by a new deliberation of Parliament, and in the case of presumption of unconstitutionality, with the right to send a bill to the Constitutional Court before promulgation.[33] In this sense the presidential initiative referendum appears to be more of a complementary and consequential institution than the suspending veto power, to request the electorate to repeal an Act which managed to survive a second parliamentary approval. In practice, however, this institution has not been used.
Under this configuration, the referendum in the Hungarian rules must pass at least two levels of procedural and substantive constraints, with a strong imbalance in favor of the representative council. The calling of a referendum has a mandatory character and is binding only when the initiative comes from two hundred thousand voters. When it has been promoted by other subjects, on the contrary, the calling is problematic and is subject to the discretionary intervention of the National Assembly, and the outcome may be merely advisory. In any case, the effectiveness of the people's decision is subject to a double quorum: the minimum threshold of votes validly cast, and a minimum number of voters having expressed the same option. Article 28/C(6), Const. 1949, stated: "A national ratification referendum shall be considered successful if more than half the votes of the citizens voting are valid and at least more than one-quarter of all eligible voters have given the same answer in the referendum".
The same constitutional provision, at para. 5, lists in detail the matters excluded from the referendum, among which can be found: the budget Act and tax matters; the obligations set forth in international treaties; the constitutional provisions on a national referendum and people's initiatives; the
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issues relating to the organizational autonomy of National Assembly and its dissolution; the Government program; the declaration of a state of war, emergency or national crisis; the use of the Armed Forces; the dissolution of local bodies; the amnesty. The constitutional provisions, furthermore, contain clauses concerning the procedures for the approval of the implementation Act of referendum, to which Article 28/B introduced the need for a two-thirds majority to approve the referendum Act, attributing to them the value of a constitutional Act, with the obvious purpose to avoid moving away from the will of the parliamentary majority.
A type of ad hoc referendum has been introduced by the constitutional reform of 2002, which addressed the ratification of an international treaty allowing a limitation of sovereignty due to the accession to the European Union. With the constitutional reform Act n. 61 of December 2002, therefore, it introduced a type of referendum regarding sovereign powers related to the conclusion of the accession process to the Union. The new Article 79 of the Constitution contains a direct and explicit reference to the date of referendum convocation and to the question, regulating a unique case referendum which was repealed immediately after the consultation under the same establishing Act.[34]
By virtue of this short account, we understand how the constitutional reform of 1997 was the result of a compromise between two different constitutional guidelines on the issue of direct democracy institutions. One was directed to reduce, by procedural constraints, the effective utilization of these institutions, and the other was in favor of enlarging the spectrum of rights and direct people's participation. From a regulatory standpoint, moreover, the dynamics of the implementation of the Constitution of 1949, as substantially amended in 1989-1990, were particularly troublesome and led in the 1990s to the development of an extremely confused and fragmented legislative corpus on direct democracy institutions.[35] Imagine that until 1997, the unique implementation Acts of referendum and people's initiative remained those above mentioned in 1989.
However, the complexity of the constitutional and legislative provisions can best be understood in the light of their practical application and case law interpretation.
Before undertaking an analysis of the decisions of the Hungarian Kúria relating to referendum, it should be recalled that the list of functions assigned to the Constitutional Court did not originally contain the express terms of his intervention in the referendum process. This function was introduced by Act n. C of 1997 that added to the list of the functions and powers of the Court, including control over a referendum.
The role of the Hungarian Constitutional Court was incisive both on the referendum process, with the validity verifiction function, and the subsequent nullification power of acts and decisions by the independent electoral Committee; and in the acceptance of ex post appeals, in particular on the parameters of the procedural validity of the referendum and the constitutional compatibility of remaining legislation. On four occasions the Kúria has blocked the referendum requests from promoter subjects.[36]
In the interpretation of direct democracy institutions, the Hungarian Constitutional Court had a dominant role in three aspects: in defining the role of people's institutions of political decisions rather than the traditional circuit of parliamentary democracy; in refining and enriching the referendum technique, identifying gaps in legislation and helping to define a true "right of deliberative vote" comparable to the electoral law; and, finally, in limiting the interference of other public authorities, such as the Parliament, in the exercise of the rights of participation and direct legislation of the demos. With this background, the incomplete and unclear constitutional and legislative provisions on direct democracy institutions have focused on five "great pronouncements".[37]
With the start of democratic stabilization, the first occasion on which the question of the referendum was received at the Constitutional Court was in January 1993, when the debate on the hypothesis of introducing direct democracy institutions into the Hungarian democratic order, as part of the mutated State system, had become more intense. On that occasion, the Association of citizens under the subsistence minimum level (LAÉT) submitted a referendum initiative to introduce an "arbitration referendum" on the collegial people's recall of representatives.[38] Parliament then requested a preliminary opinion from the Constitutional Court on the compatibility of a referendum question that would
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have an impact on the duration of Parliament. The Court, interpreting Article 2(2), Const. 1949, asserted that the new constitutional order provides, in the usual way, for the exercise of power by Parliament, as the highest agency of State power, and that representation is the main tool for the exercise of people's sovereignty,[39] whereas the referendum is a complementary institution in relation to the network of parliamentary democracy.
The Magyar judge noted that the Constitution does not contain detailed provisions on referendum and delegates entirely to the Parliament the possibility of adopting a detailed regulation. Moreover, whereas the only legislation in force was adopted in 1989 - before the entry into force of the substantial amendments to the Constitution of 1949 - it was necessary to provide an interpretation in accordance with the new constitutional principles. On this basis, the Court concluded that the institution of collegial people's recall of representatives was not among the instruments for dissolving Parliament expressly mentioned in the Constitution, and that its introduction could cause a surreptitious modification of the same. Indeed, the Court ruled that in the liberal democratic State system introduced by constitutional reforms of the 1990s, representation is the main path for the exercise of people's sovereignty, whereas Parliament cannot be recalled by voters, except through a constitutional reform in accordance with prescribed procedures.[40] This judgment, therefore, had a role in defining the set of uncertain relationships that can be established between the State and the people and in the interpretation of the sovereignty principle[41].
In 1995 the Hungarian Parliament was thereby encouraged to reject the initiative of the Independent Smallholder's Party on the direct election of the President, the extension of his competence, and other questions on the basis of the argument that the Constitution cannot be modified by people's initiative.[42] In that same year the Hungarian Communist Workers' Party (Magyar Munkáspárt), which is not represented in Parliament, submitted an initiative with 142,000 signatures demanding a referendum before the beginning of negotiations with NATO. Both Parliament and the Constitutional Court rejected the initiative, claiming that a referendum was impossible before the negotiating process could be completed.[43] Furthermore, the Court also rejected the complaint for want of jurisdiction on a non-regulatory parliamentary act.[44] Before the negotiations for Hungarian NATO membership were completed, however, Parliament held a legally binding referendum on 16 November 1997, which had a favorable outcome with a large turnout but lower than the previous 50%.[45] This was the first referendum after the constitutional reform adopted by Parliament in July and October 1997, since participation of the majority of all eligible citizens was no longer an issue, rather, any plebiscitary decision needed the consent at least one quarter of those citizens.
Following approval of the aforementioned amendment to the Constitution which introduced detailed regulation of a referendum, the Court was requested by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights, a variant of Ombudsman, to intervene on the type of referendum with binding effectiveness regulated by the new Article 28/C(2) and (4).[46] Behind the decision was the people's referendum initiative of opposition parties to prevent the Government from adopting a law which would have made it possible for agricultural co-operatives to acquire ownership of agricultural land, prohibited for corporations and foreigners since 1994.[47] In the judgment the Court observed that the direct exercise of people's power, recognized by Article 2(2), Const. 1949, is based on two essential elements: the definition of the limits and the effectiveness of direct people's legislative function, and the concept of the "right of referendum", as a fundamental political right.
Regarding the first element, there is a clear difference, in the constitutional provisions, between the mandatory or optional referendum. In the first case, the expansion of subjects of the initiative referendum, the determination of the question, the mandatory nature of the calling thereof, and the binding effectiveness all guarantee elements of the people's title to the institution and the real effect of the direct legislative function. The electorate - in the interpretation of the Court - is the sovereign entity in control of all steps of the referendum process, from the collection of signatures to the definition of the date, until the determination of the binding effect of the same. Under these circumstances, calling the referendum is a mandatory act. Parliament not only has a duty to ensure the holding of the referendum and respect the outcome of the vote, but also the duty to refrain from any action or omission that may affect or limit the realization of this right, except to prevent other State agencies from acting in this way. The second type of referendum, conversely, constitutes a discretionary power of the Parliament that maintains exclusive control over the various phases of the referendum process, even in the moment in which these
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are completed, and validates the gathering of the minimum number of 100,000 signatures of voters. In the classification of Hungarian tools of direct democracy, therefore, the mandatory referendum occupies a more important place when compared to the optional referendum.[48]
The second essential element in determining the weight of the people's decision in the Hungarian system regards the interpretation of the referendum right, provided by Article 70(1), Const. 1949, as a fundamental political right that extends to all the material aspects surrounding the institute, namely, the referendum initiative, the filing of the referendum request, and the voter turnout.
The State, therefore, cannot interfere with the people's referendum right from the time of the collection of signatures or during the referendum campaign. The Hungarian Constitutional Court has recognized that the period within which this right is exercised extends from the collection of signatures and not from the time of the validation of the same. Under this reasoning, the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned Act n. XVII of May 1989 which attributed to Parliament the right to decide and fix the date for the start of the collection of signatures.[49] The element of the initiative referendum rules - the Court concluded - substantially affects the exercise of the "right of referendum" and are a constitutional violation. In this way, the Court of Budapest has aligned itself to the interpretation of political participation rights made by the European Court of Human Rights and the basis of the internationalist doctrine.[50]
A further decision of the Court intervened to clarify the procedures for amending the Constitution and the lack of a relationship between the institution of people's referendum initiative and referendum in the field of constitutional reform:[51] this was a referendum initiative by the Social Democratic Youth League which intended to introduce the direct election of the President. According to the Court, the Constitution does not define a relationship among the tools of representative democracy and those of direct democracy: the second always remain exceptional and legislative power is attributed, in principle and in general, to the representative body. Article 28/C(5), lett. c, Const. 1949, furthermore, explicitly integrates among the subjects excluded from referendum the constitutional reform Acts, which remain within the exclusive competence of the Parliament.[52] The constitutional field, therefore, cannot be subject to referendum.
Last, a judgment has limited the institution of the referendum, but has also elevated it to the rank of a fundamental right of political participation, opening the way for the basis of the new Constitution of 2011. Under these circumstances, the Court has been exhorted to examine a failure to comply with the constitution by the Hungarian constitutional legislator.[53] The object of the complaint concerned the gaps in the implementation of referendum rules regarding the durability of the effects of the binding referendum and the modification of the remaining legislation, confirmed or repealed by consultation. The Court emphasized that the right to referendum is a fundamental right of political participation which not only requires the title of a protection and a subjective recognition, but increases a constitutional duty for the State. In regulating the mandatory referendum, therefore, the legislator is required to regulate the binding effects of the result, and the possibility to intervene again on the question, according to the procedures described in Article 28/B(2). However, the dissenting opinion of Judge Trócsányi claimed that the Constitution already contains a detailed provision on direct democracy institutions, attributing to the field a constitutional status and excluded from the competence of parliamentary majorities.[54]
On the contrary, the practical application of the institution has been particularly low quantitatively when you consider that, from 1989 to 2011, only twelve referendums were organized, of which two related to substantive institutional issues, the same as questions relating to the election of the Head of State, and two related to supranational matters, the same as joining NATO and the European Union.[55]
Beyond the merely quantitative evaluation, however, the issues submitted to referendums were relevant and sensitive; they testify to the potential inherent in that institution. All fundamental issues of national interest related to the form of government and the institutional structure of the State, to fiscal and international politics, and to the difficult definition of the boundaries of the Hungarian political community, were subjected to a referendum.
With the start of transition there has been extensive use of referendum to resolve issues that had not been solved in the political-party mediation. Among them was that of the election of the President of the Republic, which was subjected on two different occasions to people's opinion. In 1989-1990 these provisions were amended several times and people's consultation was used to resolve the institutional impasse.[56]
During the round table of transition, the electoral law was amended. Parliament was obliged, at the request of 50,000 citizens, to attend to an Act,
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and, at the request of 100,000 citizens, to hold a referendum on that Act. The opposition parties were dissatisfied with the compromise proposals of the governing Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) and collected 140,000 signatures. Dissident MSZMP members contributed a further 60,000 signatures, so the threshold was easily reached. Attempts to have the signatures declared invalid failed.
On 26 November 1989 one of the first people's consultations in the Central and Eastern Europe countries was undertaken which had to object, among other things, to a question on the parliamentary election of the President of the Hungarian Republic; it reported a favorable outcome.[57] The subsequent referendum of 29 July 1990, promoted by the Socialist Party, on introducing direct elections for the Presidency was declared invalid;[58] as a result, the President continued to be elected by the National Assembly.
However, the people's vote of 26 November 1989 was a four-part referendum. Voters were asked not only whether the President should be elected after parliamentary elections, but also whether organizations related to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) should be banned from workplaces,[59] whether the political party should account for properties owned or managed by it,[60] and whether the Workers' Guard (Betriebskampftruppen) should be dissolved.[61] The goal of the "four-yes referendum"[62] was the dismantling of the State-party and the reduction of the role of Hungarian Socialist Party.
In 1990, furthermore, it was proposed that a referendum to submit the final draft of the new Constitution was subsequently withdrawn.
It follows that, even if contradictory, even if approved by a Parliament still dominated by a single party, the referendum Act of 1989 provided a legal basis for calling a referendum, ensuring in Hungary, after July 1989, an effective exercise of direct democracy.[63]
An interesting practical case, finally, was the use of referendum to settle a thorny issue of Hungarian constitutional history; namely, the presence of Hungarian minorities in neighboring States. Indeed, the referendum initiative submitted in 2004 concerned the extension of dual citizenship to Hungarians identified on the basis of ethnicity, but citizens of a neighboring State.
In this circumstance, the Association of Hungarians Resident Overseas, the referendum promoter, intervened with a specific corrective function of parliamentary legislative activity, in order to encourage Parliament to adopt an Act that would allow Hungarians resident overseas to obtain citizenship of the Hungarian State. The referendum involved a crucial issue in the management of multiculturalism and minorities, attempting to redefine the boundaries of the political community and to resolve the legal status of Hungarian minorities outside the borders of the national State, designed by the 1919 Treaty of Trianon,[64] but, nevertheless, did not have the sufficient quorum.[65]
Moreover, in 2004, simultaneously, there was a referendum on the maintenance of the public health service, also invalidated by an insufficient participation of voters.[66]
Finally, the three questions presented in the 2008 referendum were related to the field of social rights and with a strong impact on the State budget because they concerned the abolition of the ticket for health treatments and higher public education fees (the so-called "social referendum"). The referendum was initiated by opposition parties Fidesz and the Christian-Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP). They submitted seven proposals for the collection of signatures[67] (tuition fees for public higher education; hospitals as communal property; consultation fees for doctor visits; medical supplies only in pharmacies; labor permits for retired persons; pre-emptive rights of leased land for farmers; accountability of the government in cases of budget overruns). The National Electoral Committee and the Constitutional Court approved only three proposals that would cancel government reforms which introduced doctor visit fees per visit and medical fees per number of days spent in hospital, as well as tuition fees for higher education. The three-part referendum was valid and approved[68] with strong endorsement by the left governmental coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) and the Liberal Party (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége - a Magyar Liberális Párt, SZDSZ); this was the birth of the first minority government in Hungary since the end of communism, supported externally by the SZDSZ. Thus, the outcome of the "social referendum" played a great part in the Fidesz triumph in the parliamentary election of 2010.
This series of initiatives contributed to referendum initiative development: as of 2007, the number of people's referendum initiatives increased significantly and the President of the Constitutional Court, Paczolay, called the referendum an "explosion of dormant mines" which began in 2007-2008:[69] the majority of initiatives were not serious and overburdened the National Electoral Committee[70] and the Constitutional Court, but the right to
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referendum which every single voter has to launch people's initiatives has been used impressively.
With the approval of the Constitution of 2011, the two problematic aspects of the role of the demos in the constitutional process and in constitutional review and the extension of the direct democracy institutions, already mentioned above, did not find an appropriate solution. The political environment in which the 2011 Constitution was approved was symptomatic of the political attitude of the governmental majority with regard to people's participation in public decisions, and even more to those destined to become "the basis of our legal order; it shall be an alliance among Hungarians of the past, present and future. It is a living framework which expresses the nation's will and the form in which we want to live", as the Constitution is defined in the Preamble.[71]
The Hungarian constitutional process of 2011 was considered to be insufficiently negotiated and participation was regarded as inadequate. The European Commission for Democracy through Law (better known as the Venice Commission) criticized the lack of transparency in the drafting and approval process;[72] doubts about the compatibility of the text with the European Union documents were discussed by the European Parliament, which adopted a resolution asking Hungary to adapt the text to a set of common principles and regulations of the European constitutional heritage.[73]
This epilogue appears more contradictory if we consider that the debate on the definition of procedures and majorities for the constitutional revision in the 1990s proceeded at the same speed as the progress of the permanent reform process of the Constitution.[74] Hungary inherited from the socialist era the absence of procedures, tools, and methods for the people's intervention in the phase of initiative and of deliberation for constitutional review. Indeed, Article 24(3), Const. 1949, provided that: «A majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament is required to amend the Constitution and for certain decisions specified therein», the same majority required for the adoption of constitutionally relevant Acts.
One doctrinal view supported the need to adopt the Constitution by referendum,[75] whereas others observed that as a new Charter it could be approved by the procedure previously used for accession to the European Union.[76] The draft constitutional reform, approved in 1995 by the Parliamentary Commission, proposed to strengthen the review process of the Constitution with the direct participation of the demos in the procedure of constitutional revision. Moreover, the same constitutional draft was presented to the civil society and experts in a broad public debate, with the publication of the draft in major national newspapers and an invitation to readers to propose comments.[77] However, the Venice Commission said that the draft maintained, de facto, the concept of an almost flexible Constitution that did not strengthen the amendment procedures.[78]
Despite the total absence of the demos in the constitutional process, the new Constitution preserves the institutions, the discipline and the space dedicated to direct democracy institutions, demonstrating the implementation of the consolidated jurisprudential principles.
The constitutional framework of the direct democracy institutions consists approximately of the same institutions provided in the previous text (national legislative and local referendum) and the referendum by people's initiative.[79] The first change to the previous text is the abolition of the consultative referendum and the people's legislative (agenda) initiative. In the Constitution of 2011, moreover, the referendum on European Union accession of Hungary, established one-off by the constitutional reform Act of 2002 has disappeared.
The 2011 Constitution contains a repeated affirmation of the principle of people's sovereignty, but Article B(4) recognizes that: «The power shall be exercised by the people through elected representatives or, in exceptional cases (kivételesen), directly», placing unequivocally the direct democracy institutions as supplemental and exceptional tools rather than the traditional representative network, while the former Constitution co-ordinated representative and direct democracy.
A significant change concerns the level of formal drafting. Indeed, the constitutional regulation of the national referendum has been fully included in a single article that consolidated the rules on this subject, offering a complete framework for the real and effective use of the institution in the context of the new constitutional order. Article 8 of the Constitution prescribes two ways to hold a referendum. Parliament shall order a national referendum upon the motion of at least two hundred thousand electors and Parliament may order a national referendum upon the motion of the President of the Republic, the Government, or one hundred thousand electors. The Constitution imposes a number
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of prohibitions on matters on which a referendum can be held, including amending the Constitution, budget, taxing, obligations arising from international agreements, military operations, and others. Required voter turnout for the referendum is 50% of valid votes of the total registered to vote; the decision made by a referendum is binding on the Parliament.
This Article calls to mind the previous 28/C and identifies the same two types of referendum with binding effectiveness, excluding the consultative referendum. In the constitutional text of 2011, the topics excluded from the object of the referendum which coincide with those of the previous text are defined in detail, except in two cases. A first novelty concerned the explicit exclusion from the referendum of the questions to change the Constitution, codifying judgment n. 25 of 1999 and the resulting non-involvement of constitutional referendum in the Hungarian public order, consolidating the parliamentary monopoly on the function of constitutional review. A second matter explicitly excluded from the referendum is the topic of elections (Hungarian and European Parliament members, local representatives, and mayors) that prevents the referendum being used as a tool of institutional innovation, known in Italian experience.
In the 2011 Constitution, the institution of people's initiative previously provided disappears entirely, whereas the provision relating to local referendum - contained in Article 31 - remained latent and was deferred explicitly to an implementation Act. The former is still included in the Act on a national referendum and people's initiative, but the draft law on referendum no longer provides for it.
Particularly interesting is the verbocity of Article XXIII that disciplines political participation rights, introducing a fundamental innovation com compared pared to the previous Article 70 in which elective and deliberative voting were governed jointly. Indeed, the 2011 Constitution separates the voting right from the participation right in the referendum, also acknowledging in this case the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the "right to participate in a referendum" with the dignity of a fundamental political right. Thus, para. 7 of said article provides that: «Everyone having the right to vote in elections of Members of the National Assembly shall have the right to participate in national referendum. Everyone having the right to vote in elections of local government representatives and mayors shall have the right to participate in local referendum». Similarly, therefore, the parameter for participation in the deliberative voting remains, according to the Constitution, and conforms to those for access to the active and passive electorate.
The 2011 constitutional text does not affect the role of the Constitutional Court in the admissibility of the referendum questions. Article 24 of the Constitution safeguards the principle of implied powers extending by law the functions of constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court's role remains unchanged compared with the previous constitutional order in which the Court intervened in the decision in advance on the admissibility of an abrogative legislative referendum, after an eventual deliberation of the Parliament.[80]
Concerning the referendum practice, doubling the quorum is the most important element.[81] It is important to recall that, after 1989, the average turnout in Hungary for a parliamentary election was approximately 61%[82] and of eight national referendums only two reached the 50% threshold (the "four-yes referendum" of 1989 and the "social referendum" of 2008). Thus, only initiatives with enormous mobilizing power will have a chance to be adopted by referendum:[83] not even the referendum on a populist theme such as the European Union relocation migrant quota was able to achieve the target. Opponents will always be interested in campaigns which intend to talk their adherents out of participating with an obstructionist strategy (the so-called "sabotage of quorum"): it is much easier to hinder the success of a referendum with abstention (or, also, invalid votes) than by means of positive argumentation to take part in the vote. In most national referendums of European Union members there is no quorum, with the exception of fourteen countries with different participation or/and approval quorum;[84] insofar as the Code of good practice on referendum by the Venice Commission advised not to provide for a turnout quorum because it assimilates voters who abstain to those who vote aainst and the approval quorum (approval by a minimum percentage of registered voters), because this risks involving a difficult political situation if the draft is adopted by a simple majority lower than the necessary threshold.[85]
The reasons for re-introducing the 50% validity threshold can be explored in the context of stakeholder intervention during the constitutional review process. In this topic the fundamental idea in the Commission entrusted with the preparation of the new Constitution was that if voters may take back the power of the Parliament by means of referendum, it is reasonable to prescribe that at least
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50% take part in the vote.[86] Moreover, in the parliamentary debate on constitutional review, it was explained that the lowering of the threshold in 1997 was a distortion of the relationship between direct and representative democracy and that national referendums are curtailments of the powers of the Parliament; therefore it is reasonable to prescribe a validity threshold of 50% again, in addition as a contribution to increasing the significance of referendum.[87] Finally, the position of the "National Consultation Body" also indicates that direct democracy had a real function in times immediately after the political transition, but later lost its importance. Its function is to give a tool for voters if the government intends to put through measures that are opposed by large circles of the society; they can veto these measures: but these are exceptional cases and the direct vote should happen with a high participation.[88]
Essentially, the Fidesz and KDNP, proponents of the 2011 Constitution, experienced the effectiveness of the citizen initiated referendum in 2008, as opposition parties, when the stability of the government could be undermined by the so-called "social referendum". In that case, the 25% approval quorum was to be applied, although the participation slightly exceeded the 50% as well (the only other case where this happened was the so-called "four-yes referendum" in 1989). Being in power, this risk cannot be taken and - according to the political rationale - the chances of a successful citizen initiated referendum shall be diminished. Undoubtedly, this has disadvantages in the case of referendums ordered at the initiative of the government: the case of the 2016 migrant quota referendum is perfect confirmation.
Moreover, in the referendum procedure it is meaningful that the initiators only have 120 days to collect the signatures and, except for European Citizen Initiatives, the signatures cannot be collected electronically. For this reason, it is not easy to fulfill the time requirement; only organizations with a significant nation-wide network and activists have a real chance to overcome this obstacle.[89]
Therefore, the controversial Constitution approved in April 2011 has led to a general downsizing of people's participation institutions, ensuring their effective use, better protected by the constitution source thanks to the significant role attributed to the Kúria. However, the contradictory aspects of the process highlight the attitude of the majoritarian political forces regarding the participatory principle.[90]
The founding philosophy of the constitutional provisions has been greatly affected by the Constitutional Court and the debate during the 1990s about the placement of direct democratic institutions and participatory principle within the framework of a pluralist democracy State system with a parliamentary form of government.
From a comparative perspective, and also considering the other European countries of the former socialist area, the Hungarian order appears to be anchored to a traditional concept of representation where the use of direct democracy institutions is limited to exceptional cases.[91] Moreover, a detailed analysis of direct democracy and political culture in Hungary reveals limited participation in societies and other civic organizations (only Bulgaria and Romania show similarly modest figures as Hungary):[92] this suggests that people's rights tend to be tools which deepen conflicts rather than a means of reconciliation.[93]
Accordingly, the need for a reflection on the referendum, in the general context of the political system and party crisis - currently characterized by increasing distance and incommunicability with the social base - highlighting that the use of the referendum produces, sometimes, distorted effects, not effective for the attenuation of the crisis or national issues. The specious or improper use of the referendum institution, it is functional to reflect on the balancing role, in the constitutional system, of the direct democracy institutions regarding the representative model, in a more balanced perspective between the two components, that is possible on the base of a real relationship of truth between representatives and represented subjects, as a fundamental ethical and political parameter.
What is the importance of the Hungarian referendum case? Why does it merit discussion in a comparative or broader European perspective? These may to some degree be self-evident, but is important to be clear what the point of view is and why it matters outside Hungary.
We need to recall that the process of European integration has been by far the leading factor in promoting the use of referendum during the last four decades on the continent. To date there have been some sixty referendums tied to European Union issues in as many as twenty-three member States. The common denominator of the European Union referendum is that they were national and
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European: national because they were organized under State law; European because they were related in some way to the continental European integration process. Policy referendums are held by member States on specific European Union-related issues such as monetary union, fiscal policy, or European Union foreign policy.[94]
In this view, last in the temporal order but not least, Hungary voted on migratory policy. Indeed, the Hungarian referendum experience related to that of the European Union took the form of vote on migrant resettlement plans that was held on 2 October 2016. The people's consultation, initiated by the government, is commonly referred to as the quota referendum (kvótanépszavazás or kvótareferendum) in Hungarian media and political life. Hungary was one of the affected countries during the 2015 European migrant crisis via the Balkan route. The Hungarian Government constructed a metal fence along its southern terrestrial border with Serbia and Croatia.
In September 2015 the European Union interior ministers meeting in the Justice and Home Affairs Council approved a plan to relocate 120,000 asylum seekers over two years from the frontline countries Italy, Greece, and Hungary to all other European Union countries: under the resettlement Hungary had an allocation of 1,294 refugees.[95]
Hungary voted against the relocation plan. Its 54,000 asylum seekers were not taken into consideration, that number being relocated to Italy and Greece instead. Following the decision, Hungary[96] and Slovakia[97] separately took legal action over the European Union mandatory migrant quotas at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. In theory, the Hungarian Government could veto any refugee plan.
Afterwards, the Hungarian Government announced that a referendum would be held on whether to accept the European Union proposed mandatory quotas for relocating migrants[98] because the quota system would "redraw Hungary's and Europe's ethnic, cultural and religious identity, which no EU organ has the right to do".[99] The National Assembly officially approved the referendum initiated by the government with 136 votes cast in favor by a majority coalition (Fidesz and Christian-Democratic People's Party, KDNP) and the opposition party Jobbik; the majority of leftwing opposition boycotted the plenary session.
In May 2016, after examining the legal challenges, the Constitutional Court (Kúria) allowed the holding of the referendum and, finally, the Hungarian President set the date for the consultation. The Kúria rejected four appeals submitted against the National Electoral Committee decision to pass the referendum question. After assessing the appeals against the Electoral Committee approval of the initiative, the Kúria determined that the referendum question was consistent with the Constitution and the referendum Act. The three criteria a referendum question has to meet in order to be cleared are that it cannot be in conflict with international treaties, its subject-matter must fall within the competence of parliament, and it must be clearly phrased. The Kúria said the government's question met all three requirements and the question does not clash with any international treaty because it concerns a European Council resolution and not Hungary's treaty of accession. The Court said any area subject to regulation falls within parliament's competence. In the case of the referendum question, determining the legal status of non-Hungarian citizens staying in Hungary as well as the lawful duration of their stay is a subject-matter that falls under parliament's jurisdiction, the Kúria said.[100] The Kúria's ruling is binding and not subject to appeal.
The European Union reaction against a quota referendum was strong, as this was an ideological decision, not warranted by a lack of resources or capacity, because Hungary has to accept only 1,294 asylum seekers according to the decision on relocations. Likewise, different Hungarian NGOs argued in May 2016 that the referendum cannot be held, based on the Hungarian Constitution. They added, the Constitutional Court adopted an unlawful decision when allowing the referendum to be held.[101]
The referendum question is a typical example of voter manipulation: «Do you want the European Union to be entitled to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the National Assembly?». The Hungarian quota referendum actually appeared to be a democratic negotiation with other European Union countries on migrant affairs.
But direct democracy may be vulnerable if the political players ask people incomprehensible or rigged questions. In recent years there are been examples of manipulative referendums in Europe and the United States on various topics.
The first was in 2014 with the referendum in Crimea when the secessionist local government asked voters to choose between becoming either a constituent part of the Russian Federation or a part of Ukraine with broader autonomy under a previous version of its 1992 Constitution: the status quo,
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of Crimea as an autonomous Ukrainian republic (avtonòmna respublika), was not on the ballot.[102]
The 2015 Greek referendum on the country's latest bailout package asked Greeks a specific question of national financial economy.[103] The question contained a specifically economic text that few understood. Greeks voted "No" and were duly ignored by their own government, which had called the vote.
Other examples of manipulative referendums were in 2016, in this case at United States at the municipal level. The electors in the city of Austin, the capital of Texas, voted on whether to eliminate some tough rules for car-hailing services with a truly contorted question:[104] local residents voted "No" and it is likely many did not understood what they were voting for. More so, the local referendum in Jacksonville (Florida), on pension liability sales tax is characterized by utter nonsense and confusing ballot language even for experts in local financial law.[105]
In the United Kingdom for the 2016 Brexit referendum, the Government initially framed the question in a leading way: «Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union?», but the United Kingdom Electoral Commission recommended spelling out both options instead of just one («Remain» or «Leave»).
As a result of the approval of the quota refugee referendum question by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the Hungarian voters were given a choice between agreeing with the Hungarian Government, such as the Fidesz establishment, or recognizing that the European Union can do whatever it pleases in Hungary without the National Assembly having any say. The third option was not to vote, thus refusing governmental manipulation.
If the results could have been a symbol against the European Union like a democratic revolution against the bureaucrats of Brussels, the Hungarian vote has little to do with democracy: is a plebiscite like a demonstration of how a leader can abuse those values.
The Hungarian governmental referendum campaign distorted the facts about immigrants with various fearmongering anti-migrant messages included in an 18-page booklet such as "Forced settlement endangers our culture and traditions". The booklet, which the government sent to 4.1 million Hungarian households, argued that people should vote "No" in the national referendum with respect to the European Union relocation quota plan and contained distorted facts about Europe's refugee crisis, portraying asylum seekers and migrants as dangerous to Europe's future. It linked migration to increased terrorism and referred to non-existent "no-go" areas in European cities with large migrant populations (London, Paris, Marseille, Berlin, Gothenburg, and Stockholm), where authorities have allegedly lost control and where law and order is absent.
The position of minority parliamentary parties on the referendum is divided about the answer to the question. Some are campaigning for a "Yes" vote, others for casting invalid votes, and others urges to remain at home - this is because to have a valid referendum more than half of the voters have to cast a valid vote.
Among opponents to the referendum, the satirical Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party (MKKP) was involved in the quota vote campaign, mocking the government's anti-immigrant messages and phrases, thus the party asked the people to vote invalidly.[106] Conversely, there was the position of Jobbik, the radical right party, which pointed out that the referendum was no longer the right tool for achieving the goals, while his party's bill to amend the Constitution to reject the migrant quota would be efficient and cheaper.[107]
Several domestic and foreign political scientists and journalists argued that the Hungarian government considered the referendum as the first step towards withdrawal from the European Union (the so-called Huxit)[108] and that Hungary's migrant referendum shows Europe's post-Brexit challenge.[109]
Nevertheless, if the European Union migrant-relocation plan was approved by voters, the low voter turnout invalidates results.[110] The referendum will not have a strong legal basis because under European Union treaties, Brussels already has the power to impose policy such as refugee relocation quotas, but with a high turnout, this could set a precedent and an example followed by other European Union countries with the problem of migration and the fear that this arouses among citizens and voters.
It was a questionable, distorted, and ideological test of direct democracy (also called a "Potemkin referendum"),[111] endorsed arguably from the Constitutional Court, in the context of relations with the European Union anxious to avoid any post-Brexit domino effect - insofar as Hungary is not the United Kingdom and is not prepared to withdraw from the Union - with some doubts about the amount of State funds that were used to pay for referendum advertisements in government-friendly media outlets or on hoardings owned by government allies.
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Moreover, the topic of migrants is a highly demagogic and weak-willed question to create an enemy for the voters and can also help the government distract people from its domestic problems and failures (especially corruption[112] and the national health system[113]) in a national-populist framework with authoritarian features,[114] and particularly the need to strengthen its power, even through a populist use of democratic tools. If it is true that a "zero migrants" policy is meant to safeguard Europe's Christian identity and culture from the mostly Muslim migrants and refugees, it is equally true that the European Union imposes duties of solidarity; the problem of migrants cannot be a problem for only two out of twenty-eight Countries, that is Greece and Italy.
The recurrent persistence of the Hungarian Government on this issue is demonstrated by the fact that after the invalid outcome referendum it proposed a constitutional amendment - a primeval proposal by the far-right party Jobbik - that included a clear statement on preventing the European Union from ordering the resettlement of migrants to Hungary under a resolution without the consent of the Hungarian Parliament; it includes banning mandatory group resettlements, and stating that the resettlement of people without the right to free movement and stay in Hungary can only take place on the basis of individual requests assessed by the Hungarian authorities in procedures outlined by Parliament. However, the seventh constitutional amendment on a proposal to bar migrants from being resettled in the country fell short of the two-thirds majority needed:[115] indeed, the Fidesz-KDNP alliance lost the initial qualified majority (133 deputies) for the passing of some deputies to other parliamentary groups.
Ultimately it may be useful to reflect on the particular aversion to the immigrants question from Central and Eastern European countries, particularly the four countries of the Visegrád Group (also called Visegrád four, or simply V4: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia).[116] This revulsion - regardless of logical policies in any country - appears to derive from the fact that Eastern Europe has not participated in colonization, historically had had less contact with the "other", which makes the population fearful of the stranger, therefore remembering the literal meaning "xenophobia", like "fear of difference". During the Cold War and the 1990s, Western Europe had extensive experience with migrations that did not relate to the other side of the Iron Curtain, among them North Africans in France, Turks in Germany,
Indians and Pakistanis in England, North and sub-Saharan Africans in Italy: none of this has happened in Central or Eastern Europe, including Hungary. The Hungarian political turning to the right led to a referendum on the relocation of migrants to which the remaining European Union countries may reply with another fanciful referendum question, namely: «Do you agree that the Country "X" pay Hungary € [...] billion in structural funds and € [...] billion for rural development?».[117] ■
NOTES
* The article was originally published on The Journal of Comparative Law (2017), pp. 173-197.
[1] In the reconstruction of the main stages of the Hungarian constitutional history, the events of March 1848 were particularly significant and emblematic of the political culture that informed the institutions and the relations between the branches of the Hungarian State. After the Pest revolution of 15 March 1848, the National Assembly adopted laws that sanctioned the freedom of the press and the establishment of representative and responsible government. The transition to liberal legislation for the establishment of an Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was sanctioned by the Compromise reached in 1867 between the Hungarian classes of landowners and capitalists and the corresponding Austrian classes. See A. Adam, "La mise en place du système de gouvernement en Hongrie", in S. Milacic (ed.), La démocratie constitutionnelle en Europe centrale et orientale: bilans and perspectives (1998); Z. Szente, "The Historic Origins of the National Assembly in Hungary", Historia constitucional (2007), p. 8.
[2] The Constitution of 1949, as substantially amended and in force until 1 January 2012, was reformed for the last time in Autumn 2010. A draft new Constitution, with the introduction of limitations on the powers of the Constitutional Court in the fields of finance and tax audit, already had been prepared. A judge of the Constitutional Court can no longer interfere in the verification of budgetary laws and in tax matters, except in special cases. See E. Sorda, "Ungheria. Approvato un emendamento alla Costituzione per limitare i poteri della Corte costituzionale in materia di tassazione e fondi pubblici", in DPCE online (2011), p. 1.
[3] For a detailed reconstruction of the constitutional events, see K. Kelemen, "Nuova Costituzione ungherese adottata e promulgata", in Diritti comparati (2011), p. 1. The application submitted to the National Electoral Office had been justified by the exceptional events and not on a constitutional basis, the constitutional referendum being unknown in the Hungarian system. Moreover, Hungary never used the referendum for the review of a constitutional text, even in the transition years of 1989 to 1990.
[4] See M. Ganino, "La revisione costituzionale in Europa orientale", in S. Gambino and G. D'Ignazio (eds.), La revisione costituzionale e i suoi limiti (2007), p. 456.
[5] See F. Palermo (eds.), La manutenzione costituzionale (2007), p. 2.
[6] See M. Ganino, "Le transizioni costituzionali nell'Europa orientale", in S. Gambino (eds.), Costituzionalismo europeo e transizioni democratiche (2003), p. 87. On this point, also see: J. Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence (1901), p. 154ff.; F. Lanchester, La Costituzione tra elasticità e rottura (2011), p. 6.
[7] See A. Di Gregorio, "La Costituzione ungherese del 25 aprile 2011: è davvero tutto così nuovo? Qualche osservazione in libertà", in Diritto pubblico dei paesi dell'Europa orientale (2011).
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[8] See R. Bifulco, "La teoria della democrazia deliberativa e la realtà della democrazia rappresentativa", in R. Cerreto (eds.), La democrazia italiana: forme, limiti, garanzie (2010), p. 25.
[9] See M. Luciani and M. Volpi (eds.), Referendum. Problemi teorici ed esperienze costituzionali (1992), p. 4.
[10] See L. Volpe, "Democrazia diretta", in L. Pegoraro (eds.), Glossario di Diritto pubblico comparato (2009), pp. 76-80.
[11] For a reconstruction in detail of the etymological origin and philosophical and historical institute, see among others: A. Gigliotti, L'ammissibilità del referendum in materia elettorale (2009), p. 3.
[12] See M. Volpi, "Le forme di Stato", in G. Morbidelli, L. Pegoraro, A. Reposo, and M. Volpi (eds.), Diritto costituzionale italiano e comparato (1997), pp. 433ff.; Volpi, "Referendum nel diritto costituzionale", in VV.AA., Digesto delle discipline pubblicistiche (1997), pp. 500-505.
[13] See F. Delperée, "Referendum e ordinamenti costituzionali", in Luciani and Volpi, note 9 above, pp. 49-50.
[14] See: P. Biscaretti di Ruffìa, "Su alcune recenti procedure e tendenze contrarie al principio dell'irresponsabilità politica parlamentare", in Rassegna di Diritto Pubblico (1947), pp. 85ff.
[15] On this topic see M. Fatin-Rouge Stéfanini, Le contrőle du référendum par la justice constitutionnelle (2004).
[16] See L. Komáromi, "Popular Rights in Hungary. A Brief Overview of Ideas, Institutions and Practice from the Late 18th Century Until Our Days", in C2D Working Paper Series (2010), pp. 1-3; P. Blokker, New Democracies in Crisis? A Comparative Constitutional Study of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (2013), pp. 110-112.
[17] See Komáromi, ibid., p. 5.
[18] See A. Körösény, Government and Politics in Hungary (1999), pp. 145 ss.
[19] Ignác Martinovics (1755-1795) was a philosopher and leader of Hungarian Jacobin movement. See: L. Komáromi, "Milestones in the history of direct democracy in Hungary", in Iustum Aequum Salutare (2013), pp. 41-43.
[20] See Komáromi, note 16 above, p. 4.
[21] See ibid., pp. 6-7. According to the Treaty of Trianon, the city of Sopron in western Hungary and its surroundings were assigned to Austria. After an uprising in 1921, a referendum was held the 14th-16th December 1921 by Italian diplomatic mediation in the Venice Protocol and 65,08% of the votes were in favor of belonging to Hungary. The referendum has been accepted by the major powers and the transition of Sopron from Austria to Hungary has been only the only serious territorial revision in the years following the Treaty of Trianon.
[22] See M. Ganino, Partecipare nella società socialista. Forme di manifestazione diretta dell'opinione e della volontà dei cittadini negli "Stati socialisti" europei (1987), pp. 30 ss.
[23] See Komáromi, note 16 above, pp. 9-10.
[24] In a later judgment it was clearly stated: "the independent mandate means that after the elections, the representative becomes a legally independent voter; he elaborates his positions, as well as his vote, based on his own convictions and his conscience; the representative cannot be recalled because of the vote and his activities". See J. P. Massias, Droit constitutionnel des Etats d'Europe de l'Est (2008), p. 263.
[25] See A. Ciammariconi and A. Di Gregorio, "Il referendum nei nuovi Stati membri dell'Unione europea", in Diritto pubblico comparato europeo (2005), pp. 1407-1408.
[26] See P. V. Uleri, "Referendum: Europa centro orientale e Italia", in Rivista italiana di scienza politica (2003), pp. 320-321; M. Dezsö and A. Bragyova, "Hungary", in A. Auer and M. Bützer (eds.), Direct Democracy: The Eastern and Central European Experience (2001), p. 66.
[27] The Constitution of Hungary is available in English on the website of the Hungarian Government (Kormany).
[28] Act n. LIX of 15 July 1997 and Act n. XCVIII of 31 October 1997 on the amendment of Constitution.
[29] Act n. XXXVI of 18th April 2013.
[30] Act n. CCXXXVIII of 17th December 2013, modified by Act n. XLVIII of 22th May 2016.
[31] Art. 28/C, Const. 1949, was worded as following: «(1) A national referendum may be held for reaching a decision or for an expression of opinion. Carrying out a national referendum may be mandatory or may be the result of the consideration of a matter. (2) A national referendum shall be held if so initiated by at least 200,000 voting citizens. (3) If a national referendum is mandatory, the result of the successfully held national referendum shall be binding for the Parliament. (4) Based on its consideration, the Parliament may order a national referendum upon the initiative by the President of the Republic, the Government, by one-third of Members of the Parliament or by 100,000 voting citizens».
[32] See: E. G. Mahrenholz, "Referendum e democrazia", in Luciani and Volpi, note 9 above, p. 21.
[33] See Adam, note 1 above, pp. 476-477.
[34] The exact wording of Constitution was: "There must be a mandatory referendum on the entry of the Hungarian Republic to the European Union based on the conditions established by the Treaty. The referendum date is 12 April 2003. The question of the referendum should be worded as follows: "Are you in favour of the accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European Union?". The European Union accession referendum was approved by 83.76% votes with a turnout of 45.59%.
[35] See M. Dezső and A. Bragyova, "Hungary. Country Report", in C2D Working Paper Series (2000), p. 4.
[36] See Uleri, note 26 above, p. 321.
[37] Kúria judgments nos. 2/1993, 3/1996, 52/1997, 25/1999, and 27/2007.
[38] Kúria judgment of 22 January 1993, n. 2.
[39] Venice Commission, Hongrie. Cour constitutionnelle (1993), p. 15.
[40] See P. Paczolay, "Hongrie", in Annuaire International de Justice constitutionnelle (1993), p. 516.
[41] See Massias, note 24 above, pp. 216-217.
[42] Parliamentary resolution n. 54/1995.
[43] Parliamentary resolution n. 120/1995; Kúria judgment of 23 February 1996, n. 3.
[44] Kúria judgment of 14 October 1997, n. 52. See: Venice Commission, Hongrie. Cour constitutionnelle (1996), p. 65.
[45] The question of the NATO accession referendum was worded as followed: «Do you agree that the Republic of Hungary should ensure the protection of the nation by becoming a member of NATO?» and was approved by 85.33% votes with a turnout of 49.19%.
[46] Kúria judgment n. 52/1997.
[47] Act n. LV of 1994 on agricultural land, Article 7.
[48] Venice Commission, Hongrie. Cour constitutionnelle (1997), p. 414.
[49] Ibid., p. 413.
[50] See F. Sudre, Droit européen et international des droits de l'homme (2006), pp. 520ff.
[51] Kúria judgment of 7 July 1999, n. 25.
[52] Venice Commission, Hongrie. Cour constitutionnelle (1999), p. 426.
[53] Kúria judgment of 17 May 2007, n. 27.
[54] Venice Commission, Hongrie. Cour constitutionnelle (2007), p. 411. The same opinion is expressed by Ergun Özbudun in the Opinion of the Venice Commission on the draft reform of the Constitution passed in 1995. Özbudun observed the need to include the discipline of essential elements of referendum in the constitutional text and to preserve the role envisaged by Constitutional Court as the court of supremacy of
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the Constitution, including in relation to the exercise of direct democracy institutions. See Venice Commission, Avis sur les principes directeurs de la Constitution de la République de Hongrie par M. Ergun Özbudun, Chapter V, Le Parlement et le processus législatif, CDL(1995)065f-restr, 23 October 1995.
[55] See Körösény, note 18 above, p. 22; Centre for Research on Direct Democracy, Data Hungary (2016).
[56] See Adam, note 1 above, pp. 475-476; M. Ganino, C. Filippini and A. Di Gregorio, "Presidenti, Governi e Parlamenti nei paesi dell'Europa orientale (Polonia, Lituania, Ungheria, Repubblica Ceca): l'equilibrio innanzitutto", in A. Di Giovine and A. Mastromarino (eds.), La presidenzializzazione degli esecutivi nelle democrazie contemporanee (2007), p. 171.
[57] The question about the election of the President by Parliament was worded as follows: «Should the President of the Republic be elected by the new Parliament?» and was approved by 50.07% votes with a turnout of 58.04%.
[58] The question about the direct election of the President was worded as follows: «Are you in favour of the President of the Republic being elected by the people» and was approved by 85.90% votes but with an insufficient turnout of 13.91%.
[59] The question about disclosing the accounts and property of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) was worded as follows: «Are you in favour of the accounts and property of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party] being disclosed?» and was approved by 95.37% votes with a turnout of 57.85%.
[60] The question about presence of political parties in businesses was worded as follows: «Are you in favour of ending the presence of political parties in businesses?» and was approved by 95.15% votes with a turnout of 58.04%.
[61] The question about the dissolution of Betriebskampftruppen [Workers' Guard] was worded as follows: «Should the Workers' Guard be dissolved? » and was approved by 94.93% votes with a turnout of 58.04%.
[62] See Komáromi, note 16 above, p. 49.
[63] See M. Ganino, "Premessa a Ungheria", in P. Biscaretti di Ruffìa and M. Ganino (eds.), Le Costituzioni di sette Stati di recente ristrutturazione (1996), pp. 390-391.
[64] See Massias, note 24 above, pp. 229-231.
[65] The question about Hungarian dual citizenship was worded as follows: «Do you agree that Parliament should pass a law which allows facilitated granting of Hungarian citizenship to those people who claim to be of Hungarian descent, do not live in Hungary, are not Hungarian citizens and are able to manifest their Hungarian descent by a 'Hungarian identity card' according to Article 19 of Act n. LXII/2001 or by a different way determined by Parliament?» and was approved by 51.57% votes but with an insufficient turnout of 37.41%. See P. Gelard, "L'actualité constitutionnelle en Russie, dans les États de la CEI et de l'Europe de l'est et dans les États toujours ou anciennement communistes (Mai-Juillet 2001)", in Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel (2001), pp. 663-664.
[66] The question about privatizations within the health care system is: «Do you agree that the institutions of the health system and hospitals have to remain in public or communal domain and that Parliament is obliged to abolish every law which does not comply with this regulation?» and was approved by 65.01% votes but with an insufficient turnout of 37.41%.
[67] See Centre for Research on Direct Democracy, Data Hungary (2016).
[68] The question about the abolition of fees for in-patient treatment was worded as follows: «Do you approve of not raising daily fees for in-patient treatments in hospitals starting from 1 January after the holding of the referendum?» and was approved by 84.08% votes with a turnout of 50.49%. The question about abolition of fees for convalescent treatments was worded as follows: «Do you agree that starting from 1 January of the year following the people's vote on this issue, there shall be no fee for medical consultations, dental treatments and special convalescent treatments?» and was approved by 82.42% votes with a turnout of 50.49%. The question about abolition of tuition fees for public higher education was worded as follows: «Do you approve of exempting students of public higher educational establishments from tuition?» and was approved by 82.22% votes with a turnout of 50.49%.
[69] See Komáromi, note 16 above, pp. 55-56; Z. T. Pallinger, "Citizens Initiatives in Hungary: an Additional Opportunity for Power-Sharing in an Extremely Majoritarian System", in M. Setala and T. Schiller (eds.), Citizens' Initiative in Europe: Procedures and Consequences of Agenda-Setting by Citizens (2012), pp. 113-133; E. Krug, "Szunnyadó akna. A népszavazás szellemét nem az Alkotmánybíróság szabadította ki a palackból", in 168 Óra Online, 4 July 2008.
[70] In 2002 the National Electoral Committee dealt with 18 people's initiatives, in 2003 with 25, in 2004 with 9, in 2005 with 28, in 2006 with 47, in 2007 with 412. There was a decrease with 14 initiatives in 2014, 104 in 2015, 32 in 2016 and an increase with 69 in 2017, until April. Source: National Electoral Committee.
[71] See G. Tóka, "Constitutional Principles and Electoral Democracy in Hungary", in E. Bos and K. Pócza (eds.), Constitution Building in Consolidated Democracies: A New Beginning or Decay of a Political System? (2014), pp. 311-328.
[72] Venice Commission, Opinion on the New Constitution of Hungary, n. 618/2011, 20 June 2011.
[73] If the examination of the provisions of a European Union member State Constitution is not within the competence of the European Parliament, as explicitly noted in the resolution, the adoption of a new fundamental text relates to a matter of "common values" to European Union countries that deserves the attention of the organ Union representative. See: European Parliament, Resolution n. P7_TA(2011)0315, 5 July 2011.
[74] See a detailed reconstruction in: T. Drinóczi, "Revisione e manutenzione costituzionale nell'ordinamento ungherese", in Palermo, note 5 above, pp. 437 ss.
[75] See Z. Péteri, "Constitution-Making in Hungary", in Acta Juridica Hungarica (1994), pp. 3-4.
[76] See Ganino, note 4 above, p. 470.
[77] See Drinóczi, in Palermo, note 5 above, pp. 461-462.
[78] Venice Commission, Avis sur la doctrine réglementaire de la Constitution de la République de Hongrie par M. Sergio Bartole, Chapter XIX, Modification de la Constitution, CDL(1995)042f-restr, 28 August 1995.
[79] See L. Komáromi, "Direkte Demokratie in Ungarn. Kurze Zusammenfassung über die letzten zwei Jahrzehnte und Bemerkungen zum neuen ungarischen Grundgesetz", Pázmány Law Review (2013), pp. 105-117.
[80] See A. Gamper, ""Ni la force, ni la riguer?" Judicializing Direct Democracy", in Percorsi costituzionali (2015), pp. 125139; M. Ganino, C. Filippini, A. Di Gregorio and M. Mazza, "Corti costituzionali e Corti europee. I casi di Federazione di Russia, Polonia, Repubblica Ceca e Ungheria", in G. F. Ferrari (eds.), Corti nazionali e Corti europee (2006), p. 95.
[81] See Komáromi, note 33 above, p. 57.
[82] General elections in Hungary were held in two rounds until 2010, with a second, run-off round taking place two weeks after the first. From 2014 a one-round system replaced the former system. The average turnout is 61.30%: the bigger participation was in the second round of 2002 parliamentary elections with turnout of 73.51% followed by an considerable decrease from 2002 to 2014 with 61.73%, while the lesser
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participation was in the second round of 1990 consultations with 45.54%.
[83] See L. Komáromi, "Participatory Democracy: International and European Tendencies, Constitutional Framework in Visegrád Countries, Hungarian Instruments and Experiences", in Iustum Aequum Salutare (2015), p. 58.
[84] Participation quorum in: Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia; approval quorum in: Denmark, Ireland; both quorums in: Latvia, Lithuania. See L. Aguiar-Conraria and P. C. MagalhTJes, "Referendum Design, Quorum Rules and Turnout", in Social Science Research Network (2009).
[85] The Code of good practice on referendum was adopted by Venice Commission on 16-17 March 2007, CDL-AD(2007)008rev, 13, 22-23.
[86] Declaration by Gergely Gulyás, deputy head of the Commission entrusted with the preparation of the new Constitution, see: L. Komáromi, "A népszavazásra vonatkozó szabályozás változásai az Alaptörvényben és az új népszavazási törvényben", in MTA Law Working Papers (2014), p. 10.
[87] Intervention by László Salamon, President of the Commission entrusted with the preparation of the new Constitution, see Komáromi, ibid., p. 11.
[88] Declaration by József Szájer, President of the "National Consultation Body", the principal drafter of the 2011's Constitution, see Komáromi, ibid., p. 11.
[89] Of the twelve questions submitted to referendum since 1989 only one was proposed by a non-partisan civic organization (World Federation of Hungarians of 2004: citizenship for Hungarians living abroad). See Komáromi, note 83 above, p. 58.
[90] On the creation of a new constituent power in Hungary, see K. L. Scheppele, "Unconstitutional Constituent Power", in R. Smith and R. Beeman (eds.), Constitution-Making (2015), pp. 42-45.
[91] See Ciammariconi and Di Gregorio, note 25 above, p. 1408. On the crisis of the direct democracy institutions in the Hungarian constitutional rule and praxis: H. Küpper, "Die Krise der dorekten Demokratie in Ungarn", Ost Europa Recht (2009), pp. 2-23.
[92] See Pew Research Center, Two Decades After the Wall's Fall, 2 November 2009, pp. 25-26.
[93] See Komáromi, note 83 above, pp. 58-59.
[94] See A. Auer, "The People Have Spoken: Abide? A Critical View of the EU's Dramatic Referendum (In)Experience", European Constitutional Law Review (2016), pp. 403-404.
[95] Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece. See: A. Geraci, "There is Not Enough Union in this Union". Principio di solidarietà e Sistema di Dublino alla prova del più imponente esodo di profughi dal secondo dopoguerra", in Federalismi (2016).
[96] Hungary v Council, Case C-647/15. See W. Helbling, "Hungary Challenges EU Refugee Distribution System", in http://jurist.org, 4 December 2015.
[97] Slovakia v Council, Case C-643/15. See H. Von Der Burchard and J. Barigazzi, "Slovakia Files Lawsuit Against EU's Refugee Relocation", in http://politico.eu, 2 December 2015.
[98] Initiative of 24 February 2016 with decision of National Electoral Committee of 29 February 2016, n. 14.
[99] See "Orbán: Népszavazás lesz a betelepítési kvótáról", in Magiar Nemzet, 24th February 2016; Fidesz Delegation in the European Parliament, 19 July 2016.
[100] Kuria resolution of 3 May 2016, n. Knk.IV.37.222/2016/9.
[101] See "Alkotmányellenes a kvótaügyi népszavazás - állítják a civilek", in http://24.hu, 4 May 2016.
[102] The 2014 Crimean status referendum question was worded with two choices to choose from and voters were able to choose only one of these: «1) Do you support the reunification of Crimea with Russia with all the rights of the federal subject of the Russian Federation? 2) Do you support the restoration of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea in 1992 and the status of the Crimea as part of Ukraine?». The reunification option was approved in the Autonomous Republic Crimea by 96.77% votes with a turnout of 83.10% and in the Special Status City of Sevastopo by 95.60% votes with a turnout of 89.50%. See R. De Caria, "I referendum indipendentisti", in Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo (2014) , pp. 1614-1616; J. Vidmar, "Crimea's Referendum and Secession: Why It Resembles Northern Cyprus More than Kosovo", in Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 20 March 2014.
[103] The 2015 Greek bailout referendum question was worded as follows: «Should the plan of agreement be accepted, which was submitted by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund in the Eurogroup of 25th June 2015 and comprises of two parts, which constitute their unified proposal?» and was rejected by 61.31% votes with a turnout of 62.15%. See G. Grasso, "Il referendum greco e la questione democratica nella (ri)costruzione del soggetto politico europeo", in Osservatorio costituzionale (2015) .
[104] The 2016 Austin transportation network companies (TNCs) referendum question was worded as follows: «Shall the City Code be amended to repeal City Ordinance n. 20151217075 relating to Transportation Network Companies; and replace with an ordinance that would repeal and prohibit required fingerprinting, repeal the requirement to identify the vehicle with a distinctive emblem, repeal the prohibition against loading and unloading passengers in a travel lane, and require other regulations for Transportation Network Companies?» and was rejected by 55.72% votes with a turnout of 17.43%. Although other cities in the United States have passed ordinances requiring TNCs to operate under the same rules as taxis, they have not used the referendum process.
[105] The 2016 Jacksonville pension liability sales tax referendum was worded as followed: «Permanently closing up to three of the City's underfunded defined benefit retirement plans, increasing the employee contribution for those plans to a minimum of 10%, and ending the Better Jacksonville 1/2-cent sales tax are all required to adopt a 1/2-cent sales tax solely dedicated to reducing the City's unfunded pension liability. Shall such pension liability sales tax, which ends upon elimination of the unfunded pension liability or in 30 years maximum, be adopted?» and was accepted by 65.11% votes with a turnout of 27.87%.
[106] See L. Petrovszki, "The Success of Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party", in http://4liberty.eu, 19 September 2016.
[107] With the amendment of Article E, para. 2, Const., the amendment bill proposed literally the addition of the following sentence: "Without the approval of the Hungarian National Assembly, the EU cannot order a mandatory settlement of foreign nationals to Hungary".
[108] See L. Bershidsky, "Hungary's Manipulative Referendum", in http://bloomberg.com, 5 July 2016.
[109] See G. Szakacs, "Hungary's Migrant Referendum Shows Europe's Post-Brexit Challenge", in http://reuters.com, 1 July 2016.
[110] The migrant quota referendum was approved by 98.36% votes but with an insufficient turnout of 41.32% valid votes.
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[111] See G. Buldioski, "Viktor Orbán's Potemkin Referendum", in http://politico.eu, 22 August 2016.
[112] Corruption in Hungary increased significantly, according to the 2015 corruption perception Index by Transparency International. Moreover, in a comparative study of nineteen European Union countries and the efforts of their governments to make lobbying and influence peddling more transparent, open to public scrutiny, Hungary came in last place; that was not the result of carelessness, lack of attention by public authority, but to conscious premeditated political strategy on the part of the Fidesz government.
[113] See A. Lestyánszky, "Hungary's Healthcare 'On the Brink of Disaster'", 16 January 2015, and references therein.
[114] See K. Gawron-Tabor, "Viktor Orban's Illiberal democracy in the Indices of the Quality of Democracy", in Kultura i Edukacja (2016), pp. 46-62; F. Argentieri, "Dall'Ungheria alla Polonia, nell'Est dilaga "l'effetto Putin", in l'Unità, 5 October 2016, p. 8.
[115] See C. Kroeth, "Hungarian MPs reject Orbán's antimigrant push", in http://politico.eu, 8 November 2016.
[116] On participatory rights in the Visegrád Countries' Constitutions, see Komáromi, note 83 above, pp. 55-57.
[117] In 2014 Hungary was the second biggest net recipient of European Union funds after Poland with 6,620 billion Euros, drawing about 6.57% of its GDP from the European Union.
Lábjegyzetek:
[1] The Author is adjunct Professor in Public Law, University of Venice.
Visszaugrás
