Megrendelés

Jorn Van Rij[1] - Emmanouela Mylonaki[2]: Terrorism and Legal Instrumentalism: A Criminological Response (JURA, 2014/1., 172-178. o.)

1. Introduction

Depending one one's interest and academic training, there are many perspectives to a single phenomenon, whether social, natural, or other. The same is true of violence. Violence itself is further distinguished and categorized on the basis of victims and perpetrators; domestic, political, ethnic, religious and other forms of violence spring to mind[1]. All such emanations of violence establish a variety of interesting prisms; sociological, criminological, political/international relations, legal and, with the plethora of current scientific and social methods, many others. Prior to the events of 9/11 the topic of terrorism was not on the top of domestic and international agendas. While not being a peripheral matter, there was an emphasis on dealing with the domestic law and at the international level the pheonomen was regulated in thematic fashion on the basis of treaty law dealing with the particular manifestations of terrorist activity. Likewise pre-9/11 the biggest challenge for political theorists and international lawyers was to make a fine distinction between terrorist violence and other forms of politico-ideological violence, particularly struggles of self-determination, as well as to come up with a universally acceptable definition of terrorism at the international level. While these issues are still relevant, the post-9/11 study of the phenomenon of terrorism has triggered questions on the relevance of criminological perspectives to the study of international terrorism. In this chapter we reaffirm the relevance of criminology to the study of terrorism by focusing on counter terrorism and issues of instrumentation.

We reiterate the criminology relevance to the study of terrorism by using the idea of instrumentalism as a weakness and undesired effect of the continues expansion of counter terrorism legislative measures. The concept of instrumentalism is derived from the work of Foqué and Hart who researched the relation between instrumentality and the Sense of Justice[2]. The balance between the two, especially when combating crime, is fragile and easily leads to a situation of governmental abuse of legal instruments at the expense of legal protective rights which out of the Rule of Law perspective can also be upheld to the government[3]. The same goes for the relation between the social and legal sciences who are inseparable in their effectuation[4]. This especially goes for criminology which researches a) the emergence and development of criminal behaviour, b) the nature and extent of the criminal activities c) the prevention of perpetration and victimisation and finally d) the society's response i.e. punishment by the government. Criminology is inextricably linked with both Criminal and Penal law which at the same time, according to Criminologist, are unable to address the total concept of crime because it focuses too much on repression and punishment which is due to its mere reactive character. This excludes the idea of prevention by deterrence[5] which effects are being criticised among modern orientated criminologists worldwide. As Garland mentions: "The problem of crime control in late modernity has vividly demonstrated the limits of the sovereign state... In the complex, differentiated world of late modernity, effective, legitimate government must devolve power and share the work of social control with local organisations and communities[6]".

2. Common Crime and 'Uncommon' Terrorism

Traditionally criminologists focus on common crime and violence, rejecting terrorism as a subject of criminological research. The fact that terrorism is a complex and difficult to define term is one of the contributing factor to the limited emphasis of criminological research on the phenomenon of terrorism. 'Terrorism' is a powerfully emotive word in the contemporary lexicon[7]. The emotive nature of the subject matter, the term's derogatory thrust and the relevant political discourse are major contributory factors to the complexity of the concept[8]. In spite of the spread of ideologically motivated violence throughout the world[9], international law still appears incapable of coming up with a universally accepted definition of terrorism and of controlling the violent acts this entails[10]. Moreover terrorism, as Laqueur observes, has taken so many forms that 'any explanation that attempts to account for all its many manifestations is bound to be either vague or altogether wrong'[11]. Terrorism indeed has taken so many forms throughout history that the definition of the phenomenon seems a rather mission impossible. Indeed, no theory has emerged

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from political science, criminal justice, economics, philosophy or any other discipline to satisfactorily explain terrorism. The fact that acts of terrorism affect relations between States in one way or another, engender tensions and provoke conflicts, offer some explanations as to why it is so difficult to come up with a precise definition[12]. Every effort to define international terrorism has met the vehement resistance of some governments who in absence of commonly shared values and agreed goals and means, prefer the ambiguity of the term[13] as this gives them the power to control and determine what kind of criminal activity can be seen as a terrorist act and implement on-going repressive and legal restrictive legislation. Thus, the questions as to what constitutes terrorism and who is a terrorist still remain unanswered as a matter of a universally shared conception based on commonly held values among all States. The fact that no definition exists is self-explanatory. The concept itself constitutes a phenomenon that is so complex, multi-faceted and polymorphic that cannot readily be made subject to the rigid confines of a semantic definition, or distinguish itself from related concepts[14]. Apart from this, the term has been abused excessively from common use, especially by the mass media[15], frequently utilised in a gross and flippant manner. Indeed, virtually any act of violence that is perceived as directed against society is often labelled 'terrorism'[16].

States have opted to encompass ideological violence in the criminal justice system, even in times when physical threats to the wider public could be described as accidental collateral damage, or rare isolated events. The criminalization of particular behaviour, besides outlawing the act itself, carries with it a necessary social stigma that serves to alienate whatever popular basis the terrorist group may have had. Thus, the early criminalization of terrorism served the interests of the State more than it did the social and welfare interests of their citizens, particularly since with hindsight we now appreciate the social righteousness of some politically-motivated violence of past times (e.g. post WW II uprisings against Communism in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, some Marxist polemic against the poverty caused by imperialism in South America, the cause espoused by the Irish Republican Army, and others). Such criminalisation is easy to justify because of the existence of the element of violence, which itself is outlawed in common criminal law.

The next question for policy and law-makers was whether to create a distinct terrorist offence apart from the underlying crime that each terrorist act entailed. The choice was between the following mutually exclusive scenarios: a) rendering of a distinct terrorist offence as an aggravating circumstance of the underlying crime; b) rendering a distinct terrorist offence, albeit with mitigating or exculpating circumstances on the basis of the perpetrator's motive, or; c) treating the violence as a common crime. Since the State, against whom terrorist violence was directed, was particularly keen to alienate terrorism from its popular basis, the latter option was unable to serve that purpose as it fails to colour terrorism as the ultimate urban crime. The second formula was prevalent between the 1960's to the 1980's only in countries that did not experience terrorist violence and thus did not share the collective experience of terrorism found in other countries. This was particularly expressed through the existence of forums whose courts afforded terrorists the so-called political offence exception[17], but it is not true to say that even in these countries the incidental killing of civilians escaped criminal culpability[18]. During this time, countries facing serious terrorist problems, such as the UK, assumed a completely antithetical stance, the legislature of which most typically appended aggravating circumstances to the distinct crime of terrorism either through the substantive or procedural criminal law. The significant contemporary threat of terrorism has activated this latter approach throughout the world, although the terms of its application are more stringent in some States than they are in others[19].

3. Weaknesses of a Purely Anti-terrorism Legal Response

The preservation of democratic society which is free of fear and all other sorts of relevant intrusive criminal dangers is and should always be the goal when structuring ideas on combating terrorism and the prevention of terrorist attacks. This is an utmost necessity as just one single successful attack can cause structural sociological and psychological damages which are beyond repair.

The implementation of legislation is still seen as the foremost weapon for Europe's (preventive) war on terror. There are numerous examples of European member states who have supplemented their penal and criminal codes containing definitions and actions which can or cannot be described as terrorist activities. Yet while security practitioners and politicians seemingly have no difficulty with the use of the terminology to describe terrorism in general, academics still struggle defining terrorism on a less conceptual level.[20] In practice this means that a wide range of definitions for the word terrorism is being used. In order to see the forest for the trees and cre-

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ate a workable structured definition it is necessary to brake these commonly used definitions down into recognisable and measurable elements. While doing so the defined core elements, according to the European Union, should always exist out of an objective criterion which focuses on the use and or threat of violence and a subjective criterion which looks at the aim and or motives of the acts.[21] These motives should always have a political aim but other available and accepted alternatives are economic, social, religious or ideological goals.[22] At the same time this is the sole difference on which (organised) crime and terrorism can be distinguished as the modus operandi of the criminal activities is indistinguishable and only the final goal differs between the two. (Organised) criminals are out for financial gain, power and respect while terrorists their only relevant goal is to commit terrorist activities and by doing so cause fear amongst the people and in the end to overthrow democratic society.[23]

One explicit example is the current situation of the United Kingdom which has a long history of terrorist attacks as though the source of the attacks shifted from the perpetrators being solely nationalistic freedom fighters to also being Islamic fundamentalists. In their efforts to combat terrorism the United Kingdom has adopted the idea of legal activism as the best method to combat terrorism. And as a nation under threat befits, they have acted on this with great enthusiasm as they have added no less than five legislative measures since 2000 when they combined[24] all previous Prevention of Terrorism Acts since 1974.[25] These measures and their basic effects are:

- Terrorism act of 2000 which in the basis widens the definition of Terrorism and increases counter-terrorist powers.[26]

- Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 which enables the home secretary to indefinitely detain, without charge or trial, foreign nationals who are suspected of terrorism.[27]

- Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 which introduces new control orders, which in turn allow the government to restrict the activities of individuals it suspects of "involvement in terrorist-related activity", but for whom there is not sufficient evidence to charge.[28]

- Terrorism Act 2006 which extends the precharge detention period from 14 to 28 days.[29]

- Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 which enables post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects. Constables are allowed to take fingerprints and DNA samples from individuals subject to control orders and it amends the definition of terrorism by inserting a racial cause.[30]

Besides adopting a legal activist approach within their own borders, the United Kingdom uses its European influence to lead the European counter-terrorism ideology towards a system which seeks to unite the different counter-terrorism legislation of the member states.[31] The United Kingdom do not stand alone in their preference for legal activism and their views on an united European approach. As a matter of fact the International Commission of Jurists have need for a monthly E-magazine which informs them on all proposed and actual changes in counter-terrorism laws, policies and practices.[32]

Legalist and legal practitioners would undoubtedly argue there is only one sufficient way to counter-act terrorism and this can only be achieved by enforcing more legislation and by doing so increase the amount and possibilities of investigative powers and further more to create possibilities for easier, more swift and foremost severe punishment. This is usually combined with a classical positive retributionistic ideal as designed by Kant[33], which means that people who deserve punishment because they have committed a crime should always be subjected to punished according to the law.[34] This retributionistic idea nevertheless falsely presumes that penal and criminal law will have a preventive outcome on both a primary as well as on a secondary perpetration when dealing with terrorists and all other social issues. As in the basis prevention should always be the primary aim when combating terrorism, this is a noble goal but a more utilitarianism approach is desired as within this approach prevention is the primary aim.

The reason why the idea of legal activism nevertheless is so popular and frequently applied, is merely because these classical orientated thinkers lack the in-depth knowledge to look for other possibilities as they have been blinded by their own legal expertise. This lack of imagination to involve a multi causal and preventive approach gives room for the idea of Instrumentalism to enter the arena. Before a description of the dangers associated with Instrumentalism can be given we first need to distinguish two types of Instrumentalism. The first one is penal instrumentalism which is defined as follows: "Using punishment as an instrument of social policy and ignoring the conditions under which punishment can indeed be an instrument to achieve certain aims, as well as ignoring the limits to be imposed on the use of punishment."[35] The second type is the more general approach called legal instrumentalism which is characterized by: law is viewed as a neutral means to achieve certain ends; law is subordinated to politically selected values; law is a means of steering from the centre; law is

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output-orientated; the use and effects of law must be monitored by social science research.[36]

Each of these points can be criticised as the law in itself has intrinsic values which are derived out of the by the elite created social order which in turn creates a system by which the legal subjects become dependent of the political interest. This approach therefore is always structured from the top-down and the effects of this approach are usually vague and not easily measured and at last, they are commonly researched with a different standard as the interest of social scientist differ from those of legalists.[37]

4. Criminological Responses

While enforcing this idea of legal activism and implementing it on a wide scale throughout the European Union, the possibilities of abuse of these newly amended powers by governments, and its officials, politicians and law enforcers increases. The dangers therefore lurking are hidden in the fact that power always corrupts and the fragile balance between freedom and security, out of an Beccarian Social Contract approach[38], which states that all citizens will have to hand in a small amount of their personal freedom to the government in order for the latter to guarantee public safety, is easily shifted. In this scenario freedom becomes limited extensively and soon the legal protective measures against the government have to go as they are limiting the possibility of ensuring public safety. These are the same legal protective measures which have to protect the people from an overly energetic government which sees itself more and more as a Leviathan[39] with Rousseauian powers.[40] In other words a protector with absolute power who protects those without freedom, who therefore cannot act against the protector. These legal instruments which are instrumentalist by nature or because of abuse, will eventually lose their effect and can become counter-productive as they lack a social base. Hopefully, people within democratic society will never allow this type of society to be formed nor simply accept its existence. Examples of these measures, amongst others, can be found within the Dutch penal system. The Netherlands as a country have never been victim of a terrorist attack but have nevertheless implemented far going counter-terrorism legislation and expansion of the penal and criminal law codes towards a situation of almost penalising the intention of a person itself. Other examples which can be given are found in the on-going expansion of Stop and Search actions, the increasing use of investigative powers like phone taps without legal order and the transfer of criminal acts out of the penal code into administrative law. The latter is being used to get round the fundamental human rights i.e. the presumption of innocence. The only protection which remains is the principal of Una Via which means that once the choice for an administrative measure has been made, no further criminal actions are possible by which the basic principle of ne bis in idem is uphold. Dutch administrative law nevertheless has a punitive element but far less limitations on investigative powers i.e. searches of premises and legal protection against governmental actions and sanctions as mentioned before.

Whilst many a government seeks refuge in legislation as a preventive measure and by doing so ignoring the dangers a simple quick fix alternative remains absent. Meanwhile this does not mean there are no other possibilities with less danger for abuse. The adage of the one man's terrorist being the others freedom fighter is frequently applied and gives insight in the possibility for terrorist activities to develop within a countries own borders as this type of home grown terrorism with a widened social base is currently one of the biggest security threats.[41] Europol distinguishes five types of terrorism which all can be home grown and whose modus operandi in order to gain funds does not differ from those of (organised) criminals. These types are: religiously inspired terrorism; ethno nationalist and Separatist terrorism; Left-Wing and Anarchist terrorism; Right Wing terrorism; Single Issue terrorism.[42]

Even though perpetrators out of each type have their own characteristics an important causal factor for each group can be traced back to basic social determents like a low Social Economic Status, deprivation, marginalisation etc. As post-modern society is continuously changing due to globalisation, migration but also feminism etc. adaptations in values and standards as well as in morals are becoming more frequent. This also has its effects on legislation as pluralism forces legislation to adopt new ideas and views. This can lead to cultural conflicts as subcultures contradict with the dominant culture which in turn could lead to uncertainty and anomie. This in itself is reason enough for people to radicalise and become vulnerable to terrorist ideas. This situation of anomie is first described by Emile Durkheim who discovered that societies values and standards became vague due to rapid changes caused by the industrial revolution. This eventually led to criminal behaviour which in turn functions as a signal for the existence of an society in anomie.[43] This society orientated approach of anomie had been adopted by Merton who in turn looks at the effects of anomie on a more individual level. Merton[44] who, unlike Durkheim, interpreted Anomie not as a stress causing

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effect onto society, but wielded a more individual and therefore more or less micro orientated approach which he eventually described as strain. This Mertonian thought towards anomie is founded on the notion that people living within society are being forced, by that same society, to have certain aspirations, goals and motives. In general this is a positive assumption because these aspirations are at the basis for both individuals' as society's progress. However it can also cause extreme stress in situations where a person does not have the necessary institutionalised means (both physically and economically) to achieve these cultural goals. This is mainly the case of people who are already marginalised and who are out of a lower social economic status[45]. This status frustration causes people to react in certain ways and by doing so possibly alienate themselves from society. Merton distinguish five types of peoples' reactions, which make them: Conformists; Innovators; Ritualists; Retreatists; Rebels.[46]

All people who encounter strain, at some point in time will come in contact with the reality that their expectations have to be adjusted. This adjustment is the basis for the typology given by Merton. A conformist will keep his goals but accepts the current existing impossibilities without acting on it. An innovator however will uphold the goals to any cost and criminal behaviour as a forced alternative is an actual probability. Ritualists will adjust the goals so they will fit the available means. Retreatists become disillusioned by the strain and disappointment by the encounters and decide to abandon their goals but by doing so they also reject societies enforced means. They decide to place themselves out of society. Finally rebels also reject their goals and the means, but instead of retreatists they want actively change and by doing so replace the existing means within society.[47] Terrorist are most likely to come forth out of this last group.

According to Agnew[48], Merton's strain theory shows little interest for persons private and internal processing of the by society generated and enforced feelings of disappointment. Agnew states that strain is caused by personal and impersonal relationships which enforce the visibility of existing differences within society. Akers operationalization of Agnew's interpretation of strain is as follows; "Failure to achieve positively valued goals: the gap between expectations and actual achievements will derive from short- and longterm personal goals, and some of those goals will never be realized because of unavoidable circumstances including both inherent weaknesses and opportunities blocked by others; and the difference between the view of what a person believes the outcome should be and what actually results increases personal disappointment. Frustration is not necessarily due to any outside interference with valued goals, but a direct effect on anger, and has indirect effects on serious crime and aggression[49]".

These feelings of strain and or frustrations can cause people to develop or become a member of a subculture.[50] In general this is not seen as negative but in some cases being a member of a subculture can lead to terrorist activities because of exclusion out of society, labelling effects, peer pressure and or a self-fulfilling prophecy. These are presumably the most important reasons for citizens to radicalize and become terrorists. See i.e. the young Dutch men from Somalian decent who travelled over to Somalia in order for them to participate in training camps of Al Shabaab in the Somalia border region with Kenya and who after their return to the Netherlands become so called sleeper cells.[51]

Penal and criminal law should always remain a last resort as it has its functions and effects but only when applied in accordance with the memorandum it was based upon. To abolish the penal and criminal law system without a workable alternative is not an option.[52] It would be more fruitful to look into the possibilities of a combination between a repressive legal means and a pragmatic preventive social based approach as the best alternative. In this scenario the more and more expanding intrusive penal and criminal measures can be limited to those who decide to ignore all given opportunities and choose to live the life of a terrorist. The discussion regarding this scenario is not if to act but how. Is there really a need for the current strategy of legal activism or are the current existing means and powers given to combat (organised) crime and terrorism sufficient? The latter ought to be the case as continuously following the path of legal activism will surely lead to a further limitation of the peoples' freedom which could cause people to rebel, not unlike the idea of Marx[53], against the legitimate democratic government. This makes the people themselves become terrorists. In this scenario the aims of the terrorist we currently fear, are met. Not by them using violence or threatening with the use of violence but by simply creating a social situation of dissatisfaction and fear of the government which transcends the objective and subjective criterions nowadays applied to describe terrorism and the terrorist goals. More positive would it be to create a situation by which causal factors for radicalisation are limited and signals for radicalisation are dealt with on a social level with the help of social control and a cohesive solitary society. In practice this requires the help and assistance of the people who need to adapt their attitudes and avoid any type of prejudice but there is also an active role for primary care providers like youth workers, community po-

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lice officers but also the clergy etc. who all need to work closely together as well as with both local and national politicians and policy makers.

5. Conclusion

Terrorism and counter-terrorism present important intellectual challenges for criminological theory and research and are likely to remain important for many years to come. Studying the causes and motives of terrorism, criminologists can unravel many of the complexities in the development and proliferation of terrorist activities across the world and by doing so avoid any irreversible short term legalistic solutions. The most critical contribution of criminology thereby is the study not merely of crimes or acts of deviance associated with terrorism, but of terrorism itself as crime or as deviance. Developing theory and undertaking research in this area, criminologists can expand social-scientific knowledge and contribute to build a counter-terrorism policy that is effective, preventive and just in tackling terrorist violence. ■

NOTES

[1] See: Wilkinson, P., Terrorism versus democracy, the liberal state response, (Frank Cass 2000), pp. 20-21.

[2] Foqué,R., & 't Hart A.C., Instrumentaliteit en rechtsbescherming. Grondslagen van een strafrechtelijke waardendiscussie, Gouda/Quint, 1990) Arnhem/Antwerpen 501

[3] 't Hart, Instrumentalisme en strafrechtelijk beleid in: Bovens M., (ed.), Rechtsstaat en sturing, (Tjeenk Willink, 1987) Zwolle, p. 68-86

[4] See: Rassin, E., De hand in eigen boezem: vier hindernissen voor de forensische psychologie (Erasmus University Press, 2008) Rotterdam and Westen, N., & Innes, M., Terrorism. In: Brook-man, F., Maguire, M., Pierpoint, H., & Bennett, T., Handbook on Crime. (Willan, 2010) Portland, p. 846-864

[5] Tonry, M., Learning from the Limitations of Deterrence Research. In: Tonry, M. (ed), Crime and Justice, A Review of Research (Chicago University Press, 2008). Chicago/Londen p. 279-311

[6] Garland, D., The Culture of Control (Oxford University Press, 2001) Oxford p. 205.

[7] See: Kegley, C., (ed.), International terrorism: characteristics, causes, control, (St. Martins Press, 1990), p.p.1-6; for the political dimension of terrorism, see: Jenkins, B., International terrorism: the other World War, (RAND, 1985), pp. 27-38. See also: Antonopoulos, G. A., On the definition of terrorism, 14 Terrorism and Political Violence (2002), p. 156.

[8] For the difficulties involved in offering a comprehensive definition of the phenomenon of terrorism, see: Griffith, L. N., Organised crime in the Western Hemisphere: content, context, consequences and countermeasures, 8 Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement (1999), p. 8.

[9] Despite the definitional problems involved, US sources estimated that only in 1995, 440 terrorist acts took place all around the world. According to the same sources, there is a decrease in terrorist attacks during the last decade. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism (1995).

[10] See: Evans, A. E., Murphy, J. F., (eds.), Legal aspects of international terrorism, (Lexington Books, 1978), p.p.12-20; Lockwood, B. B., Preliminary thoughts towards an international convention on terrorism, 68 AJIL (1974), p. 69.

[11] Laqueur, W., The age of terrorism, (Little Brown, 1987), [p.] [17.]12

[12] Sofaer, D. A., Terrorism and the law, 64 Foreign Affairs, (1986), p. 903. See also Cooper, H. H. A., Terrorism-the problem of definition revisited, 44 American Behavioral Scientist, (2001), p. 881.

[13] Schmid, A., The response problem as a definitional problem, in Schmid, A, Crelinsten, D. R., Western responses to terrorism, (Frank Cass, 1993), p. 7.

[14] Hoffman, B., Inside terrorism, (Indigo, London, 1998), p.p. 13-15.

[15] On the symbiotic relationship between media and terrorism, see: Weimann, G., Conrad, W., The theatre of terror: mass media and international terrorism, (Longman, 1994); Wilkinson, P., The media and terrorism: a reassessment, 9 Terrorism and Political Violence (1997), p. 51. Also, Hess, S., Kalb, M., The media and the war on terrorism, 80 Journalism and Mass Communications Quarterly, (2003), p. 986.

[16] Loverdos, A., On terrorism and the political offence, (Sakkoulas, 1987), (in Greek). See also: Post, J. M., Terrorist on trial: the context of political crime, 28 Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law, (2000), p. 171.

[17] E.g. Folkerts v Prosecutor (1978, Dutch Supreme Court), 74 ILR 498.

[18] Re Croissant (1978, Conseil d'Etat), 74 ILR 505; Yugoslav Terrorism case (1978, FRG Federal Supreme Court), 74 ILR 509.

[19] See British legislation directed primarily to the situation in Northern Ireland; Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989; see also: US Public Law No. 104 302 (1996), where a federal crime of terrorism is a crime 'calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct' and to other crimes mentioned in US law, such as unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, crimes against internationally protected persons. According to the French Law of 1986, terrorist acts are crimes 'en relation avec une enterprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler l'ordre public par 1'intimidation ou la terreur,' i.e. 'terrorism' refers to individual or collective acts which aim at causing social intimidation by terror. See also: State Reports submitted to the UN CTC: Russian Federation, UN Doc. S/2002/887 (3 June 2003); Finland, UN Doc. S/2004/118 (18 February 2004); Germany, UN Doc. S/2003/671 (25 June 2003); Italy, UN Doc. S/2004/253 (29 March 2004).

[20] See: Westen, N., & Innes, M., Terrorism. In: Brookman, F., Maguire, M., Pierpoint, H., & Bennett, T., Handbook on Crime. (Willan, 2010) Portland, p. 846-864

[21] Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA

[22] See: Lintz, J.M., Terrorisme en rechtshandhaving. In Blad, J.R. (Ed.), Strafrechtlijke rechtshandhaving (Boom, 2007) The Hague p. 179-208

[23] See: Levi, M., Organized Crime and Terrorism, in: Maguire, M., Morgan, R. and Reiner, R., The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, (Oxford, 2007) p. 771-809 Oxford university Press.

[24] See: Golder, B. & Williams, G. (2004) What is Terrorism? Problems of a legal definition. In UNSWLaw 27(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal. (UNSWLaw, 2004) New South Wales

[25] http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1974/56/pdfs/ukpga_19740056_en.pdf

[26] http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/pdfs/ukpga_20000011_en.pdf

[27] http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/pdfs/ukpga_20010024_en.pdf

[28] http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/2/pdfs/ukpga_20050002_en.pdf

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[29] http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/pdfs/ukpga_20060011_en.pdf

[30] http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/28/pdfs/ukpga_20080028_en.pdf

[31] Hanman, N. Explainer: Terrorism legislation. The Guardian, 2009

[32] http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=401&langage=1&myPage=E-Bulletin_on_Counter-Terrorism_and_Human_Rights

[33] See: Beyens, K., Straffen als sociale praktijk; Een penologisch onderzoek naar straftoemeting. (Vubpress, 2002) Brussel

[34] See: Koppen, van P.J. et al. Het recht van binnen. (Kluwer, 2002) Deventer

[35] Blad, J.R. (2003). Against penal instrumentalism. In IIRP (Ed.), International Institute for Restorative Practices (IIRP), Building a Global Alliance (pp. 130-141). (Bethlehem, 2003) P.134

[36] Blad, J.R. (2003). Against penal instrumentalism. In IIRP (Ed.), International Institute for Restorative Practices (IIRP), Building a Global Alliance (pp. 130-141). (Bethlehem, 2003) P.135-136

[37] Blad, J.R. (2003). Against penal instrumentalism. In IIRP (Ed.), International Institute for Restorative Practices (IIRP), Building a Global Alliance (pp. 130-141). (Bethlehem, 2003) P.135-136

[38] Beccaria, C. (1764) An essay on crimes and punishments http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2193/Beccaria_1476_EBk_v6.0.pdf

[39] Hobbes, T. (1651) Leviathian http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hobbes/Leviathan.pdf

[40] See: Westerman, P.C., Rechtsfilosofie.(Van Gorcum, 1998) Assen

[41] Europol TE-SAT 2012 EU Terrorism and Trend Report. European Police Office.

[42] Europol TE-SAT 2012 EU Terrorism and Trend Report. European Police Office.

[43] Durkheim, E. (1893) De la division du travail http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Durkheim_emile/division_du_travail/division_travail_1.pdf Durkheim, E. (1897) Le Suicide http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Durkheim_emile/suicide/suicide_Livre_1.pdf

[44] See: Merton, R., Social Theory and Social Structure. (The Free Press, 1968) New York

[45] See: Young, Jock. (ed.). The Exclusive Society: Social Exclusion, Crime and Difference in Late Modernity. (Thousand Oaks, 1994) London and Matthews, R., & Young, J., The New Politics of Crime and Punishment. (Willan Publishing, 2003) London

[46] See: Newburn, T., Criminology. (Devon, 2008) Willan Publishing

[47] See: Merton, R., Social Theory and Social Structure. (The Free Press, 1968) New York

[48] See: Agnew, R. Foundation for a General Strain Theory. In Criminology 30(1) 1992) p. 47-87

[49] Akers, R., Criminological Theories: Introduction, valuation, and Application. (Los Angeles, 2000) RoxburyANP. P. 159

[50] Newburn, T.,Criminology. (Devon, 2008) Willan Publishing

[51] ANP (2012) Nederlandse Somaliers bij Al Shabaab. June 3, 2012

[52] See: Hulsman, L.H.C., Critical criminology and the concept of crime. In. Contemporary Crisis 10 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986) Dordrecht, p. 63-80

[53] See: Marx, K., Das Kapital (Dietz Verlag,1873/1969) Berlin

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[1] The Authors is Senior Lecturer in Law Inholland University Netherlands.

[2] The Author is Senior Lecturer in Law London Southbank University UK.

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