This study examines the interrelation between the Parliament and the Data Protection Ombudsman from the beginning of the Hungarian regime change in 1989 until the abolition of the Hungarian Data Protection Ombudsman. The paper aims to demonstrate that in the exercise of almost all its powers, the National Assembly formed a specific intersection with the case law of the Data Protection Ombudsman. In the argument of the paper, these cases have shaped the development of domestic parliamentary law. The argument of the paper is that not enough attention were given earlier to these cases in their legal-historical context. The study seeks to fill this gap.
Keywords: parliament, parliamentary law, data protection ombudsman, information rights, Member of Parliament
Nóra Bán-Forgács, research fellow, HUN-REN, Institute for Legal Studies, ban-forgacs.nora@tk.hu
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The political groups are the powerful, influential organisations of parliaments, from the drafting of legislation to the election of officials, the opinions expressed and proposals put forward on behalf of the groups carry great weight, "the political groups are the nervous system of parliament". Group Members also have wider legislative opportunities than non-attached, or independent, Members. The political groups nominate the President and Vice-Presidents of Parliament. Each parliamentary group must have at least one seat on each parliamentary committee. The group leaders are members of the House Committee. In interpellations, questions and immediate questions, as well as in speeches on the agenda, only members of the political groups have priority, and only members of the political groups may speak outside the agenda. In addition to this, political groups receive substantial additional financial support compared with non-attached Members. Group leaders and deputy leaders have additional rights and allowances. Members who sit in political groups are addressed by the chairman of the sitting in the name of their party or political group, while independent Members, whether or not they belong to a party or wish to represent a party, are addressed as independents. From the foregoing, it is clear why groups that have split from their respective parties want to form a parliamentary group, or why parties on the verge of dissolution as their numbers dwindle do everything possible to maintain their parliamentary groups. But this also explains why, in a competitive multi-party system, parties that already have a parliamentary group try to manipulate (prevent if they are on the same political side or encourage if they are on the opposite side) other organisations to form a parliamentary group. The aim of the study is to review the stability of parliamentary groups in Hungary, taking into account the various changes in the legislation from 1990 to the present. It determines the impact of the provision for legislative groups on the competitive position of the individual parties.
Keywords: parliament - parties - political groups - stability - regulation
Ferenc Tábori, assistant lecturer, University of Pannonia Faculty of Humanities Institute of Social Sciences, tabori.ferenc@htk.uni-pannon.hu
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The rules on legislation were previously lex imperfecta, lacking sanction, since only the most serious breaches of law triggered the application of the gravest sanction against the law, namely public-law invalidity, which takes a lengthy process to establish.
With the legislative amendment in 2022, the legislative procedure has been altered so that the absence of public participation should be penalised. The procedure itself is also unusual: the Government's controlling body examines each year the fulfilment of the obligations, and imposes substantial fines on organisations in default.
Act CXXX of 2010 on Legislation (hereinafter: Jat.) and Act CXXXI of 2010 on Public Participation in the Preparation of Legislation (hereinafter: Jet.) were amended by the Act XXX of 2022. The amendment to the Act on Public Participation in the Preparation of Legislation is based on the Government's commitment that, in the case of draft laws covered by the Act, the proportion of draft laws that published in the Hungarian Official Gazette, have been subject to public consultation will be at least ninety per cent. Each year, the Hungarian Government Control Office (hereinafter: KEHI) summarises whether public consultation was held on laws, government decrees and ministerial regulations promulgated in the previous year, provided that their preparation was within the scope of the law. The KEHI prepares a report which is published by the Minister of Justice by 31 January of the following year. So far, KEHI has had a look at two legislative periods, the fourth quarter of 2022 and the full year of 2023. My study aims to present the results of the KEHI study and the legal conclusions drawn from it, reflecting on previous findings in the literature. In addition, I would like to refer to the amendment to Act XXX of 2022, which was tabled during the parliamentary debate, which would have made the public consultation of bills submitted by parliamentary motion mandatory. The idea should be examined from a legislative point of view because, on the one hand, it would have made public consultation compulsory for a bill prepared not by the Government, and on the other hand, it would have interrupted the parliamentary stage of lawmaking in such a way that the draft would have been passed to the administration and then back to the parliamentary stage. Although the amendment was not adopted, I believe that important lessons can be drawn from it for jurisprudence.
Keywords: Legislation, public consultation, Hungarian Government Control Office, lex imperfecta, fine
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