https://doi.org/10.56749/annales.elteajk.2024.lxiii.2.21
Cooperation between the Court of Justice of the European Union and national courts is based on the preliminary ruling procedure. In particular, there has been a large number of preliminary rulings in the area of the internal market. Hungary has been a Member State of the European Union for 20 years. Based on the experience with the Hungarian preliminary ruling procedures, clearly visible changes and shifts in emphasis in the case law of the Court of Justice can be traced. Three of these trends are presented in this paper.
First, it is argued that the preliminary ruling procedure has undergone a transformation, shifting its focus from the interpretation of EU law itself to assessing the compatibility of national legislation, as well as national administrative and judicial practices, with EU law. Second, the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in particular, its elevation to the status of a primary source of law by the Treaty of Lisbon, has resulted in the strengthening of the fundamental rights approach in preliminary ruling procedures. Further reinforcement of this new approach is expected with the evolving division of responsibilities between the CJEU and the General Court. Third, the CJEU is required to respond to the new challenges of the 21st century in the context of the Digital Single Market, and public authority activity shall at least be as much focused on law enforcement (mainly related to digital data) as it is on market surveillance with regulatory functions.
Keywords: Preliminary ruling procedure; Charter of Fundamental Rights; argumentation technique; Digital Single Market; Hungary
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The European Union - in other words, the European integration project - is more than a simple commercial cooperation[1] between Member States.[2] The EU aims to enable EU citizens to study, live, shop, work, and retire in any EU country and enjoy products from all over Europe.[3] The EU is a union in many ways: on the one hand, it is a union of the four freedoms,[4] but on the other hand, it is a union of justice.[5] Hungary has been a member of the European Union for 20 years. Hungarian judges were the first among the countries that joined in 2004 to submit preliminary ruling questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and they still play a very active role in this cooperation.[6] Between 1 May 2004 and 31 December 2023, 280[7] references for preliminary rulings were made to the CJEU by Hungarian courts. Of the 280 requests for preliminary rulings, the Curia (formerly the Supreme Court) only initiated 43, which shows that Hungarian lower courts also make use of the referral mechanism. Compared to other Member States, Hungarian courts have been very active in this area. These references also clearly illustrate the shifts in emphasis that characterise the case law of the CJEU today. Looking back over the last 20 years, one can clearly observe visible changes and shifts in emphasis in the jurisprudence of the CJEU. It is contended that the preliminary ruling procedure has undergone a transformation, shifting its focus from the interpretation of EU law itself to assessing the compatibility of national legislation, as well as national administrative and judicial practices, with EU law. It is further argued that the role of preliminary rulings in the context of internal market
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law needs to be reinforced to ensure the protection of fundamental rights. Third, the CJEU is required to balance competing legal interests between internal market freedoms and data protection in the interest of the protection of the law.
The article examines the arguments described above primarily using Hungarian examples, with a particular focus on their impact on the internal market.
The preliminary ruling procedure[8] is a form of cooperation between judges of national courts and judges of the CJEU.[9] Its essence is that a national court or tribunal can ask the CJEU for a preliminary ruling if it has doubts about the validity or interpretation of EU law.[10] Originally, the function of the preliminary ruling procedure [under Article 177 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Article 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and Article 267 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)] was to ensure that national courts interpret and apply EU law correctly.[11] As prominent authors already noted in the early 2000s, the preliminary reference system, particularly in conjunction with the principles of primacy and direct effect, has redefined constitutionalism at the European level[12]
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and facilitated the redistribution of powers.[13] This issue can be examined on three levels: supranational, national, and within the judiciary itself. Looking at the judiciary, it can be observed that the focus of referrals has shifted significantly towards a form of revision[14] (and sometimes self-revision[15]) by the national courts in concrete cases compared to the original objective of preliminary rulings. This trend is particularly striking in the context of national jurisdictions[16] with regard to the relationship between lower and final instance courts.[17] Nowadays, in the vast majority of cases, judges (including Hungarian ones) use their references for preliminary rulings to clarify the compatibility of national legislation[18] with EU law through the interpretation of EU law by the CJEU.[19] In specific cases, the question of compatibility arises not in legislation but in relation to administrative practice[20] or judicial practice.[21]
It follows that the CJEU must respond differently to these changing submissions. In such cases, there is a tendency for the CJEU to draw the boundaries of its interpretation by distinguishing what it considers to be questions of law which now fall expressly within the jurisdiction of the national court.[22] In these cases, the CJEU, based on the principle of providing a useful answer,[23] formulates criteria for the
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application of the law[24] but leaves to the national court the possibility[25] (and responsibility[26]) of examining the substance of the question.[27] Here, only those de facto referrals can be mentioned where the CJEU refers a decision back to the national judge for the interpretation of national law[28] while simultaneously defining the key points of interpretation.[29] In my view, where further factual examination is necessary[30] to answer the questions raised in the preliminary ruling procedure, this can only be described as a sham reference back.[31] In such cases, the CJEU effectively refuses to reply on the merits, citing that the factual basis has not been adequately presented.[32] This approach follows from judgments and orders in which the CJEU emphasises that its statements are confined to the facts as presented in the case.[33] If additional facts not provided by the referring court can influence the legal classification, the CJEU's interpretative guidelines are not applicable only in those situations. This technique also intends to avoid the misinterpretation of EU law due to insufficiently detailed factual foundations. It also allows the CJEU to depart in its subsequent case law from previous interpretative premises in similar but at least partially factually different cases.[34]
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Several conclusions can be drawn from these changes. On the one hand, new methodological solutions are needed (especially in the technique of asking questions and providing answers), which may also entail new developments in argumentation techniques.[35]
On the other hand, however, we can also see that the guaranteed elements of the preliminary ruling mechanism remain unchanged. The preliminary ruling system, governed by Article 267 of the TFEU, involves a direct dialogue between courts, meaning it is independent of the judicial hierarchy established by national law.[36] The right to initiate a preliminary ruling procedure cannot be challenged by the application of rules or case law that make such a dialogue impossible because they would deprive the CJEU of its power to rule on cases involving questions of interpretation of EU law provisions.[37] However, the unlimited right to initiate a preliminary ruling procedure does not imply "freedom" since the responsibility for assessing the relevance and necessity of the request for a preliminary ruling[38] rests exclusively with the referring court.[39]
An essential element of vertical cooperation and communication between the CJEU and national courts is that parties in the national proceedings have a legitimate right to the application of EU law. Therefore, national courts must be allowed to make referrals to inquire about the content of EU law without restriction. The courts of the Member States, in cooperation with the CJEU, therefore, have a shared responsibility to ensure that the law is respected in the application and interpretation of the Treaties.[40]
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An important starting point in this area is the Cartesio judgment,[41] in which the CJEU, on the Hungarian initiative and with regard to the specific features of the Hungarian system of legal remedies, took the position that no appeal is allowed against an order of a lower court to make a referral to the CJEU. These rights in the context of the preliminary ruling procedure are also essential in other respects for the exercise of fundamental rights.
The European Union has its own catalogue[42] of fundamental rights:[43] the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter). This is important, as the second hypothesis, closely related to the above, suggests that the role of preliminary rulings in the context of internal market law needs to be reinforced to ensure the protection of fundamental rights.[44] The interpretation of the rights declared in the Charter - which must be guaranteed in EU legislation - is a matter for both EU and national courts.[45] However, the Charter does not create a legal basis for the adoption of Union acts, nor does it create any new powers or tasks for the Union.[46] The Charter is primarily intended to codify the existing list of human rights standards which form part of the values on which the Union is founded and which are reflected in the principles governing its policies.[47] The Charter provides clarity and visibility to the list of fundamental rights. The rights, freedoms and principles enshrined in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions set out in Title VII of the Charter, which governs its interpretation and application, and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter that outline the sources of those provisions.[48] This means that the courts interpreting the provisions of the Charter must do so in the
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light of those explanations.[49] It is important to underline that the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States (including central, regional and local authorities) in the context of the implementation of Union law.[50] However, the activities of Member States in areas of national competence fall outside the scope of the Charter. Consequently, the Charter can solely apply to the application or implementation of EU law by Member States.[51]
In my opinion, the adoption of the Charter, and in particular its elevation to the status of primary source of law by the Treaty of Lisbon,[52] has also provided an impulse which has led to a new aspect: the strengthening of the fundamental rights approach in preliminary ruling procedures. In addition, the judicial protection role of the procedure has been increased. The reference to the Charter has become increasingly frequent in the referrals, and its binding force has also been a decisive factor in developing the Court's argumentation on fundamental rights. The Charter has become an increasingly important element of European legal protection.[53] This is shown by the fact that, since 2010, the European Commission has adopted an annual report on the application of the Charter. Today, EU legal sources are required to present and justify their compliance with the relevant provision of the Charter. This change in legislative technique and the elevation of the Charter to the status of primary source of law has also meant that a reference to fundamental rights in the Charter is now an appropriate legal basis for referrals on its own, provided the matter has a cross-border element[54] or if the matter is related to one of the basic notions of EU law like the independence and impartiality of the courts.[55] Further, according to the latest jurisprudence, the jurisdiction of the
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CJEU is triggered if a completely national legal dispute involves national legislation based on EU law without having any cross-border elements.[56]
A good example of these conclusions can be found in case C-419/23,[57] which focused on the issue of internal market freedoms and the effectiveness of the Charter in cross-border situations. The background to this case was an infringement procedure in which the CJEU found that Hungarian legislation infringed the principle of the free movement of capital and the right to property guaranteed by the Charter.[58] New legislation was adopted to enforce the infringement judgment. In this way, the Charter has been able to have a direct impact on cross-border legal relations. In Case C-564/19,[59] the Court of Justice interpreted Article 47 of the Charter and Article 267 TFEU, concluding that EU law prohibits the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against a national judge on the grounds that they have referred a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU.
The European Union is based on a community of values.[60] The constitutional institutional principles that are unassailable in the Member States, such as democracy, the rule of law, the separation of powers, loyalty and subsidiarity, and the context in which they are expressed in the relationship between the individual and the EU, are clear. Fundamental rights are at the heart of the European Union's guiding values.[61] With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the issue of fundamental rights has been given a new perspective, the clause of values has been expanded, and the principles of human dignity and equality have been added to the list of fundamental values that are
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protected, which clearly multiplies the EU's tasks in the field of the protection of rights. It is also clear from the growing body of case law that the CJEU is confronted with a huge number of fundamental rights problems and new challenges of the future may involve a multiplication of these.[62]
The application of the Charter has led to a renaissance of many of the fundamental constitutional issues of EU law.[63] As prominent authors put it, the Charter is a "shadow" of EU law.[64] Just as an object defines the contours of its shadow, the scope of EU law defines the scope of the Charter. The metaphor can be extended by saying that the sun that enables the creation of a shadow is, in our case, the transferred power.[65] This issue is closely linked to the double safeguard clause of identity and transfer of competence.[66] The analysis of this issue will certainly be a major task in the future, not only for academics but also for national courts and Constitutional Courts.
In my view, the CJEU has made a clear distinction between situations covered by the Charter and those not covered.[67] The replies to the Hungarian references also indicate that, in the CJEU's view, the applicability of EU law implies the applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter in the field of the internal market only in situations falling within the Charter's scope.[68] On the other hand, where a legal situation does not fall within the scope of EU law,[69] the CJEU has no jurisdiction to
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rule on it, and the provisions of the Charter that may be invoked cannot in themselves constitute grounds for such jurisdiction.[70]
However, the same case law has also demonstrated that the classical division of the two situations is not always sufficient. Indeed, there are grey areas at the edge of the shadow where it is difficult to determine - using my metaphor - where the darkness ends and the light begins.[71] The case law of these borderlands is currently being shaped by the case law of the CJEU, with its interpretation of European and national identity,[72] the objectives of the EU as a community of values,[73] and the renaissance of the doctrine of primacy[74] in the 21st century.[75]
The decade of the 2000s brought to our attention significant changes in our social, economic, natural, and legal environments, as well as the need for global thinking and action in these areas.[76] The 21st century has presented the European Union with many new challenges that it had not faced before.[77] To give just a few examples, this was the first time that a Member State left the Union, opening a new chapter in EU law. The pandemic situation, with all its social and legal implications, had to be faced. The effects of climate change have a significant impact on our daily lives and activities. Artificial intelligence and modern technologies, in addition to their many positive
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effects, are creating serious fundamental rights challenges. Of these, the ongoing digitalisation of the Single Market is key,[78] based on four elements: (1) better connectivity; (2) a stronger industrial and technological presence in strategic parts of the supply chain (e.g. AI, cybersecurity, cloud infrastructure, 5G); (3) a true data economy and common European data spaces; and (4) a more equitable and facilitated business environment.[79]
A Digital Single Market[80] will benefit the economy, reduce environmental impacts and improve quality of life through e-commerce and e-government. As services shift from fixed to mobile platforms, this shift requires an EU framework for cloud computing, cross-border content access and seamless mobile data while ensuring privacy and cybersecurity. Digital services and digital markets laws will significantly transform the market in the coming years. As a result of the Digital Single Market, the case law of the CJEU has also seen an increase in cases related to digital space, digital consumer rights and related data protection issues.[81]
In the digital single market, the safeguarding of data protection in online transactions has become extremely important. The GDPR Regulation[82] as well as other EU laws[83] protect personal data, and digital service providers have an increased responsibility to safeguard such data. Additionally, the CJEU is increasingly required to balance competing rights. It must assess the intersection between the right to personal data and information society rights, and it often has to interpret autonomous concepts of EU law or at least define the scope of concepts in EU legal sources using EU methodology. Another important starting point is that EU law exists as an autonomous legal system,[84] and its rules are distinct from both international law and the internal legal systems of the Member States. It has its own legal terminology, autonomous legal concepts and its own method of interpretation.[85] The legal interpretation given by the CJEU has, therefore, a special significance.
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EU law as a whole has an autonomous conceptual framework, and therefore, in particular, because of the obligation to apply the doctrine of direct applicability, direct or indirect effect, national courts must also use autonomous concepts in their own practice.[86] This may even mean leaving behind the conceptual framework of the Member States and adding EU legal content to the concepts used in an EU source. It may require open-minded thinking by practitioners, with the use of comparative methods as a key feature.[87] One possible approach to this would be to interpret EU law in accordance with different linguistic versions,[88] which can be derived from the multilingual nature of EU law. It can also be interpreted in the light of the Treaty,[89] legal principles,[90] precedents,[91] international treaties,[92] fundamental rights,[93] the common constitutional traditions of the Member States,[94] moral values,[95] and common legal traditions and practices.[96] The correct identification of the content of concepts often requires a complex interpretation and the simultaneous application of several methods.
Together with the above methodologies, the specificity of digitalisation at the intersection of data protection law, the freedom to provide services online and the involvement of supervisory authorities in the enforcement of the rules guaranteeing
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the exercise of rights play a particularly important role. Consequently, the new challenge of interpretation of the law in the digital space could be a key factor in shaping the powers of these authorities.
In my view, the activity of public authorities in the 21st century should be at least as much focused on law enforcement (mainly related to digital data) as on market surveillance, which is intended to perform regulatory functions.[97] In modern economies, data has emerged as a key factor of production, often described as the "goldmine" of the single market in the 21st century. It is increasingly recognised as a potential fifth freedom, complementing the four fundamental freedoms of the EU.[98] Therefore, the role of data protection in the Digital Single Market for consumers has been upgraded.
A recent Hungarian case serves as a pertinent example of the latest decision of the CJEU in this regard. In case C-46/23, the CJEU ruled in favour of the Hungarian supervisory authority, deciding that it is entitled to order the erasure of unlawfully processed data, even in the absence of a prior request by the data subject.[99] In its judgment, the Court, interpreting the supervisory authority's powers of judicial protection, held that the national supervisory authority may do so, provided that such a measure is necessary for the performance of its task of ensuring full compliance with the GDPR. According to the Court, requiring a prior request would mean that the controller could retain the personal data in question in the absence of a request and continue to process them unlawfully. The CJEU has provided a legal interpretation which respects both the specificities of data protection and the balancing of competing rights in the interests of protection of the law. Of course, based on maiore ad minus, the supervisory authority may also order the erasure of unlawfully processed personal data in the case of a request directly from the data subject, but this cannot be required as a precondition in view of the foreseeability of the tasks of judicial protection.[100]
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Almost 20 years of EU membership show that the possibility of having recourse to the preliminary ruling procedure is well integrated into the application of EU law in Hungary. This is indicated not only by the high number of referrals but also by the considerable activity of different levels of the judiciary; lower courts also make bold use of the referral option. Hungarian referrals cover a wide range of EU law, but in some areas - for example, in the field of the single market - they are particularly frequent and have become a significant shaper of Hungarian law, while in others, they have contributed to the dynamic development of EU law. The three arguments discussed earlier will now be elaborated on.
First, it is argued that, following years of referrals deemed inadmissible, the CJEU has recently accepted referrals concerning the compatibility of national law with EU law, marking a shift in the Court's attitude. The nature of the rules governing the four fundamental freedoms is based on a common pattern: EU law guarantees freedom of movement as a general rule and national restrictions introduce exceptions to this rule, and in the majority of cases, the legality of the restrictions must be assessed case by case in light of the principles of necessity and proportionality. However, a very high proportion of conflicting and frictional legal situations require the examination of the relationship between EU rules and national law or the assessment of the legality of national rules. Addressing such referrals cannot rely on the previously established reasoning methodology of the CJEU, as these referrals do not concern the interpretation of EU law and the content of EU law alone.
The change in the legal nature of the questions posed necessarily requires the CJEU to adopt a fundamentally different method of reasoning in order to provide a useful answer. In such cases, the CJEU must proceed with caution, precisely to preserve the coherence of EU law, because it must rule in a legally complex domain ('grey zone'). The CJEU must give its interpretative guidance in such a way that it does not stray into the territory of national law. Therefore, the need to apply comparative methods[101] is all the more important, and given the substantial differences between the legal systems of the Member States, only a sufficiently general interpretation of the law can be given. The CJEU, in these cases, as a main rule, merely formulates EU interpretative guidelines and principles, meaning that it sets out the framework for interpretation but refers the specific question back to the national court. The consequence of this technique is that the national judge makes their decision within
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the framework provided by the CJEU, adhering to the guidelines. A good example of this is case C-51/17. In this case, the Court of Justice formulated this requirement as follows. "In that regard, although it is for the national court alone to rule on the classification of terms in accordance with the particular circumstances of the case, the fact remains that the Court has jurisdiction to elicit from the provisions of Directive 93/13, in this case, the provisions of Article 4(2) thereof, the criteria that the national court may or must apply when examining a contractual term."[102] The CJEU has also set out the criteria for the examination to be carried out by the national court.[103]
In addition, it should be pointed out that if the interpretation of the law given by the CJEU leads to the result that a Member State's legislation, which has been referred to it by the referring national court concerned, is not compatible with EU law, it may be necessary, as a matter of principle, for the CJEU to formulate the context of the interpretation precisely and if necessary to limit its "scope". Take the example of case C-290/05,[104] in which the CJEU ruled that a national tax rule that existed at a particular time was contrary to EU law. Following the conclusion of the preliminary ruling procedure, the Hungarian law adopted after the preliminary ruling procedure made it possible to recover the excess registration tax that had become unlawful under the CJEU judgment for those entities who had paid such tax during the period for which the infringement of EU law rules was apparent from the specific individual decision.[105]
It should be noted that the forthcoming major reform[106] of the preliminary ruling procedure[107] is also linked to this change in the nature of preliminary ruling
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procedures.[108] According to the CJEU's statistics, the number of pending references for a preliminary ruling is growing dynamically,[109] and the references are often complex. Since references for a preliminary ruling must be dealt with in a timely manner in order to ensure that national courts can guarantee the right to an effective remedy, the Court of Justice has submitted a request for the amendment of Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union[110] ("2022 reform proposal"),[111] pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 281 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In order to enable the Court to continue to fulfil its task of preserving and strengthening the unity and consistency of Union law, it has taken the initiative, in accordance with the possibility provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 256(3) TFEU, of allowing the General Court to rule on questions referred for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU in certain categories of cases.[112] These are the common system of value-added tax, excise duties, the Customs Code and the tariff classification of goods in the Combined Nomenclature. As a result of the reform, the General Court will therefore be empowered to rule on references for a preliminary ruling in the following areas of the single market: the determination of the taxable amount for the purposes of determining value added tax or the conditions for exemption from payment of that tax;[113] the interpretation of the general provisions on excise duty and the framework for the taxes on alcohol, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, energy products and electricity; the factors on the basis of which import or export duties are fixed in the context of trade in goods, such as the Common Customs Tariff, the origin and customs value of goods; import and export procedures, including the creation, determination and extinction of customs debt; special customs procedures; the duty relief system and the provisions of Annex I, Part I, Part II, to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 concerning the interpretation of certain tariff headings
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and the criteria for the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87.[114]
Second, as a result of the reform to be introduced, the CJEU will be better able to focus on cases involving the interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.[115] An important aspect of the division of jurisdiction between the CJEU and the General Court is that the CJEU should have exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving fundamental rights. The reform will enable the CJEU to engage in a more effective dialogue with the referring courts and, on the other hand, to have sufficient resources and time to provide high-quality answers to the questions of interpretation raised in cases involving complex theoretical problems, in particular questions involving the interpretation of the Charter as a primary source of law since the Lisbon Treaty.
Third, the CJEU shall respond to the new challenges of the 21st century.[116] Four areas of the Digital Single Market can be identified on the basis of the findings of the Letta Report, where we are confronted with new developments in both legislation and case law. The above-discussed Hungarian case on data protection illustrates that the challenges of the modern world require a holistic approach to the application and a dynamic interpretation of the law. My initial hypothesis was that public authority activity in the 21st century is at least as much law enforcement (mainly related to digital data) as it is market surveillance with regulatory functions. This case illustrates the partial shift[117] in the tasks of public authorities[118] and the emergence of a new approach to law enforcement with a view to data protection,[119] which is aimed at data protection compliance and which recognises user interests even ex officio - i.e., in this sense, law
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enforcement with a legal protection purpose.[120] Butterfly effects[121] can be assumed in a similar way in other areas of law in the digital internal market.
Both in the course of administrative supervision and in the application of the law by the courts, legal interpretation may be necessary for the purpose of legal protection, the doctrinal basis of which is the principle of interpretative primacy. Interpretative primacy implies, on the one hand, requiring the national courts to interpret a national law which has been drafted exclusively for the domestic situation in the case under examination in such a way that it is also applicable to the cross-border situation and, on the other hand, attributing an autonomous EU interpretation to the terms to be interpreted. The limitation of this interpretation must be that it cannot be a substitute for a legal prerequisite, i.e., the interpretative primacy cannot serve to create a substantive right itself.
Interpretative primacy is also closely linked to the principle of indirect effect (doctrine of interpretation), according to which the national court is obliged to interpret national law in accordance with the objectives and wording of the EU norm. The obligation to interpret in accordance with the purpose of EU law can only be limited by general principles of law. In particular, the principle of legal certainty must be respected in the sense that this obligation cannot be the basis for a contra legem interpretation of national law. In the interests of effective legal protection, the balancing of competing rights must be ensured, where necessary, by applying the test of necessity and proportionality.[122]
Consideration of the two trends presented here - (i) the CJEU's increasing openness to accepting referrals in the grey zone of the internal market and providing interpretative guidelines for national courts regarding the application of national law, even beyond EU law, and (ii) the CJEU's objective of giving appropriate weight to the interpretation
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of the Charter, which appears as a primary source of EU law in numerous cases - leads to the conclusion that this development also influences the argumentation technique employed by the CJEU, which has evolved in response to the need to balance fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights within the internal market.
The Court's case law is anticipated to remain dynamic, driven by the assessment of cases situated within the 'grey zone', where classic doctrinal questions - such as the transfer of jurisdiction, issues of identity, and the principle of primacy - continue to play a critical role.
Regarding the challenges of the 21st century in the context of the digital market, the CJEU has provided a legal interpretation which respects both the specificities of data protection and the balancing of competing rights in the interest of the protection of the law. The balancing of competing rights by the CJEU and the usage of interpretative primacy by national courts support the parties' legitimate rights to the application of EU law in national proceedings. ■
NOTES
[1] J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, (1991) (8) Yale Law Journal, 2403-2483.
[2] C. Barnard and J. Scott, The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2002).
[3] T. Jaeger, Introduction to European Union law: foundations - institutions - enforcement - internal market rules (Wien Facultas, Vienna, 2021).
[4] C. Barnard, The substantive law of the EU: the four freedoms (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019); M. Egan, Single Markets: Economic Integration in Europe and the United States (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015); F. Schuhmacher, Europarecht. II, Binnenmarkt, Grundfreiheiten, Wettbewerbsrecht (LexisNexis, Vienna, 2018); L. Vogel, Les fondamentaux du droit du marché intérieur (LawLex and Bruylant, Paris and Brussels, 2020).
[5] A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2004); G. Steiner, Une Certaine Idee De L'europe (Actes Sud, Arles, 2005); P. Pescatore, The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease of Community Law, (1983) (8) European Law Review, (155-157) 157.
[6] A number of Hungarian preliminary rulings have been related to the single European market concerning taxation, such as regarding VAT and other taxes, but mainly those concerning specific types of taxes, such as registration tax, business tax or retail sales tax; also, consumer protection law; free movement of workers, goods, services and capital; public procurement law; competition law; road transport issues; and the interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the field of internal market.
[7] Sources of these statistical data are the published annual reports and judicial statistics of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
[8] See more: C. O. Lenz, The Role and Mechanism of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure, (1994) 18 (2) Fordham International Law Journal, 389-409., https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1409&context=ilj (last accessed: 31.12.2024.). For more detailed information on certain aspects of the preliminary ruling procedure, see the literature in Hungarian: Blutman L., EU-jog a tárgyalóteremben: Az előzetes döntéshozatal [EU law in the courtroom: The preliminary ruling] (KJK-KERSZÖV, Budapest, 2003); Simonné Gombos K., 10 éve az Európai Unióban: Az előzetes döntéshozatali eljárás magyar tapasztalatai [10 years in the European Union: the Hungarian experience of the preliminary ruling procedure] (OPTEN Informatikai Kft., Budapest, 2014); Király L., Az előzetes döntéshozatali eljárás a polgári jogvitákban, különös tekintettel a tagállami felelősség kérdésére [Preliminary ruling procedure in civil matters, in particular on the question of the liability of the Member State] (OITH Magyar Bíróképző Akadémia, Budapest, 2008).
[9] See in this respect: S. Iglesias Sánchez, Preliminary Rulings before the General Court: Crossing the Last Frontier of the Reform of the EU Judicial System? EU Law Live Weekend Edition, No 125. (17 December 2022).
[10] M. Broberg and N. Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021).
[11] K. Lenaerts et al., EU Procedural Law (Oxford European Union Law Library, Oxford, 2023); R. Schütze, Judicial Powers I: (Centralised) European Procedures, in European Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015) 343-393.
[12] See K. Tuori, European Constitutionalism, in R. Masterman and R. Schütze (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2019) 521-553. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316716731
[13] T. Tridimas, Knocking On Heaven's Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure, (2003) 40 (1) Common Market Law Review, 9-50. DOI: https://doi.org/10.54648/5115417
[14] Such revision often takes place following infringement proceedings. For an illustrative example, see the order of the Court of 20 June 2023 SOLE-MiZo Zrt. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, C-426/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:517, paragraph 10.
[15] Somssich R., Egységes jog - Egységes értelmezés? Az uniós jog értelmezése a tagállami bíróságok szintjén [Uniform law - Uniform interpretation? Interpretation of EU law at national court level] (ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 2016) 201-216.
[16] See: Judgment of the Court of 27 April 2023, MJ v AxFina Hungary Zrt., Case C-705/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:352.
[17] See: order of the Court of 9 January 2023, A. T. S. 2003 Vagyonvédelmi és Szolgáltató Zrt. "f.a." v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, C-289/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:26.
[18] Judgment of the Court of 12 September 2024, SPAR Magyarország Kft. v Bács-Kiskun Vármegyei Kormányhivatal, C-557/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:737; Judgment of the Court of 23 November 2023, J. P. Mali Kerékpárgyártó és Forgalmazó Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, Case C-653/22. ECLI:EU:C:2023:912.
[19] R. Somssich and M. Z. Fehér, Magyar előzetes döntéshozatali eljárások 2004-2019 [Preliminary References from Hungarian Courts 2004-2019], (2019) 22 (3) Európai Tükör, (7-22) 13-14. DOI: https://doi.org/10.32559/et.2019.3.1
[20] Judgment of the Court of 16 November 2023, Tüke Busz Közösségi Közlekedési Zrt. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, C-391/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:892.
[21] Judgment of the Court of 2 September 2021, JZ v OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt. and others, C-932/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:673.
[22] For an illustrative example, see the Judgment of the Court of 20 April 2023, DIGI Communications NV v Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság Hivatala, C-329/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:303, paragraph 48.
[23] According to settled case law, the Court of Justice of the European Union may - if necessary, even by reformulating the questions referred to it - in the context of judicial cooperation, provide the national court, on the basis of material submitted to it, with an interpretation of EU law which may be useful for assessing the effects of one or another provision of EU law (Judgment of 16 July 2015, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria, Case C-83/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:480, paragraph 71 and the case-law cited).
[24] For an illustrative example, see the Judgment of the Court of 1 August 2022, HOLD Alapkezelő Befektetési Alapkezelő Zrt. v Magyar Nemzeti Bank, C-352/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:606, paragraphs 66-67.
[25] For an illustrative example, see the Judgment of the Court of 14 May 2020, FMS and others v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and others, C-924/19. PPU. and C-925/19. PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2020:367.
[26] For an illustrative example, see the Judgment of the Court of 1 December 2022, Aquila Part Prod Com SA v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, C-512/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:950.
[27] See M. Varju and E. Várnay, After the Judgment: The Implementation of Preliminary Rulings in the Hungarian Judicial System 2004-2019 and Beyond, (2022) 59 (6) Common Market Law Review, 1743-1770. DOI: https://doi.org/10.54648/cola2022117
[28] See Judgment of the Court of 29 July 2019, Hochtief Solutions AG Magyarországi Fióktelepe v Fővárosi Törvényszék, C-620/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:630.
[29] For an illustrative example, see the Judgment of the Court of 19 October 2023, Központi Nyomozó Főügyészség, C-147/22, ECLI:EU:C:2023:790.
[30] For an illustrative example, see the order of the Court of 3 June 2022, Megatherm-Csillaghegy Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, C-188/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:444.
[31] There is a view that both situations should be treated as a reference back. See Várnay E., Az Európai Unió Bírósága visszautal a magyar bírósághoz [Deference from the European Court of Justice to the Hungarian Courts], (2019) 22 (3) Európai Tükör, 23-33. DOI: https://doi.org/10.32559/et.2019.3.2
[32] See Judgment of the Court of 27 April 2023, MJ v AxFina Hungary Zrt., Case C-705/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:352. paragraph 36.
[33] See Judgment of the Court of 20 October 2022, Digi Távközlési és Szolgáltató Kft. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság, C-77/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:805.
[34] See Judgment of the Court of 8 July 2021, C-178/20, Pharma Expressz Szolgáltató és Kereskedelmi Kft. v Országos Gyógyszerészeti és Élelmezés-egészségügyi Intézet, ECLI:EU:C:2021:551, in which case the Court drew the referring court's attention to the overall assessment of the facts on a case-by-case basis.
[35] K. Lenaerts and J. A. Gutiérrez-Fons, To Say What the Law of the EU Is: Methods of Interpretation and the European Court of Justice, (2013) (9) Academy of European Law (AEL) European University Institute (EUI) Working Paper, 1-48.
[36] Judgment of the Court of 12 February 1974, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Case C-146/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:12, paragraph 3; Judgment of the Court of 16 January 1974, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Case C-166/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:3, paragraph 4; Judgment of the Court of 16 December 2008, CARTESIO Oktató és Szolgáltató Bt., Case C-210/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:723, paragraphs 88 and 92-97.
[37] Judgment of the Court of 16 December 2008 CARTESIO Oktató és Szolgáltató Bt., Case C-210/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:723, paragraphs 96 and 97.
[38] Judgment of the Court of 24 November 2020, Criminal proceedings against AZ [Openbaar Ministerie; Forgery of documents], Case C-510/19, ECLI:EU:C:2020:953, paragraph 25, and the case law cited therein.
[39] Judgment of the Court of 22 June 2010, Aziz Melki and Sélim Abdeli, Case C-188/10 and Case C-189/10, ECLI:EU:C:2010:363, paragraph 63; Order of the Court of 16 July 2015, Daniele Striani and Others v Union européenne des Sociétés de Football Association (UEFA) and Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association (URBSFA), Case C-299/15, ECLI:EU:C:2015:519, paragraph 33.
[40] Judgment of the Court of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas, Case C-64/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 33, and see, to that effect, Avis au titre de l'article 300, paragraphe 6, CE [Agreement establishing a unified patent litigation system] Opinion No 1/09 of 8 March 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, paragraph 69; Judgment of the Court of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, Case C-583/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 99.
[41] Judgment of the Court of 16 December 2008, CARTESIO Oktató és Szolgáltató Bt., Case C-210/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:723.
[42] See more G. de Búrca, The Road not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor, (2011) 105 (4) American Journal of International Law, 649-693. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.105.4.0649
[43] See more R. Schütze, Judicial Powers III: EU Fundamental Rights, in European Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015) 429-470.
[44] See Judgment of the Court of 11 January 2024, Global Ink Trade Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, Case C-537/22, ECLI:EU:C:2024:6.
[45] See Judgment of the Court of 25 April 2024, NW and others v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság and others, Joint Cases C-420/22 and C-528/22, ECLI:EU:C:2024:344.
[46] Article 6(1) Treaty on European Union (TEU).
[47] See Judgment of the Court of 23 January 2023, BE v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság, Case C-132/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:2.
[48] Article 6(1) TEU.
[49] See Judgment of the Court of 11 July 2024, Financijska agencija v HANN-INVEST d.o.o. and others, Joint Cases C-554/21., C-622/21. and C-727/21, ECLI:EU:C:2024:594; Judgment of the Court of 19 December 2024, "Vivacom Bulgaria" EAD v Varhoven administrativen sad and others, Case C-369/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:1043.
[50] See Judgment of the Court of 22 May 2014, Érsekcsanádi Mezőgazdasági Zrt. v Bács-Kiskun Megyei Kormányhivatal, Case C-56/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:352.
[51] See Judgment of the Court of 13 January 2023, Marcas MC Szolgáltató Zrt. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, Case C-363/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:21.
[52] K. Lenaerts and J. A. Gutiérrez-Fons, Az Európai Unió Bíróságának jogértelmezési módszerei [Interpretation methods of the Court of Justice of the European Union] (HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 2022); K. Lenaerts, Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, (2012) 8 (3) European Constitutional Law Review, 375-403. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019612000260
[53] See more I. Solanke, Fundamental Rights in EU Law, in EU Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2022) 305-358. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108913225.020
[54] See Judgment of the Court of 12 December 2024, CN v Nemzeti Földügyi Központ, Case C-419/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:1016.
[55] Case C-204/21, European Commission v Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2023:442, para. 78: "the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, interpreted in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, which imposes on the Member States a clear and precise obligation as to the result to be achieved and which is not subject to any conditions, in particular as regards the independence and impartiality of the courts called upon to interpret and apply EU law and the requirement that those courts must be previously established by law, has direct effect which means that any provision, case-law or national practice contrary to those provisions of EU law, as interpreted by the Court, must be disapplied".
[56] In case C-58/22 NR (Judgement of the Court of 25 January 2024, ECLI:EU:C:2024:70), the CJEU confirmed that in case of a national rule which involves the implementation of an EU decision, the Charter is applicable even if the case has no cross-border element: "41. ...national law provisions ensure the transposition of Framework Decision 2003/568 into the Romanian legal order, and more specifically Articles 2 and 4 thereof. 42. Accordingly, and without it being necessary to rule on the possible relevance of the benchmarks set out in the annex to Decision 2006/928, the condition of the implementation of EU law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, is satisfied in the present case. It follows that the Charter applies in the main proceedings".
[57] Judgment of the Court of 12 December 2024, CN v Nemzeti Földügyi Központ, Case C-419/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:1016.
[58] Hungary adopted legislation in 2013, which abolished usufructuary rights in favour of persons who are not closely related to the owner of the agricultural land concerned on its territory. In its judgment (C-235/17, EU:C:2019:432), the CJEU ruled that this was contrary to EU law.
[59] Judgment of the Court of 23 November 2021, Criminal proceedings against IS, Case C-564/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:949.
[60] See on the importance of the community of values: Judgment of the Court of 16 February 2022, Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-156/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:97.
[61] See more B. De Witte, The European Union in the International System of Human Rights Protection: Solo Singer or Voice in the Choir?, in E. Bribosia and I. Rorive (eds), Human Rights Tectonics: global perspectives on integration and fragmentation (Intersentia, Cambridge, 2018) 225-241, https://hdl.handle.net/1814/60159 (last accessed: 31.12.2024.).
[62] S. Greer, J. Gerards and R. Slowe, The Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in Human Rights, in The Council of Europe and the European Union - Achievements, Trends and Challenges (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018) 293-367. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139179041.008
[63] R. Schütze, Limiting Powers: EU Fundamental Rights, in European Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021) 451-496. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198864653.003.0012
[64] Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, To Say What the Law of the EU Is, 3-61.
[65] K. Gombos, Hungary, in K. Alexander (ed.), XXX FIDE (Fédération Internationale pour le Droit Européen) Congress in Sofia 2023. Vol. 1: Mutual trust, mutual recognition and the rule of law (Ciela Norma, Sofia, 2023) 395-415.
[66] K. Gombos, Judicial independence in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in K. Beliznai and Z. Megyeri-Pálffi (eds), Guarantees of Judicial Independence (Pátria, Budapest, 2024) 185-202.
[67] Lenaerts, Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 375-403.
[68] See e.g. Judgment of the Court of 01 December 2022, Aquila Part Prod Com SA v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága, Case C-512/21., ECLI:EU:C:2022:950; Erdős et al. emphasized in relation to price regulation that "Despite the fact that the EU's primary sources of law include the Charter of Fundamental Rights - including the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16) and the right to property (Article 17), the CJEU's practice on price regulation is based on a more competence-based logic, and is founded on aim to ensure the functioning of the internal market." Cs. Erdős, V. Verebélyi and L. Knapp, The limits of restrictions on free competition in the state of emergency - the Hungarian fuel and food retail price maximisation in the light of the Hungarian constitutional court's, the Strasbourg court's and the Luxembourg court's jurisprudence, (2025) 7 Frontiers in Political Science, Section Comparative Governance, 10. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1542096
[69] For an illustrative example, see the Judgment of the Court of 27 June 2024, FR v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága [Pinta], C-225/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:567. In this case, the decisive factor was the personal scope of the interpretative directive, and since none of its provisions applied to a natural person, the application of Article 47 of the Charter was conceptually excluded.
[70] Order of the Court of 10 October 2013, Nagy Sándor and Others v Hajdú-Bihar megyei Kormány- hivatal and Others, Joined Cases C-488/12 to C-491/12 and C-526/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:703.
[71] M. Dougan, Judicial review of Member State action under the general principles and the Charter: Defining the "Scope of Union Law", (2015) 52 (5) Common Market Law Review, (1201-1245) 1201. DOI: https://doi.org/10.54648/cola2015102
[72] K. Lenaerts, The Court of Justice of the European Union and the Protection of Fundamental Rights, (2011) 31 Polish Yearbook of International Law, 79-106.
[73] See e.g. Judgment of the Court of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Case C-64/16., ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 30.
[74] See Judgment of the Court of 10 March 2022, "Grossmania" Mezőgazdasági Termelő és Szolgáltató Kft. v Vas Megyei Kormányhivatal, Case C-177/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:175; Judgment of the Court of 07 March 2024, Die Länderbahn and Others Case, C-582/22, ECLI:EU:C:2024:213, paragraph 61.
[75] See more: D. Augenstein, Disagreement - Commonality - Autonomy: EU Fundamental Rights in the Internal Market, (2013) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 1-26. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5235/152888713809813549
[76] M. Bauer et al., Reinventing Europe's Single Market: A Way Forward to Align Ideals and Action, (2024) 11 ECIPE Press Release Policy brief, 1-28.
[77] E. Letta, Much more than a market - Speed, security, solidarity. Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens (Enrico Letta's report presented to the European Council on 18 April 2024). Available: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf (last accessed: 31.12.2024.).
[78] S. Garben and I. Govaere, The Internal Market 2.0 (Hart, Oxford, 2020).
[79] See more: Letta, Much more than a market - Speed, security, solidarity.
[80] L. D. Dabrowski and M. Suska, The European Union Digital Single Market (Routledge, 2022).
[81] See: Annual Reports of Court of Justice of the European Union.
[82] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
[83] Examples in the area of the Digital Single Market are the DSA [Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on the Digital Single Market and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act)] and DMA [Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on competitive and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Market Act)].
[84] See the Court's Opinion No 1/91 of 14 December 1991.
[85] Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, Az Európai Unió Bíróságának jogértelmezési módszerei [Interpretation methods of the Court of Justice of the European Union], 36-39.
[86] See Judgment of the Court of 8 November 2005, Götz Leffler v Berlin Chemie AG, Case C-443/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:665 paragraphs 45-46.
[87] M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve, Courts and Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 117-232.
[88] Judgment of the Court of 9 April 2014, GSV Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Észak-Alföldi Regionális Vám- és Pénzügyőri Főigazgatósága, Case C-74/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:243.
[89] Judgment of the Court of 23 September 2020, WO v Vas Megyei Kormányhivatal, Case C-777/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:745. This case has great significance in other respects too. Here, the Court of Justice of the European Union has developed its own previous practice, and in this Hungarian case has set out a new doctrine in the field of cross-border health services. For more details on the significance of the case, see É. Gellérné Lukács, Prior and Subsequent Authorization of Cross-Border Healthcare under Directive 2011/24/EU, (2023) 11 (1) Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law, 50-73. DOI: 10.5553/HYIEL/266627012023011001005
[90] Judgment of the Court of 14 May 2020, T-Systems Magyarország Zrt. and others v Közbeszerzési Hatóság - Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság, Case C-263/19, ECLI:EU:C:2020:373.
[91] Judgment of the Court of 12 December 2024, CN v Nemzeti Földügyi Központ, C-419/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:1016.
[92] Judgment of the Court of 4 October 2018, Dooel Uvoz-Izvoz Skopje Link Logistik N&N v Budapest Rendőrfőkapitánya, Case C-384/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:810.
[93] Judgment of the Court of 31 March 2022, Lombard Pénzügyi és Lízing Zrt. v PN, Case C-472/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:242.
[94] Judgment of the Court of 8 May 2024, Asociaţia 'Forumul Judecătorilor din România' and others v Parchetul de pe lângă Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie - Procurorul General al României, Case C-53/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:388.
[95] Judgment of the Court of 28 February 2018, Sporting Odds Ltd v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Központi Irányítása, Case C-3/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:130.
[96] Judgment of the Court of 29 July 2024, Virgilijus Valančius v Lietuvos Republikos Vyriausybė, Case C-119/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:653.
[97] Gombos K., Az adatvédelem és az online szolgáltatások kapcsolódási pontjai - A digitális reziliencia és az értelmezési elsődlegesség sajátosságai [The links between data protection and online services - The specificities of digital resilience and interpretive primacy], (2024) 13 (2) In Medias Res, 52-67. DOI: https://doi.org/10.59851/imr.13.2.4
[98] B. Martens, Research, innovation and data: a fifth freedom in the EU single market? Research and innovation should be at the top of the EU economic policy agenda, but cannot over-rely on public investment, Bruegel Analysis, (23 May 2024), https://www.bruegel.org/system/files/2024-06/research%2C-innovation-and-data%3A-a-fifth-freedom-in-the-eu-single-market%3F-9996_0.pdf (last accessed: 31.12.2024.).
[99] Judgment of the Court of 14 March 2024, Újpesti Polgármesteri Hivatal, Case C-46/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:239.
[100] P. Bruyas, Données personnelles - Effacement en cas de traitement illégal, (2024) 5 Europe, comm. 199.
[101] See on the importance of the comparative method: M. de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser, Judicial Deliberations - A Comparative Analysis of Transparency and Legitimacy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009); K. Lenaerts, The Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, (2010) 59 (2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 255-301. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589310000023
[102] Judgment of the Court of 20 September 2018, OTP Bank Nyrt. and OTP Faktoring Követeléskezelő Zrt v Teréz Ilyés and Emil Kiss, Case C-51/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:750, paragraph 72.
[103] "In the present case, in the light of the foregoing, it is for the referring court to take into account, inter alia, the presence in the loan contract at issue of paragraph 10 thereof, entitled 'Declaration of notification of risk', the wording of which was set out in paragraph 19 of the present judgment, read in conjunction with any additional information provided before the conclusion of that contract. In that last regard, it is apparent from the information before the Court that the borrowers received, inter alia, an additional information sheet relating to the foreign exchange risk, containing examples of specific calculations of the risk in the event of a depreciation of the Hungarian forint in relation to the Swiss franc, which it is nonetheless for the referring court to ascertain." Judgment of the Court of 20 September 2018, OTP Bank Nyrt. and OTP Faktoring Követeléskezelő Zrt v Teréz Ilyés and Emil Kiss, Case C-51/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:750, paragraph 77.
[104] Judgment of the Court of 5 October 2006, Ákos Nádasdi v Vám- és Pénzügyőrség Észak-Alföldi Regionális Parancsnoksága (C-290/05) and Ilona Németh v Vám- és Pénzügyőrség Dél-Alföldi Regionális Parancsnoksága (C-333/05), Joined cases C-290/05 and C-333/05, ECLI:EU:C:2006:652.
[105] This period covered the period from 1 May 2004 to 31 December 2005.
[106] C. Amalfitano, The Future of Preliminary Rulings in the EU Judicial System, (2022) (125) EU Law Live Weekend Edition.
[107] D. Petrić, The Preliminary Ruling Procedure 2.0, (2023) 8 (1) European Papers, European Forum, 25-42.
[108] Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
[109] In statistical terms, the number of incoming preliminary references is about 500-600 yearly.
[110] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:12008E/PRO/03 (last accessed: 31.12.2024.).
[111] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15936-2022-INIT/en/pdf (last accessed: 31.12.2024.).
[112] Iglesias Sánchez, Preliminary Rulings before the General Court.
[113] R. García Antón, Reframing the Reform to Transfer Preliminary Rulings to the General Court with the Meaning of Judicial Cooperation: a Look into Recent VAT Preliminary Rulings, (2023) 12 May, EU Law Live Institutional Law - Justice & Litigation - Tax. https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-reframing-the-reform-to-transfer-preliminary-rulings-to-the-general-court-with-the-meaning-of-judicial-cooperation-a-look-into-recent-vat-preliminary-rulings-by-ricardo-garci/# (last accessed: 31.12.2024.).
[114] Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff.
[115] Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, Az Európai Unió Bíróságának jogértelmezési módszerei [Interpretation methods of the Court of Justice of the European Union], 167-170.
[116] A. Wallerman Ghavanini, Power Talk: Effects of Inter-Court Disagreement on Legal Reasoning in the Preliminary Reference Procedure, (2020) 5 (2) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 887-910. https://www.europeanpapers.eu/sites/default/files/EP_eJ_2020_2.pdf (last accessed: 31.12.2024.).
[117] P. G. Picht, CJEU on Facebook: GDPR processing justifications and application competence [EuGH, Urt. vom 4.7.2023: C-252/21], (26 July 2023) Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, 1169-1172. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4521320; A. Haberer, The neverending story: Neues zum Verhältnis von Kartell- und Datenschutzrecht [EuGH, Urt. vom 4.7.2023, C-252/21: Meta Platforms Inc. u.a./BKartA], (2023) 11 (10) Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht, 546-549.
[118] See by analogy the analysis of the Meta-case: I. Graef, Meta platforms: How the CJEU leaves competition and data protection authorities with an assignment, (2023) 30 (3) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 325-334. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263X231205836
[119] F. Rizzuto, The implications of the Meta Ireland Platforms ruling for the powers of national competition authorities and national regulatory and supervisory authorities, (2023) 44 (12) European Competition Law Review, 532-538.
[120] P. Nebbia, The interaction of competition, consumer and data protection laws: a few comments inspired by the recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, (2023) 23 (4) ERA-Forum: scripta iuris europaei, 515-527. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12027-023-00733-0; M. Botta and K. Wiedemann, The Interaction of EU Competition, Consumer, and Data Protection Law in the Digital Economy: The Regulatory Dilemma in the Facebook Odyssey, (2019) 64 (3) The Antitrust Bulletin, 428-446. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X19863590
[121] See details on the principle: K. Gombos, The European Butterfly Effect on the Right of Remedy in the New Hungarian Procedural Acts, in Somssich R. (ed.), Ratio et mensura - Studia M. Király dedicata: Ünnepi tanulmányok Király Miklós 60. születésnapja alkalmából [Ratio et mensura - Studia M. Király dedicata: Festive essays on the occasion of Miklós Király's 60th birthday] (ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 2021) 219-228.
[122] Gombos, Az adatvédelem és az online szolgáltatások kapcsolódási pontjai [The links between data protection and online services], 52-67.
Lábjegyzetek:
[1] The Author is Professor at University of Public Service.
Visszaugrás
