The study tributes to the Speakers of the Hungarian National Assembly who play a representative role in the 30 years of work of the democratic Hungarian parliament and in the political system. The Speakers are among the most prominent public offices of our democratic system because during the change of regime, the constitutional transition positioned the legislature in accordance with the traditions of Hungarian parliamentarism. The basis of the review is that we deduce the role and perception of the Speakers from the 1989-90 design of the powers and internal rules of the parliament and their transformation through subsequent constitutional and house rule reforms. The study presents the role of the Speaker in the recent Hungarian political history, while introducing their sociological background and leadership profile which reflects the features of the Hungarian political elite too.
Keywords: National Assembly, Speaker, regime change, legislation, parliamentary law
Péter Smuk, professor, University of Public Service Széchenyi István University, smuk.peter@uni-nke.hu.
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The article looks back at the reform thirty years ago, which led to the rebirth of the parliamentary democracy in Hungary. It recalls the basic legislative steps aimed at establishing the responsible government by reforming the regulations of the time. Since in parliamentary systems ministerial accountability is interpreted as direct responsibility before the parliament, the article describes the process of regime change at the end of which parliament became entitled to replace the government by expressing its lack of confidence. This parliamentary power is decisive for ministerial responsibility, but also for the functioning of the parliamentary system as a whole. It ensures that the government continuously obtains the (majority) support of the deputies and the confidence of the parliament for its operation and mandate. With regard to the institution of the constructive motion of censure, the article points out that it is not necessarily in itself able to concretize a government that has lost its parliamentary base, nor can it ensure absolute stability by neglecting the majority principle. It is not this institution, but party discipline that is actually blocking the enforcement of the basic rule of parliamentary democracy, namely that the loss of parliamentary confidence is accompanied by the inevitable consequence of the fall of the government.
Keywords: system change, parliamentary democracy, responsible government, change of government, the vote of no confidence
Vilmos Térey, Law clerk, Constitutional Court of Hungary, terey@mkab.hu.
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In this paper I elaborate the role of head of states concerning the creation of technocratic governments. This type of cabinet is a crisis phenomenon and a symptom of temporary crisis for representative democracy and party governance. The role of head of state can be crucial in this respect when need to have consensus between the parties (which are unable to handle the crisis avoiding the blame for governance) constructing a nonpartisan technocratic government. However in partisan representative systems a technocratic cabinet can be arisen as a state of exception and a means of crisis management. Furthermore it should be emphasised that in parliamentary systems the presidential acts are legitimate if parties are unable or unwilling to govern and avoid the blame for governance. Then the presidents realise the party failure and intervene into the processes. Thus it is not a kind of arbitrariness they act properly according to the crisis. Notwithstanding technocratic cabinets sometimes are mentioned as presidential governments in the literature because of proactivity of the presidents. What lessons can be drawn from these experiences? Is it a widening of authority for head of state or a state of exception for parliamentary system? Can technocratic governments be labelled as presidential governments? According to my thesis technocratic cabinets cannot be labelled as presidential governments in parliamentary system. Presidential activism is a result of temporary weakness of the parties and the president intervenes as a crisis manager. However presidential acts need to be approved by the parties and those can also be rejected by them. Therefore the correct label can be presidential technocratic government for this type of cabinet but presidential refers to the technocratic not to the government. In this paper I analyse these issues in comparative perspective by elaborating the presidency of Giorgio Napolitano and Miloš Zeman because Monti and Rusnok cabinets are also labelled as presidential governments. Though Napolitano wanted to sort the crisis out but Zeman deepened it better.
Keywords: technocratic government, presidential government, parliamentary system, crisis, state of exception
László Galambos PhD candidate Corvinus University of Budapest, Doctoral School of Political Science galamboslaszlo@t-online.hu
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The paper examines the British constitutional processes that have developed as a result of the UK's intention to leave the EU. In this context, I describe the characteristics of the country's legal system in short, strangely the parliamentary sovereignty. After the setting in motion of the Brexit-processes, the constitutional conflicts have deepened between the Parliament and the Government. I start my exposition with the June 2016 referendum, and I try to describe the effects of referendum on the principle of parlamentary sovereignty. In connection with these events, I analyse two Supreme Court decisions, along with a short description of the lawsuits that preceded them. It is necessary, because the Supreme Court had to decide in conflict between the Government and the Parliament in both cases. Gina Miller played an important role of both cases, because the judgments of Supreme Court were founded on her claims.
The first (2017) Supreme Court decision was associated with the announcement of the intention to withdraw from the EU. The principal issue in these case is whether such a Notice can, under the UK's constitutional arrangements, lawfully be given by Government ministers without prior authorisation by Parliament. In judgment, the Supreme Court holds that Parliament is required to authorise ministers to give Notice of the decision to withdraw from the EU.
The second (2019) decision is preceded by a proposal from the Prime Minister to the Queen to prorouge Parliament. The Supreme Court determined that the decision to advise Her Majesty was unlawful because it had the effect of preventing the ability of Parliament to perform its constitutional functions without reasonable motivation.
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