"Conservatism" is a notion used abundantly with adjectives before it and in this regard, it doesn't have a privilege in Turkey. The variety of the meanings given to the concept, without doubt, is a result of the idea that it is not right to explain the notion of conservatism with universal principles; in other words, the apathy towards the concept of "ideology", and as its extension, is a result of various historical practices that would be the basis for each country's conservatism. Although this enriches the theoretical studies literature, also causes a severe conceptual chaos. Thus, one has to consider the conceptual ambiguity for a discussion based on Turkey or consider that the subject must be limited to its one or a few dimensions.
Considering conservatism as a notion developed by the reactions of aristocracy; means to have a stance against the French Revolution, Enlightenment, liberalism, and finally, against bourgeoisie. Indeed, based on this thesis, S. P. Huntington defines conservatism as the protectionism of permanent institutions and an autonomous idea system. Layton, 1982: 4). Although this approach, which can be found in many studies on conservatism, makes theoretical definitions easy, it can be misleading in practice. However, when we think about the fact that conservatism does not propose a universal political model, it would not be right to tell that a stance against liberalism would be come prominent in every case. L. Köker states that the reaction against liberalism has an important place in the historical development of conservatism but also states that it does not occur on the same level in all countries.[1]
There is no doubt that conservatism had substantially improved as a reaction against the French revolution. However, it must be noted that reaction against the revolution shows itself in two different ways. B. B. Özipek, makes a distinction between the Continental Europe and Anglo-American world.
Alongside the "reactionary conservatism" of the Continental Europe that praises pre-revolution in all of its aspects, there is also the Anglo-American type "moderate conservatism".[2] The first idea was led by Maistre, and the second by Burke.
It can be said that within time, the "reactionary" type of Conservatism accepted the idea of change. In this regard, it wouldn't be right to say that conservatism represents a stance against all kinds of change. This is a result of the dominance of the "moderate" type of conservatism until today. So, if we have to state with the accurate evaluation of Özipek; although conservatism has a significant distrust against the unknown, it is not the same with "reaction", which represents a stance against change in all situations.[3]
The most effective sentence, giving a meaning to this distinction, belongs to Burke: "change is the means of our preservation". In his book Reflections, Burke has established the main principles of conservatism and this has maintained its effects until today. Accordingly; value given to religion and history, and the concern that reforms would bring injustice against individuals, importance of private property and the conception of society as a living organism come forward as the main foundations of Burke conservatism.[4]
It is possible to assess Turkish conservatism based on the principles established by Burke, the pioneer of Anglo-American conservatism. In this regard, it is useful to examine the similarities of the said conservatism and the conservatism embodied in Turkey. This examination is also important for giving a meaning to the current political trends and the practices of the parties in power in Turkey. It should be immediately noted that the scope of this study will be limited to the stance of conservatism against religion and change.
Another issue to be stated beforehand at this stage is that it is possible to assess Turkish conservatism from many different angles, as stated above. The preference of researching the similarities between Anglo-American conservatism comes from its functionality for understanding the political developments and government practices. In other words, the "moderate" theme dominant in Turkish conservatism is essential in its key function in assessing the Turkish political life and it should be taken as the meeting point of theory and practicality.
The process of modernization in Turkey can be traced to the last century of the Ottoman Empire. Without
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doubt, the radical practice of the steps in this direction comes after the establishment of the Republic, and the first reactions of the conservative idea are the products of the same period. We see the idea of synthesizing the East and the West, which became first significant in the magazine Turkish Thought (Türk Düsüncesï), as the dominant theme. The problem is to prevent the conflict between revolutionists and reactionists. In other words, it is to overcome the struggle between those who defy the positive sides of the Turkish revolution and those who ignore the values of the past. Thus, East and West are being synthesized in their material and moral dimensions.[5]
Historian, one of the founders of the Democrat Party, who came to power in 1950, known by his sometimes reactionary and mostly moderate conservative characteristics, Fuat Köprülü's (1890-1966) studies on Turkish culture must be assessed as an extension of the said synthesis. Indeed, Köprülü made an "original status" analysis on Turks, beginning from Central Asia, and explained the reason of its maintenance within history without facing major changes, by the internalization of outside effects. Y. Alpay, presents this approach he found in Köprülü as an eminent conservative thought tendency, desiring to form a binding between the Turkish revolution and the past.[6]
It is possible to find examples of Y. Alpay's evaluation in Turkish conservatives. Professor of philosophy, and known for his studies in Turkish philosophy, Mustafa Sekip Tunc (1886-1958), is one of the first names to be mentioned in this regard. Tunc, takes both ideologies in their "conscious" forms in his article Conservatism and Liberalism, and evaluate these as products of Greek, Renaissance and 18[th] century Enlightenment. According to Tunc, in "conscious" civilizations, a liberal party answers the needs of progression and a conservative party protects the honorable pages of history, and their harmonic completion of each other serve for an ideal social and political order.[7]
Tunc's approach, pointing out a harmonic synthesis between liberalism and conservatism, becomes solidified with Peyami Safa's (1899-1961) Views on Turkish Revolution (Türk inkilabina Bakxslar), in terms of the nature of the bond to be established between the old and the new. In this regard, it can be said that Safa's article Fight between the Old and the New, is the most effective statement of the stance that has a significant position in Turkish conservatism and approves of gradual change. Assessing "the New" as a "unreliable and misleading concept", Safa says[8]:
Is "New" chronological? ... If so, a used pen I bought today has to be accepted as newer than the pen I bought yesterday... Does "New" mean unused? Then, a cloth I bought fifty years ago, which I have never used, is newer than a cloth I bought a month ago, which I have used. Is "New" youth and freshness? Then, civilizations that were young in their years of establishment and flourishing should be considered newer than those of today.
What is "New"? If you look at individuals and materials, they begin as new, they get old and they disappear. If you look at communities, civilizations, cultural movements, they are both old and new. Without doubt, I am who I was forty years ago. There have been many changes in my style of thinking, ideas, excitements, and conscious or automatic responses to outside effects. However, I am me again, not another person. If not, I wouldn't recognize and know myself... So, an individual or a community can partially change by staying loyal and equal to its identity; otherwise, it will perish.
There are two types of change: One is; a jug goes and another replaces it. This is a total change. The other is the partial change, which occurs with the mixing of the new to the old. This is how European civilization changes... Each living thing has to change in order to live... I recognize myself with my memory. I connect my today with yesterday, and my identity of today with my identity of yesterday. And Turkish nation recognizes itself with its history, national memories and traditions. There are two conditions for Turkish nation to exist: The first one is continuing to be itself, continuing to be loyal to its history and traditions. And the second one is changing and innovation in a degree not to lose its identity.
Safa's proposition is extremely clear and he sees conservatism necessary for nations not to forget their histories. In this regard, conservatism is presented as the protector against the danger of "forgetting and losing one's self-consciousness", and brought forward with its necessary for not confronting innovations unless they destroy the past.[9]
The last situation pointed out by Safa has been a problem of modernization persistently stated by Turkish conservatives. These conservatives, focusing on how modernization would take place, have opened ways to question Turkish revolution in a descriptive meaning and showed the reason for the situation of post-revolution Turkish society as the fast modernization method. Famous general of the War of Independence, politician, and one of the first spokesman for Turkish conservatism in political sense, Kazim Karabekir's (1882-1948) statement "The abolition of the Caliphate was rushed, causing this institution to vanish in the air"[10], is a extension of this concern.
Karabekir's objection comes from the first years of the Republic and should be assessed in the context of the political atmosphere of the period. Indeed, in order to declare conservative objections vocally, people had to wait until the end of the Single Party Period.
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It wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that the first was significant reaction was from Peyami Safa. Safa, aimed to criticize the Revolution in its work, Views on Turkish Revolution (Türk inkilabina Bakxslar). On the other hand, Safa achieved significant success with his magazine, Turkish Thought (Türk Düsüncesï). For example, according to Safa; one of the issues accelerating the disconnection with the past was, not converting the main works of art, which were the carriers of the national culture, from the old alphabet to the new one. So, a generation that was neglected of its history and culture was brought up, and with Safa's words "a youth, embracing any nonsense in the name of novelty" was not surprising at all.[11]
Portraying a conservative stance by stating that traditions are formed by religion, language and art; politician and academician ismayil Hakki Baltacioglu (1886-1978) agrees with Safa's evaluation by going more backwards in terms of history. According to this, Tanzimat (Reorganization) period is not a good example for Europeanization. Yet, "Tanzimat movement thought that it would become Europeanized by changing male clothing, reforming the army, and opening schools"[12]. The concept of Westernization gained a significant position in conservative thought. As one of the best examples for this; emphasizing the importance of religion in his studies on Turkish history, professor of history Osman Turan (1914-1978) pointed out the wrong sides of Westernization, as one of the main reasons of the moral depression that in his belief Turkey was in. According to Turan, Turkey started its Westernization without changing its religion in order to compete with Europe as a compulsory process; however, while doing this, it proceeded with a "moral dependency to the Western world, instead of a knowledge of it" and therefore has become distant with the national culture.[13]
Reactions against Westernization came to be stated in harsher forms in 1960s. Displaying a conservative stance with his emphasis on moral values, philosophies academician Nurettin Topcu (1909-1975) is noteworthy. According to Topcu, moral values in both the cities and the villages of Turkey have almost completely disappeared. Indeed "the last generation played its band of farewell to morality by turning its face to the West, the side where the sun goes down"[14]. A man of ideas, who adorned his conservatism with Islamic tones, Necip Fazil Kisakürek (1904-1983) also puts all the blame in the West. According to Kisakürek, the Western World has reached the last stage of its de-Islamization policy, which it had started since the Ottoman period, and with his own words, "achieved its goal". And finally, by imposing the ideas of democracy and liberty, what was left in the hands of Turkey was "a footloose independence of self-control that accepts no religions, moralities, family values, societies, manners, traditions, laws, order, science, consciousness, and control".[15]
Change has mostly revealed itself in Turkish conservatism, in studies on Westernization. Based on this, it should be stated that the idea of change is not completely rejected and is largely approved if it did not cause cultural deformation. One of the most important reasons for Turkish conservatism's finding itself a political position is this moderate approach. It should also be noted that the discussions of the mentioned conservative thinkers still continue on the same level. Moreover, moderate conservative stance has been very functional for positive attitudes towards Turkish revolution and for the harmonization of Turkish society with its internal dynamics.
Faruk Alpkaya's quotations from Kazim Karabekir; "The People's Party, which we had established in accordance with the desires and nature of our nation, today, is being formed into non-religious and non-moral clubs... The nation is becoming chic, it is not becoming modern; it is collapsing"[16], can be assessed as one of the first post-republic conservative reactions based on religion.
It is not possible to say that reactions similar to these political considerations of Karabekir were frequently stated during the Single Party Period. Indeed, the period in which studies on religion by thinkers, who we can accept as the representatives of the moderate trend in Turkish conservatism, corresponds to the period after the 1940's. Such studies displayed varieties and consideration of religion has been carried to different dimension under its cyclical effects. Nevertheless, a certain line was formed in the approaches of conservative thinkers on religion. In this regard; adorning conservatism with nationalism, pointing out moral depression, danger of communism and discussions over secularity contributed to a rich conservatism literature.
Accepted as one of the foremost representatives of nationalist-conservative thinking, politician and academician Remzi Oguz Arik (1899-1954) was a conservative, who had stated and wrote the most ideas on the issue in the 1940s. The important contribution of Arik, who compiled his writings in books in later years, was that he gave conservatism a nationalistic identity. Such that, according to Arik; Islam saved Turks from "being completely vanished". Arik's efforts were to ensure that religion would reach the position in society it deserves, by emphasizing its
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importance in Turkish society. Such a concern can also be found in the statements of Nurettin Topcu, who defined Turks' being Moslems as "transition to material life to spiritual life"[17], and of ismayil Hakki Baltacioglu.
Baltacioglu's approach begins with the criticism of Durkheim's social facts analysis. In Durkheim's thought, there are twelve social facts in which social morphology is decisive, while the other eleven are deemed equal, including religion. Baltacioglu's first objection comes against this analysis by emphasizing the importance of religion. According to him, although social morphology is the basis; religion, language and art have a special position, importance and decisiveness. Baltacioglu reaches this idea by the existence of three facts since the primitive societies. Furthermore, it is not possible to talk about an institution in a society where religion, language and art are not involved. One has to look for these 3 elements in the formation of traditions that is the main decisive in the formation of a nation, and it is impossible for a nation deprived of these elements to protect its original values.[18]
This assessment of Baltacioglu's, emphasizing the importance of religion in social life can be considered from two angles. The first one; focusing on religion's not being thought separately from nation, provides an important sociologic base in nationalist-conservative synthesis. The second one, points out the problems that may arise by religion's being forgotten among society. Indeed, Baltacioglu connects the "strong and clean sources" of a society to its enthusiasm of religion.[19]
Comment of Osman Turan, "No other country except Turkey and communist Russia have ever depraved their new generation from religious education and training, and the institution of religion from science and culture for 30 years".[20] This coincides with the emphasis of Baltacioglu importance of religion for society. A similar approach can be found in Necip Fazil Kisakürek. Such that, Kisakürek complains the existence of the situation of "soul decay and mind darkening", which he names "Irreligion Psychosis".[21]
It must be stated that discussion on religion were shaped by the perception of communism threat in the 1960's. Therefore, it wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that all components of Turkish right were focusing on the same. although the discussion gained a wide dimension, it is almost impossible to separate the Turkish right in the 1960's to its components. So, it is obvious that the stance of the conservatives were affected by the general intellectual atmosphere of the period. By the 1970's, a significant separation occurred in the right wing and as a result, discussions
of religion had a nature more suitable to its theory for the conservatives of Turkey. One of the dominant voices of the period was intellectual, Ottoman period advocate Samiha Ayverdi (1905-1993). Ayverdi's assessments on families and mosques were like the reflections of the importance given by the conservative thought to intermediary institutions. According to her, Western societies have a moral depression caused by bringing up children away from their families, in nurseries etc., and churches are incapable of fulfilling their original function of purifying the souls of individuals. Ayverdi, underlines that such events were not faced in Turkey, and that mosques are important locations for learning to form a unity.[22]
Even though the discussions by Turkish conservatives on religion vary, their common point is that their emphasizing the importance of religion for society, their concerns on the dangers of the moral stress caused by the lack of it, and their ideas on secularity. Without doubt, these common points are also in question within the "moderate" conservative thought, mentioned within this study.
The issue of secularity has been on the agenda of almost all conservatives. However, in order to repeat similar ideas over and over, it would be proper to take the leading name of liberal conservatism, professor of law Ali Fuat Basgil (1893-1967) as the best example. In this regard, Baltacioglu's presenting the involvement of religion into areas such as law, economy, politics and similar areas in a nature that threatens liberty[23], is in parallel with the ideas of Basgil on this issue.
Tuncay Önder, in his ideas on religion and secularity, emphasizes that Basgil was on a "liberal conservative" line.[24] Basgil mentions that secularity, both in its theoretical meaning and in its practice in Western law, does not exist in Turkey. According to him, religion's being controlled by in Turkey is the greatest setback for religion and freedom of conscience.[25]
The above statement, given as the main theme of Basgil's thoughts on secularity, is also a summary of the stance of "moderate" conservative thought on the issue. This stance was not limited only to an intellectual level but also had political reflections. More correctly, Turkish conservatives have been successful to carry the issue on political arena in almost all periods. Indeed, the issue of secularity has become an ever dynamic pursuit of Turkish political life.
It is possible to date back Türkish conservatism to Ottoman Empire. Even if it existed before, it should
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be told that the first serious statements were made within the last century of the empire. Without doubt, Ottoman Empire's economic and political incapability had a great effect in this. Indeed, while looking for an answer to the question of "how can this country be saved", voices for the reinstatement of the past came forward. In other words, Islamic tones of conservatism had strong influence for those who showed disengagement from Islam as the reason for leaving behind the glorious days of the Empire. Beyond that, for those who saw "salvation" in change or being like the West, conservatism produced a thought on a different dimension. Actually, this second conservative stance came to be effective during the Republic and represented a political meaning in this sense.
Of course, it is not possible to say that conservative thought was at an effective point during the Single Party period in terms of both intellectual and political demands. It was after the Single Party period when Turkish conservatives could effectively express themselves. Suitable conditions for developing and spreading the conservative thought were created during the relatively free environment of post-1946.
Turkish Thought (Türk Düsüncesü) magazine was a publication in which the conservative thought could best express itself. Besides, Great East (Büyük Dogu) and Serdengecti magazines contributed to the development of conservative thought. In these activities, the main theme was merging conservatism with a nationalistic statement. Expressing itself also in the future years of Turkish conservatism, this theme was never given up. Such that, nationalism has never lost its importance in this synthesis, even in 1950's, when conservatism would come out strong. In 1960's it was more significant; even in the interpretations of conservatism based on religion; nationalist themes discovered in Islamic theory were used. The period was shaped by the desire of the Turkish right to act together against the threat of communism and without doubt, conservative thought found itself in these events.
1970's were years when in Turkey, ideological camping and thus, political fronts became clearer. There was a significant separation in the Right, as well as in the Left, and the associations formed against 1960's communism threat began to disconnect. Just in these times, conservative thought began to return to its purity of the 1950's. However, because the streets were the only means to be heard in the chaotic sociopolitical environment of the 1970's, conservative thought lost its effectiveness and was limited to the publications of Kubbealti Akademi magazine.
One of the most important feeding sources of conservative thought, which began with the Republic and made its presence felt until the end of the 1970's, is the ideology of nationalism. This is compliant with the general principles of conservative thought, and also coincides with the traditional priorities and values of Turkish nation. Thus, political demands of Turkish conservatism got attention in all periods.
Omer Caha points out liberal-conservative line as one of the main blocks of Turkish right. Caha lists Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi), Liberal Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi) and Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) as the political reflections of liberal-conservative right. He separates the central right of Turkey into two fronts, defines Menderes-Özal line as liberal-conservative and underlines its main characteristics as blending national values with consistent policy and liberal values.[26]
Caha's assessment allows making evaluations on Turkish political life in terms of sociopolitical power relations. Without needing a sociologic analysis or even though it is stating the obvious, it should be said that Turkish society is open to the idea of change with its historical practices. However, the concern that this change might destroy traditional and historical values can be seen in nationalist reflexes expressing themselves at any time. So, there are plenty of examples, showing that Turkish society does not object to gradual change or such objections hardly find political responses. In other words, in Turkey, political movements that can answer "moderate" conservative demands can have a high rate of success. There is no doubt that the most important factor behind the successes of Democrat Party, Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) and finally Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi/Ak Party/ AKP), is the said ability of "answer". Ak Party is the last representative of the moderate conservative, or as defined by Caha, the liberal conservative political base, which can be accepted as one of the decisive elements of politics in Turkey. A comparison of change and religion, the two elements being mentioned since the beginning of this study, would be enough to display the similarities between AKP policies and Turkish moderate conservative thought. Indeed, AKP's determination of joining EU, which is pro-Western, and its embodiment, should be assessed as a stance that does not want to disconnect from world's facts, caring about modern values and finally articulating on liberal world's economic order. Also in internal politics, dynamics of economical development are defined by liberal principles, and conservative statements are presented with social contents. Here, the decisive factor is that social conservatism is not presented with Islamic tones, but rather in a manner to include all historical and traditional values of Turkish
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society. In other words, Ak Party plans and carries out its policies for pluralism in a manner to include all of Turkish society. Its attitude on secularity seems to be a precondition of this pluralism. Indeed, secularity is considered as an assurance of all faiths in its context of institutionally separating the state and religion. This thought is identical with the words of Basgil, one of the most important representatives of liberal conservative thought: The way to remove the obstacles before religion and freedom of conscience is to practice secularity with its form in Western law. ■
NOTES
[1] Köker, Levent: Liberalizm-Muhafazakarlik Ilickisi Üzerine. Türkiye Günlügü, 1989. 9. 42. p.
[2] Özipek, Bekir Berat: Muhafazakarlik, Devrim ve Türkiye. Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düsünce (Muhafazakarlik). Istanbul Iletisim, 2003. 67. p.
[3] Özipek, Bekir Berat: Muhafazakarlik. Ankara Liberte, 2004. 90. p.
[4] Zürcher, Eric Jan: Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi ve Siyasal Muhafazakarlik. Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düsünce (Muhafazakarlik). Istanbul Iletisim, 2003
[5] Tunaya, Tarik Zafer: Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatinda Batililasma Hareketleri. Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2004. 138. p.
[6] Alpay, Yalin: Fuat Köprülü. Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düsünce (Muhafazakarlik). Istanbul: Iletisim 2003. 136. p.
[7] Tunc, Mustafa Sekip: Muhafazakarlik ve Liberallik. Türk Düsüncesi.1954. 92. p.
[8] Safa, Peyami: Eski-Yeni Kavgasi. Türk Düsüncesi. 1956. 48-51. p.
[9] Safa, Peyami: Irtica Nedir? Türk Düsüncesi. 1959. 2. p.
[10] Alpkaya, Faruk: Kazim Karabekir. Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düsünce (Muhafazakarlik) Istanbul Iletisim, 2003. 49. p.
[11] Safa, Peyami: Eski-Yeni Kavgasi. Türk Düsüncesi. 1956. 31. p.
[12] Baltacioglu, Ismayil Hakki: Aydinlar! Din Gercegini Ne Zaman Göreceksiniz? Türk Düsüncesi, 1955. 257. p.
[13] Turan, Osman: Türkiye'nin Manevi Durumuna Umumi Bir Bakis. Türk Yurdu 1959. 3.
[14] Topcu, Nurettin: Manevi Kalkinma. Türk Yurdu, 1960. 16. p.
[15] Kisakürek, Necip Fazil: Bati Muradina Erdi!. Büyük Dogu, 1971. 15. 3. p.
[16] Alpkaya, Faruk: Kazim Karabekir. Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düsünce (Muhafazaksrlik) Istanbul Ileticim, 2003. 49. p.
[17] Topcu, Nurettin: Manevi Kalkinma. Türk Yurdu, 1960. 21. p.
[18] Baltacioglu, Ismayil Hakki: Dinsiz Milliyet Olur mu. Türk Yurdu, 1959. 7. 11-21. p.
[19] Baltacioglu, Ismayil Hakki: Din Softalari, Bilim Softalari. Türk Düsüncesi, 1957. 1. 17. p.
[20] Turan, Osman: Türkiye'nin Manevi Durumuna Umumi Bir Bakis. Türk Yurdu, 1959. 3.
[21] Kisakürek, Necip Fazil: Dinsizlik Psikozu. Büyük Dogu 1967. 3. 17. p.
[22] Ayverdi, Ssmiha: Garb'in ve Sark'in Elinde Insan. Kubbealti Akademi Mecmuasi, 1977. 4. 5-7. p.
[23] Baltacioglu, Ismayil Hakki: Din Softalari, Bilim Softalari. Türk Düsüncesi, 1957. 1. 17. p.
[24] Önder, Tuncay: Ali FuadBasgil. Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düsünce (Muhafazakarlik). Istanbul Iletisim, 2003. 299. p.
[25] Basgil, Ali Fuad: Din ve Laiklik. Istanbul Yagmur, 1962. 176. p.
[26] Caha, Omer: Dört Akim Dört Siyaset. Istanbul Zaman Kitap, 2001. 126. p.
Lábjegyzetek:
[1] The Author is from Karadeniz Technical University Faculty of economics and administrative sciences Department of public administaration Trabzon/TURKEY.
Visszaugrás
