In 2014 Ukraine signed an Association Agreement with the European Union. This took place amidst contentious circumstances and, at least in the short term, was a result ofthe Euromaidan Revolution which occured the same year. The decision of the then President Vicktor Yanukovych not to ratify the Association Agreement acted as the catalyst for a series of events centred around the protest movement in Kiev's Maidan Square, which led tothe coming to power of an unambigiously proWestern government intent upon European and Euroatlantic integration. The subsequent tumultuous events included the incorporation of the Crimean Peninsula into the Russian state and a conflict between Ukrainian state forces and separatists in the Donbass region which continues up until the present day. These dramatic happenings have taken place in the heart of the European continent as a result, essentially, of conflicting opinions with regards to a legal agreement seeking to bring Ukraine and the European Union more closely together. Thus, it is strongly justified and warranted that we glance-back in order to surveysome earlier steps along the path which led to present developments, specifically, earlier agreements which acted as the basis for the establishment and development of the Ukrainian-EU relationship. Here, two specific legal instruments shall be focused upon: The Ukraine-European Union Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994 and the Ukraine-European Union Action Plan (AP) of 2005. This shall include providing the broader historical-political context and background of these agreements, and a survey of their most salient and vital content.
The fall of the Soviet Union and the tearing of the Iron Curtain led to the creation of a new political reality on the European continent.[1] Old ideological conflicts and divisions seemingly came to an end and suddenly the European Community faced a plethora of countries on its borders which were no longer to be seen as hostile forces and threats to security, but rather as partners who in many cases were seeking a "return to Europe". This desirewas essentially embodied in the quest to integrate into European and Euroatlantic structures created in the post-war period, namely the EU and NATO. This integration was often viewed by those statesas the key to shaking off their pastand erasing traces of the communist period.
Some of these countries had long traditions of statehood and had once been strongly attached to Western civilization, while others once formed constituent parts of both the Soviet Union and earlier the Russian Empire and had not had in the modern period lasting experiences of independent statehood. One such example is Ukraine, which in 1991 voted for its independence from the Soviet Union. This was an event of vital historical importance, for apart from a short period between 1917-21 it was the first time that a modern Ukrainian state had come into being.[2] Ukraine set about establishing bilateral relations with the European Community, with the latter recognizing Ukraine's sovereignty as a result of the clearly democratic nature of the referendum calling for independence from the Soviet Union.[3] Naturally, the young Ukrainian state began to create a foreign policy which set out its aims and priorities in relation to the geopolitical environment which it inhabits. It quickly became the general consensus that Ukraine should go down the path of European integration.[4]
Upon attaining independence Ukraine articulated something of a multivector strategy in relation to foreign affairs. For example, the 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine proclaimed that Ukraine would be "a permanently neutral state",[5] and later the 1993 Fundamental Guidelines in Ukrainian Foreign Policyadvocated the principle that the country have a multidimen-
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sional foreign policy.[6] Yet at the same time, Ukraine very early on also proclaimed its desire to move closer to European structures, while simultaneously attempting to limit its participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to issues of a bilateral economic nature, opposing attempts to turn the organisation into a federation or confederation.[7] On December 25 1990 the Verkhovna Rada of the URSR in its resolution "On the implementation of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine in the sphere of foreign relations" stated that it was a goal of Ukrainian foreign policy "to ensure direct participation of Ukraine in the general European process and European structures".[8] The abovementioned 1993 Fundamental Guidelines also stated that "the prospective objective of Ukrainian foreign policy is Ukraine's membership of the European Community..."[9] This desire and vision is rooted in a number of factors, part of which relates to the feeling that Ukraine geographically, historically and culturally is a European country, coupled with the view that integrating itself into the European Union will reap economic and security benefits, the latter particularly relating to Ukraine's vital and precarious geopolitical position.[10] This move towards independence was viewed by many as being explicitly tied to the idea of a "return to Europe", and this concept and affirmation of Ukraine as being a European country with a European destiny has been, at least formally, the main thrust of Ukraine's foreign policy for much of the time since the state came into existence.[11] It must be said that this declared goal has not always been pursued in a single minded fashion, and commitment to it has varied from administration to administration, with often a multivector approach having been employed in order to manage its geopolitical position, namely its relationship with Russia.[12] However, this has been, at least officially, the declared aim of post-Soviet Ukraine.[13]
The European Community, unlike other international actors or even its own member states, had no official relationship with the Soviet Union until it signed a declaration with COMECON in June 1988, which was followed in August of the same year by their mutual recognition.[14] Then in 1989 the European Community and the Soviet Union signed the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which, particularly seen in hindsight as compared to the later agreements that shall be surveyed here,can be considered to have been fairly modest.[15] It was inherited by Ukraine, as well as the other former Soviet states, upon the attainment of independence.[16] The collapse of the USSR essentially led to the EC being faced with a number of challenges, one of the most pressing being the need to create a strategy of engagement with these neighbouring post-communist states.[17] And in light of the importance which these placed upon reorientating themselves towards Western institutions and structures, it is no exaggeration to say that the EC and later the EU in dealing with these countries was thrust into the position of adopting a "civilizing mission", having the role of bringing theminto the European mainstream.
In this context it was necessary for new agreements to be made with these states in order to establish parameters and frameworks which would act as the basis of future relations. With regards to the Central European countries that would later go on to become EU Members States, the Europe Agreements were created for this purpose.[18] These were association agreements which recognized the third country's aspirations for European Union membership and acted as the legal framework for those countries eventual accession.[19] In the case of former Soviet states suchas Ukraine, itwas acknowledgedthere was a need for a new, "intermediate type of agreement", whose nature would go beyong the TCA, but which would not be as deep and comprehensive as the Europe Agreements.[20] As a result, on October 5 1992 a resolution was adopted by the Council of the European Union empowering the European Commission to conduct negotiations in order to create Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the newly independent statesthat came into being after the fall of the Soviet Union,[21] which wouldact as a mechanism in order to establish contractual bilateral relations.[22]
The abovementioned 1993 Fundamental Guidelines had declared that "In order to maintain stable relations with the European Community, Ukraine shall conclude with them an Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, implementation of which will be the first step in moving towards an associate, and later - full membership of the organization"[23] Ukraine signed such an agreement with the European Communities on June 16 1994, and was the first of its kind to be signed by a member state of the CIS.[24] This development may be described as the first great concrete legal manifestation of Ukraine's orientation towards and
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integration into Europe,and which acted as the initial basis for relations between Ukraine and the EU, a process which initially began with the recognition of Ukrainian independence by the European Community and its Member States.[25] The PCA only came into effect on March 1 1998, due to the need for the Parliaments of all 15 EU Member States having to approve it.[26] However, it is also generally believed that this delay in ratification was due to Ukraine at that time being a low priority for the European Union.[27]
As to its main, overriding goal, the Agreement stated that it aimed to strengthen the "links and to establish partnership and co-operation" between the European Community and Ukraine.[28] More specifically, the aims of the PCA were articulated in Article 1 and were as follows:
- to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the Parties allowing the development of close political relations;
- to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between the Parties and so to foster their sustainable development;
- to provide a basis for mutually advantageous economic, social, financial, civil scientific technological and cultural cooperation;
- to support Ukrainian efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy and to complete the transition into a market economy.
Article 51 states that "The Parties recognize that an important condition for strengthening the economic links between Ukraine and the Community is the approximation of Ukraine's existing and future legislation to that of the Community. Ukraine shall endeavour to ensure that its legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community".[29] This commitment to embark upon legal approximation has been described as a "(soft) commitment".[30] There are various areas in which the PCA called for harmonisation with EU law. This included areas such as intellectual, industrial and commerical property rights (Articles 50), customs law, company law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property, worker protection, financial services, rules on competition, public procurement, protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants, the environment, consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical rules and standards, nuclear laws and regulations, transport (Article 51) agriculture and the agro-industrial sector (Article 60), the environment (Article 63), money laundering (Article 68), social protection (Article 71), consumer protection (Article 75), customs (Article 76), and statistical cooperation (Article 77).
However, it is questionable as to what extent the PCA was an effective legal instrument in deepening EU-Ukraine relations. Despite the statements calling for legal approximation, the EU did not have a clearly articulated goal and strategy in relation to non-candidate neighbors such as Ukraine.[31] The PCA itself lacked clarity with regards to the obligations that it contained, such as the extent to which they were binding, the consequences of their implementation or the deadlines set with regards to them.[32] Furthermore, such PCAs did not have the intention of providing an EU membership perspective for the signatory country, as evidenced by the omission of a reference in the PCAs preamble to future integration of Ukraine into the European Union.[33] This is despite the fact that there is a strong resemblence between the abovementioned Europe Agreements and PCA in terms of approximation objectives.[34] Instead, the PCAs ultimately sought to foster cooperation between the signatories.[35] In addition, the Agreement's primary focus was the facilitation of trade by Ukraine's adoption of WTO norms and standards, with economic issues having preeminence throughout the document.[36] Ukraine was also accused of violating several of the binding provisions within the Agreement, including all the major ones relating to the trading of goods, which included freedom of transit, most-favoured-nation treatment, and the prohibiting of quantitative restrictions on imports.[37] It was claimed that the impression within the EU with regards to Ukraine's determinationto implement the PCA was that it was"at most hesitant and at times even ebbing", and that the country was "in breach of virtually all key provisions on trade in goods".[38] Ukrainians themselves considered that the restrictions on importing Ukrainian textile and steel products contradicted the concepts of partnership and fairness that the PCA claimed to espouse.[39]
In 2004 and 2007 the European Union experienced a great enlargement as a result of its integration of a number of countries of the former Eastern Bloc.[40] One of the consequences of this historical event
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was that it brought a group of new neighbours to its borders with which it would have to coexist and relate to in a very direct and immediate way. Many of these new neighbouring states have been characterised by unstable political structures and environments, low standards of living, organized crime and deep, systematic corruption.[41] It was thus necessary for the EU to formulate a strategy in order to deal with this novel and dramatic situation, one which would define its own interests, vis- -vis its neighbours and the creation of very real mechanisms and tools in order to achieve its goals. The proposed answer to this problem was the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was initiated as part of the EU's quest to formulate an identity for itself in light of the new environment and circumstances that it encountered as a result of its expansion.
The ENP was launched with the document "Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours". It stated that the then upcoming 2004 enlargement gave "new impetus to the effort of drawing closer to the 385 million inhabitants of the countries who will find themselves on the external land and sea border, namely Russia, the Western NIS, and the Southern Mediterranean. The accession of the new member states will strengthen the Union's interest in enhancing relations with the new neighbours".[42] Furthermore, the document claims that the EU seeks "to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union".[43] It states that "the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood - a ring of friends" with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations".[44]
The major incentive for the partner states is that through the ENP they "are offered the prospect of a stake in the EU's internal market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of - persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms)".[45] Essentially, by attempting to modernize the neighbouring states and to make them stable, secure and prosperous, the EU attempts to induce changes in their behaviour in line with its own aims, norms and preferences.[46] As well as being a major instrument in the achievement of EU external relations goals, it also claims to be mutually benefical for both itself and neighbouring countries, as it allows the latter to "share the benefits of EU enlargement in terms of stability, security and well-being"[47] and to "participate in various EU activities".[48]
Previously, the EU's relationship with neighbouring states was seen through the prism of its policies of enlargement and the pre-accession process.[49] However, with the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 the EU came at least close to reaching what some consider to be as its limits, and encountered states that may never actually be given a EU membership perspective.[50] The ENP, despite containing elements of the EU's enlargement strategy (in particular the export of the acquis communautaire and the use of polity), was essentially created in order to act as an alternative to further EU enlargement.[51]
It conditionality should be noted that the time of the great eastern expansion of the EU can be characterised as one of great optimism and self-belief, with it being confidently proclaimed that "The European Union is a success story" and that after the traumatic events and divisions of the 20[th] century "Europe is on its way to becoming one big family".[52] After the Kosovo crisis there was a newfound confidence among the leaders of the EU that it should play a more vital role in the area of foreign policy, in particular, in the countries in its immediate vicinity.[53]Such an attitude may be said to have also given the EU an assertive confidence when dealing with this new neighbourhood, a confidence which would give it the boldness to project its own values and norms beyond its borders through such initiatives as the ENP.
The central instrument for the implementation and realization of the goals of the ENP are Action Plans, which function as road maps and guides, seeking to build upon and compliment the legal agreements already in existence between the EU and partner states, particularly Partnership and Cooperation Agreementsand Association Agreements.[54] The APs cover such areas as "political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU's internal market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts".[55]
So far 12 such agreements have be drawn up between the EU and ENP partner states,[56] one of which was signed with Ukraine in 2005. The enlargement of 2004 made Ukraine the EU's most important neighbour to its East.[57] According to
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Ukraine's AP, this provided the opportunity for developing the EU and Ukraine's relationship in the direction of "gradual economic integration and a deepening of political cooperation".[58] The agreement was to cover a span of 3 years[59] and aimed to assist in the fulfilling of the provisions of the already existing 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and to support the general objective of Ukraine's integration into the EU's structures.[60] However, the AP also set certain priorities that went beyond the PCA's scope.[61]
The AP is divided into three sections, the first part introducing the agreement and outlining its major priorities and aims. The second section forms the main bulk of the agreement, and lists 71 priorities corresponding to the abovementioned interests of the APs in general. The third and final section relates to the monitoring of the AP. The AP mentions that, despite all the priorities listed being important, the following 14 points should be given particular emphasis and attention.[62]
- Further strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law;
- Ensuring the democratic conduct of presidential (2004) and parliamentary (2006) elections in Ukraine in accordance with OSCE standards;
- Ensuring respect for the freedom of the media and freedom of expression;
- Develop possibilities for enhancing EU -Ukraine consultations on crisis management.
- Enhanced co-operation in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation;
- Enhanced co-operation in our common neighbourhood and regional security, in particular working towards a viable solution to the Transnistria conflict in Moldova, including addressing border issues;
- Accession to the WTO;
- Gradual removal of restrictions and non-tariff barriers that impede bilateral trade and implementation of the necessary regulatory reforms;
- Improving the investment climate, through non-discriminatory, transparent and predictable business conditions, simplified administrative procedures and by the fight against corruption;
- Tax reform, improved tax administration and sound management of public finances;
- Establishing a constructive dialogue on visa facilitation between the EU and Ukraine, with a view to preparing for future negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement, taking account of the need for progress on the ongoing negotiations for an EC-Ukraine readmission agreement.
- Gradual approximation of Ukrainian legislation, norms and standards with those of the European Union; further reinforcing administrative and judicial capacity;
- Encourage dialogue on employment issues and best endeavours, in accordance with the PCA, to ensure that treatment of migrant workers does not discriminate on grounds of nationality.
- Full implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding on the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, including completing and starting-up of the 'K2R4' nuclear reactors, in compliance with the internationally accepted nuclear safety standards.
Additionally, in 2005 the Ukrainian government adopted a roadmap in order to assist in the implementation of this program,[63] which was renewed annually for the AP's duration.[64] This roadmap essentially acted as a governmental programme which would act as a blueprint for reform in Ukraine.[65]
The concept of the EU as a normative power is the assumption that essentially lies behind the conception and formulation of the ENP[66] and thus this initiative may be viewed as a vehicle for the projection of the "soft power" of the EU.[67] The ENP has been characterised in terms of being an external governance project,[68] that is, a mechanism to integrate third countries within the EU's legal order without full membership or integration within its institutional order, or as former Commission President Romano Prodi has said, "sharing everything but institutions."[69] Reflecting this mentality, the "Introduction" of the AP states that "Implementation of the Action Plan will significantly advance the approximation of Ukrainian legislation, norms and standards to those of the European Union." Additionally, the Action Plan can be said to have given the PCA's approximation idea a greater substance,[70] though at the same time it can be said that both agreements share the common feature of not imposing obligations to carry out approximation, but rather express intentions to that effect.[71] However, this assertion must also be qualified by other factors. For example, the ENP does not seek a wholesale export of the EU's acquis to partner
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countries,[72] and as stated above in the AP's priorities the goal at this stage was the "gradual approximation" of Ukrainian law to that of the EU. As one commentator has said, Ukraine's AP expresses "intentions rather than explicit obligations".[73] In fact, the ENFs APs are not legally binding and the participants have no obligation to fulfill the contents of the agreement.[74] It holds the principle of "more for more", meaning that the EU will develop stronger ties with states that achieve greater progress in the area of democratic reforms.[75] Furthermore, the AP process may be considered to be a less hierarchical model of EU interaction with its neighbours, due to the fact that both the setting of priorities and the monitoring of reforms are done jointly.[76] Though partner countries are not able to determine the regulatory rules of the EU, they have a flexbility to "negotiate the import of a sub-set of those rules only."[77] Not all APs are identical, and are created in such a way as to suit the specific circumstances the EU's neighbouring countries.[78]
As to the success of the implementation of the AP by Ukraine, the European Union released a yearly progress report in order to evaluate this. In the first progress report released in 2006, Ukraine received praise for "the preparation and conduct of overall free and fair parliamentary elections in March 2006", which meant that "Ukraine consolidated the breaktrough in conducting a democratic election process that began with the Orange Revolution and which is also a key element of the Action Plan".[79] In addition, it was noted that there had been progress in the realm of foreign policy cooperation between Ukraine and the EU, that Ukraine had taken steps forward with regards to the consolidation of human rights protection and the rule of law, that there had been advancements in the area of trade and the WTO accession process, and that there had also been improvements in the area of energy cooperation.[80] At the same time, the report admitted that "progress is being hindered by endemic corruption, which is the main challenge to the development and economic growth of Ukraine, and by the lack of an independent judiciary".[81] Additionally, there were criticisms due to the fact that "at this stage a clear-cut economic policy is still lacking", as well as concern "about loose monetary and fiscal policies", and a need to improve the tax system and correct inconsistencies in legislation.[82] Later, in the 2007 Progress Report it was stated that "Ukraine continued to make progress in most areas, although the pace of progress stalled somewhat compared to the previous years, in particular as regards economics and structural reforms, also due to the political instability which characterised most of 2007".[83] It was mentioned that the major priorities for further reform related to establishing "the necessary checks and balances between the main state institutions", and that it was necessary to take "further steps towards consolidating the rule of law through judicial reform, stepping up the fight against corruption, and signficiantly improving the business and investment climate", while also taking steps to create conditions for sustained economic growth.[84] Finally, the 2008 Progress Report[85] signified that Ukraine had moved ahead in several areas in relation to the implementation of the AP, and that negotiations with regards to a future Association Agreement had deepened relations between Ukraine and the EU.[86] Additionally, in May 2008 Ukraine acceded to the World Trade Organisation, and progress was made in relation to the negotiation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, and in the same year there was a launching of negotiations with regards to Ukraine's accession to the Energy Community Treaty.[87] However, as in the previous report, it was noted that "the continuing political instability was not conducive to reform" and that in fact "there was a slowing in the pace of reform in the second part of the year, as a consequence of the global financial and economic crisis".[88] Singled out was that "no or only limited progress in the implementation of some key political reform measures including constitutional and judicial reform and efforts to combat corruption".[89]
It may be questioned to what extent and how effectively the PCA and AP acted as tools to integrate Ukraine into the European Union, if by their very nature and scope from the outset they could be said to have had limited ability to bring about the thorough importation of the EU's standards and norms into Ukraine. This also goes to the essence of the problem of legal instruments at the disposal of the European Union outside the scope of explicit enlargement policy: that the important principle of conditionality is missing, and thus, so is the strong incentive to restructure and reform in line with the EU's acquis communautaire. However, despite their limitations and "conditionality-lite" qualities, looking back retrospectively in light of the events of the
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Euromaidan Revolution and the subsequent signing of the Association Agreement by Ukraine with the European Union in 2014, it can be said thatboth the PCA and later the AA were the first significant steps on the path of Ukraine's European integration. As for the European Union itself, the ENP itself marked an important phase in its relations with neighbouring countries such as Ukraine and as part of the attempt to articulate an international identity for itself.[90] It was a recognition that with the integration of a large number of countries from the former Eastern Bloc, the EU had become a political power of sorts with an assertive role of uniting and integrating the European continent beyond traditional Cold War boundaries, which would inevitably and necessarily then have a reach and influence beyond its own Member States. ■
NOTES
* The paper was created within the framework of programmes aiming the increasing of quality of lawyer education (IX - 14/6/2/2017. contract number).
[1] A nother analysis of the topic of the Ukraine-EU PCA from the authorwill be published in the forthcoming volume of the Doktoranduszok Fóruma, Miskolci Egyetem, November 15-17 2016 under the title of The Ukraine-European Union Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA).
[2] Sakwa, Richard, Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, I.B Tauris, London and New York 2015, 7, 9.
[3] Kuzmin Denys, and Maksymenko Iryna, Analysis of the EU - Ukraine Relations in the Context of the Association Agreement and Related Documents and the EU 2014-2020 Financial Perspective, Bridge: International Project co-financed by the European Commission, EuropeAid, 2012, 14.
[4] Kuzio, Taras, Slawophiles versus Westernizers: Foreign Policy Orientations in Ukraine. In Spillmann, Kurt R., Wenger, Andreas, and Müller, Derek (eds.), Between Russia and the West: Foreign and Security Policy of Independent Ukraine, Bern, Peter Lang, 1999, 56.
[5] Article IX,
http://static.rada.gov.ua/site/postanova_eng/Declaration_of_State_Sovereignty_of_Ukraine_rev1.htm
[6] Lyubashenko, Igor, Sources of misunderstanding: Intervening variables influencing the effectiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy towards Eastern states.In Stadmüller, Elzbieta - Bachmann, Klaus -(eds.), The EU's Shifting Borders: Theoretical approaches and policy implications in the new neighbourhood, Routledge: London and New York, 2012, 90.
[7] Kuzio, i.m. Slawophiles versus Westernizers,56.
[8] Quoted in Palagnyuk Yuliana, Formation of State Policy of Ukraine towards European Integration, Przeglad Politologiczny, 2013 Issue 4, 251-252.
[9] Ibid, 252.
[10] Wolczuk Kataryna, Integration without Europeanisation: Ukraine and its policy toward the European Union, European University Institute Working Papers: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies No. 2004/15, 6-7.
[11] Kuzio Taras, European, Eastern Slavic, and Eurasian: National Identity, Transformation, and Ukrainian Foreign Policy. In Moroney, Jennifer D.P., Kuzio, Kuzio and Molchanov, Mikhail (eds.), Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, Praeger: Westport, Connecticut, and London, 202.
[12] Freire Maria Raquel, The Russian Federation and the CIS. In Kolodziej, Edward A. and Kanet, Roger E. (eds.), From Superpower to Besieged Glogal Power: Restoring World Order After the Failure of the Bush Doctrine. Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press, 2008, 163.
[13] Wolczuk Kataryna, Ukraine's Policy towards the European Union: A Case of 'Declarative Europeanization', 2004, http://www.batory.org.pl/ftp/program/forum/eu_ukraine/ukraine_eu_policy.pdf.
[14] Delcour, Laure,Shaping the Post-Soviet Space? EU Policies and Approaches to Region-building. Surrey: Ashgate, 2011,24, 25.
[15] Hillion, Christophe, The Evolving System of European Union External Relations as evidenced in the EU partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, PhD Dissertation, Leiden University, 2005, 16.
[16] Palagnyuk, i.m.,251.
[17] Delcour, i.m., 25.
[18] European Commission, Europe Agreement, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/europe-agreement_en
[19] Ibid.
[20] Schneider, Klaus, The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Ukraine and the EU - Idea and Reality. In Hoffman, Lutz - möllers, Felicitas (eds.)Ukraine on the Road to Europe, Springer-Verlag, Berlin and Heidelberg, 2001, 66.
[21] Yunusov Khaydarali, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements of the European Union with Central Asian Countries, Studii Europene, (2014) 1, 2.
[22] Hillion, i.m.,14.
[23] Quoted in Palagnyuk, i.m., 252.
[24] Kuzmin and Maksymenko, i.m., 14.
[25] Ibid, 15.
[26] Schneider, i.m. 68.
[27] Piontek, Eugeniusz,Ukraine. In Blockmans, Steven - Lazowski, Adam (eds.), The European Union and Its Neighbours, T.M.C Asser Instituut, The Hague, and the authors, 2006, 502.
[28] European Commission,Partnership and Co-operation Agreement Between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine, L49, 19/02/1998,4,
[29] It should be noted, however, that the voluntary harmonization of Ukrainian law with Community law began even before the PCA's coming into force. See MURAVYOV, Viktor, Legal approximation: evidence from Ukraine, at workshop, "The European Neighourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation", European University Institute, 1-2 December 2006, 2.
[30] Petrov, Roman, Legislative Approximation and application of EU law in Ukraine. In Van Elsuwege, Peter -Petrov, Roman (eds.), Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union: Towards a Common Regulatory Space?, Routledge, London and New York, 2014, 137.
[31] Van Elsuwege, Peter, and Petrov, Roman, Setting the scene: legislative approximation and application of EU law in the Eastern neighbourhood of the European Union. In Van Elsuwege, Peter - Petrov, Roman (eds.), Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union: Towards a Common Regulatory Space, 2-3.
[32] Piontek, i.m., 509.
[33] Petrov, Roman, The Partnership and Co-operation Agreements With the Newly Independent States. In OTT, Andrea - Inglis, Kirstyn (eds.), Handbook on European Enlargement, T.M.C Asser Press, The Hague, 2002, 177.
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[34] Piontek, i.m., 508.
[35] Petrov, The Partnership and Co-operation Agreements, i.m., 177.
[36] Kubicek Paul, The European Union and democratization in Ukraine, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005), 275.
[37] Wolczuk, i.m., Ukraine's Policy towards the European Union, 17.
[38] Schneider, i.m., 71.
[39] Kubicek, i.m., 275.
[40] Another analysis of the Ukraine-EU AP from the author was published in the volume of the conference Actual Problems of Legal Regulation in Ukraine and Neighboring Countries (Legal Approaches to the Geopolitical Realities), 23 December 2017, Lviv, under the title The 2005 European Union-Ukraine Action Plan, and another analysiswill be published in the forthcoming volume of the XXX. Debreceni Doktorandusz Konferencia, May 27 2016 under the title The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU-Ukraine Action Plan.
[41] Whitman, Richard G. and Wolff, Stefan, Much Ado About Nothing? The European Neighbourhood Policy in Context. In whitman, Richard G. and Wolff, Stefan (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2010, 4.
[42] Communication from the Commission - Wider Europe -Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, 11 March 2003, COM (2003),3, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf
[43] Ibid, 4.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Lyubashenko, i.m., 83.
[47] Communication from the Commission - Policy: European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper, 12 May 2004, COM (2004), 6, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004DC0373&from=EN
[48] Ibid, 3.
[49] Gebhard, Carmen, The ENP's Strategic Conception and Design Overstretching the Enlargement Template. In Whitman and Wolff (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective, 89.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Wolczuk,Kataryna, Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2, March 2009, 189-190.
[52] Presidency Conclusions European Council Meeting in Laeken, Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, Annex 1, 14-15 December 2001, 19.
[53] Johansson-Nogués, Elisabeth, The EU and its neighbourhood: an overview. In Weber, Katja, Smith, Michael E., and Baun, Michael (eds.), Governing Europe's Neighbourhood: Partners or periphery?, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2007, 23.
[54] Legrand, Jerome, and REY, Benjamin, The European Neighbourhood Policy, 12/2016, Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2017, European Parliament, 2, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/fiches_techniques/2013/060504/04A_FT(2013)060504_EN.pdf
[55] Communication from the Commission [2004] i.m.
[56] Legrand and Rey, i.m., 1.
[57] Sasse, Gwendolyn, The ENP and the EU's Eastern Neighbours: Ukraine and Moldova as Test Cases. In Whitman -Wolff, The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective, 183.
[58] European Commission, EU/Ukraine Action Plan, 2005, 1, http://library.euneighbours.eu/content/eu-ukraine-action-plan-0
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid, 3.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Gallina, Nicole, Ukraine Knocking at the Door? The EU-Ukraine Relationship after the Orange Revolution, Lushnycky, Andrej N. - Riabchuk, Mykola (eds.) Ukraine on Its Meandering Path Between East and West, Peter Lange, Bern, 2009, 48.
[64] Wolczuk, i.m., 200.
[65] Ibid., 201.
[66] Kapitonenko, Mykola, Ukraine: The Need to Securitize the European Neighborhood Policy". In Inayeh, Alina -Forbrig, Joerg, Reviewing the European Neighbourhood Policy: Eastern Perspectives, Europe Policy Paper 4/2015, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington DC, 2015, 38.
[67] Herdina, Andreas, Approximation of Laws in the Context of the European Neighbourhood Policy - A View from Brussels, European Journal Of Law Reform, Vol. IX, No. 3, 502.
[68] Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, i.m., EU rules beyond EU borders, 792.
[69] Prodi, Romano, A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability, Speech/02/619, "Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU" Sixth ECSA-World. Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, 6.
[70] Van Elsuwege and Petrov, i.m., 3.
[71] murayov, i.m., 5.
[72] Herdina, i.m., 502.
[73] Muravyov, Viktor, Legal Approximation: Evidence from Ukraine, presented at "European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation?", European University Institute, 1-2 December 2006, Fiesole, 5.
[74] Noutcheva, Gergana - Emerson, Michael, Economic and social development. In Webter, Katja - Smith, Michael E. -Baun, Michael (eds.), Governing Europe's Neighbourhood: Partners or periphery?, Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2007, 93.
[75] Legrand and Rey i.m., 1.
[76] Noutcheva, i.m., 93.
[77] Sasse, i.m., 181.
[78] Petrov, Roman, Relationship Between the EU and Ukraine. In Siskova, Nadezda, From Eastern Partnership to the Association: A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle, 2014, 90.
[79] European Commission, European Neighbourhood Progress Report Ukraine, Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, COM(2006) 726 Final, 4 December 2006, SEC(2006) 1505/2, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52006SC1505&from=EN
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] European Commission, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2007 Progress Report Ukraine, Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2008) 164, 3 April 2008, SEC(2008) 402, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52008SC0402&from=EN
[84] Ibid, 2.
- 313/314 -
[85] In 2009 the Action Plan was replaced by the European Union-Ukraine Association Agenda, which from then on acted as the main framework for the negotiation of the future Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement. See European Commission, EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement, http://www.me.gov.ua/Documents/Download?id=6eb8f32b-91a6-46c3-849f-308cc97d1404
[86] European Commission, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008 Progress Report Ukraine, Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2009) 188, 23 April 2009, SEC(2009) 515/2, 2, http://ua-energy.org/upload/files/sec09_515_en.pdf
[87] Ibid, 3.
[88] Ibid, 2.
[89] Ibid, 3.
[90] Ghazaryan, Nariné, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU: A Legal Analysis, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014, 1.
Lábjegyzetek:
[1] The Author ia teaching Fellow and PhD Student, Faculty of Law, University of Debrecen.
Visszaugrás
