https://doi.org/10.14232/forvmaip.2025.2.77-94
Foreign interference and its impact on democracies have become a focal point of academic research in recent years.[1] Numerous events have drawn attention to this phenomenon and the dangers it poses, both globally and within the EU and its member states. Among the earliest cases were the cyberattacks that struck Estonia in the spring of 2007, during which denial-of-service attacks against Estonian government portals rendered the country's operations impossible for several hours, and in some cases for several days, following the Estonian government's decision to relocate a Soviet monument[2]. In August 2022, an incident very similar in its background and execution to the events of 2007 occurred, during which more than two hundred Estonian public and private institutions were hit by a cyberattack claimed by the Russian hacker group Killnet.[3] The multi-actor and multi-faceted Russian interference in the 2016 U.S.
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presidential election,[4] the attempt to influence the 2017 French presidential election through a disinformation campaign targeting Emmanuel Macron, as well as a hack-and-leak operation targeting his campaign team two days before the election,[5] the Russian information campaign aimed at influencing the 2016 Brexit referendum,[6] the Qatar-gate scandal in December 2022, during which the Belgian federal prosecutor's office filed charges against several MEPs and European Parliament staff members on suspicion of money laundering, corruption, and participation in a criminal organization,[7] as well as Russian interference in the November 2024 Romanian presidential election and, as a result, the annulment of the first-round election results by the Constitutional Court were among the incidents that brought the topic of foreign interference into not only political and academic discourse but also public discourse.
A concept related to foreign interference is "sharp power," a concept of power that emerged in international political theory in the 2010s, centred on the pursuit of state interests and foreign policy objectives through deception and disruption, achieved by intervening in another state's political, economic, and social affairs. Foreign interference is thus a manifestation of the assertion of interests through sharp power strategies in international politics, which poses an ever-greater and more frequent challenge to states, particularly for democracies, which, due to their open political, economic, and social conditions, as well as their democratic values, institutions, and processes, are more vulnerable to various forms of foreign interference aimed at manipulation and disruption.
Drawing on qualitative source analysis and the literature on international political theory, this study attempts to clarify the concepts of sharp power and foreign interference, addressing issues of demarcation and definitional problems in relation to the latter.
Since the end of the Cold War, numerous new concepts regarding the nature and types of power have emerged within the theory of international relations. In the early 1990s, Joseph Nye introduced the concept of soft power, arguing that the sources and instruments of power had undergone significant changes. While in a world based on the logic of self-
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help, military power (hard power) remained the ultimate form of power, other instruments of power also became important, such as culture, ideology, communication, and organizational and institutional capabilities.[8] These intangible resources have given rise to another way of exercising power, namely cooptive or soft power, which seeks to achieve its goals through "attraction and persuasion." In contrast, the traditional form of hard power relies on military or economic coercion[9]. Nye later introduced the term "smart power" as a "context-dependent" combination of soft and hard power.[10]
In 2017, Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig expanded the discourse on soft, hard, and smart power with the concept of sharp power. They emphasized that the influence techniques employed by authoritarian regimes, such as the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China, whilst not "hard" in the overtly coercive sense, are not exactly "soft" either. Initiatives of Moscow and Beijing in the media, culture, think tanks, and the academic sphere are not aimed at "winning hearts and minds" through attraction and persuasion, as in the case of soft power strategy, but rather focus on distraction and manipulation. Sharp power, rather, "penetrates, infiltrates, or perforates the political and informational environment of target countries."[11]
Nevertheless, not everyone regards sharp power as a distinct form of power in international politics. Nye conceives of sharp power as a subtype of hard power that manipulates information, and although information is an immaterial source of power, it is not incompatible with hard power: "verbal threats, for example, are both immaterial and coercive."[12] While accepting Nye's approach to smart power as a combination of soft and hard power, Xin Liu identifies sharp power, in contrast to smart power, as a negative combination of these, or, in his words, as "not smart power."[13] At the same time, if we distinguish between soft and hard forms of power based on their tools and methods, namely, persuasion and attraction versus coercion, then it makes sense to regard sharp power as a distinct type of power, since its methods differ. As Yenna Wu points out, the main difference between hard and sharp power is that the former relies on the direct and overt use of military or economic force, while the strategy of sharp power focuses primarily on manipulation, which "is seemingly hidden within 'soft power' efforts."[14]
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Another central question regarding sharp power is whether it is exclusively a power strategy of authoritarian regimes? In his 2015 article, even before conceptualizing sharp power, Walker described the post-bipolar foreign policy of authoritarian states as a policy of "new containment" or, more precisely, "the containment of democracy," which means that "the most significant adaptation of authoritarian systems was the leap from subversion of democracy within the borders to the systematic undermining of democracy beyond its borders."[15] Nye, however, reminds us that sharp power is not unique to authoritarian regimes, pointing out that the U.S. also employed it consistently during the Cold War.[16] Nevertheless, many authors argue that while democracies also use sharp power, it occurs much less frequently. Typically, two explanations can be found in the literature: the normative explanation,[17] according to which liberal democracies tend to transpose the norms that guide their internal affairs, such as freedom, accountability, transparency, and the rule of law, into their international relations, and as a result, democracies are less inclined to use coercive power.[18] The explanation of institutional constraints emphasizes the supervisory role of independent institutions, as well as the importance of checks and balances, which impose limits on the government's use of coercive power.[19] These normative and institutional constraints, however, are absent in non-democratic regimes, which explains their greater propensity to use coercive power.
Although liberal democracies are less likely to act as actors employing sharp power, their vulnerability makes them easier targets. This is because there is a strategic asymmetry between autocracies and democracies. Due to their open political, economic, cultural, and social structures, as well as globalization and the information and communication revolution, democracies have become optimal targets for sharp power. In contrast, autocracies are better able to defend themselves thanks to their repressive mechanisms, at the same time, they readily employ the tools of sharp power against democracies to exploit their vulnerabilities.[20]
The relevant literature approaches the concept of sharp power from various perspectives. Walker and Ludwig examined the channels and domains through which sharp power strategies are implemented, including the media, education/science, technology, and the economy.[21] They also identified the typical tools and methods of
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sharp power in each of these areas. Disrupting the information ecosystem helps "narratives preferred by authoritarians gain ground." In the knowledge sector, freedom of research is threatened, while in the field of digital information technology (such as social media platforms, artificial intelligence, and digital surveillance), the spread of disinformation, the exercise of censorship, and efforts to shape international rules have been identified as key threats. Finally, in the economic dimension, authoritarian regimes seek to gain political and economic influence through so-called "corrosive capital" and "strategic corruption."[22]
Lukasz Skoneczny and Boguslaw Cacko identified information warfare, support of political actors and social organizations, manipulation of memory politics, interference in campaigns and elections, scientific cooperation, international economic ventures, and even hybrid conflicts as methods and domains of the exercise of sharp power.[23]
Alexander Richter, arguing for the conceptual independence of sharp power, highlights its malign objectives, such as the erosion of the legitimacy of the target state's institutions, the manipulation of public opinion, and the influence of the target state's political and economic actors.[24] He identifies the subtle erosion of the target country's governmental and independent institutions as "one of the most important components of sharp power," which is typically achieved through disinformation campaigns and the sponsorship of divisive media outlets. Through these activities, the sharp power amplifies existing divisions between the state and society or among certain social groups. Manipulating public opinion in the target country to create and reinforce a favourable image of the authoritarian state is another key element of the sharp power. The main tools for this are information campaigns aimed at "censoring communications that damage the reputation of the state and/or promoting propaganda intended to improve the reputation of the state." Finally, pressure on political and economic actors is primarily exerted through foreign investments or political channels, such as embassies.[25]
In summary, sharp power involves infiltrating and interfering with the political, economic, and social systems of a target country with the intention of manipulation, distraction, disruption, and inflict harm.
Foreign interference[26] can be identified as a tool of sharp power. The concept of foreign interference predates that of sharp power, but the two concepts are closely linked. When examining the definition of foreign interference, we encounter numerous approaches, whether from state and non-state actors in international relations or from the academic
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sphere. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "foreign interference is malicious activity by a foreign government or actor aimed at sowing discord and manipulating public discourse, undermine confidence in the electoral system, influence or subvert political processes, and disrupt market processes with the aim of undermining the interests of the United States and its allies."[27] According to the Australian Department of Home Affairs, "foreign interference is coercive, corrupting, deceptive, or covert activity conducted by or on behalf of a foreign power that is contrary to Australia's sovereignty, values, and national interest." It encompasses all conduct aimed at covert and unauthorized interference in Australian society to advance a foreign power's strategic, political, military, and social interests, but to the detriment of Australia. Foreign interference may take the form of espionage, disinformation, or other forms of malicious influence.[28] In 2023, the British Parliament passed the National Security Act, which distinguishes between general cases of foreign interference and those occurring in the context of electoral processes, and prescribes penalties for both. According to the UK Home Office's guidance on the Act, foreign interference refers to illegitimate influence exerted by or on behalf of a foreign state with the aim of advancing that state's interests or causing harm to the United Kingdom. The offense covers all forms of inappropriate interference in British democracy and society that take the form of covert influence, disinformation, and attacks on elections.[29]
In addition to states, certain international organizations also address the phenomenon of foreign interference and possible responses to it. According to NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, foreign interference refers to the efforts of a hostile foreign actor to advance its own interests using hybrid methods.[30] The hybrid threat has been a focus for NATO as a defense organization since Russia's 2014 hybrid warfare against Ukraine. It encompasses potentially overt or covert military and non-military activities that state or non-state actors may employ to undermine the social cohesion of the target state and advance their own political interests.[31] The OECD defines foreign interference as follows: intentional actions by state or non-state actors to advance the interests of a foreign government. These actions are covert, non-transparent, and manipulative in nature, and their aim is to exert a negative influence on the target country's political, economic, and social systems, as well as its information sphere. It is
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important to note that, according to the OECD's interpretation, acts of sabotage, targeted assassinations, terrorist acts, and overt or covert military operations do not fall under the concept of foreign interference.[32] When examining the concept of foreign interference in the context of the European Union, it must be noted that there is no uniformly established and applied definition within the EU; individual institutions and bodies use their own definitions, which share common elements and, in certain cases, also exist in a part-whole relationship. According to the European Parliament's interpretation, foreign interference is a pattern of behaviour that threatens or negatively impacts the values, democratic procedures, political processes, and security of citizens of the EU and its member states, as well as their capacity to manage emergencies. Such activities are manipulative, their financing and execution are deliberate and coordinated, and their perpetrators may include both foreign state and non-state actors, whose activities may be aided by actors within the EU who stand to gain economic or political advantages from favouring foreign strategies. In connection with the latter phenomenon, the European Parliament resolution emphasizes that cooperation between foreign forces and domestic allies can blur the line between foreign and domestic interference in democratic processes.[33] The joint communication adopted in 2016 by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy uses the term "hybrid threat," which covers coercive and subversive activities carried out by state or non-state actors using traditional and non-traditional methods (such as military, intelligence, diplomatic, economic, and technological) by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives. "The emphasis is generally on exploiting the target's vulnerabilities and creating an ambiguous situation aimed at disrupting decision-making processes."[34] The European External Action Service uses a third term, foreign information manipulation and interference, which refers to a pattern of manipulative behaviour that threatens or is capable of exerting a negative influence on values, procedures, and political processes, and which is carried out intentionally and in a coordinated manner by foreign state or non-state actors, or their proxies, within or outside their own territory.[35]
In its March 2022 resolution on foreign interference, the European Parliament also points out that tactics of foreign interference can take many different forms in practice; it mentions a few of these by way of example, without claiming to provide an exhaustive list, such as:
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- disinformation and withholding of information;
- manipulation of social media platforms, their algorithms, and advertising systems;
- cyberattacks;
- hack-and-leak operations;
- threats and harassment against journalists, researchers, politicians, and members of civil society organizations;
- covert donations and loans to political parties, campaigns, organizations, and media outlets;
- interference in electoral processes;
- "capturing" the political elite of the target country;
- abusive exploitation of historical, religious, and cultural narratives;
- pressure on educational and cultural institutions;
- taking control of critical infrastructure;
- putting foreign nationals living in the EU under pressure;
- using migrants as a tool;
- espionage;
- creating dependency within the economic supply chain.[36]
Based on the above overview, it can be concluded that there is no uniform definition of foreign interference either at the international level or within the European Union; actors in international relations interpret the essence of the concept in accordance with their interests, positions of power, or, in the case of international organizations, their profiles, attributing either a narrower or broader meaning to it. The greatest contrast lies between the two approaches that equate foreign interference with the concept of hybrid threats - that is, including armed or military interventions carried out covertly using unconventional means - as defined by NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, or the joint statement by the European Commission and the High Representative, whereas the OECD definition excludes these from the concept of foreign interference. This contrast, even if not explicitly stated, can also be found in various European Union definitions,[37] which, in addition to causing inconsistency, may also hinder the effectiveness of efforts to address the phenomenon. It would therefore be desirable to develop a unified EU definition of foreign interference.
Clarifying the concepts of foreign interference and hybrid threats and defining their relationship to one another is important because the concept of hybrid threats is quite controversial within the field of security studies. The concepts of hybrid threats, hybrid operations, hybrid war, and hybrid warfare entered both the broader public consciousness and the focus of security studies in connection with the 2014 Russian-Ukrainian conflict,
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although many authors caution that it is not a new phenomenon.[38] The declaration issued at the NATO summit held in Warsaw on July 8-9, 2016, uses the term "hybrid warfare" and defines it as follows: a broad, complex, and adaptive combination of conventional and unconventional means, as well as overt and covert military, paramilitary, and non-military measures, employed in an integrated manner by state and non-state actors to achieve their objectives. It is important to emphasize that, according to the statement, NATO is prepared to respond to hybrid warfare within the framework of collective defense; in other words, in principle, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty may be invoked depending on the decision of the North Atlantic Council.[39] This approach resonates with the phenomenon referred to in Russian military strategic thinking as "new-generation warfare,"[40] whose leading Russian theorists are Sergei Chekhinov, Sergei Bogdanov, and the Chief of the General Staff, General Valerij Gerasimov, who refer to it as a new form of warfare employed by the West and primarily by the United States, identify its most important characteristics and phases, emphasizing that Russian strategic thinking and the military must also be prepared to defend against it.[41] In Gerasimov's interpretation, in new-generation warfare, instead of conventional warfare - that is, the open and direct deployment of regular forces - there is a combined use of political, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other non-military means alongside military force, in which non-military means play a dominant role, given that "the role of non-military means in achieving political and strategic objectives has increased, and their effectiveness often surpasses that of military force."[42] Another characteristic is that, in the use of military force, indirect, covert, and disguised forms are primarily preferred through paramilitary or civilian irregular forces, with the open, direct deployment of regular forces occurring only in the final phase of the conflict, often under the guise of crisis management or peacekeeping.[43]
One of the challenges regarding the concept of hybrid warfare and the hybrid threat is determining exactly what the term "hybrid" refers to. As we have seen above, mainstream approaches today define its essence as the integrated use of military and non-military means and methods. It should be noted, however, that the term "hybrid warfare" was first used in 2002 by William J. Nemeth in his study, in which he described it as a method of warfare employed by the Chechens during the Chechen wars, wherein they utilized a blend of regular and irregular warfare.[44] As Krisztián Jójárt puts it, the Chechens: "made
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extensive use of the technologies and weapons created by modern states, yet the moral constraints imposed by modernity did not permeate Chechen warfare at all. Thus, for example, the lack of distinction between combatants and civilians, kidnappings, massacres, and acts of terrorism were all part of the Chechen arsenal of warfare."[45] In his 2009 study analyzing the conflicts in the Middle East of the 2000s, Frank G. Hoffman concludes that in the 21st century, the United States will increasingly face enemies (primarily non-state actors) who simultaneously employ both conventional and unconventional (guerrilla warfare, terrorism, or even criminal methods) warfare.[46] In its original sense, therefore, the term "hybrid" did not refer to the combined use of military and non-military means, but rather to the blending of conventional and unconventional warfare tools and methods within military responses.
Mikael Wiggel, who also addresses concerns and criticisms regarding the concept of hybrid warfare and the concept of hybrid threats, introduces the concept of hybrid intervention in the context of foreign interference targeting liberal democracies, although for him the term "hybrid" refers to the combined use of various non-military tools, such as clandestine diplomacy, geoeconomics, and disinformation with the aim of increasing divisions within the target country's society. He identifies hybrid intervention as a "wedge strategy" that avoids direct, open confrontation with the target country, instead weakening it by undermining its internal cohesion through the covert use of non-military means. The tools employed span a wide spectrum, including cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, covert financing of certain political forces, corruption of political actors, and securing economic advantages for actors who are important to the country employing the strategy and capable of influencing the target country's economic and political processes. If skillfully applied, such intervention does not excessively provoke the target country's society's perception of threat, and although there will be those who warn of the danger of external intervention, societal division often makes it difficult or impossible to take countermeasures.[47] Wiggel points out, regarding the terminology of hybrid warfare and hybrid war, that these can in certain cases lead to the escalation of a given conflict, as they lower the threshold for warfare and war.[48] Others, however, emphasize the gray-zone nature of hybrid warfare, meaning that the line between war and peace has become blurred in many cases today, and we can speak of an increasingly broad intermediate, gray-zone state characterized by hybrid threats and warfare.[49]
For the reasons outlined above, we do not consider it appropriate to use the term hybrid threat and warfare as part of the conceptual framework of this study; instead, we prefer the terminology of foreign interference. Our approach favours the narrower definition of foreign interference, one that does not encompass the use of conventional or unconventional, overt or covert military means, and therefore does not consider it a synonym for hybrid threat or warfare.
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In connection with foreign interference, another important issue of distinction arises, namely the need to distinguish it from foreign influence. While influence refers to legitimate methods of asserting interests in international relations, foreign interference is an illegitimate means of it. But what makes foreign interference illegitimate and undesirable- that is, how does it differ from influence? Influence is a common, normal, and accepted phenomenon in international relations; essentially, it is the open, transparent, and non-malicious exercise of influence on an international actor's decision-making process to advance one's own interests; in practice, it is most often carried out through diplomatic negotiations, lobbying, or public diplomacy.[50] In contrast, foreign interference involves the pursuit of self-interest in a covert and deceptive manner, typically with malicious intent to cause harm.[51] Distinguishing and separating these two methods of asserting interests can also aid in distinguishing the soft and sharp power strategies discussed above, since the soft power strategy, which focuses on persuasion and making one's own model attractive, relies on influence, while sharp power, aimed at manipulation and disruption, relies on the tools and methods of foreign interference.
Kristine Berzina and Etienne Soula examine two key aspects of foreign interference, intent and transparency, though they note that while these serve as good starting points for defining the concept, they do not, of themselves, constitute its definition. As for intent, if the behaviour or actions of an international actor are malicious - that is, manipulative, disruptive, destabilizing, or capable of causing harm - and thereby pose a threat to democratic institutions, processes, or public trust in them, then such intent serves as an indicator of foreign interference. At the same time, determining the nature of the intent is often no simple task. The authors mention several factors that can help identify the malicious nature of the intent, such as the timing, scheduling, or coordination of the action.[52] The hacking and leak attack prior to the 2017 French presidential election, which targeted Emmanuel Macron, clearly indicated an intent to interfere in the election, as it occurred 48 hours before the vote.[53] Nevertheless, we also see examples where such interference is not a well-timed, one-off operation, but rather an ongoing activity aimed at influencing the political processes of another state through non-transparent means, as we have seen in the case of the Russian state-funded troll farm, the Internet Research Agency, which, well before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, as early as 2014, started its opinion-forming activity that continued even after Donald Trump's election,[54] suggesting that the aim of the activity was not merely the presidential election, but the general influence of American public opinion and, thereby, U.S. political processes. The
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scheduling and timing of the interference, therefore, do not follow a set pattern but are context-dependent, aligning with the objective the operation seeks to achieve. Regarding the Internet Research Agency's activities, not only did their temporal progression indicate malicious intent to cause harm, but so did their coordination. As the indictment in the criminal proceedings against the organization also points out: the Agency's employees created fake profiles on social media platforms, where they posed as U.S. citizens and expressed themselves on divisive, polarizing political and social issues. Another typical pattern of conduct was the acquisition and use of profiles belonging to real U.S. citizens. "Over time, these social media accounts became tools for the defendants to reach a significant number of Americans with the aim of interfering in the U.S. political system, including the 2016 presidential election."[55] Another central concept in foreign interference is transparency, or rather, the lack thereof, meaning that such activities are covert and obscure in nature. The lack of transparency is particularly evident in the case of financial investments and donations, the latter being a method frequently used to influence political parties and campaigns. One tool of Russian interference in the Brexit campaign was the offer made by a Russian businessman, who was in contact with the Russian ambassador in London, to Arron Banks, a co-financier of the Leave.EU campaign, regarding investment opportunities in gold and diamond mines. Foreign investments, particularly when they involve strategic sectors such as the energy sector or advanced technologies, can also become tools of foreign interference and, specifically, of economic or political pressure; therefore, ensuring their transparency is essential not only for policymakers but also for the public.[56]
According to Muhammad Faizal Bin Abdul Rahman and his co-authors, foreign interference refers to the hostile, covert, and deliberately deceptive activities of an external entity (whether a state or a non-state actor) that undermine the policies and political system of another state. Beyond defining the concept, they also list typical forms of foreign interference, such as:
- covertfinancing or coercion, which may involve politicians, government officials, political parties, influential private individuals or business circles, civil society organizations and activists, educational institutions, and the academic sphere;
- cyberattacks;
- hostile information campaigns: the dissemination of disinformation or propaganda through both traditional and online media platforms.[57]
James Pamment and his co-authors define foreign interference along three dimensions, which they also regard as the key criteria for distinguishing it from the accepted form of asserting interest:
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- legitimacy: an illegitimate method of influencing public opinion through information manipulation. Its unacceptability stems not from its illegality, but rather from its negative moral judgment, which can be attributed, on the one hand, to its deceptive nature, and on the other hand, to the fact that it exploits the vulnerability of liberal democracy, that stems from its openness, the freedoms it guarantees, furthemore open social and political debates. It also violates the rules of transparent, open consultation and is incompatible with constructive dialogue.
- Intent: It is carried out in the interests of foreign forces (states, non-state actors, or their proxies) and with the intent to cause harm.
- Ambiguity: It can be carried out in peacetime, during war, or within the context of so-called gray-zone, hybrid threats, or warfare.[58]
A significant portion of the literature focuses on the responses to foreign intervention, whether these are to be applied within national, European Union, or international frameworks. Within this response-centered approach, one strand discusses possible steps and reactions to foreign interference in general or to a specific manifestation thereof. Rahman and his co-authors, using national examples, list general (strategic) and specific (tactical) responses, such as:
- Identifying the goals and interests of the hostile foreign entity: in order to understand the foreign actor's intentions and objectives in its interference, it is necessary to understand what general goals it pursues in international politics, how it defines its interests, and how it views the current international system or international relations and its own place and position within them;
- Identifying elements of one's own vulnerability: this primarily involves identifying the institutions and information that form the basis of national sovereignty, as well as defining the ideas and individuals that play a key role in shaping national identity, interests, and policies, and are thus considered the primary targets of foreign interference;
- Defining the precise strategic objectives of countermeasures: Responses to foreign interference can essentially have two types of strategic objectives: a) deterrence through punishment, or b) deterrence by undermining the aggressor's objectives. Deterring foreign interference through punishment is primarily a strategy pursued by major powers, as they possess the necessary hard power, that is military, economic, or cyber capabilities capable of coercion. Rendering the objective of interference unfeasible is much more of a preventive strategic objective, serving to enhance the country's resilience against foreign interference and, in parallel, to reduce its vulnerability, for example, by establishing an appropriate legal framework or institutional system, and by increasing social awareness and vigilance;
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- Establishing an institution for strategic response: the purpose of the institutional framework responding to foreign interference is to carry out the strategic, tactical, and operational tasks of the response;
- Developing and applying specialized tactics against specific instances of foreign interference: for example, taking action against the covert funding or coercion of politicians, government officials, political parties, business circles, civil society organizations, and activists, or even the academic sphere; defending against cyberattacks or hostile information campaigns (disinformation and propaganda).[59]
Veronika Krátka ©palková and Andrej Poleąčuk, also examining national best practices, focus specifically on protection against foreign interference in elections in their study, in which they classify the applicable countermeasures into four groups based on the timing of their implementation. The first group includes measures applicable regardless of the election cycle, whose primary purpose is to ensure the integrity of elections, such as strengthening the resilience of the electoral system and infrastructure, preventing foreign interference in elections through covert financing, protecting against hostile foreign information campaigns, and increasing voter resilience against foreign interference. The second group consists of measures to be implemented 3-12 months prior to the election, such as testing for interference in the voting process, protecting voter databases and candidate registries, and providing cybersecurity training for those involved in conducting the election. Measures in the third group should be implemented in the 3 months leading up to the election, during which timeframe official information campaigns primarily targeting voters are used to raise awareness of the threat of foreign interference and the practical steps to counter it. Finally, the measures in the fourth group serve two purposes: first, to ensure the smooth and secure conduct of elections, and second, to guarantee that the new political leadership takes office in an atmosphere of confidence in the election results. The latter includes measures to ensure the physical safety of election commission members and voters, as well as ensuring the transparency of vote counting.[60]
At the European Union level, Political Capital and its six regional partners, with support from the National Endowment for Democracy, conducted research on the authoritarian influence observable in the European Union, particularly in the European Parliament, and, in this context, proposed the following measures to counter foreign interference in their study:
- establishing an EU investment screening mechanism aimed at ensuring that "key European companies do not fall into the hands of hostile states";
- the European Parliament should place greater emphasis on vetting MEPs and their assistants; it would also be necessary to review the rules governing access to EU documents and lobbying activities;
- continuous improvement of cybersecurity for EU institutions and bodies, as well as the cybersecurity knowledge of EU officials.[61]
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Daniel Fiott and Giulia Tercovich examine the phenomenon of interference by authoritarian regimes in a specific area of EU policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Here, a typical method involves dividing EU member states or exploiting their divisions regarding a foreign and security policy issue, since the unanimity rule that continues to be applied as a general principle in the Council voting in this policy area, allows for the "sabotage" of the formation of a common EU position or action through member state vetoes. Consequently, the authors' proposal focuses on a transition to qualified majority voting in this policy area.[62]
The study, produced as part of a joint initiative by RAND and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, brought together American, European, and Russian non-governmental experts, primarily from the fields of cybersecurity and international relations, who met on several occasions during 2020-2021 to discuss possible approaches to curbing foreign interference within an international, multilateral framework. The discussions resulted in a study published in January 2022, that is, prior to the Russia-Ukraine war. The unfortunate timing was acknowledged by the editors, adding that, due to the circumstances, they have not listed the names of the experts who participated in the consultations, nor have they considered it realistic to invite them to further consultations given the current situation. They published the version of the study accepted by all experts without changes, expressing their hope that although current geopolitical events and processes do not favour the establishment of such multilateral cooperation, this may change in the future. After reviewing and comparing complaints regarding foreign interference raised by the United States, Europe, and Russia, the study offers the following recommendations for multilateral and mutual efforts aimed at curbing this phenomenon:
- Harmonizing the concept of foreign interference and developing a sort of "diagnostic approach": Given the differing interests and interpretive frameworks of the parties involved, an exact, definition-level determination of the concept's nature cannot be considered a viable path. At the same time, consensus on certain definitional elements of foreign interference, a sort of "diagnostic glossary", could help harmonize the assessment of specific incidents;
- Establishing a framework for regular, high-level government dialogue on the subject among the United States, the EU, and the Russian Federation;
- Self-restraint commitments to curb foreign interference: experts recommend a mutual renunciation of two specific forms of foreign interference: influencing elections and the disclosure of politically sensitive information obtained covertly;
- Development of technical tools to verify compliance with the commitments: since both election interference and the acquisition and leaking of politically sensitive information (hack and leak operations) primarily occur in the cyberspace (though not exclusively), demonstrating compliance with commitments and the ability to verify them therefore primarily require cyber-technical developments;
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- Development and adoption of common guidelines aimed at curbing cross-border manipulation of social media platforms and providing guidance to companies operating such platforms, for example regarding content moderation, which would be a step forward because it would prevent any single actor from accusing the others of censorship;
- Relaxing restrictions on foreign broadcasting: foreign-language broadcasting, typically state-funded, has long been accused of being one of the primary tools of foreign interference, whether through propaganda or disinformation campaigns or to support a domestic political force, and therefore must operate within an increasingly strict legal environment, such as the United States' decision to require Russia Today to register as a foreign agent under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which significantly increased its reporting obligations. In Russia, Radio Free Europe has also been subject to the local Foreign Agents Registration Act since 2019, and even prior to that, it lost its broadcast frequencies and could only broadcast online.[63]
- Declaration regarding the absence of intent to interfere: from the perspective of confidence-building, a joint declaration on non-interference or the renunciation of certain forms of interference (e.g., interference in elections) would represent the optimal solution. However, due to the blurred lines between influence accepted in international relations and foreign interference considered illegitimate, as well as the lack of harmonization regarding the latter concept, experts agreed that the adoption of such a joint declaration has very little chance of becoming a reality. Instead, the parties could issue coordinated unilateral declarations regarding their lack of intent to intervene. These declarations, just like mutual declarations, would not necessarily signify a change in the parties' behaviour, namely that they would actually refrain from intervening in each other's political affairs, but they could be interpreted as the first, initial steps toward building trust, and their violation would entail or could entail condemnation by the international community or a part thereof.[64]
As we have seen above, the new concept of power that emerged in international political theory in the 2010s, sharp power, is closely intertwined with the concept of foreign interference, given that the latter serves as a tool of sharp power. The challenge posed by foreign interference was also responded to by states and international organizations, on the one hand by defining, or rather circumscribing, the phenomenon, and on the other hand by taking the necessary measures to prevent it and reduce its harmful consequences, although the examination of the latter was not the subject of this study.
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A common element in the definitions of foreign interference is disguised, covert influence, which is carried out with malignant intent (most often disruption, deception, or causing damage) and manipulative means. Interference in the political, economic and social system of the target country can take many forms, from cyberattacks through disinformation campaigns, hidden financing of political parties and movements, and taking control of critical infrastructure, to interference in elections.
We examined the usability of the concept of hybrid warfare and hybrid operations in relation to foreign interference, given that it is used in several definitions (NATO and certain European Union definitions), but given the ambiguous content of the adjective hybrid, we do not consider it appropriate to use it as a synonym for foreign intervention.
The distinction between influence, which is a legitimate, accepted means of asserting interests in international politics and foreign interference has emerged as an important issue of demarcation. In this regard, we have established that transparency is one factor that can help to separate cases of influence and foreign interference. The other is malignant intent, however, proving this subjective factor can be problematic in many cases, and the timing, scheduling or even coordination of the act may be the circumstances that indicate the harmful nature of the intent.
Literature on foreign interference not only covers the conceptual elements and attributes necessary for identifying and delimiting the phenomenon, but also some of it is response-focused, i.e. it proposes strategic-level and operational countermeasures to foreign interference in general and in relation to some of its specific manifestations based on empirical experiences of national responses. We have also seen that responding within the framework of multilateral cooperation is also in the focus of interest, as shown by the proposals for transforming the decision-making system of the EU's common foreign and security policy, or by the example of the expert proposal "outside of the alliance" for curbing foreign interference.
The phenomenon of sharp power and foreign interference has become the focus of research in international studies, political science, and security studies, with different emphases, due to the increasing incidents of recent times. This work has attempted to identify the conceptual elements of foreign interference and clarify certain demarcation issues based on the growing literature on the topic.
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Foreign interference is a manifestation of the assertion of interests through so-called sharp power strategies in international politics, which poses an increasingly greater and more frequent challenge for states, especially democracies, which, due to their open political, economic and social systems, as well as their democratic values, institutions and processes, are more vulnerable to foreign interference based on manipulation, distraction, disruption and damage. The study seeks to clarify the concepts of sharp power and foreign interference by drawing on the relevant literature, identifying the most important definitional elements of the latter, and discussing the demarcation issues related to the concept of that. ■
NOTES
* The research was supported by the Digital Society Competence Centre of the Humanities and Social Sciences Cluster of the Centre of Excellence for Interdisciplinary Research, Development and Innovation of the University of Szeged; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8120-8967.
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[7] Európai Parlament: A katari korrupció gyanúja és az európai intézményeken belüli átláthatóság és elszámoltathatóság iránti általánosabb igény. Az Európai Parlament 2022. december 15-i állásfoglalása a katari eredetű korrupció gyanújáról, valamint az átláthatóság és elszámoltathatóság európai intézményeken belüli érvényesítésének általános szükségességéről. P9_TA(2022)0448. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0448_HU.html (Elérés: 2025.03.22.) pp. 1-2.
[8] Nye, Joseph S. Jr.: Soft Power. Foreign Policy 1990. No. 80. p. 155.
[9] Nye, Joseph S. Jr.: Soft power: the origins and political progress of a concept. Palgrave Communications 3 17008 (2017). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/palcomms.2017.8.
[10] Nye, Joseph S. Jr.: Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power. Foreign Policy 2009. Vol. 88, No. 4.160. p.
[11] Walker, Christopher - Jessica Ludwig: From Soft Power' to 'Sharp Power.' Rising Authoritarian Influence in the Democratic World. National Endowment for Democracy 2017. https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Sharp-Power-Rising-Authoritarian-Influence-Full-Report.pdf (2026. 02. 23.).
[12] Nye, Joseph S. Jr.: China's Soft and Sharp Power. Project Syndicate, 2018. Jan, 4. https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/china-soft-and-sharp-power-by-joseph-s--nye-2018-01 (2026. 02. 23.).
[13] Liu, Xin: What Sharp Power? It's Nothing But "Unsmart" Power. USC Center on Public Diplomacy. CPD Blog, 2018. Nov 15 https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/what-sharp-power-it%E2%80%99s-nothing-%E2%80%9Cunsmart%E2%80%9D-power (2026. 02. 23.).
[14] Wu, Yenna: Recognizing and Resisting China's Evolving sharp Power. American Journal of Chinese Studies 2019. Vol. 26 No 2. https://complitlang.ucr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Wu-sharp-power-AJCS-2019.pdf (2026.02.23.) p. 133.
[15] Walker, Christopher: The New Containment: Undermining Democracy. World Affairs 2015. Vol. 178, No. 1. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43555281 (2026.02.23.) pp. 403-44.
[16] Nye, Joseph S. Jr.: Countering the Authoritarian Challenge. Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development 2020. No. 15. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/48573639.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae896af45fa17e5584a79a479c074141a&absegments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 (2026. 02. 25.) 105. p.
[17] Richter, Alexander: A Theoretical Framework and Constructed Model for Sharp Power. Open Journal of Political Science 2022/12. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2022.124035 p. 655.
[18] Wu 2019, p. 134.
[19] Skoneczny, Łukasz - Bogusław Cacko: Sharp power - introduction to the issue. Internal Security Review 2021. Issue 25 (13). DOI: https://doi.org/10.4467/20801335PBW.21.032.14309 p. 329.
[20] Walker, Christopher - Jessica Ludwig 2017, p. 6.; Wu 2019, p. 133.
[21] Walker, Christopher - Jessica Ludwig: A Full-Spectrum Response to Sharp Power. The Vulnerabilities and Strengths of Open Societies. Sharp Power and Democratic Resilience Series 2021 https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/A-Full-Spectrum-Response-to-Sharp-Power-The-Vulnerabilities-and-Strengths-of-Open-Societies-Walker-Ludwig-June-2021.pdf (2026. 03. 09.) IV.
[22] Walker, Christopher - Jessica Ludwig 2021, pp. 6-12.
[23] Skoneczny, Łukasz - Bogusław Cacko 2021, pp. 330-336.
[24] Richter, Alexander 2022, p. 653.
[25] Richter, Alexander 2022. pp. 658-659.
[26] In the European Union context, the terms external interference or third party interference are also used.
[27] US Department of Homeland Security: Foreign Interference Taxonomy https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/foreign_interference_taxonomy_october_15.pdf (2026.03.13.).
[28] Australian Government Department of Home Affairs: Defining foreign interference. https://commissioningerenceetrangere.ca/fileadmin/commission_ingerence_etrangere/Documents/Preuves_et_Presentations/Preuves/COM0000078.pdf (2026.03.13.) pp. 1-2.
[29] UK Home Office: National Security Bill Factsheet. https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2022/05/11/national-security-bill-factsheet/ (2026. 03. 13.).
[30] NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence: A capability definition and assessment framework for cpontzering disinformation, information influence, and foreign interference https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/a-capability-definition-and-assessment-framework-for-countering-disinformation-information-influence-and-foreign-interference/255 (2026. 03. 13.) p. 4.
[31] NATO Headquarters: Hybrid threaths and hybrid warfare. Reference Curriculum. NATO Headquearters Brussels, June 2024. https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/deep/Hybrid-threats-and-hybrid-warfare-ENGLISH.pdf (2026. 03. 13.) p. 16.
[32] OECD: Strengthening the Transparency and Integrity of Foreign Influence Activities in France: A Tool for Tackling Foreign Interference Risks. OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2024 https://doi.org/10.1787/438da77f-en p. 14.
[33] Európai Parlament: Az Európai Unió valamennyi demokratikus folyamatába történő külföldi beavatkozás. Az Európai Parlament 2022. március 9-i állásfoglalása az Európai Unió valamennyi demokratikus folyamatába történő külföldi beavatkozásról, beleértve a félretájékoztatást is. P9_TA(2022)0064 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0064_HU.pdf (2026. 03. 13.). p. 3.
[34] Európai Bizottság és az EU külügyi és biztonságpolitikai főképviselője: Közös közlemény az Európai Parlamentnek és a Tanácsnak. A hibrid fenyegetésekkel szembeni fellépés közös kerete, az európai uniós válasz. Brüsszel, 2016.4.6. JOIN(2016) 18 final https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0018 (2026. 03. 02.).
[35] European Extrenal Action Service: 2021 Stratcom Activity Report. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/2021-stratcom-activity-report-strategic-communication-task-forces-and-information-analysis-division_en (2026. 03. 02.). p. 2.
[36] Európai Parlament 2022, p. 3.
[37] See the definitions of the European Parliament and the European External Action Service versus the definition issued by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
[38] Andersson, Jan Joel -Tardy, Thierry: Hybrid: what's in a name? European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief Issue 32 (2015) p. 1.; McCuen, John J.: Hybrid Wars. Military Review 2008. March-April, p. 107.; Wigell, Mikael: Hybrid interference as a wedge strategy: a theory of external interference in liberal democracy. International Affairs (2019) 95:2. p. 257.
[39] NATO: Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016. point 72. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm#hybrid (2025. 03. 15.).
[40] Chekinov, Sergey G. - Bogdanov, Sergey A.: The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War. Military Thought, 2013. Issue 4.
[41] Rácz András: Oroszország hibrid háborúja Ukrajnában. KKI-tanulmányok T-2014/1. p. 6.
[42] Quoted by Rácz 2014, p. 6.
[43] Rácz 2014, p. 6.
[44] Rácz 2014, p. 7.
[45] Jójárt Krisztián: A hibrid hadviselés és a jövő háborúja. Haderőszervezés, -fejlesztés HSz 2020/1. p. 5.
[46] Hoffman, Frank G. : Hybrid Warfare and Challenges Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 52, 1st quarter.
[47] Wigell 2019, p. 262.
[48] Wigell 2019, p. 260.
[49] Weissmann, Mikael: Hybrid warfare and hybrid threats today and tomorrow: towards an analytical framework. Journal on Baltic Security 5(1) p. 17.
[50] Jones, Kate: Legal loopholes and the risk of foreign interference. In-depth analyis Policy Department for External Relations Directorate General for External Policies of the Union January 2023, p. 7.
[51] Australian Government Department of Home Affairs: Countering Foreign Interference in Australia. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/nat-security/files/cfi-australia.pdf (2026. 03. 13.) 2. p.
[52] Berzina, Kristine - Soula, Etienne: Conceptualizing Foreign Interference in Europe. Alliance for Securing Democracy March 18, 2020 https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Conceptualizing-Foreign-Interference-in-Europe.pdf (2026.03.13.) pp. 9-10.
[53] Bendix, Aria: The 'Massive' Hack of Macron's Campaign. The Atlantic May 5, 2017 https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/05/france-macron-hacked/525720/ (2026. 03. 13.).
[54] Berzina, Kristine - Soula, Etienne 2020, p. 10.
[55] United States of America v Internet Research Agency LLC United States Destrict Court for the District of Columbia Case 1:18-cr-00032-DLF https://www.justice.gov/d9/fieldable-panel-panes/basic-panes/attachments/2018/02/16/internet_research_agency_indictment.pdf (2026. 03. 13.) 3. p.
[56] Berzina, Kristine - Soula, Etienne 2020, pp. 10-11.
[57] Rahman, Muhammad Faizal Bin Abdul et al.: Countermeasures againts Foreign Interference Policy Report Nanyang University, Singapore April 2020, 6. p.
[58] Pamment, James et al.: Countering Information Influence Activities: The State of the Art, version 1.4. Department of Strategic Communication, Lund University (1 July 2018) pp. 15-16.
[59] Rahman et al. 2020, pp. 7-16.
[60] Krátka ©palková, Veronika - Poleąčuk, Andrej: Preventing election interference: Selected best practices and recommendations Hybrid CoE Research Report 10 September 2023. p. 9.
[61] Krekó Péter - Molnár Csaba - Szicherle Patrik: Autoriter árnyékok az Európai Unióban. Tekintélyelvű nagyhatalmak befolyása az Unió intézményeiben. Political Capital 2020. pp. 8-9.
[62] Fiott, Daniel - Tercovich, Giulia: Votes, Vetoes, Values: Foreign Interference, QMV and EU Foreign Policy in a Competitive Age. Brussels School of Governance Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy CSDS Policy brief n° 2023/21.
[63] Emphasizing: these are restrictions for the period prior to the Russian aggression in February 2022.
[64] Charap, Samuel - Krumm, Reinhard (ed.): Proposals to address political interference. Oucomes of a Trilateral Dialogue. RAND 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CFA1775-1.html (2026. 03. 13.) pp. 29-50.
Lábjegyzetek:
[1] The author is senior lecturer, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Szeged.
Visszaugrás
