Csaba Erdős - Viktória Verebélyi: In the Defence of Parliamentary Autonomy - 35 Years of Practice by the Hungarian Constitutional Court in the Field of Parliamentary Law[1] (ABSz, 2025. Különszám, 36-44. o.)

Abstract

This study, through an examination of thirty-five years of case law, demonstrates that the Hungarian Constitutional Court intervenes in internal parliamentary affairs only in instances of clear and direct constitutional violations. The analysis then places this approach in a comparative perspective by showing that the European Court of Human Rights has increasingly recognized parliamentary autonomy when assessing disciplinary sanctions imposed on members of parliament.

Keywords: parliamentary autonomy, Hungarian Constitutional Court, European Court of Human Rights, self-regulation, disciplinary law

I. Introduction

One of the key issues in constitutional systems is the division of powers, a particularly difficult question being that of external control - exercisable by another branch of power - over the internal functioning of independent branches of power. This is such a difficult question that there is hardly a 'single correct answer',[2] as it is necessary to ensure both the independence of the branch of power in question and the principle that public power should not be exercised without restriction. The challenges of reconciling these two conflicting requirements can be found in relation to the legal status of judges, but they also arise as a serious issue in connection with the functioning of parliaments. The literature traditionally subsumes the latter under the concept of parliamentary autonomy, contrasting it with the requirement of external review.[3] Based on this, we can distinguish between trends that support and weaken parliamentary autonomy and those that emphasise the importance of constitutional control, and we can place the decisions of the constitutional court and the supreme court on these issues on a scale marked by these extreme values.

The aim of this study is to review which of these categories the Hungarian Constitutional Court can be classified into based on its thirty-five years of practice, and whether there have been any deviations in its jurisprudence. The study also focuses on how the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR), which has a significant impact on Hungarian public law issues, views the desirable degree of parliamentary autonomy. A comparison of the relevant practices of the two courts is particularly justified and topical given that the ECtHR has dealt with Hungarian parliamentary law in several cases, most recently in Csárdi and Others v. Hungary[4]. This has provided a relatively accurate overview of the parallels and differences between the practices of the two courts.

Before embarking on a detailed analysis, the key concept of this study - parliamentary autonomy - must be defined, as it determines the scope of the research. Clarification of this concept is particularly justified by the fact that different approaches to it are known in the literature. In a broader sense, the concept refers to discretionary decision-making without legal control[5] , while in a narrower sense, it can be interpreted as a specific function of the National Assembly, which includes determining its own organisational and operational rules, electing its officers and members, the exercise of disciplinary and law enforcement powers, the operation of its own administration, and the exercise of parliamentary privileges, including the immunity of members and the assessment of conflicts of interest.[6]

Taking into account the available space, this study focuses on two aspects of autonomy in the narrower sense, namely self-regulation and disciplinary law relating to the legal status of members of parliament and

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examines the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the case law of the ECtHR in these fields.

II. The practice of Hungarian Constitutional Court relating to the self-regulation and organisational freedom of the National Assembly

On the one hand, it should be noted that parliamentary autonomy can be interpreted primarily as regulatory autonomy,[7] which, due to the special position of the legislature in the state organisation, requires that certain decisions relating to its organisation and functioning be taken by the parliament itself. On the other hand, given that the power of self-regulation is also decisive regarding disciplinary law, which will be the subject of a later examination, it is essential to consider the primary sources of internal parliamentary law. Furthermore, a brief overview of the constitutional court's practice regarding the National Assembly's freedom of self-regulation and organisation.

The Fundamental Law defines the role of the National Assembly in the state organisation, its powers and the guarantees of its democratic functioning.[8] The rules governing the functioning and order of debate of the National Assembly are laid down in a cardinal act on the one hand and in the House Rules on the other: "Parliament shall establish its rules of procedure and debate within the framework of its House Rules, to be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament present. With a view to maintaining order and protecting the dignity of Parliament, the Speaker of Parliament is vested with the power to enforce disciplinary action as laid out within the framework of the House Rules."[9] The purpose of the House Rules is to provide political actors with workable and predictable rules for the exercise of parliamentary functions.[10]

Currently, the House Rules provisions appear in the following two legal sources: Act XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly (hereinafter: Ogytv.), several provisions of which are considered fundamental,[11] and - although not considered a piece of legislation, a public law regulatory instrument - Resolution 10/2014. (II.24.) OGY (hereinafter: HHsz). The Ogytv. contains comprehensive, code-like provisions on the most important rules governing the organisation of the National Assembly and the legal status of members of parliament, while the HHsz. regulates the detailed rules of parliamentary operation, individual procedures and parliamentary groups. Both the key parts of the Ogytv. and the HHsz. are adopted and amended by the National Assembly with a two-thirds majority of the members present.

It should be noted that prior to 2014, instead of a unified, quasi-codified regulation at the level of law, the rules governing the legal status and remuneration of members of parliament were contained in several laws in addition to the 'House Rules'[12] included in the resolution. The legal source of the House Rules and the assignment of certain provisions to the appropriate regulatory level were the subject of public law disputes. According to Decision 50/2003. (XI. 5.) AB of the Constitutional Court of Hungary, the National Assembly committed an act of constitutional violation by failing to regulate in law the rules governing the investigative activities of the permanent and temporary committees of the National Assembly in accordance with Article 21 (2) and (3) of the Constitution, and by failing to create the legal conditions for the effectiveness of parliamentary committee investigations.