An important question related to the legitimacy of the Kádár regime, the issue of the ethnic Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary, was a forbidden topic the whole Kádár-era. The issue was made taboo by the web of the regime's commitments to the internationalist and "fraternal" socialist (communist) parties of the Soviet bloc. It from this comes that the interpretation of problems presented by the presence of the Hungarian minority was the regime's prerogative. Therefore, an open discussion of these issues was relegated to the politically illegal opposition. It also gave voice and an agenda to Hungarian emigres of the west, as well as to the Hungarian-language media published and broadcasted abroad.
The meetings of editors-in-chief of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party served as additional control mechanism of the party over the press[1]. Such monthly meetings sought to identify anticipated events suitable for publication, as well as an analysis of the media's output to date. Pursuant to the regime's agenda on the "nationality question," the party leadership suspended in 1978 all "problematic writings" related to Transylvania, as well as strengthened the "effectively functioning" of "ex-post censorship". It provisionally" mandated that writings dealing with Hungarians abroad could only be published after consulting the Central Committee's Department of Agitation and Propaganda. However, more important than these measures were the interpretation of the set of guiding principles for the press:
" - Regardless of location in the world, only socialism - can solve the problem of nationalities; there is no other solution.
- The fundamental precondition to resolve the nationality question is that there should be good relations between peoples and countries. (Read: tensions between Hungarians and Romanians only harm the situation of Hungarians living in Romania.)
- We must treat the issue in a way that would not harm our cause (danger of isolation) and would not harm Hungarians living outside the borders.
- The ethnic issue is not a territorial issue for us.
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- Hostile, fascist émigré groups now especially agitating on behalf of Hungarians in Romania are our enemies, as they are enemies of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Hungarians living in Romania.
- In sum, we care about the fate of Hungarians abroad according to principles of internationalism."[2]
In the same year the same issue came up with a similar level of secrecy, but with a radically different interpretation. At that time, the Department of Intelligence (III/I-1.) of the Ministry of the Interior was given the task of intelligence operations against the United States and international organizations. Evidence of the success in obtaining information needed for domestic consumption in Hungary was the acquisition of a NATO[3] internal document. On 18th April 1978, the British delegation prepared a memorandum on the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania for the session of the Political Committee of the NATO.[4]
About two months later, the Interior Minister sent the translation of the memorandum to János Kádár and to the five members of the party's Politburo[5]. The summary is a follows:
" - The Hungarian ethnic minority - that lives mainly in Transylvania - is one of the largest ethnic minorities in Europe. According to Romanian census data, there are 1,7 million Hungarians of the total population of 21,5 million. According to Hungarian émigré sources, the number of Hungarians living in Romania is estimated at 2,5 or possibly 3 million.
- Transylvania has historical importance for both Romania and Hungary. For the Romanians, it means the homeland of their ancestors who lived there since antiquity. Hungarians had ruled Erdély directly or indirectly since the 13th century. From 1867 to the First World War, the Romanians suffered much from Hungarian nationalism and forcible attempts to assimilate. The Romanians - considering the invasion of northern Transylvania by Hungarians in the Second World War by virtue of the Second Vienna Award of August 1940 - are probably afraid that the Hungarians once again will demand the return of Transylvania.
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- At the end of the 1950's, the old Hungarian university in Cluj Napoca was integrated into the Romanian university system as part of coercion against the Hungarian ethnic minority; and this coercion has been implemented partly or totally ever since. Probably encouraged by other anti-regime movements elsewhere in Eastern Europe, some members of the Hungarian minority initiated an open protest movement in recent years. The first manifestation of this protest - to which the west paid attention - was the so-called "Lazarus Document" allegedly written by a Hungarian person living in Transylvania under a pseudonym.[6] This document contains a report about the past of the Hungarians in Transylvania, about their participation in the fight for Romanian socialism between the two world wars and describes their present situation. Although it is very probable that the document was written before 1976, it was published in the West only in March 1977. An intellectual group consisting of mainly Transylvanian Hungarians somehow managed to obtain this document; therefore, it also became known in Hungary before the meeting of Kádár and Ceausescu in June 1977 near the Romanian-Hungarian border.[7]
- The Hungarians are critical the "Romanization" policies in education, because they are afraid that this phenomenon will not only decrease the number of educated Hungarian in positions requiring a high level of academic preparation to a minimal number, but it also endangers the characteristic Hungarian culture in Transylvania. The ethnic policy of President Ceausescu is the product of Romanian nationalism that is the gist of both his external policy and internal policy aiming to create a strong nation state. Ceausescu, in his speech addressed to the Commission of Hungarian-speaking Workers on 15th March said that ethnic problems must be examined based on class aspects, and "if discriminations occurred in Romania, then they did not occur based on national, but on class interests".
- Kádár also spoke about the solution of ethnic problems with socialist solutions. In an interview published in the Frankfurter Rundschau the previous year Kádár declared: "In the 20th century, an ethnic problem cannot be solved by 19th century standards. The fate of the minority cannot be separated from the fate of the majority. The ethnic is-
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sue is one of the issues that will gain their final solution in socialism, based on the fact that socialism provides free development for the whole society, including the minorities within. In today's Europe, the fate of nations and ethnic minorities cannot be solved by recalling past glories, only by the correct application of the lessons of history. " This last sentence can be interpreted as a warning to Hungarians living in Hungary, or as criticism to the Romanians, or both. Kádár, while he is probably anxious about the fate of the Hungarians in Transylvania, has to operate carefully, if he does not want to see the revival of nationalism and irredentism in Hungary.
- Kádár - according to the declaration - during - his meeting with Ceausescu last year agreed that for both countries the right solution of minority issues lies in building socialism; at the same time, he admitted that the solution of the problem are an internal affair of each country. During the meeting an agreement was reached on opening the border for local traffic and about the establishment of a Consulate in Cluj Napoca a long time wish of local Hungarians and about the establishment of a Romanian Consulate in the Hungarian city of Debrecen. Despite this, concerns in Hungary about the fate of Hungarians living in Transylvania did not subside. Gyula Illyés, the well-known Hungarian writer published articles in the December and January issues of the Hungarian daily Magyar Nemzet expressing concern for the increasing oppression of the Hungarian minority in Romania. When Stefan Andrei, secretary of foreign affairs of the Party visited Hungary, the issue was obviously discussed, but judging from the brief statements issued and published on the press of both countries, no visible progress was made on the matter.
- While it is not probable that Kádár would encourage the reemergence of Hungarian territorial demands for Transylvania, the Romanian failure to improve their treatment of the Hungarian minority will most likely not satisfy Budapest's expectations, leading to continued or even increased tensions between the two countries. The assumption is that it is not in the interest of the Soviet Union for the situation to worsen but it may be tempted to apply some degree of pressure on Romania in response to the Hungarian minority concerns."
The NATO report reflects the British Intelligence's concise summary of the background of the historic ethnic conflict between Hungary and Romania, focusing on the current problems, that is, those of the 1970s forwarding the information to the NATO Council, one of the most significant deliberative bodies of the organization. A very important approach of the report is that it made a connection between the increasing protests on behalf of the Hungarian minority and the opposition movements in Eastern Europe. Using material from legal and undercover sources of intelligence, the report was able to document the tensions between the two countries, and it also offered dubious solutions to end the controversy, using official documents and unofficial or informal hearsay material. A common feature of the afore mentioned documents was the article written by noted Hungarian writer Gyula Illyés published in the Christmas 1977 issue of Magyar Nemzet. In fact, while the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party calls it a problematic writing", the NATO report makes reference to the "very strong article" by the "highly respected Hungarian writer". There are no data about the fate of the NATO re-
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port. János Kádár read the document without commenting on it. In the next decade, its most significant findings became increasingly valid.
After the publication of the three-volume History of Transylvania[8] in 1986, edited by a leading party ideologue, the already tense Hungarian- Romanian relationship was further burdened by ideological conflicts. The Romanian government did its best to make people and the international public opinion believe that the history book contained "Fascist, chauvinistic and racist statements" and "forgeries of history that harm the memory of the victims of the Horthyist terror".[9] In their campaign, "the nationwide plenary sessions of the Committee of Hungarian- speaking Workers" were also enrolled in the effort. On 27[th] February 1987, a new session Commission of Ethnic Affairs was organized and even non-experts criticized the History of Transylvania without reading it and made their statements on prepared texts. Ceausescu argued for the theory of Daco-Romanian continuity, spoke about the Hungarian-Romanian cooperation against the Turks and declared that the ethnic issues had already been solved in Romania. He commented on the book that "it was a forgery of history" that was thwarting cooperation between two socialist countries.[10]
But the anger fuelled by the Romanian political leadership was only an element of increasingly vocal national homogenization efforts. At the 10[th] Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, the Secretary General highlighted the changing role of the state: "No doubt that after the elimination of the exploiting classes, in harmony with the developing homogenization of the socialist society, the role of the state and the instruments it employs also changes.[11] When making reference to the nationalities of Romania and until the mid-eighties, Ceausescu made specific references to "all of the workers - Romanians, Hungarians, Germans and other nationalities", but this expression was re-
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placed by "all of the workers without any differences, our whole people", "all citizens of our homeland" and "nationalities living together" at the session of the Committees of Hungarian and German Workers at the end of 1984.[12]
However, the process of cultural homogenization had begun much earlier[13]. In the first quarter of 1985, broadcasting by the ethnic district stations of the Romanian Radio were discontinued in Cluj Napoca, Targu Mures and Timisoara and the editorial staff and their nearly 600 employees were dismissed. The Hungarian language TV channels had a similar fate. From 1986, the material of the museums in Transylvania was transferred to Bucharest[14], and Hungarian books became unavailable for the readers in the libraries.[15] Bilingual inscriptions and street names disappeared in Transylvania, and the majority of streets of Hungarian towns were renamed in Romanian. The number of books published in Hungarian decreased to 50 percent in 10 years; in 1972 265 books were published in Hungarian, but only 225 in 1980, and in less than 200. 1987. Only 2 million books of the 50 million copies published in 1981 were Hungarian, but based on the ethnic-linguistic ratios, this number should have been around 4 million. After the Second World War, there were six independent Hungarian theatres in Romania - there were more in 1956, when four companies operated only in Cluj Napoca - up to the 1980's, when only two theatres remained: one in Cluj and one in Timisoara.
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The two large theatres of Transylvania were integrated into Romanian theatre companies: in Targu Mures and Sfantu Gheorghe. From the end of the 1970s, the number of Hungarian primary and secondary schools decreased to 25 percent. Based on the earlier Act of Education, 15 students were sufficient to create an "ethnic class," but until the beginning of the 1980s the students could learn in Hungarian primary school with 25 students, and in secondary schools with 36 students. While in the school year 1977-78, the number of Hungarian primary school students was 7-8 percent, in 1986-87 this ratio was only 5 percent. The practice introduced in 1956 according to which one could take an entrance exam in Hungarian at any university of the country, and in case of students a Hungarian group, could be established, was ended. In the Department of Hungarian Studies of Babes-Bolyai University, 32 instructors taught in the school year 196465, but only 14 in 1988. In the school year 1986-87 7 students got a degree of Hungarian studies, but since it was the state that gave jobs to graduating teachers, engineers and doctors, fewer and fewer of them got a job in the areas of Transylvania populated by Hungarian majority. In 1985, 5 of the 22 final-year students got a job in Transylvania, and since 1987, it was the norm that Hungarians having a baccalaureate or a similar degree were employed in nearly exclusively Romanian-speaking areas.[16]
The situation worsened with news gradually coming out of Romania at the beginning of 1988 about the urbanization project of gigantic proportions, later called "village destruction" scheme. In March Romania declared that the majority of the population of villages would be relocated to so-called agricultural centers of urban character" within the framework of the urbanization project. According to his own admission, President Nicolae Ceausescu was preparing for the project to run for more than 20 years.[17] The details of the President and Secretary General of the Party were made known to the world in his speech delivered on 29th April 1988. The number of villages (then about 14,000) was to be cut by nearly half - declared Ceausescu at the session of the Political Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist party. The Central Committee quickly accepted his declaration at its next session, and in May the 40 county party committees also announced their support for the project. In place of the about 7,000 villages to be eliminated, they proposed to create 350,000 hectares of field and nearly 500 large industrial and agro-biological complexes. This project affected 2,000 largely Hungarian settlements, mainly in the counties of Hargitha, Alba, Bihar, Cluj, Satu Mare and Covasna[18].
The initial shock was followed by sharp Hungarian, and then, international protests. Government agencies and non-governmental organizations spoke up against the project. At the end of February the United States declared that they would deny Romania most favored nation status because of its human rights record. The most favored nation status
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trade privilege had been given to Romania for its previous independent foreign policy posture within the Soviet bloc. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany learned about the village destruction plan with "the greatest anxiety", as it would affect the German minority living in Romania. At the Vienna follow-up meeting (1986-1989) dealing with the Helsinki Final Agreement it was reiterated in several speeches that the provision of ethnic rights was an organic part of normal interstate relationships, and the meeting in Vienna could not ignore the event connected to it.
The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called in the ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Romania in the beginning of April and explained: the Hungarian government had been informed with deep anxiety about the fact that in Romania the names of settlements had been used only 3[rd] from April in Romanian. Furthermore, they told him that the elimination of smaller settlements would modify the ethnic composition of the country and this measure would discriminate against ethnic minorities. The forcible eviction of residents would violate the most basic human rights; with the elimination of thousands of the villages inhabited by ethnic minorities their sense of community and preservation of heritage would be weakened.[19] In this situation, Károly Grósz made an unexpected announcement in the middle of July at the national meeting of Worker Guard commanders, when he declared that he would soon start official negotiations in the Socialist Republic of Romania.[20] His proposal was accepted by the session of the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party Secretary on 28[th] March 1988, and the official invitation transmitted by Bucharest with the proviso that "the date of the visit should be diplomatically agreed".[21] According to the decision of the Political Committee made at the session on 14[th] June, the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs of the two parties should have a preparatory initial meeting where they would discuss the elements of the Hungarian-Romanian relationship. If these initial negotiations were successful, there would be a basis for the later negotiations with the Heads of the Governments and later a meeting of at Secretary General level.[22]
The demonstration held at the Heroes's, Square in Budapest on 27[th] June rewrote the planned scenario for both Budapest and Bucharest. At the mass demonstration organized for the first time since 1956 about 40 to 50 thousand people (according to the police 20 to 30 thousand, and according to the participants more than 150 thousand) demonstrated against the plan of village destruction program.[23] The next day the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called in the Hungarian ambassador in Bucharest and informed him that the Romanian Government decided to close immediately the Hungarian Consulate in Cluj Napoca and demanded that the staff of the Consulate should leave
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Romania within 48 hours. The decision was justified by the Hungarian demonstrations against the Romanian resettlement plan.[24]
On the same day, the Council of Romanian Workers of Hungarian Nationality held asession. The approved statement hailed as the greatest achievement of the Ceausescu-era that is "securing consistently the total equality of all compatriots and the unity of the workers." They resented and declared unacceptable the chauvinistic, irredentist, and revanchist manifestations of the People's Republic of Hungary that "purposefully distort reality and treat with hostility the great achievements of the Romanian people through the new socialist social system that not only falsify the present, but also the historical past." Next day the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party took up the question of the Romanian- Hungarian relations in a similar vein.[25] Ceausescu declared that "certain chauvinist and nationalistic circles, in order to distract attention from problems wanting for solutions, employ methods that even Horthy would not have allowed".[26]
The tense situation and its background were summarized by a comprehensive report prepared in Bucharest that was forwarded to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Ambassador:
"Based on Nicolae Ceauseşcu's own conception, in the autumn of 1986 we obtained the first information about a comprehensive plan of resettlement according to which a demarcation of area where settlements can be built will be outlined, and the real estate and settlements outside that demarcation will be eliminated. According to the plans of that period, the affected real estate will be nationalized. The former owners will be compensated at 20% of the value of their property. These owners would be housed in rental units in the village center or elsewhere in the new settlement, generally with smaller plots of land (250 square meters). Vice Prime Minister Ion Dinca explained at the meeting with Comrade Váncsa[27] that with this new method, for example, with the elimination of superfluous roads they would gain back 500,000 hectares of land for agriculture. Another objective was to eliminate the differences between villages and towns.
From these conceptions evolved the program of village destruction and the bulldozer policy. The execution of the program would be just one component and symbol of the historically grandiose Ceausescu era. In our view, the redrawing of the ethnic and geographical map of the country, is not directly linked to the broad range settlement program worked out in the 1970's in Romania. At that time there were no plans to elimi-
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nate half of the settlements. Thais why it is untenable that Ceauşescu's claim that the project undertaken would be a part of a 20 year plan.
It is true that earlier resettlement plans were frequently discarded. The modification and destruction carried out in Bucharest were often done by on-site decision made by Ceausescu himself (not only due to the building program of the new monumental government quarter) and as part of the creation of several town centres in the country. In underdeveloped regions, for example in Moldova, the new centres meant a positive change, a kind of improvement; but in other cases, for example, in Transylvania, they contributed to the uprooting of historic and ethnic characteristics. The secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party admitted that "settlements in Transylvania are more compact.[28]
" The plan of village destruction involving many settlements, real estate and masses of people was unique in the world, and had from the very beginning a negative bent in terms of ethnic policy, as the settlement program was designed to strengthen the Romanian character of ethnic areas and weaken the centuries-old compactness of Hungarian ethnic groups. The redrawing of the map of Romania by Ceauşescu would have extremely negative consequences for the Hungarian ethnic minority, their values and for the preservation of Hungarian and European history and culture. Because the ethnic characteristics of towns were changed in the past 70 years in favor of Romanians, the existence of the Hungarian ethnic communities remained more or less untouched in villages. The threatened disruption of this traditional network of villages posed the greatest danger. For example, the fate of churches and cemeteries was unclear; the majority of such properties were church property. We could assume that there may remain some historic buildings or monuments and others may be transferred by the church. As the churches, both Catholic and Protestant, lacked the necessary financial means, many monuments would have been lost, just as it happened in Bucharest. The ethnic character of Transylvania would diminish with the redrawing of the map, and the replacement of many villages would with uniform new settlements and towns.
Between 1986 and 1988, many villages were destroyed around Bucharest and modest small settlements were built where the whole population were forced to move in. Around Snagov, in the autumn of 1987 some villages were already destroyed. The former owners had to dismantle their own houses, or else they had to pay for the contactors to do it. In the new housing blocks they became not owners but tenants. This was not only a violation of human rights, but also illustrated the coercive character of the whole project.
It is noteworthy that the Romanian party leaders did not support the village destruction project until the beginning of 1987. The project was mentioned only in a few speeches given by Ceauşescu. The situation was the same in the time of the Congress of People's Councils in March, where Ceauşescu argued for speeding up the resettlement
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plan. He declared that the number of 13,000 villages must be drastically reduced to 5 to 6,000. Upon the implementation of the plan, at most 2,000 villages would have remained, and, in accordance with the number of agricultural committees, 558 agricultural centers were to be established. Until 1990, two-three model agricultural centers were to be created, and by 1995 the building of agricultural towns would be completed, and by 2000 the whole project must be completed.
After the congress, the resettlement of villages received a greater emphasis in the propaganda effort. The media got weekly instructions to promote the execution of the plan. The party's Central Committee and representatives of the National Council of People's Committees set up a committee in charge of carrying out the project, and the prime minister shortly thereafter became its leader.
A decision, which was not made public, was made about the fact that county plans would be worked out and finalized in a few months. Although there were doubts about the feasibility of the program (at issue were financial resources and the capacity of the building industry), but the dismantling phase was fast approaching. There was some personal information from the ethnic areas of the county of Covasna, where the whole plan cycle would be completed by 1992. In fact, based on the speeches given by Nicolae Ceausescu all preparations were made for the village destruction program. The area around Bucharest was a showcase of the consequences of the program."[29]
When this report was made, "the top secret, highly confidential document made exclusively for the highest state and party leadership" could no be known for the Hungarian embassy, but the document was in possession of the Hungarian intelligence "from an operational venue", and it also reached the narrow leadership of the HSWP via the ministry of the Interior's department III/I.[30]
This department officially could not execute missions against "fraternal socialist countries" including Romania[31]. On the other hand, its actual operational fields, marked with X, belonged to a "fraternal" socialist state. It was also an open secret that many agents of the Department of Foreign Intelligence of the Securitate, the Departamentul de Informaţii Externe (DIE), was already active in Hungary.[32] The documents evaluating
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the meeting of the two parties' secretaries general on 28[th] August, 1998 in Arad, were drafted for the HSWP politburo by the foreign department of the CC, HSWP also called attention to this issue: " Violating the agreements concerned, Romania is doing widerange intelligence activities in Hungary. To neutralize these activities, the competent authorities of the ministry of interior should assess the impact of these activities against our state security, including the circles connected with embassy staff and the activities of Romanian intelligence present in Hungary."[33]
The document of the Hungarian intelligence forwarded to Budapest, cited below was not on the agenda of the politburo, but all the members of this body as well as the secretaries of the Central Committee.[34] The introduction of the report contains the summary of the Ministry of the Interior about the escalation of tensions up until 1988 and their reasons:
"The competent authorities of the ministry of the interior - based on a high-level political decision - are continually informed about developments in the Romanian situation, Romanian moves and their outcome. According to this, Romanian authorities increased in July the discriminative actions taken against Hungarian missions and their staff in Romania. Selective control at airports was extended to our personnel, as well as to our experts on long-term missions and their family members, including their visiting relatives.
In a departure from earlier practice, an incident took place involving a Hungarian holding a diplomatic passport which was confiscated and a shipment consigned and sealed by the ministry of foreign trade, was opened and returned to him 8 hours later. There is suspicion that our diplomatic pouches are monitored electronically.
In conjunction with discriminative measures against Hungarian citizens assigned on official missions in Romania, the Romanian authorities were trying to give the impression that the Hungarian government was unable or unwilling to provide the appropriate circumstances for the unhindered operation of the Romanian embassy in Budapest. The advisor assigned to liaise with Romanian diplomats accredited in Budapest told diplomats of other countries that an expert of the Romanian ministry of foreign affairs visited Budapest at the beginning of this month (July) and his assignment was to make preparation for the evacuation of embassy staff and families.
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It was rumored that the successor of the incumbent Romanian ambassador in Budapest would not be career diplomat, but a well-known historian or academic, or perhaps only a caretaker official.
There were signs that there was resistance against the resettlement plan. Apparently the leaders of Covasna and Hargitha counties were trying to hinder the implementation of the programs by failing to prepare in a timely manner proposals for elimination of villages and were also trying to seek to obtain concessions from the central authorities. Contemporary observers surmised that given the dissatisfaction with the resettlement program in some villages populated by both Hungarians and Romanians, the emphasis of Ceauşescu's speeches had shifted. In one of his speeches he said that the measures did not have to be acted upon so urgently, and in another there was a variation in the number of settlements to be destroyed.
There were prominent personalities and their family members among the Romanian citizens migrating to Hungary from Romania and not intending to return home. These included the children of high ranking officers of the Securitate, the daughter of the former minister of the interior, an ex-body guard of Ceauşescu.
On the Romanian side of the border everything was done to prevent the migration of people. A Securitate brigade of 2,800 was dispatched to the Romanian-Hungarian border. Their main task was to prevent illegal emigration of Romanian citizens to Hungary and to strengthen border control. To reinforce border guards, newly recruited Worker Guards were also deployed. On 15th July of 1987 shots were fired at a railway car behind the international express train to Biharkeresztes, and there are also unconfirmed reports of the presence of Securitate officers, with the mission to create confusion among refugees in Hungary.
We obtained the rough Hungarian translation of a top secret document issued by the Romanian Communist party for high-level political leaders. The material - assuming that was not disinformation - gives us an insight to the thinking of the highest Romanian leadership about the relationship of the two countries and about likely "solutions". Our agencies are monitoring events and adopting measures consistent with their sphere of authority."
The Bucharest-originated document provided no further information on the purpose and character of the material itself or the circumstances surrounding its distribution, and there was no comment on part of Hungarian intelligence either. But the observation that the document "may have been sent to us as a provocation" suggest suspicion on the part of department III/I. In addition, the translation of the text was not done by the Hungarian state security agencies either, but "a rough and extracted translation" was obtained by Hungarian intelligence. Much of this raises the question of whether or not it was possible that a document drafted in Romanian "for the highest political leadership" could be translated into Hungarian at once in the Ceausescu-era, or it is only a bogus disinformation document made for the Hungarian government.
However, the style and content of the document suggested that the document may be genuine and was intended for the Romanian party bureaucracy's mid-level leadership. From documents of the HSWP, it was known that proposals were deemed to complete only when the issuers of the concerned departments were identified. In the document
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obtained, the issuers were the secretary, the CC and the secretariat of the Romanian Communist party. Therefore, it can be assumed that the document was confidential and was prepared by the department of agitation of propaganda of the CC with active contributions from the DIE (Romania's security agency) and was intended to provide guidelines for the party apparatus (and perhaps leading press representatives) on how to handle the tense situation leading up to the summer of 1988. The stylistic feature of the document was that it contained "apparat-speak", such as "our beloved Homeland, dear Romania", "the great leader of the Romanian nation, of our homeland, Comrade Cea&x351;escu" may also support this assumption. Language of this sort was widely used in mass propaganda but rarely appeared in documents for the highest political leadership. The document, however, contains some really remarkable information:
- All the conditions necessary to go forward with - the resettlement project summarized in nine points were ready for the elimination of more than 7,000 villages. These conditions included the project timeline, the financial and technical requirements, including the involvement of Romanian National Army. However, in the light of subsequent events, the effect of vehement domestic and international protests could not have been an exaggeration, even though we do not have more precise information on this.
- The Romanian government imposed serious conditions to continue the Romanian-Hungarian talks with the probable aim that upon the likely refusal of those conditions the Hungarian side could be portrayed as uncompromising in resuming dialogue. Otherwise, the Romanian side would not have demanded next to the high-minded respect for Romanian national sovereignty, the absurd demand that the Hungarian Government should take the commitment to "end illiteracy".
- During 1987, according to Romanian data - 1,262 citizens migrated to Hungary altogether, while Hungarian statistics list 10,445 people. The difference may be explained by the arriving illegal migrants and those who arrived in Hungary with a valid passport but were refused to return to Romania. The Hungarian Ministry of the Interior declared on 10th June 1988 that from the beginning of the year 4,977 Romanian citizens had declared that they did not wish to return home. By the end of the year, 12,273 people were granted temporary residence by the Hungarian authorities.
The original text of this "the top secret, highly confidential document" is:
"Recently, the humiliation of our beloved homeland, our dear Romania and the international discredit of the whole Romanian nation and the smears against our great leader of our homeland comrade Ceauşescu and the whole Romanian leadership has continued.
Certain countries interfere in the internal affairs of Romania and endanger the revolutionary socialist achievements and endanger our socialist state. Our beloved Romania has always strived that those who live in Romania should have the same rights and obligations. It must be accepted that people living in Romania are Romanian citizens regardless of their nationality.
The party and state leadership of the People's Republic in Hungary are pursuing a nationalistic policy. The political leaders want to create a distraction from the serious
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economic and social problems of the country. They do their best to discredit socialism building Romania before the international public with falsehoods. The Hungarian leadership also misinforms the Hungarian people about the real conditions in Romania, on the rights and the life ethnic minorities of our country and they portray a false account of our resettlement program.
Suffice it to say that the Hungarian People's Republic's economy is burdened with high debt, some 19 billion dollars that at this moment it is unable to repay. The country sustains itself by borrowing. The economic development of Hungary is far behind Romania's achievements.
Hungarian goods cannot be sold abroad, the Hungarian technology, chemical industry and other branches of industries are completely outdated. The exchange of goods has been the characteristic of the Romanian-Hungarian commerce for a long time. It is only due to the understanding of Romania and the patience of Comrade Ceauşescu that Romania is willing to buy low-quality products from Hungary.
Henceforth the economic relationships will have to be revised. Romania cannot endlessly sacrifice its economy to help a country that permanently violates the rules of cooperation, a country that is encouraging Romanian citizens to leave their homeland, encouraging the Romanian workers to act against our beloved homeland and discredit Romanian socialist achievements abroad.
The chauvinist leaders of Hungary, instead of solving their own social problems, interfere in the affairs of neighbouring fraternal socialist country, under the leadership of the great builder of socialism, son of our beloved homeland and the people, Comrade Ceauşescu. The Hungarian leadership also denigrates the Romanian nation.
The Hungarian government calls the criminals escaping from the rightful fury and punishment of the Romanian people refugees. At the same time, the Hungarian Government keeps secret that thousands of Hungarians citizens search for asylum abroad and request political asylum in other countries, without intentions to return to Hungary.
Certainly, we cannot and do not want to solve the internal social crisis of the People's Republic of Hungary, but we expect the Hungarian government to solve these issues within their own country, and they should not be involved in the Romanian nation's revolutionary building of socialism. That is why we, at international forums, such as in Vienna, declare that all states should solve their own problems, and states should be banned from interfering in the internal affairs of other states.
Hungary makes territorial demands on our beloved homeland coupled with concern about the situation of our Romanian workers of Hungarian nationality. The chauvinist leaders of Hungary also keep it secret that there are ancient Romanian territories and what is more, also in the territory of Hungary, Romanian towns and townspeople.
If someone could have territorial demands, then it would be our dear homeland, Romania; but we do not speak about these rightful demands for the sake of friendship and the peace of neighboring peoples. But we are always ready to defend our socialist achievements against aggressors, with arms if we must. We are not afraid of threats, particularly not in the use of military force. The Hungarian attempts to conquer territory are condemned to failure. It does not only derive from the qualities of the Romanian National Army, but also from the high level preparedness, commitment and patriotism.
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We have the appropriate information about the fact that based on their equipment, the Hungarian Army can be called modern, but in its thinking it, morally, is still at the level of Horthy's army, and as for its human material, it is far behind our National Army. The Hungarian military leadership is bland; alcoholism has reached critical levels.
The only military force that can be called modern is the Hungarian air force, although the airplanes are getting older, and there is no money to replace them. At the same time, the homeland air force of our beloved homeland Romania has the equipment to defend our national air space.
The Romanian national army will undertake enormous tasks in the forthcoming resettlement program. On the one hand, in conformity with regional development regulations, our units will participate in the creation of newly designed functional districts; on the other hand, they will participate in the planned transfer of residents, assisting to convert the newly freed areas for agriculture.
The resettlement program begun on 1st June (of 1988) must be accelerated in every area. All assistance and support must be provided to the individuals and organizations that were appointed by the central administration to carry out the required tasks The Presidential decree clearly determines the tasks.
Within the territory of the county, the following tasks are to be done apart from the already mentioned: - Early registration of the population (composition - of families, age. occupation, nationality, qualification, social status, etc.)
- Estimating the required labor force, occupational distribution and evaluation of requirements.
- Definition of the new functional districts. Estimating the requirements of skilled labor, with special attention to industrial capacity.
- To achieve the goals of the project, residents need a structured reorientation. In this task local People's Council and the emerging new People's Councils and divisions of Party organizations will have a special role. The police will be in charge of public order.
- The new building area must be secured and the dismantled area must have protective measures to avoid encroachment during the building phase.
- Each citizen has to be given a job somewhere in the country. With this step we want to guarantee each Romanian citizen the right to work. If the citizen does not want to take the assigned position, this does not exempt the citizen of the obligation to move to the designated residence. Refusal to move or placing stumbling block against moving endangers the great socialist transformation of our country, and requires appropriate measures on part of the authorities wish to accept the position granted to him or her, he or she is not exempted from the obligation to move to the previously marked region and dwelling place. Denying moving endangers the socialistic reformation of our Homeland; therefore, the authorities are obliged to make the appropriate measures against it. - Each citizen must be granted the chance to voluntarily - undertake to move and accept a position, for a certain period of time, in the resettlement areas.
- Proper provision must be made citizens moving, including food supply and other social services (health care, school, kindergarten, etc.).
- Moving requests for multiple families is only possible within the framework of voluntary moving. In case of non-voluntary moving, we must insist on strictly adhering to
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the requirements of the economy and the regional experts. The proximity of relatives is not reason enough to ignore the strict principles of moving to the designated residence.
As for ownership matters, our guiding principle is that all land within the territory of our beloved Homeland Romania are state property; therefore, they are exclusively managed by the state.
As for the ownership and breeding of animals, a separate amendment of the decree will be drafted, considering the resettlement project and the formation economic areas. The areas have to strive to become self-supporting.
We have an enormous set of tasks before us - the creation of nearly 500 industrial agro-biological complexes - but this is endangered by the neighbouring People's Republic of Hungary by attempting to thwart the development our socialist society.
The chauvinistic Hungarian Government does not consider the reality of socialism, the fact that our dear Homeland Romania lead by its great and faithful son Comrade Ceausescu is working on the realization of a developed society. Nothing proves the antisocialist nature of the chauvinistic Hungarian Government more than the fact that the heroic son of our Nation Comrade Ceauşescu, on occasion of his 70th birthday was awarded, on behalf of the Soviet party and state leaders, with the Order of Lenin. If the accusations about our beloved Homeland and its great leader Comrade Ceauşescu disseminated by the chauvinistic Hungarian political leaders were true, then he would not have been awarded with this order for building socialism. The award itself is the best example that the Romanian Government represents the socialist advancement, while the Hungarian leadership denies its greatness.
This is why the dialogue between the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and the Central Committee of Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party will take place only if in the future the Hungarian leadership: - Desists in a policy of humiliation the Romanian - Nation and its leaders.
- Desists in the shameful forgeries of history
- Ceases the interference in Romanian national internal affairs
- Commits to stop disinformation about Romania in the Hungarian press and literature, banning all writings and articles humiliating Romania
- Accepting the fact that that Romania has jurisdiction over any Romanian citizens, regardless of nationality
- Repatriates Romanian citizens illegally migrating to Hungary without preconditions
- Repatriates Romanian citizens who travelled to Hungary with official travel documents, and after the expiration of such documents did not return to Romania
- Strictly abides by the Treaty of Friendship and other important international conventions related to Romania
- Withdraws declarations that are against general principles of peace and international relations
- Initiates legal proceedings against those that express hostility against Romania and the development of socialism by the Romanian people.
- Makes a commitment to strictly abide human rights and enforces them. Guarantees housing and jobs to all residents of Hungary until de Millennium.
- Solves the issue of alcoholism and drugs, and ends illiteracy
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- Commits not to violate Romanian territorial sovereignty
- Commits to best practices in economic relationships and takes notice that Romania cannot henceforth support the troubled Hungarian economy.
- Desists interfering in the affairs workers of Hungarian nationality living in the territory of Romania, and takes note of the protest of the Committee of Ethnic Workers.
The nationality has been solved in the socialist Romania, since laws guarantee rights and the ethnic minorities can have their own journals, schools, cultural institutions and book publishing houses.
Under the leadership of Comrade Ceauşescu, the heroic son of our beloved Romania, exemplary cooperation developed with the workers of German nationality in Romania Those who wanted to leave our beloved Homeland Romania could leave it on condition that the German State taking them will permanently contribute to their livelihood and that the state receiving emigrants pays to our homeland the social cost of services such health care and education.
We do not exclude similar mutually agreed upon solution for a determined number of Romanian workers of Hungarian nationality. Certainly, Hungary should defray with convertible currency the social expenses of each emigrant. The People's Republic of Hungary would provide proper jobs and housing for the immigrants. The Romanian contracting party should have access to the emigrants to ensure their welfare. Only under these conditions would the Highest Council consider taking away their Romanian citizenship.
The Romanian people have manifested great patience towards the Hungarian people under the direction the prominent personality of our Comrade Ceauşescu. We hope that the Hungarian leadership will finally recognize their mistaken policy and will cooperate with our people in the interest of social and economic progress and independent socialist development.
Both party and state leaders are responsible for their people, for history, and for humanity. Based on this, we cannot renounce from furthering our economic and social development and we cannot allow ourselves to leave the path of building socialism, the modification of our economic and regional landscape to allow the elevation of our people. This is why we have redouble our efforts to carry out as soon as possible the resettlement and economic plan. To achieve this we have to mobilize our people, our party so that we can stand up as one man for the sake of the flourishing of our beloved Homeland the Socialistic Romania.
Secretary General of the RCP
Central Commitee of the RCP
Secretariat of the RCP
Classification Clause:
The material is top secret, made exclusively for the highest state and party leadership with a determined serial number, in a number of copies indicated below; therefore secrecy guidelines must be followed in handling this material.[35]
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Because the above cited documents were undated, we can have assumptions about it. On the one hand, the supplement refers to the fact that "the resettlement should be accelerated from the 1[st] of July." By indicating the day, the report itself also refers to a date in July. However, it is precisely known that the report was on the agenda of a meeting chaired by the Hungarian deputy Interier Minister of interior on 20[th] September, 1988. After discussing the report, the chairman summed up the discussions. As for the political situation, he established that the opinion of various communist parties was not completely the same about ethnic issues, and added that the socialist camp is not completely unified in evaluating these matters.
" The interest of our policy - he added - is to prove the anticipated negative consequences of the policy of the Romanian party, but at the same time, it must do its best to build legal contacts for cooperation and to develop in the direction of mutual understanding. At the moment, the manifold possibilities of strengthening contacts and the examination of communication methods are the most important factors. In this case, it is natural that national security agencies become more active, but despite this situation, we must react to the events in a moderate and sober manner. Therefore, we should be informed about different political events, not only considering the state security aspect. We can help the political leadership if we exploit our multiple opportunities of information and explore the realities based on facts, providing a clear picture for the decisionmaking"[36]
***
By the summer of 1988, conditions were ready to begin the resettlement program, international protests also grew. The Romanian government was forced to consider this fact, even if they have not given up their plans. The protests had their results, even if ending the program was not a realistic expectation. The Romanian Government changed their tactics in several steps. At least they attempted to make the project more acceptable, but later on they only extended the deadline for the initiation of the program. By September, the press was given instructions to slow the propaganda effort. They did not have to write about the different phases of the execution anymore declared by Ceauşescu. Later, 2010 was cited as the final deadline for completing the project instead of the previously indicated 2000.[37]
The sources cited highlight the fact the complex problems associated with the political process are truly a big challenge for both the Hungarian political system change as well as for the Romanian transition. We can see today in the resolution of these tasks that changes in regulatory systems and institutional techniques, and perhaps even more, in the political culture, are a little ahead of the changes in other areas of transformation of the constitutional state. This, of course, is related to the fact that the effective and humane management of political affairs was adapted to the prevailing legal order in
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harmony with the international human rights norms. At the same time we should be mindful of the fact that when the prevailing political interest demanded it, then, and depending on the situation, the application of the (international) political standards could be placed in brackets. Finally, in spite of the various mistakes and occasional failures, the newly formed political systems answered unknown before challenges with essentially operational solutions more than 20 years ago.
A legutóbbi idők fordulatokban, eseményekben bővelkedő kelet-európai történetei a lassanként feltáruló irattárak jóvoltából egyre gazdagabban dokumentálhatók, egyre jobban megismerhetők. Különösen érdekesek lehetnek az olyan dokumentumok, amelyekben tőlünk és egymástól is távoli források szinte véletlenszerűen összekapcsolódva tartalmaznak egymásra vonatkozó, kiegészítő információkat. A tanulmányban közölt egyik irat 1978. április 18-án került a NATO Politikai Bizottsága Kelet-Európával foglalkozó ülésének napirendjére. Az jelentés különlegessége, hogy eredetileg a brit hírszerzés készítette a romániai magyar kisebbség helyzetéről. Így a dokumentum arról is tanúskodik, miként látta az MI6 Magyarország és Románia hagyományos nemzetiségi konfliktusait, illetve ennek aktuális - hetvenes évek végi - problémáit és hogyan értelmezte mindezeket a NATO egyik legfontosabb tanácskozó testülete számára. Kiindulópontja szerint "Erdély mind Magyarország, mind Románia számára nagy történelmi jelentőséggel bír." Érdekes az a megközelítése, ahogy a magyar kisebbség fokozódó és egyre nyíltabb tiltakozását Kelet-Európa más, nem feltétlenül etnikai vonatkozású rendszerellenes mozgalmaival hozta összefüggésbe. A hírszerzés legális és illegális csatornáinak felhasználásával végül olyan jelentés készült, amely tényszerűen tudta bemutatni a két ország közötti feszültségeket, az azok megoldására tett felemás kísérleteket, még ha a jelentés a hiteles dokumentumok mellett nagyban támaszkodott a személyes kapcsolatokból származó szóbeli információkra is. A másik, Romániában készült irat a Securitate külföldi hírszerzési részlegének, a Departamentul de Informaţii Externe (DIE) munkája. A magyar hírszerzés Budapestre eljuttatott dokumentuma már a nyolcvanas évek azon feszültségeit tükrözi, amelyek veszélyeire egyebek mellett maga a NATO-jelentés is felhívta a figyelmet. ■
NOTES
[1] Hegedűs, István: "Press and Control in the End of the Kádár-era." Media Research, 2001. 1.; Pór, Edit: "The press policy of the Kádár Regime 1963-1979." In: Closed, Discrete, Numbered. 2. Literary, Press and Publication Policy 1962-1979. Budapest, 2004.
[2] National Archives of Hungary (hereafter: NAH) M-KS 288. f. 22178/25.
[3] North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an intergovernmental military alliance based on the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed on 4 April 1949.The course of the Cold War led to a rivalry with communist states of the Warsaw Pact, which was formed in 1955. See more: Vass, György: Intendment of the North Atlantic Treaty. (The evolution of NATO through its Official Texts) Tradecraft Review. Special issue, 2012.2. pp. 63-70.
[4] 21 The Situation of the Hungarian Minority in Romania: Further Vicissitudes. (A magyar kisebbség helyzete Romániában: újabb megpróbáltatások.) The report of Benkei, András on the NATO-file, 1[st] July 1978. Central Archives of the Ministry of the Interior (hereafter: CAMI; nowdays at Historical Archives of State Security Agency - hereafter: HASSA) Files of Interior 1978/ 96. l-a-776.
[5] Aczél, György; Gyenes, András; Korom, Mihály; Lázár, György; Óvári, Miklós.
[6] In the March-April issue of the Paris Literary Journal the study entitled Report About Transylvania (Jelentés Erdélyről) is published, written by Sándor Tóth professor of Philosophy in Cluj Napoca and Budapest philosopher Tordai, Zádor under the pseudonym Lázár, György. The Western media turned attention to the report. For example, the issue of the Le Monde published on 5th May 1978 explained it, and then the report of Schöpflin, György was written based on this report, published by Minority Rights Group. The Witnesses to Cultural Genocide was published in 1979 in the volume entitled Romania's Minority Policies Today that was published in New York in the edition of the American Transylvanian Federation Inc. and the Committee for Human Rights in Rumania, with the foreword of Schöpflin, György. (See also: Tóth, Sándor: Introduction. In: Report from Transylvania. II. Paris Hungarian Pamphlets 13. 1989. pp. 5-16.)
[7] The document was later forwarded - with current information - to Király, Károly, the former member of the Central Committee (hereafter: CC) of RCP and the Romanian Parliament. It dealt with the letters of the Vice President of The Committee of Romanian Workers of Hungarian Nationality written to leading Romanian personalities, in which Király, Károly expresses his deep anxiety about the violent assimilation attempts of the Romanian Government against Hungarians. Király was obliged to move from Targu Mures, a town populated by mainly Hungarians to Caransebes where he was assigned to be the director of a furniture factory. See the whole text: Révész, Béla: A NATO-Document on the Situation of the Hungarian Minority in Romania. ArchivNet 2005. 1. http://archivnet.hu/politika/nato_dokumentum_a_romaniai_magyar_kisebbseg_helyzeterol.html
[8] Köpeczi, Béla (ed): Erdély története I-lII (History of Transylvania I-III.). Budapest, 1986.
[9] On 7th April 1987, the Times published an advertisement that with the publication of the book, "under the aegis of the Hungarian academy of Sciences, history has been forged". Under the same title, another text was published in English written by academicians St. Pascu, M. Musat and Fl. Constantinu (A Conscientious Forgery of History of Transylvania under the Aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Romanian News Agency.), enumerating the opinions of Romanian historians about the Dacian- Romanian Continuity, the independent Province of Transylvania, the national effort of Duke Michael, the rightfulness of the Romanian revolution in 1848-49, the Hungarian oppression in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, citing Marx, Lenin, Tolstoy and Björnson. The Trianon Treaty of Peace was evaluated as the resolution of the Romanian population of Transylvania, in North Transylvania, the oppression of the Hungarians between 1940 and 1944 and the deportation of Jews were emphasized, and finally it was declared that ethnic issues were already solved in Romania. The edition was considered "revisionist, chauvinistic, reminiscent of the Hungarian history writings of the Horthy-era". St. Pascu, M. Musat and Fl. Constantiu: The Conscious Forgery of History under the Aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, The Times (Longod), 7 April 1987 p. 8.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ceausescu, Nicolae: Report of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party about the Activities of RCP from the Period Between Congress 9 and 10 About the future Tasks of the Party. 6[th] August 1969. In: Romania on the way of building a many-sided developed socialistic society. Bucharest, 1970. p. 297.
[12] See: In the Light of the Resolutions of the Party Congress 13 About the Tasks of the Committee of Romanian Workers of Hungarian Nationality. Onwards (A Magyar Nemzetiségű Dolgozók Tanácsának feladatairól a XIII. pártkongresszusi határozatok fényében) (Előre), 29[th] December 1989.
[13] Lipcsey, Ildikó: "Four Decades of Romanian ethnic policy." Foreign Policy, 1989. 2. pp. 64-66; Sole, R. Andrea: "Plans of the Rearrangement of Settlements and Territories in Romania. " Region, 1990. 1. pp. 265-269.
[14] "Connected to the preparation of the party meeting, the first room of the Museum of Local History in Cernat where the most ancient monuments of local history were exhibited was evacuated and was filled with the material presenting the periods of the Dacians to present day and the Ceausescu-era, based on the guidelines of the County Museum. However, on the county level it was considered so important that the Secretariat of Propaganda Affairs ordered the leader of the Securitate to check it in person on Saturday, 7th November." Report of the Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest, 10 November 1989. Declassified documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1989. NAH XLX-J-1-j. 76. b.
[15] "The distribution of all Hungarian press products was suspended throughout Romania for 1990. The chances of press subscriptions were very narrow even this year, but until 1989 it was allowed to subscribe for Hungarian press products not containing political and cultural references. The customs procedure well-known as for Hungarian press products makes it impossible that even a letter written in Hungarian should be allowed in Romania." Report of the Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest, 7[lh] December 1988. In the recent weeks, Chief Bogdán, teacher of Romanian and French language was nominated as the director of the "closed library" of Sfantu Gheorghe, 54 years old (his wife is Hungarian) who is renowned for his hatred for Hungarians. The town propaganda secretary is Chiefs best friend. The new library director was assigned to annihilate everything in the library and in the Székely Museum that is Hungarian as soon as possible. The ambition of the director leaves no doubt about that he will accomplish his mission as soon as he can. The "cleaning" will begin in a few weeks. Report of the Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest, 7th February 1989. NAH XIX-J-1-j. 76. b. "Our cultural reporter has made an in interview with A. Pezderka who takes over the library in Romania. Pezderka said: The Romanian party does not intend to give back the books of 500,000 ROL value, as defined in the earlier agreement. Strictly for our own information, he handed us a list composed by him about our orders. From the list it rums out that only a small quantity of the books ordered by them has been transported up to now, one part of them is still being printed, another was not even sent to the printery. According to Pezderka, the Romanian intention was clear: since he cannot satisfy our demands, based on the principle of reciprocity, he will decrease his orders from Hungary. Report of the Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest, 1[st] December 1989. NAH XIX-J-1-j. 77. b.
[16] See: Cabinet Directive 54/1975 on the position of graduates in the industrial production.
[17] The CC of RCP passed the principles of the improvement of the administrational-territorial reorganization of the country and of the urbanization of villages in October 1967. But exactly what it means was conceptualized by Ceausescu in his comment held at the Congress of People's Committee Presidents in 1976: "As for the urbanization of villages we do our best to decrease the number of such settlements [...] and establish strong centres, the most important social and economic activities are focused on mainly in developable communities and villages. 1989. p. 78.
[18] See: Vincze, Gábor: Chronology of the Hungarian minority in Romania. Budapest, 1994.
[19] The events were published only three months later. The spokesman of Foreign Affairs Komoróczki, István about the Romanian measures. Népszabadság 7 June 1988.
[20] Nationwide Congress of Worker Guard Commanders (Munkásör-parancsnokok országos találkozója). Népszabadság, 13 June 1988.
[21] NAH M-KS 288. f. 7/802.
[22] NAH M-KS 288. f. 5/1028.
[23] Varga, Csaba (ed): Heroes' Square (Hősök tere). 'June 88 27. Budapest., 1998.; Ara-Kovács, Attila: Mirage on the Street Comer (Délibáb az utcasarkon). Speaker (Beszélő), 1999. p. 9.
[24] 38 On 28[th] June the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania called in Szűcs, Pál, Hungarian ambassador in Budapest and informed him about the Romanian party and state leadership according to which the operation of the Consulate in Cluj Napoca is considered to be ceased, and the crew of the Consulate should leave Romanian within 48 hours. Népszabadság 29[th] July 1989.
[25] Letter of the Central Committee to the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, (hereafter: HSWP) Népszabadság, 30 June 1988.
[26] See more: Vincze, Gábor: Forced Orientations - Minority Policies (Történeti kényszerpályák - kisebbségi reálpolitikák). Csíkszereda, 2003.
[27] Váncsa, Jenő was the Minister of Agricultural Affairs between 1980 and 89, himself born in Brassow, Transylvania.
[28] The Present Situtation of the Village Destruction Project. (A falurombolási terv jelenlegi állása). Szűcs, Pál ambassador's proposal forwarded to Minister of Foreign Affair Várkonyi, Péter. Embassy of the People's Republic of Hungary, Bucharest, 12 December 1988. 198/Szt/1988. HSWP Department of Social Policy NAH M-KS 288. f. 22/1989. 22.
[29] See also: Hunya, Gábor: " Urbanisation plans in the mirror of resolutions, declarations and press publications. " Space and Society, 1989. 2. p. 38.
[30] Secretary of Deputy Minister of State Security's Files HASSA 1.11.1. 27. b. 45-13/13/a/1988. Budapest, July 1988, pp. 174-183.
[31] "Although Securitate and the Romanian military intelligence had started since 1968 to carry out extensive extended its anti-Hungarian activities in conformity with the nationalist evolution of the Ceauescu regime, the Hungarian answer was belated and prudent. Only in 1982 a special order issued by the Hungarian Ministry of Interior listed Romania among the "non friendly socialist states", such as Yugoslavia and China." Stefano Bottoni: Reluctant Spies. The Hungarian State Security and Romania, 1975-1989. Historical Review, 2013. 1. p. 117.
[32] Dr. Horváth, István (former Interior Minister): There was some cooperation between the organizations regulated by bilateral agreements. The Hungarians had such agreements with the German Democratic Republic, Yugoslavia and Austria, and we were preparing to sign such an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. So there were certain agreements of cooperation between certain countries. There was cooperation and [...] there was also competition. And there was a manifestation, I must say, that we did not like, let us say that it is not important to write about in the daily press, but the Yugoslavian intelligence was operating in Hungary, in the same way as the Romanian intelligence. Memorandum about the session of the Committee Examining the Intelligence Activities of the Prime Minister, 6[th] July 2002, Delegation Hall of the Parliament. NBB-5/2002- 2006.
[33] NAH M-KS 288. f. 5/1035.
[34] Sent to: Comrades Grósz, Károly; Dr. Berecz, János; Csehák, Judit; Hámori, Csaba; Iványi, Pál; Lukács, János; Németh, Miklós; Nyers, Rezső; Pozsgai, Imre; Szabó, István; Dr. Tatai, Ilona; Fejti, György; Varga, Péter; NAH III/III-12., Archives.
[35] Secretariat of Deputy Minister of State Security's Files HASSSA 1.11.1. 27. b. 45-13/13/a/1988. Budapest, July 1988. pp. 174-183.
[36] Ibid.
[37] See: Győrffy, Gábor: Censorship and Propaganda in the Ceauşescu-era. In: Censorship and Propaganda in the communist Romania. Cluj Napoca, 2010. p. 147.
Visszaugrás
